COMPOSITION AND USE OF THE ARTILLERY
1. Retrospective view. General considerations.
2. Different sorts of artillery: Artillery of an Army; Artillery
of an Army Corps; Artillery of a Division; Trench artillery
“Tanks,” or artillery of assault.
3. Mission and use of the artillery during a battle.
4. Anti-aircraft artillery.
5. Advance or withdrawal of the batteries.
6. Conclusion.
=1. Retrospective view.= _General considerations._ In the French
army long before the war, several clear-headed and well-informed men
had foreseen the necessity of having a large, heavy field artillery,
similar to that of Germany.
To recall General Pétain’s motto: “The artillery conquers the
positions, the infantry occupies them”--this simple axiomatic statement
obviously compels the inference that an army shall possess an artillery
able to bombard efficiently every species of fortification.
Unfortunately few people in the Government or parliamentary spheres
could be brought to consider the possibility of a war; so this question
of a heavy artillery, although continually agitated in those circles,
remained unsolved.
In 1914, the immense majority of the French nation, including not only
the politicians but also a great many army officers, scoffed at the
possibility of a war with Germany. The Moroccan imbroglio, the war in
the Balkans, and the Austrian policy of conquest were not sufficient
warning for them. That France’s military preparation was entirely
inadequate, and that this was due solely to the lethargy of the
national mind, is generally admitted to-day. During the first year of
the war, not only were we hopelessly outclassed in heavy artillery, but
at Lille, Maubeuge, and La Fère the Germans captured a goodly number
of our heavy guns with their munitions, and turned them against us.
Fortunately we are able to assert that they used them with very little
advantage to themselves.
Only a few heavy-artillery regiments existed before the war. Their
armament included few quick-firing 155 mm. Rimailho guns, which, though
rapid in action, were too short in range. Other batteries were armed
with 120 and 155 mm. siege guns; good types, but too small in calibre,
and too slow in action. Moreover all these guns were placed at the
disposal of armies which, at the beginning of the conflict, considered
them as a reserve stock and kept them too far from the battle-fields of
August and September, 1914.
The impossibility of following up the victory of the Marne gradually
opened the eyes of the Government to the need of a very large, heavy
artillery, but this necessity was frankly admitted only in the autumn
of 1915, and then largely under the influence of the example given by
our British Allies. They had much more quickly comprehended that no
victory would be possible unless supremacy in artillery was achieved,
and, with their usual cold determination, had turned all the resources
at their disposal to the manufacture of every kind of gun, and
mountains of ammunition.
France followed the example.
The progress made enabled us first to hold our own against the German
artillery, then to equal it, and finally to surpass it.
Considering the limited means left to France by the invasion,
considering the seizure by the enemy of her Lorraine iron deposits,
and of her richest coal mines, it must be acknowledged that the effort
made from 1915 to 1917 was gigantic.
=2. Different sorts of artillery.= We shall divide the artillery into
three parts: the artillery of an army, of an army corps, and of a
division.
ARTILLERY OF AN ARMY. This includes heavy artillery of all sizes. The
army unit alone possesses guns of greater calibre than 155 mm. The
composition of the heavy artillery in an army varies considerably,
the number of different types of cannon allotted to any one arm
depending upon circumstances and on the work which it is expected to
do. According to local needs, therefore, the Generalissimo orders the
heavy artillery to be transferred from one army group to another.
Similarly, the Chief of a group of armies can, as he sees fit, order
such transfers of guns within his command.
We find in the armies howitzers and mortars of the following sizes:
220, 270, 280, 305, 370, 400 mm. (in inches: 8, 10, 11, 12, 14½, and
15¾). Soon we shall have 520 mm. guns (20½ inches). There are also
field guns of 120 and 155 mm. short and 155 mm. long (5 and 6 inches)
and naval guns of 19, 100, 240, 274, 305, and 340 mm.
The artillery of an army is under the command of a General.
The field batteries of 120–155 mm. are composed of four pieces;
howitzer batteries and naval batteries of 100 and 190 mm. are nearly
always of two pieces. The largest mortars, and the heaviest naval guns
mounted on railroad trucks, operate singly, and each gun is accompanied
by several trucks carrying its material and munitions.
