INFANTRY
1. Arms of the infantry: the rifle; the machine-gun; the
machine-gun rifle; the bayonet; the grenade; the trench
knife; the automatic pistol.
2. Instruction of troops. Duties of officers. “Shock-troops.”
3. The infantry of a division: the front; dispositions taken;
storming troops; occupying troops; offensive or defensive
engagements; preparation of attacks; prolonged engagements;
posts of command; signalling; battalions and companies;
subaltern staffs.
4. A word about cavalry.
=1. Arms of the infantry.= This war has completely transformed the
armament and consequently altered the fighting methods of the infantry.
RIFLE. In 1914 the French soldier was armed with the rifle of the 1886
pattern, not remodelled; _i. e._, a repeating gun with a hand-filled
magazine. It was an excellent weapon in use for a long time, but too
many of them had lost their accuracy through wear. Since 1914 these
rifles have been replaced by others of the same model fitted with
loading clips.
MACHINE-GUNS. At the beginning, the number of machine-guns was six per
infantry regiment. During a long time they were distributed at the rate
of two per battalion; then it was decided to form them into a battery
under the command of the Colonel.
This limit of six machine-guns per regiment placed France in a very
great inferiority to the Germans, who had reserves of machine-gun
companies in every division.
The first battles showed the important part played by the machine-guns,
and France prepared to turn out quantities of them. For a long time,
however, she remained in a state of inferiority in this respect, by
reason of the advances in equipment made by the Germans, and also
because, out of the three different models adopted and constructed,
two were not strong enough to stand trench warfare. These models gave
disappointing results, but the evil has now been remedied.
Each machine-gun company is now provided with sixteen guns--a number
which, we believe, has been adopted for the machine-gun company in
America. As France now possesses excellent models, the United States
troops, who already before the war had good guns, will doubtless
receive an efficient equipment. In this war, it is necessary that the
component parts of a machine-gun and its ammunition should be easy of
transport.
Notwithstanding their reduced effectives, the Germans are still able
to increase the number of their machine-guns, and they contemplate
raising their number from twenty-four to thirty-four per company. In
all likelihood the Allies will very soon have to strengthen their own
machine-gun batteries. A battery can seldom fire all its guns at the
same time because they get too hot after shooting about five hundred
rounds, and because they are likely, especially when operating over
muddy ground, to get jammed, and thus remain out of service until the
gunners can put them in working order.
For these reasons the ante-bellum regulations prescribed that
machine-guns should work in pairs, so that one would always be ready to
take up the fire, if the other should, for any reason, go out of action.
This regulation is still adhered to, but only so far as circumstances
permit. In cases of emergency, for instance, when an attack has to
be repulsed, the simultaneous use of all the guns becomes necessary,
especially against an enemy who possesses a superior number of similar
guns.
Each belligerent has captured many machine-guns and much ammunition
from the enemy. Thus France has complete German batteries, and Germany
possesses both French and English batteries.
The principal structural difference between the German and French
machine-guns consists in the mechanism for cooling off the guns; the
Germans use for this purpose water circulation, and the French air
circulation.
To avoid serious burns resulting from contact with the barrels of the
guns, the gunners wear gloves covered with very thick steel mail.
We have seen photographs of American machine-gun batteries carried on
motorcycles. The French no longer make use of this method, and although
it may have proven excellent in Mexico, it is entirely impracticable on
the French Front.
The ground for a long distance behind the lines of defence has been so
torn up and rendered impassable by prolonged bombardment that motor
vehicles cannot get through. Horse-drawn vehicles can approach much
nearer but at the entrance of the communication trenches even pack
transport has to be abandoned, and from this point (in default of such
recent devices as narrow-gauge hand-operated tracks, or pack-donkeys)
all war material has to go forward to the advance lines on men’s backs.
In case of an advance beyond the front, difficulties would be doubled,
since the devastated ground behind the enemy’s lines would have to be
traversed.
Pack transport therefore is best suited for machine-gun batteries and
their supplies. Where the number of horses or mules is insufficient,
light vehicles, each drawn by a single animal, can be used; especially
for the machine-gun sections which are to occupy more or less permanent
positions.
In order to counterbalance her losses, Germany has constantly increased
the number of her machine-guns, using them as a defensive weapon to
check the advance of the enemy, and to enable herself to cling to her
positions with a small number of men.
Germany does not hesitate to sacrifice machine-guns in order to gain
time, and German machine-gunners were often found in their shelters
chained to their guns, and so obliged to serve them until killed or
released by the enemy.
