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[Illustration: Général de Division
René Radiguet
Former Commander of the 21st Division (Marne), French Army]
THE MAKING OF
A MODERN ARMY
AND
ITS OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD
A STUDY BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THREE
YEARS ON THE FRENCH FRONT
(1914–1917)
BY
RENÉ RADIGUET
GÉNÉRAL DE DIVISION, ARMY OF FRANCE
TRANSLATED BY
HENRY P. DU BELLET
FORMERLY AMERICAN CONSUL AT RHEIMS
G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1918
COPYRIGHT, 1918
BY
RENÉ RADIGUET
The Knickerbocker Press, New York
A L’HONORABLE NEWTON D. BAKER,
Ministre de la Guerre,
Washington, D. C.
EXCELLENCE:
Vous avez bien voulu m’autoriser à vous dédier cette étude.
Veuillez y voir l’hommage d’un vieux soldat de France pour le talent et
l’énergie que vous avez deployés depuis cinq mois pour hâter l’envoi
sur le front français des troupes Américaines.
Veuillez agréer, Excellence, l’expression de mon plus profond respect.
GÉNÉRAL RADIGUET.
NEW YORK,
_November, 1917_
FOREWORD
Divers missions sent to the United States by the Allied armies are now
giving the benefit of their practical experience to the American army.
These missions are imparting to the officers of every arm the knowledge
of the details it is necessary for them to acquire.
The purpose of this book is to show to the American officers, and also
to the civilians who take an interest in war matters, how a large army
on the European Front in the last quarter of the year 1917 is made up.
In the course of general considerations we have explained what is meant
by the words “strategy and tactics”; we have described those interior
lines which have been of such powerful assistance to Germany; we have
dwelt on the composition of the large units of an army, and more
especially on that of a division as a fighting unit.
We have next examined the question of the command, and we have
attempted to define its duties as well as those of the staffs.
We have then devoted special chapters to the study of Aviation, the
Field Fortifications, the Artillery, the Supply of Munitions, and the
Infantry.
It is not at random that we have placed the various topics in this
sequence. It will facilitate the comprehension of the last chapter, in
which we describe, with examples, how an attack is to be prepared and
by what means its success can be assured.
We have deemed proper to close with a few remarks on the discreditable
means of warfare employed by the Germans: they have played too great a
part in important operations not to be mentioned.
Our readers will understand the reason why in certain instances we have
merely alluded to possible impending improvements of some parts of the
armament, without going into details which could not be given without
danger.
The few examples we cite have been selected with due consideration. We
have either personally played a part in them or they have been supplied
to us by officers whom we trust implicitly.
The perusal of this book will enable those who have sons in the
European armies to follow them more intelligently through the
operations in which they will soon take part, for we are in a position
to state that the United States Government has, for the formation of
the American army, adopted the figures which experience has taught
France to decide upon. Consequently what we say of the French and even
of the British forces will apply to the American armies.