ARTILLERY OF AN ARMY CORPS. The artillery of an army corps is under
the command of a Colonel. It includes two groups of 75 mm. field guns,
two groups of 105 (4 inch), or of 120 (5 inch), and one group of 155
(6 inch), quick-firing. This artillery is reinforced, in case of need,
by the heavy artillery which the army can dispose of. The Colonel
commanding the artillery assumes the command of all batteries, of
whatever size, momentarily put at the disposal of his army corps. He
is most specially intrusted with the selection of the ground on which
to place the batteries, and it is he who has to specify the part each
of them shall take in the action. The divisional batteries of the army
corps are also under his command, at least during the preparation for
the attacks. It is absolutely indispensable that each battery should
be assigned its objective, and should be positively forbidden to
scatter its projectiles promiscuously. Thus costly waste is avoided,
and a definite purpose accomplished.
While getting ready for their first great attack in the Somme sector,
the British, during an artillery preparation of several days’ duration
that exceeded in intensity any previously known, fired a vast number of
projectiles. At the time of the assault, the British infantry displayed
an indomitable courage, and captured several important positions, but,
for the want of a proper concentration of the fire of their artillery
on the points to be destroyed, their heavy losses in men were too big
a price to pay for the gains they made. The British artillery has
since modified its methods, and, assisted by an unexcelled service of
aviation, it has, over all its Front, impressed the Germans with the
power and accuracy of its guns.
ARTILLERY OF A DIVISION. At present, divisional artillery includes
three groups of 75 mm. (each group composed of three batteries of four
guns), one group of three batteries of four quick-firing 155 mm., and
one battery of trench-guns, the number and size of which are variable.
This artillery is under the command of a Colonel.
Further on we shall speak of the difficulty experienced in advancing
the heavy guns through the country devastated by the Germans in March,
1917. The 75 mm. field artillery, only, was able to advance quickly
enough. Guns of 105 mm. should have been able to follow the troops
everywhere and give them help until the arrival of the heavier pieces.
In position, and at the time of active operations, the artillery of a
division is reinforced by the artillery of the army corps and that of
the army.
The longest range of field guns is 8500 metres.
The range of the howitzers varies between 10,000 and 14,000 metres.
Heavy guns have a much greater range. The 380 we shall soon be turning
out will send a shell containing 150 kilograms of explosive to a
distance of 38 kilometres.
TRENCH ARTILLERY. This artillery includes special mortars, firing
at a high angle projectiles containing powerful explosives; their
longest range is not over two miles. They are principally used for the
destruction of wire entanglements, first-line trenches, and dugouts.
Their size varies from 58 to 340 mm.
The projectiles are provided with blades which maintain their
direction through the air, as the guns firing them are not rifled.
They are really aërial torpedoes, and are tremendously destructive to
trenches and defences of every sort.
The armies have a big reserve of trench guns distributed along the
Front according to circumstances. These batteries are generally placed
in the first-line support trenches.
Small-sized mortars operated by compressed air are now also used. Their
range is limited, but for short distances they are very reliable and
powerful weapons.
By reason of the great difficulties they experienced in getting heavy
artillery up into the mountains the Italians have adopted trench
mortars which fire very large projectiles to a considerable distance,
and they have succeeded in constructing some examples which will throw
heavy torpedoes three and four kilometres.
“TANKS” (ARTILLERY OF ASSAULT). Tanks were first used by the British,
to whom they have rendered very valuable service. They have not only
been of great assistance to their infantry, but have also produced a
very depressing effect on the enemy’s morale.
Their somewhat too great weight caused many to stick in the muddy and
unfavourable ground over which they had to operate. We believe that
the original model has not been abandoned, but that lighter ones have
lately been built.
The French made use of tanks for the first time in their attack on the
Aisne on the 15th of April, 1917. Their machines were not absolutely
perfect then, and, owing perhaps to faulty tactics, their success was
not equal to expectation, but, in the attack of May 5th, they were
better handled and proved valuable in the action. The French tanks have
since been improved, and now thoroughly fulfil their purpose.
It is important to note that the Germans, who for a long time did
not favour the adoption of tanks, probably because the management of
these monsters require of their crews qualities not always found among
the Boches, have recently constructed some. Of course they are of
“Kolossal” proportions. We do not know as yet exactly what results they
have obtained.