Machine-guns and grenades are certainly the most powerful arms against
assaulting waves. Seldom will the reconnoitring airplanes detect all
the numerous machine-gun shelters. Some of them always remain after a
bombardment to show activity at the time of the infantry attack.
The British have very efficiently used their tanks for the destruction
of these remaining machine-gun posts. The French have commenced to
use them advantageously. The Americans, entering the war after they
have been perfected, and profiting by their Allies’ experience, will
be able, on their arrival at the front, to use well designed and
constructed tanks in support of their infantry. Tanks will become more
and more indispensable weapons, and their general use will save the
infantry heavy losses of life. The Germans now have some.
MACHINE-GUN RIFLE. A new weapon was added to the armament of the
infantry in 1916. It is the machine-gun rifle, which is not to be
confounded with the automatic rifle (repeating rifle).
Much lighter than the machine-gun, carried and served by one man only,
it is easily moved about, and, when well used, is a most dangerous
weapon.
To shoot, the man lies down (behind a shelter if possible) and lifts
the butt-end to his shoulder, the fore-part of the gun resting on
a very short fork. Machine-gun rifles are used principally against
machine-guns.
There are several types of machine-gun rifles. The best is without
doubt that provided with a plate, containing twenty-five cartridges,
which turns on a vertical axis back of the gun and fires the
twenty-five cartridges. Each shot causes the plate to make 1/25 part of
a revolution and drop a new cartridge in the barrel. When the plate is
empty it is immediately removed and replaced by another that has been
previously loaded.
Experience shows that machine-gun rifles give good results only when
in the hands of cool and clear-sighted men, well acquainted with their
manipulation, but that they are not as good as the ordinary rifles in
the hands of African troops.
THE BAYONET. All the infantry use the bayonet, a weapon which has
maintained its full importance in the present war. French and
Russian soldiers handle the bayonet most dangerously. The Germans
are not so proficient in its use.
[Illustration: Urtebize
January 29, 1917--12.30 P.M.]
The men must be given a very detailed and thorough instruction in
bayonet practice, but as the American troops are in possession of a
very complete manual on this subject we will not dwell upon it.
GRENADES. A new weapon (or rather an old one that has been revived)
that plays a very important part in the actions of the infantry is
the grenade. Many types exist but they can be classified either as
offensive or defensive grenades. The former kind is not so destructive
as the latter. They are lighter, can be thrown to a greater distance,
and are used to prevent the enemy from coming out of their dugouts
and trenches when the assailants reach them. The defensive grenades,
which are extremely destructive, are used against attacking or
counter-attacking troops. Some are thrown by hand, others with the
rifle. Well trained soldiers can throw grenades as far as fifty and
fifty-five metres.
Rifle grenades are thrown by the propulsive power of the ordinary
cartridge. A special contrivance at the muzzle of the gun cocks the
grenade, so to speak, as it is driven from the barrel by the bullet,
so that it will explode on hitting the ground. It reaches farther than
the hand grenade.
Recently General Pershing rightly laid stress on the necessity of
perfecting the marksmanship of the recruits. To this accomplishment and
skill in the use of the bayonet, which gives the soldier self-reliance,
suppleness, and agility (qualities that the Germans do not easily
acquire) ought to be added a thorough training in the throwing of
grenades, a sport which promptly captivates those who practise it.
Excellent results are secured by offering prizes for grenade practice,
both for distance and marksmanship. The French soldier is contented
with little, and the mere offer of a few cigars or packages of
cigarettes to the best throwers has achieved wonderful performances in
this line.
We believe that the Germans have no reason to congratulate themselves
on having been the first to reintroduce the use of grenades in warfare,
because it is a weapon requiring intelligence and skill in its
handling. Thrown by shrewd quick Frenchmen, or by sportsmen like the
British, it is much more dangerous than in the hands of thick-headed,
passive German soldiers. We are sure that the American troops will use
the grenade with the same skill as their Allies.
TRENCH KNIVES. The trench-fight is a fight to a finish, and has
necessitated the adoption of a strong knife. In the hands of fierce
resolute men it is a terrible weapon, much resorted to in the confined
space of trenches, tunnels, and dugouts where bayonets cannot be used.
The African troops are very fond of these knives, and as the Germans
are well aware of this fact, they never surrender to African troops,
and the fights between these combatants always smack of savagery.