CONTENTS
PAGE
Synopsis of the Principal Military Operations of the Allies
on the Western Front 1
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN OCTOBER, 1917 6
WAR PRINCIPLES (For 1917) 10
Strategy and Tactics Are Unchanged 10
Violation of the Laws of Warfare--influence of Science 16
FIGHTING UNITS 17
A Glance at the Normal Composition of a Division 18
The Command 22
The Staffs 24
Aviation--its Military Beginnings, Its Increasing Importance 29
Use and Scope of Aviation 32
Different Kinds of Aircraft--battle-planes 34
Bombing-planes 36
Observation Or Scout-planes 40
Use of Scout-planes to Direct Artillery Fire 43
Use of Scout-planes to Direct the Movements of Infantry 44
Hydroplanes 48
Balloons--zeppelins 48
Trench Organization--general Remarks 51
General Plan of an Entrenchment System 58
Communication Lines 66
Mines and Counter-mines 69
Special Railway Troops 70
Transportation by Road 73
Camouflage 75
ARTILLERY, RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 77
Artillery of an Army 80
Artillery of an Army Corps 81
Artillery of a Division 82
Trench Artillery 83
Tanks 84
Mission and Use of the Artillery in the Fight 86
Anti-aircraft Artillery 92
Armoured Motor-cars 94
Advance Or Withdrawal of the Artillery 95
MUNITION SUPPLY 100
Sketch of the Railroad Organization 100
Organization of the Munition Parks 101
Divisional Parks 103
Replacing the Guns 107
Different Issues of Ammunition 109
INFANTRY 112
Arms of the Infantry 112
Machine-guns 113
Machine-gun Rifle 117
Bayonet 118
Grenades 119
Trench Knives 121
Automatic Pistols 121
Instruction 122
Duties of the Officers 123
Shock-troops (Stosstruppen) 129
Mission and Use of the Infantry in a Division 131
Assaulting and Occupation Troops 135
Offensive Engagements--their Preparation 136
Defensive Engagements 142
Prolonged Engagements 143
Signalling 146
Battalions of Three Companies 147
Framework of the Army 147
Cavalry 148
FORBIDDEN WEAPONS 150
Asphyxiating Gases 150
Tear-producing Gases--gaz-vésicant 152
Liquid Fire (Flammenwerfer) 153
Conclusion 156
Index 161
ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE
GÉNÉRAL DE DIVISION--RENÉ RADIGUET _Frontispiece_
Former Commander of the 21st Division (Marne), French Army
BATTLEFIELD OF THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE OF THE 22D OCTOBER, 1917 15
AILLES AND ITS WESTERN APPROACH--FEBRUARY 10, 1917--2.30 P.M. 54
SOUTH-EAST OF AILLES--FEBRUARY 10, 1917--2.30 P.M. 58
SOUTH-EAST OF LA BOVELLE FARM--FEBRUARY 10, 1917--2.30 P.M. 62
DIAGRAM OF CAMPAIGN INTRENCHMENTS 66
URTEBIZE--JANUARY 29, 1917--12.30 P.M. 118
LA BOVELLE--DECEMBER 20, 1916--3 P.M. 122
SOUTH OF LA BOVELLE FARM--JANUARY 29, 1917--12.30 P.M. 126
WEST OF AILLES--APRIL 24, 1917--10.00 A.M. 128
LA BOVELLE--MAY 5, 1917--10.30 A.M. 130
NORTH OF LA BOVELLE--APRIL 24, 1917--10 A.M. 132
LA BOVELLE--MAY 5, 1917--10.30 A.M. 134
TRENCH “BATTEMBURG”--MAY 4, 1917--NOON 138
WEST OF AILLES--MAY 4, 1917--NOON 140
VIEW TAKEN ABOUT 10 A.M. DURING THE ATTACK OF MAY 5, 1917 142
VIEW TAKEN ABOUT 10 A.M. DURING THE ATTACK OF MAY 5, 1917 144
VIEW TAKEN ABOUT 10 A.M. DURING THE ATTACK OF MAY 5, 1917 146
The Making of a Modern Army
SYNOPSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES ON THE
WESTERN FRONT
It has often been said that after the battle of the Marne the Germans
were virtually beaten. The feats of the German armies since that day on
such numerous and varied fields, the strength that they have so often
been proven to possess, prevent us from concurring in that opinion.
We believe that their defeat will be due to the accumulation of the
mistakes they have made.
In September, 1914, their superiority in numbers and in armament was
considerable. Their armies were holding in France positions that
enabled them, after a rapid reorganization, to assume a new and
vigorous offensive against the French Army, their sole adversary at
that time in the West.
The inconceivable pride of the German military party had encouraged it
to despise the enemy, and to blindly undertake that formidable rush
through Belgium for the capture of Paris. This dream vanished under the
blows struck by General Joffre and his marvellously responsive armies.