Quite recent reports reveal that in the attack of the 28th of October,
north-east of Soissons, the French used tanks far lighter than those
first employed. Last spring’s experience has caused them to be handled
in a much more efficient manner, and the first reports show that these
machines, by destroying numerous machine-gun shelters that had escaped
the fire of the artillery, have greatly facilitated the forward march
of the troops.
It seems to us that the proper tactics for tanks should not be to
advance ahead of the infantry waves and thus, without benefiting them,
hinder the barrage fire of their own artillery, but should consist
in following slightly behind the first waves in order to complete
the destruction of the numerous nests of German machine-guns which
the artillery has not always succeeded in silencing, to overthrow
obstacles, and flatten the incompletely destroyed wire.
In brief, the mission of the tanks should be to support the infantry
and clear the way for its forward progress.
=3. Mission and use of the artillery in the fight.= The mission of the
field artillery in the preparation for an offensive consists in tearing
up the first-line trenches, the passages of communication, and the wire
entanglements, and in locating and silencing the machine-guns through
the loopholes of their shelters.
Unless the field artillery is directed with most particular care, it
is liable to expose its infantry to heavy losses, which are not only
regrettable in themselves but affect considerably the morale of the
troops.
For the very reason that the 75 mm. gun is a weapon of great precision,
its accuracy is disturbed by very slight causes, such as atmospheric
perturbations, and the quality and condition of the different powders.
The officers commanding the batteries, immediately upon their arrival
in new regions, prepare firing-tables based on the local conditions of
the atmosphere and temperature, to guide the firing at the different
hours of the day. They correct also the errors resulting from the
different propulsive qualities of the various powders. As a rule all
the projectiles belonging to the same lot give similar results.
Directly it is in position, the field artillery calculates the distance
that separates it from the various points on which it may have to fire.
It complies with all the requests of the infantry, when informed of
dangerous moves of the enemy; executing rapid barrages on the signalled
objectives. By barrages, at about one hundred metres ahead of the
advance, it protects the assaulting waves of infantry. It increases the
range in proportion as the advance moves on. The groups of 105 mm. may
be advantageously used in order to reinforce the action of the 75 mm.
field artillery.
Since it has been possible to increase the proportion of 155 mm.
quick-firing guns, batteries of this calibre have often been brought
in to reinforce the barrages kept up by the 75 mm. guns. In the recent
operations on the Anglo-French front this combination has often been
used on a large scale, and with disastrous effect whenever fire was
opened in time on troops assembled for the purpose of counter-attack.
Heavy artillery has a twofold part to play. It is an artillery for
destruction and an artillery for counterfiring; it executes also
neutralizing fire. It is guided by the information furnished by
scouting airplanes and captive balloons.
_Destructive fire_ is executed against important dugouts, blockhouses,
shelters for machine-guns, and everything on the enemy’s front that can
check the advance of the infantry.
_Counterfiring_, guided by the same agencies, is executed in order to
put enemy batteries out of action. It is certain, indeed, that the
one of the two adversaries that succeeds in silencing the opposing
artillery can more easily collect his forces, and, at the time of
launching an attack or resisting a counter-attack, the task of the
infantry will be made easier of accomplishment.
At the time of the preparation of the attacks, the fire of the various
artilleries continues for seven and even eight days with unabating or
even (if necessary) increasing intensity.
_Neutralization fire_ is made with asphyxiating shells. When the
enemy’s batteries have been well pounded by destructive fire, the
quickest way to put them completely out of action is to exhaust the
gunners by neutralization fire and thus prevent them from serving the
guns. Even with gas-proof masks the men very soon become exhausted on
account of the difficulty they have in breathing through them. With
this end in view, a bombardment with asphyxiating shells is kept up for
several hours.
For instance, at the time of the attack, near Craonne, on the 5th of
May, 1917, one of our French army corps was faced by about one hundred
and eighty German batteries of all sizes. Our destructive fire had
terribly damaged those batteries; but the Germans, being undisturbed on
their Eastern Front, could bring up fresh batteries at every moment,
and were still able to oppose our advance towards the tableland of
Craonne.
On the whole length of our Front our artillery fired with asphyxiating
shells, and a few hours afterwards, with the exception of four or five,
all the German batteries had ceased firing.
The importance of the use of asphyxiating shells may be very great.