On account of their fear of knives and daggers the Germans have
pronounced their use inhuman, and have shot many prisoners on whom
daggers were found. It is advisable, then, for troops obliged to
surrender (and the bravest troops may have to do so) to throw their
daggers away in good time.
AUTOMATIC PISTOLS. Officers and non-commissioned officers only have
automatics, but we would like to see them issued to the infantry, as
they _are most useful in hand-to-hand fights_.
The use of the various arms above named has necessitated the division
of the company into grenadiers, machine-gunners, and light infantry.
The last-named fight especially with the ordinary rifles, bayonets, and
daggers.
When circumstances permit, it would be advisable to teach all the
men of a company the use of all the arms, one after the other, so as
to be able to re-establish after and even during a battle the exact
proportion of specialists. There has been too great a tendency to
neglect rifle practice. Soldiers ought to lose no occasion to perfect
themselves in the use of the rifle, which remains the principal arm of
the infantry. Its importance will be even greater in open warfare.
=2. Instruction.= To be a good infantry soldier a man ought to be very
vigorous, sufficiently young, not more than thirty-five, well fed and
well trained.
The individual instruction should be as thorough as possible, and
perfected before the man is sent to the front.
The theoretical instruction of troops must be completed before they can
be given the defence of a sector, and it is only in the lines and in
the face of the enemy that they can acquire the practical experience.
The more thorough their knowledge of theoretical details the sooner the
company and battalion will become good fighting units.
[Illustration: La Bovelle
December 20, 1916--3. P.M.]
The spirit of initiative should be specially encouraged in every
soldier, as in the present war every man has an individual part to
play, according to his duties, his rank, and his weapons. During the
actual fighting the soldier can rely but little on the leadership of
his superiors, who are merely expected to set the example, and who are
frequently the first shot.
DUTIES OF THE OFFICERS. Before ordering their men to advance and while
still in the trenches, the officers, assisted by their non-commissioned
officers, should, whenever time and circumstances allow, strive to
explain fully to every man what are the objectives to be attained and
what means are to be employed. No details should be neglected.
The Major’s duties will be to designate very clearly the fronts
assigned to each of his companies, the objectives they are to reach,
and the itineraries they are to follow. An assault is usually made in
several waves, so the order of departure, the distance to be maintained
between the successive waves, the place to station the reserves, and,
if need be, the instructions relative to the juncture and reforming
of the elements of the various companies, form so many points that
must be settled beforehand in their minutest details. The Major will
have to decide beforehand how the battalion as well as the several
companies will hold the objectives after capturing them, how they
will organize these objectives in the shortest time possible, and
how they will resist the counter-attacks. The officers in command of
battalions and companies must not forget that, once the action has
commenced, and often even before it is begun, all communications become
difficult and frequently impossible, and that consequently all possible
eventualities, within the orders received, must have been thoroughly
studied in advance. So it is indispensable to give every man minute
instructions.
This extract from a letter found on a French captain who was killed on
the Meuse will give to young and inexperienced officers a good idea of
the thoughts that must absorb the mind of an efficient commander.
“I am alone,” he wrote, “in this underground shelter, still permeated
with the foul atmosphere of the Germans, where the evidences of a
disorderly flight, biscuits, bloody rags, stained letters, a biography
of Hindenburg, etc., lie scattered in every direction. I am alone after
having relieved the company that made the attack. I am alone without
counsel if I hesitate, without help if I weaken, in this captured
trench which is half destroyed. My two hundred men are blindly piling
in, ignorant of their surroundings, of what to do. The sight of them
restores my waning energy. I have to think for them, and put everything
in order before daybreak. I consult my watch: it is midnight.”
Here is a Chief, a real leader! He goes out; until dawn he inspects
his sector, he sets his men at work. To each he assigns a task; he
stimulates them, prevents them from falling asleep, and does not spare
himself. He can count on all his subordinates to do their best, and at
the break of day, if the bombardment is resumed, if the counter-attack
is launched, the trench will be ready; the losses will be lessened;
resistance will have been made possible. It is by such methods, by
the constant co-operation of the officer and his men, that the army
performs marvellous feats. It is this constant co-operation, this
comprehension of duty by the humblest leader, that enabled us to hold
out at Verdun.
The most difficult missions should be entrusted to those known to be
the best qualified to fulfil them.
Once the signal of attack is given, the officers and non-commissioned
officers will scarcely have any other means of ensuring obedience to
their orders than by setting an example to their men.