Her hatred for England in the first place, and in the second, her
thirst for conquest, were about to lead Germany to commit serious
blunders, and to lose the prize by grasping at its shadow.
To prevent the mobilization of the British armies, the Kaiser, after
entrenching his forces on the French Front, sent all the troops he
could dispose of against Calais. He felt so sure of success that he
followed the operations in person, ready to enter as a conqueror into
the city he expected to capture. He had acted in the same way two
months before at Nancy; and having failed in that effort, he was eager
for revenge.
The French, British, and Belgian armies took care to transform his
cherished revenge into a pitiful defeat.
It was then that the German Command committed the mistake which will
cause Germany to lose the war.
Leaving the Western Front, giving to the French and British armies time
to reorganize, arm, and gather strength, the Germans, having lost all
hope of achieving the dreamed-of victories in the West, hurled their
legions upon Russia, which they knew was insufficiently prepared, and
began that campaign which was to result in their capture of Poland and
the Baltic provinces, and the recovery of Galicia.
The consequences of the adoption of this new plan were to be seen at
once.
At the beginning of the summer of 1915, in Artois, the French and
British commenced to strike blows which proved that the strongest
system of field fortifications can be taken.
In September, 1915, General Pétain, in Champagne, inflicted a terrible
defeat upon the Germans. This operation, carried out simultaneously
with one in Artois, cost them thirty thousand prisoners, one hundred
and fifty guns, heavy casualties, and--which is even of greater
importance--obliged them to abandon highly valued and strongly
fortified positions.
In the beginning of 1916, having fulfilled their program in Russia,
the German General Staff resolved to finish with the Western Front, and
attacked Verdun with such enormous forces of artillery and infantry as
had never before been known.
Everywhere in Germany the announcement was made that the assault and
capture of Verdun would bring the war to an end.
Every one knows how vastly they were deceived. The French, taken by
surprise and shaken at first, rallied rapidly. During five months they
contested the ground inch by inch with a tenacity and heroism that
stamps the defence of Verdun as the most sublime military feat recorded
by History. The Germans did not take the fortress-city, but sacrificed
in their attempt the very flower of their armies.
Verdun had not exhausted all the strength of the French armies. On
the first day of June, 1916, on the Somme, General Foch attacked the
Germans so furiously that they had to suspend entirely their offensive
against Verdun.
On July 1st, the British Army, which had been developing to its final
form and efficiency, took its place on the left of the positions
of General Foch, and from that time on the Germans were forced to
transfer most of their effectives to the Somme and the Aisne in order
to oppose the Franco-British advance.
The fight begun in these regions in the summer of 1916 has continued
until now with scarcely any interruption. Slowly but surely the
Franco-British have driven the Germans from all the positions they
considered impregnable. They will continue by this method to push them
back into Germany.
The French armies on the left and on the centre undertook in the spring
of 1917 some very large operations on the Aisne and in Champagne,
which have given them possession of dominating positions, such as
the “Chemin des Dames” on the Aisne, and the hills of “Cormillet,”
“Teton,” “Monhaut,” and “Mont-sans-nom” in Champagne, which will be of
great value for future offensives. The capture of those hills, which
the Germans had proclaimed _impregnable_, followed naturally upon
the successes gained in 1915 by the Army of General Pétain, and were
completed by numerous smaller operations too long to enumerate here.
On the Aisne the advance of the French has not been delayed by the
famous Hindenburg retreat. From the very beginning the Germans have
accustomed us to the most astounding bluffs, intended more to blind
their compatriots than to frighten their adversaries, but the famous
letter in which the Kaiser complimented Hindenburg on his “masterly
retreat” (_retraite géniale_) is certainly the most stupendous bluff on
record.
Let us, Allies, pray God that the old Prussian Marshal may often be
afflicted with such masterly ideas! These should certainly take us to
Berlin.