Recently in Champagne an asphyxiating shell of large size penetrated
through a hole made by previous heavy shell-fire into a concreted
German tunnel and exploded. This tunnel, which sheltered an important
garrison, comprising two companies and many machine-guns, had already
suffered heavily. Its exits were obstructed, but it was still holding
out.
All but one man were suffocated, surprised by the gas before they had
time to put on their masks. A French surgeon, peering through the
hole made by the shell and seeing no sign of life, crept into the
corpse-filled gallery, and, after a brief reconnoissance, signalled to
the nearest French troops that they could occupy it.
It is not unusual to see, during the big attacks, the various
artilleries established in eight and even more rows, occupying all the
available vantage ground.
The occupation of Hill 304 in August, 1917, is a striking example of
the results of a thorough co-ordination of the different elements for
the preparation of the attack and the capture of the position.
Commencing with the systematic destruction of the enemy’s defences by
several days’ continuous bombardment, accompanied by a most careful
location of his batteries, with the help of all possible means of
investigation (such as wireless telegraphy, photography, location
of the guns by light and sound, interception of code signals,
interrogation of prisoners, etc.), the guns of our counter-batteries,
having duly apportioned these various objectives, succeeded on the
morning of the 24th in neutralizing the fire of the German artillery,
and exhausting the defenders of Hill 304.
At the time of the attack our battle-planes, by driving the enemy’s
aircraft far beyond their lines, allowed our scout-planes to direct
accurately the fire of our 75 mm. guns, and permitted the aircraft
accompanying the assaulting waves of infantry to fly close to the
ground and attack the enemy in their very trenches.
To such a co-ordination of all our efforts is due the seizure, with a
minimum loss to our troops, of most important positions.
The Germans have a way of attempting to regain lost ground by
counter-attacks in mass-formation, which has cost them terrible losses.
Field artillery has a capital part to play in the repulse of these
attacks, which are usually broken up by the rapidity and power of
the barrages. The guns of 75 mm. are assisted by the groups of 105
and by the destruction groups of 155, and also by counter-battery
or neutralization fire from the heavy artillery, according to the
necessities of the moment.
=4. Anti-aircraft artillery.= Airplanes are the most reliable and
effective weapons against airplanes and Zeppelins, but it is impossible
to command at all times a sufficient number of machines to prevent the
enemy’s incursions.
Behind the lines have been placed special sections of anti-aircraft
guns of different sizes (75, 47, and 37 mm.) mounted on special
carriages that allow vertical fire. Without entering into details, we
may say that the fire of these guns has been rendered so accurate that,
though every airplane thus attacked may not be destroyed, projectiles
shower so close around them that they are forced to fly away at all
speed. A certain number of aircraft are brought down by these guns
every month.
One of these sections hit and brought down a Zeppelin near Verdun in
February, 1916; another shot down, near Compiègne, in the spring of
1917, a large Zeppelin on its way back from England. Quite recently
five Zeppelins returning from a raid on London were brought down
in France by airplanes and anti-aircraft cannon. We mention these
well-known events as indicating the unquestionable superiority of
the airplane over the dirigible, which, we repeat, has been of real
military service only at sea. They also demonstrate that by increasing
the number of anti-aircraft sections both behind the front and in
proximity to the whole enemy line, the raids on open towns can be
rendered impossible.
The Germans have recently invented a new gun, probably a mortar, which
projects with great accuracy and to a high altitude a big cluster of
whirling balls of fire, each having a potential diameter of five or six
feet of fire. The whole cluster has an apparent radius about as great
as the spread of an airplane from tip to tip. These new projectiles,
known as “flaming onions,” have been used principally on the British
Front, and do not appear to have done much actual damage, but should a
great number of them be discharged at large, slow-moving planes, they
might become dangerous.
ARMOURED MOTOR-CARS. On some armoured motor-cars small cannon are
used; on others, machine-guns are placed. They are intended to throw
the enemy lines into confusion at certain points. Their action must be
swift, sudden, and brief. Their mobility enables them to dodge the fire
of the enemy’s artillery. These cars can be much more useful in open
field operations than in trench warfare. They will be especially useful
as a help to cavalry when the latter can once more be used.
Every regiment of infantry is now provided with a section of three
37 mm. guns which being light, easy to move, and very accurate are
employed principally, either all together or in the proportion of
one to each battalion, against machine-guns. They have been greatly
appreciated by the regiment commanders; a large number will probably be
distributed as soon as they can be manufactured.