We take this occasion to render a profound homage to inferior ranking
officers of the French armies. They indeed are and shall remain the
heroes of this war. They have fallen on the field of honour since
August, 1914, not by thousands but by tens of thousands. Never, under
the most critical circumstances, has their morale weakened for a single
moment. At all times, men equally as brave as their predecessors have
been found to fill the places of those who had so heroically (I was
going to say so cheerfully) gone down to death. By the sacrifice of
their lives to their country, they have not only set an example to the
officers of their Allies, but have also given the latter time to form
and train themselves, and I can truthfully say, to equal them. The
bravery displayed by the infantry officers of the English, Italian, and
Russian armies is on a par with that of the French officers, and within
a short time, the American officers, I am sure, will show themselves
worthy of the same verdict.
[Illustration: South of La Bovelle Farm
January 29, 1917--12.30 P.M.]
Our officers have always and from the very first day of the war
invariably marched ahead of their men, leading them straight to the
enemy. They have advanced through the most intense curtain-fire; they
have exposed themselves to the fire of innumerable machine-guns; they
have been the targets of rifles and grenades. Thousands have been
killed; not one has hesitated, not one has turned back. The Allied
officers have exhibited the same daring, the same bravery.
But what about the German officers? Is it possible not to contrast
their attitude with that of our own? The German officers endeavour
to keep under shelter as long as possible their precious persons, so
greatly superior, in their own estimation, to those of their men, and
when they do muster the courage to come out into the open, they are
content to follow behind their troops, with revolvers in their hands to
exact obedience.
We wish to reproduce here two or three citations taken at random among
a thousand similar ones published in the _Journal Officiel de la
République Française_, the official organ of the French Government, to
give a vivid illustration of the way that officers ought to understand
their duties:
On September 1, 1914, _Major Parisot de la Boisse_ said to his
chasseurs: “I give you my word of honour, as long as one of us remains
alive, the enemy shall not pass.” In spite of heavy losses, though
nearly surrounded, he extricated his troops and maintained the fight.
The Pass de Mandray he defended remains French!
_Captain Robert Dubarle._ “A living example of impassibility under
fire, contempt of danger, energy, and initiative.”
_Captain Mazarde_--11th Chasseurs. “A splendid officer already cited
at the order of the Division, of the Army Corps, and of the Army. From
June 29th to July 14, 1915, he exhibited the bravery of a hero. While
leading his Chasseurs to the air of _Sidi Brahim_ in an attack upon a
wood, he was stopped by wire entanglements at 50 metres from its edge.
He maintained the line of attack for 36 hours, face to face with the
enemy, repulsed a counter-attack, and riddled the line of the enemy
with bullets and grenades. He withdrew only when ordered to do so,
taking all his wounded and the bodies of the officers killed. He was
shot, and died from his wounds.”
[Illustration: West of Ailles
April 24, 1917--10.00 A.M.]
_Captain Pierre Mercier_--67th Battalion of Chasseurs. “Entrusted with
the mission of defending the passage of a bridge, he maintained his
company under an intense fire. Outflanked on both right and left, he
did not hesitate to charge an enemy very superior in numbers, and fell
mortally wounded, saying to his men, “We have done our duty.”
Space does not allow us to give more numerous citations, but we think
that it would benefit the American army to get the minutes of the
war, to select therefrom the most brilliant citations of the French
and English armies, to have them translated and widely distributed
among the American troops. Nothing would be more instructive for the
officers, nothing could better rouse their fire, nothing would inspire
them with a greater desire to emulate their comrades in the Allied
armies. The example of heroism is contagious for young men.
SHOCK-TROOPS (STOSSTRUPPEN). The continual failure of the German
attacks or counter-attacks for more than a year led them to the
creation of what they call _Stosstruppen_. The new recruits of the
German army were lacking greatly in quality--the German soldier at best
is wanting in initiative. The High Command therefore resorted to a
selection of the best elements to be found in some of their divisions,
with which to form battalions or companies for assault.
The promise of receiving better and more abundant food than that given
to the other troops (so important is the question of food to the German
soldier, who has been on somewhat short rations since 1916) has been
sufficient to bring forward volunteers for these companies.
These special troops are exempted from work in the trenches, and are
brought up to the lines only when needed. On such occasions they are
scattered all over the attacking front for the purpose of encouraging
by their example the elements which are not so well organized.
The Germans, who, after the Russian revolution, were enabled to
withdraw the best elements from their divisions on their Eastern Front,
made, in June and July, 1917, a frequent use of their _Stosstruppen_ in
counter-attacks in Artois, and in desperate and daily attacks on the
Chemin des Dames, but the result was far from expectation.
The _Stosstruppen_, obliged, like the ordinary troops, to attack in too
serried ranks, offer a splendid target to artillery and machine-guns
and, nine times out of ten, their rush is stopped before they can
engage in a hand-to-hand fight.
[Illustration: La Bovelle
May 5, 1917--10.30 A.M.]
We wonder what the German divisions on the Russian Front will be able
to accomplish without their best and strongest elements when the
Russian Army rallies and re-enters the war in earnest.
=3. Mission and use of the infantry in a division.= We have stated
that a division includes three or four regiments. We will now dwell on
the disposition of a division comprising two brigades of two regiments
each. It seems certain that this is the type that will be adopted by
the American Army, which possesses a sufficient number of men for this
normal constitution of a division.
_Front of a division._ The front of a division in trench warfare is
very variable in extent. The occupation of strong intrenchments,
enabling the reserves to be sheltered from the enemy’s fire, allows
of the extension of the front, especially if the army remains on the
defensive.
As soon as a division takes the offensive, however, its front is
reduced to such proportions as will permit of energetic effort. The
front of a division in the open field has been fixed at 1800 to 2000
metres. The operations in 1914 showed that the fronts were always
longer than this and often twice as long and such will perhaps
continue to be the case in future if the war in the open is resumed;
but, so long as the war remains one of intrenchments, it will be
very dangerous not to limit the fronts, especially at the time of
an offensive. This is an acknowledged truth, and there is a growing
tendency, especially in the British Army, to shorten the front of
attack of a division.
DISPOSITIONS. The most logical mode of disposing the troops in a
division on the battlefield will always consist in the junction of the
two brigades side by side, and, in the brigades, the junction of the
regiments side by side.
The division, the brigade, the regiment, and even the battalion, have
each to constitute reserves either to ensure success or to guard
against possible failures in their offensive. In this warfare of
position, even more perhaps than in one of movement, the necessity of
always having troops near at hand, ready to repel counter-attacks, is
imperative, owing to the fact that every repulse is followed by the
enemy’s occupation of a part of the line of defence which would have to
be retaken later with great losses should the enemy be given time to
organize themselves therein.
[Illustration: North of La Bovelle
April 24, 1917--10 A.M.]
The disposition of the units in depth enables the Command, when the
lines are cleverly constructed and their intercommunications well
assured, to keep only a few men in the severely bombarded spots, and
to shelter the largest part of the troops where they cannot be injured.
The study of the last large operations, especially on the British
Front, shows that the experience and training gained by the British
troops in the field, and the cohesion of their artillery and infantry,
have compelled the Germans to abandon their method of distributing
their forces in 1916 and to adopt a quite different system of fighting.
In the battle of the Ypres-Menin road the Germans launched three
divisions on a very narrow front, with three battalions, one from each
division, on the first line.
Immediately behind each leading battalion a second was placed
to support it. The other two battalions of each regiment of
four battalion-formation, and the third battalion of the three
battalion-regiments, were held in reserve in depth to try and check the
English advance and to execute detailed counter-attacks.
Behind these divisions of attack, special troops, carefully selected,
composed a general reserve, waiting in very solid shelters where
they were protected from heavy-artillery bombardment. These reserves
were used when the first line divisions failed to check the enemy’s
advance, or when there was a chance of retaking lost ground by violent
counter-attacks.
The natural consequence of this new distribution of the German troops
is that to counteract it successfully very narrow fronts have to be
adopted. Forces strong enough to repel the enemy, and permit no time
for the supporting battalions to engage effectively, have to be placed
on the first line. The first lines are to be backed up by reserves
strong enough to oppose the enemy reserves without any loss of time.
A general reserve is to be kept in readiness in sufficient force to
hold the conquered positions against all counter-attacks which may be
launched by the general reserves of the Germans.
The last operations of October show that these dispositions are now in
force in all the armies.
DEFENSIVE. We have just explained the dispositions the Germans had to
adopt on the defensive, and we think that all parties will perforce be
led to adopt a somewhat similar distribution.
[Illustration: La Bovelle
May 5, 1917--10.30 A.M.]
The power of resistance of the trench-lines of the Allies being far
inferior to that of the German lines, the Allies must, to guard against
the danger of attack, take advantage of the superiority of their
artillery. They must dispose their forces in depth, in such a way as to
ensure the repulse of the enemy by a succession of assaults that will
stagger him and prevent him from re-forming.