=5. Advance or withdrawal of the artillery.= One of the most
interesting questions for an army in the making, such as the American
Army, is that of the rapid moving of the heavy artillery, at a given
moment.
We do not hesitate to say that this problem is far from being entirely
solved on the Western Front, and that its study and organization will
be a very hard task for the engineers entrusted with its solution.
American engineers will have to go to the Western Front and see for
themselves all the difficulties to be surmounted.
ADVANCE. During the spring of 1917, the French Army had to pursue on
a large front an enemy who had not only devastated the country behind
them to a depth of from 30 to 35 kilometres, but had also accumulated
in this wilderness all the obstacles their fertile imagination could
suggest.
The 75 mm. field artillery alone, at the cost of great efforts and
tremendous loss of horses, managed to overtake, though somewhat late,
the advance of our infantry, which had succeeded in going forward
everywhere.
The sections for the supply of munitions followed their batteries,
but more slowly; and some batteries, which at the cost of great and
continuous efforts, had come into position, had no munitions.
The only way to guard against such delays, in the future, will be to
keep in reserve complementary teams of horses, to replace those that
are killed, or to help the batteries and their ammunition sections
through the worst passages.
We have not the right to give here in detail the difficulties
encountered in the advance of the heavy artillery. We were informed of
them by a confidential note from the High Command.
However, while this confidential note sets forth in detail all the
difficulties encountered, it makes no recommendation whatever as to
what should be done on such occasions in the future.
There is absolutely no doubt that wherever the Germans retreat, they
will endeavour to accumulate obstacles behind them as they did on the
Somme and the Aisne. The question of the advance of the different
artilleries must therefore be very carefully considered. Means must be
found to ensure it, while keeping within the immediate reach of each
battery the requisite munition supply.
America, however great her participation in the war, will never be
able to mobilize more than a small part of her immense population.
Unlike France, she will not be forced to suspend the activities of
ordinary industrial and commercial life. Assisted by technicians,
she will succeed in training all the special troops required and in
supplying them fully with material. She will even be able to lend
some of them to France, who, having mobilized all her fencible men
for service at the front or rear, experiences great difficulty in
recruiting the technical troops she needs.
The problem of the rapid advance of the artillery is to be solved
by increasing the road-making facilities. Whatever the difficulties
encountered and the obstacles created by the enemy, we must be able
to make, with the least possible loss of time, large and solid roads
in sufficient number, and to repair or build entirely new lines of
railroads of all gauges.
WITHDRAWAL. We must always foresee the possibility of a defeat, prepare
everything to lessen it, and leave as few guns as possible in the hands
of the enemy. This problem is easier to solve than that of an advance
towards the enemy, and in order to be able to withdraw the various
artilleries rapidly, it will be sufficient, when preparing the attack,
to have foreseen the number of roads and tracks necessary to remove the
batteries from the front.
These roads and railway lines have to be constantly kept in order by
special gangs, and the holes made by shells must be immediately filled
up.
In fact we shall see that the perfect repair of all these ways of
communication is intimately connected with the supply of munitions.
=6. Conclusion.= From the mere general outlines we have just given
concerning the use and mission of the artillery, we may draw the
following conclusion:
Till the end of the war it will be necessary to constantly increase
the manufacture of guns of all sizes, especially those of the largest
calibres, and to accumulate a reserve of ammunition far beyond the
actual needs. The adversary that will have succeeded in silencing the
opposing artillery will be sure of victory, and will obtain it without
the enormous losses in human life that all combatants have sustained
since the beginning of the war.
These losses, it may be remarked in passing, have been considerably
reduced of late by the employment of more scientific methods of
fighting.
The transference of heavy artillery from one army to another, according
to local needs, has many disadvantages. Such a practice prevents the
High Command from deceiving the adversary as to the real point of
attack. If the artillery preparation could be maintained with equal
intensity for equal periods of time on the Fronts of several armies,
the enemy could not possibly foresee which of the armies would strike
the principal blow, and would be much embarrassed as to the disposition
of their reserves.
It will never be possible on a 600 kilometre front to accumulate
a sufficient number of guns literally to accomplish this, but by
constantly turning out new guns, by increasing the number of batteries
and of large artillery concentrations on many points distant from one
other, the enemy will be kept guessing.