It is impossible to give hard and fast rules for the distribution
of forces between the different lines of the divisions, regiments,
battalions, and companies. The distribution depends entirely on the
nature of the operations, and is left for each unit to carry out
in conformity with the orders received. When sufficiently detailed
instruction has been given to a unit in the course of its training,
these distributions are an easy matter to decide upon, provided the
officers of all ranks perform conscientiously the duties we have
indicated elsewhere.
ASSAULTING AND OCCUPATION TROOPS. Experience has suggested to the
Allies to divide their fighting troops into army corps for assault and
army corps for occupation.
Once the objectives are attained and strongly held, the assaulting
troops are replaced by the occupation troops that arrive fresh on the
ground. Their task, though one of defence, is often hard. They have to
remain a long time in the first lines, exposed, by reason of the new
German methods, to frequent and severe bombardments, and obliged to
repel numerous counter-attacks.
The generals commanding-in-chief are the exclusive judges of the part
the different army corps will have to play, but, in our opinion, there
is one principle which must never be ignored in war. In the army, as
well as in the battalion and in the company, it is the duty of the
Chief to select for action, irrespective of any rotation of service,
that element of the troops under his command which he deems the one
most likely to achieve the desired result.
What we have said concerning the use of the artillery, the armament
of the infantry, the distribution of the infantry in the division and
the trenches of attack, will enable us to give an exact idea of the
physiognomy of an offensive action and of its preparation.
OFFENSIVE ENGAGEMENTS. THEIR PREPARATION. The preparation of attacks in
a war of position is a long one. On account of the work it necessitates
it is very difficult to conceal these preparations on the front from
the opposing aviation, and also, alas! from the curiosity of the rear.
An attack can be determined upon only by order of the
General-in-Chief, who decides where and on what front it shall be made.
He gives his instructions to the General in command of an army group,
who, according to circumstances, employs one or several of his armies
for the operation. Each General commanding an army prepares an order
of operation for each of his army corps, and so on, until the precise
instructions reach the elements of the first line.
The preparation then commences. It consists in establishing on the
terrain under the protection of the batteries:
1st. The new lines of the infantry, and, if necessary, the
communications between these lines;
2d. The location of the artillery of all calibres;
3d. The organization of the posts of command;
4th. The bringing up of the munitions and material of all kinds;
5th. The construction, at the rear of the front of attack, of railroads
and ordinary roads in sufficient number, rather in excess of the
estimated needs than otherwise;
6th. The organization of the reserves of infantry.
7th. The preparation for the evacuation of the wounded, and the
installation of large field hospitals, as close as possible to the
lines;
8th. The organization of stations of evacuation;
9th. The organization of the parks;
10th. The organization of the centres of supply, etc.
This enumeration, from which we have omitted the aviation, by reason of
its special installations on appropriate grounds, gives a sufficient
idea of the labour required in preparing an offensive, which takes
generally several weeks to accomplish.
A few days before the attack, an effort is made to secure the mastery
of the air. Destruction fire is then directed against the opposing
trenches. The comparison of the different photographic plates handed
daily to the General Staffs enables the Command to watch the progress
of the destruction of the lines and positions of the enemy. When the
destruction is deemed thorough enough, the order is given to attack,
at given points, at a given hour of a certain day. The last operation
of the artillery, called “the rolling surprise fire,” consists in
subjecting numerous portions of the front to a series of terrific
and rapid bombardments, which leaves the enemy in doubt as to the
points against which the attacks of infantry are to be launched.
At the time appointed these attacks commence. The field artillery
covers its infantry by barrages as intense as possible. The first
assaulting waves, followed by those of the supporting troops, rush to
the objectives selected, drive off the enemy by all means at their
disposal, occupy and organize them. If necessary, the reserves come in,
either to help the assaulting troops, or to repulse the counter-attacks
of the enemy, if any occur.
[Illustration: Trench “Battemburg”
May 4, 1917--Noon]
It was decided some time ago that the troops must not, yielding to
their ardour, or the excitement of a too easily acquired success,
go beyond the objectives that have been assigned to them. A close
examination of the defensive dispositions of the Germans which we have
described reveals the wisdom of this precaution. It does not follow
that additional objectives cannot be taken on the same day, but in this
case the additional advance will be made by a fresh attack and the
effort will be distributed accordingly.
Documents found on Germans in Champagne, in August, furnish the
following details of an attack they had prepared north of the Souain
Hill. A similar attack had been rendered impossible by the action of
the French at Verdun, and by the destruction of the gas reservoirs by
the French artillery.
Three fresh divisions and fifteen companies of _stosstruppen_
(shock-troops, or special troops of assault) were to lead the attack
with light machine-guns, _minenwerfer_, signalmen, miners, sappers,
gasmen, grenadiers, stretcher-bearers, and artillery patrols. Twelve
“booty-squads” and twelve “destruction-squads” each composed of
an officer and thirty-two men were to follow the _stosstruppen_.
Arrangements had been made with a view to removing the captured guns.
They had prepared for a formidable discharge of a new gas by a
six-company regiment of sappers.
The gas attack was to be launched for a quarter of an hour. A
very strong artillery preparation was to follow, after which the
_stosstruppen_ were to rush forward.
The aviation was to play an important rôle, and the attack was to be
made with the aid of all the means of liaison known: dispatch-runners,
telephonists, optical signals, carrier-pigeons, luminous rockets, and
wireless telegraphy.
[Illustration: West of Ailles
May 4, 1917--Noon]
Orders had been given to bring back as many French gas-victims as
possible, with a view to studying the effects of the new product.
On the 20th of November, 1917, the third English army, by a successful
surprise attack, penetrated into the German lines to a great depth and
on a large front.
This operation, prepared in the greatest secrecy, was carried out
without the usual assistance of the artillery or barrages. The infantry
attacked under the protection of numerous tanks which destroyed the
wire entanglements and the most important obstacles.
We do not think that this method will henceforth become a rule.
Before launching this attack, the British Commander must have been
informed by his aviation, or by some other means, that the German Front
was lacking in artillery and infantry and he must very cleverly have
taken advantage of this momentary situation.
Must we conclude that the rules of preparation of attack, as stated
above, will not be applied hereafter? It is very doubtful, in view of
the fact that the Germans have prepared in France too many lines of
defence, one behind the other.
This English victory, however, shows that the High Command, whenever
in possession of information warranting the hope of success, will have
to combine regularly prepared attacks with surprise attacks on points
where the German effectives happen to be reduced.
The success of this operation on the Cambrai Front proves that, however
strong a position may be, however numerous its wire defences, it will
always be possible to take it when not protected by a sufficient force
of artillery and infantry.
DEFENSIVE ENGAGEMENTS. When the troops have to withstand an attack
on their lines, they must bear in mind the very sound principle of
war that a passive resistance can only end in defeat. On the first
lines all the elements necessary for as long a resistance as possible
will have to be accumulated. The infantry will then have occasion
to make a telling use of rifles, grenades, rifle machine-guns, and
machine-guns in as great a number as possible. The supporting troops
and the reserves must be ready to counter-attack the enemy without loss
of time, and throw him out of any trenches he may occupy temporarily.
We have often seen German attacks on advanced trenches repulsed in
the very moment of success by a simple bayonet charge made by the
troops of the first lines. To the field artillery, however, belongs
the most important rôle in repulsing the attacks of the enemy, and
the “communiqués” of all the Allies show that eight out of every ten
attacks are repulsed by barrage fire. When the aviators can report in
time exactly where the enemy troops are being massed for attack, the
trench artillery can work great havoc in the ranks of those usually
compact formations.
[Illustration: View taken about 10 A.M. during the attack of May 5,
1917]
PROLONGED ENGAGEMENTS. What we have just said refers to attacks made
from regularly organized lines which have not been entirely destroyed
by shell-fire.
On a ground where fighting has been proceeding continuously, the
trenches are entirely destroyed, and the men and machine-guns
belonging to the first-line troops remain with no other shelter than
shell-craters, which are, as far as possible, connected together during
the night by shallow trenches, provided this work is not prevented by
continuous shell-fire. The communication trenches with the rear do not
exist any more; and connections can only be maintained with the utmost
difficulty; by what means, we will later explain.
In order to resume the attack under such conditions, it will be
necessary to choose the exact moment when the enemy is supposed to be
demoralized by the artillery, and to rush the troops forward. In nearly
every case, the assistance of fresh troops or of troops that have
suffered little will be needed.
These field operations are difficult and require from both the chiefs
and the soldiers a resolute will to conquer, and a thorough knowledge
of war conditions.
During the last battles on the Somme, on the Aisne, and at Verdun,
advanced infantry fractions had to hold out for several days in
shell-craters, not connected with one another, and often filled with
water. The heavy enemy shell-fire rendered every move impossible and
stopped the arrival of all supplies. The adverse lines were often
merged into one another and from hole to hole grenade fighting was
kept up. It was nevertheless under such trying conditions that our
troops fought inch by inch to defend the French lines at Verdun, and
their heroic resistance enabled the Command to prepare new positions,
to redistribute the troops and to move them forward, after they had
finally thwarted the great German effort.
[Illustration: View taken about 10 A.M. during the attack of May 5,
1917]
POSTS OF COMMAND. In a division all the commanders of units from
the General of Division to the Major direct the fight from quarters
called Command Posts. These quarters, rendered as much as possible
proof to field artillery fire, must overlook the battlefield. They are
fitted with all the rapid means of communication, both telegraph and
telephone. The wires, although numerous and deeply buried seldom resist
the bombardment until the time of attack. As a last resource recourse
is had to signals, optical devices, carrier-pigeons, and messengers.
Apparatus for ground-telegraphy, which seems destined to come into
general use, has lately been employed, but we have not seen it in
operation.
As communications between the advanced lines and the rear have become
so very difficult during the preparation bombardment and the barrages,
which are often uninterruptedly kept up for several days, the western
armies have again had recourse to the carrier-pigeons, which are
furnished in large numbers by private societies, existing before the
war. Their co-operation is very useful and helps to save many human
lives. They are also sent out by airplanes whenever the use of wireless
telegraphy is not deemed expedient. They render great service in
keeping the front in communication with the rear, and are also of
priceless value for connecting the rear with the front.
SIGNALLING. The difficulty of communication between the rear and the
front during the bombardments will necessitate the increasing use
of infantry aircraft for the direction of operations. The aircraft,
connected by wireless with the various divisional headquarters, are
able to send information and in turn, to receive and transmit orders by
signal to the troops on the front.
These aircraft will also maintain a connection between the infantry and
the field artillery, which must be close and continuous if demoralizing
consequences, such as have only too frequently occurred in all camps,
are to be averted.
After the Anglo-German battles in Artois, the German prisoners,
respectively of the infantry and the artillery, had to be separated,
so great was the feeling between them. The infantrymen claimed they
had not had sufficient protection, and wanted to “take it out” of the
gunners.
So as to avoid confusion during infantry attacks, the guiding aircraft
ordinarily send up but one sort of rocket-signal, indicating to the
artillery either a lengthening or a shortening of the range by one
hundred metres.
[Illustration: View taken about 10 A.M. during the attack of May 5,
1917]
BATTALIONS OF THREE COMPANIES. At the same time that the effectives
of certain divisions were reduced, the battalions were returned to a
three-company formation.
A company of infantry is in principle composed of two hundred and
fifty men, a quota which is however purely theoretical, as this number
becomes rapidly reduced by various causes, such as illness, loss in
battle, etc.
FRAMEWORK OF THE ARMY. The ranks of the officers and non-commissioned
officers of the French Army have been renewed several times since the
beginning of the war. Many captains in 1917 were mere privates in
1914 and most of them are very young. They are, generally, excellent
officers, and it is to be regretted that those who have proved their
worth are not even more rapidly promoted.
The spirit of routine that prevails in an army officered by soldiers of
regular professional training is often responsible for the promotion to
high command of men too old for the effective direction of a long and
exhausting war like the present one.
There is no reason to think that the American people, any more than
the British and the French, will meet with serious difficulties
in recruiting and quickly training a strong staff of officers of
all ranks. They will also, like the Allies, find no insuperable
difficulties in filling the gaps which the enemy’s fire will make among
them.
=4. A word about cavalry.= If in this treatise we have not devoted a
chapter to the use of cavalry it is because, since September, 1914,
cavalry has had but few opportunities to operate as such.
The cavalry has been generally used in the present trench warfare in
the same manner as the infantry. It has been reduced in number; that of
the army corps has been suppressed, and only two squadrons have been
allotted to each division.
Some regiments of cuirassiers have been dismounted, for want of proper
horses.
But we think that, notwithstanding the small part the cavalry has taken
in the war during the last thirty months, its opportunity is bound to
come.
Some cavalry corps, comprising several divisions, have been retained,
and during the offensives they are held in readiness to move to the
front in case the enemy lines should be broken.
Cavalry squadrons rendered good services to the British and French
during the pursuit in March, 1917.
The Germans will perhaps not always be able to protect their retreats
by the desert-like devastation of thirty or forty kilometres of
country. Their weak point will be found some day or other, and on that
day the cavalry will resume its importance.
The difficulty in feeding and obtaining horses seems to have compelled
the Germans to reduce their cavalry forces considerably.