For the purpose of recapturing the Chemin des Dames, the Germans have
recommenced on the Aisne a series of those reiterated attacks in
mass-formation which had cost them so dear at Verdun in 1916, and which
are now no less costly and unsuccessful.
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN OCTOBER, 1917
Two great facts dominate the situation to-day.
1st. The great success won at Verdun in August, 1917, by the French,
who in two days retook the positions that had cost the Germans five
months of ceaseless assault and enormous losses in men and material.
It is indeed a most remarkable success, considering that the German
General Staff, in the defence of the ground so hardly won, employed
every means known to military science.
The last battle of Verdun evidences the superiority that the French
artillery has gained over the German artillery.
2d. The recent victories of the British Army and those of the French
Army under General Anthoine in Flanders. Both French and British
have made continuous progress despite most unfavorable weather
conditions--fog, rain, and deep mud. The lines of communication of the
Germans with the Belgian coast are threatened, and the occupation of
the Belgian coast by the Allies will put an end to the hopes Germany
has based upon her submarine warfare.
The significant feature of these latest French and British victories
is the fact that the German armies now find it impossible to react
in time--or, in other words, to check an assault by launching prompt
counter-attacks.
The difficulty that the two Crown Princes experience in finding
immediately and on the moment troops sufficient for energetic attack,
proves:
1st. That notwithstanding the withdrawal of various contingents from
the Russian Front, they are short of reserves;
2d. That the quality and the morale of their troops have declined,
which is also evidenced by the large number and inferior fighting-value
of the prisoners taken.
These are signs which foreshadow not only the final victory, which is
not doubtful, but even a more rapid termination of the war than could
have been anticipated six months ago.
While the approaching entry of the American armies into the fighting
lines will be, from the start, of great importance for the military
situation, the participation of the United States in the war has
already produced in Germany a moral effect that the German authorities
are vainly trying to conceal. The number of the adversaries of the
military power increases every day, and even Prussian brutality is
powerless to prevent the diffusion of the idea that the leaders of
the Empire have terribly blundered in turning the whole world against
Germany.
Germany suffers much, and her sufferings can but increase, owing to the
insufficiency of the harvest in Europe.
Let us remember the prediction of a man who knows Germany well, the
former Representative from Alsace in the Reichstag, Father Weterlé.
“After her defeat,” he said in 1915, “Germany will astonish the world
by her cowardice.”
May his prediction prove true!
* * * * *
We will now consider the general principles of the French military
organization, which are based upon experience dearly bought during the
past three years of war.
The American armies will be constituted upon a similar plan.
CHAPTER I
WAR PRINCIPLES
(For 1917)
1. The rules of strategy and tactics have not been modified. The
mode of fighting alone is different.
2. Violation of the laws of warfare. Influence of science.
3. Fighting units. The Army. The Army Corps. The Division. The
Command. The Staff.
=1. Strategy and tactics are unchanged.= _Strategy_ is the art of
manœuvring large armies over a great extent of country.
_Tactics_ is the art of handling the troops on the battlefield.
One might be inclined to believe that, in the present war and since the
victory of the Marne, the general rules of strategy and tactics have
been modified. Not at all. The ways of fighting and the armament only
have undergone a transformation.
The opposing lines have buried themselves in mazes of entrenchment.
On both sides old methods of warfare and weapons forsaken or
forgotten for centuries have again been gradually resorted to. The
“Minenwerfers,” the trench guns, are nothing but the old-fashioned
mortar much improved upon. The jet of liquid fire driven by compressed
air, finds its prototypes in the Greek fire of Constantinople and the
hand-thrown combustibles--boiling oil and burning pitch--of the Middle
Ages.
STRATEGY. The rules of strategy remain immutable. They still consist
in attacking the enemy on one of his wings; in attempting to outflank
him on one side; in trying to cut his line in two by a blow in
the centre; in organizing a system of transportation so that the
necessary forces may be quickly assembled at the points which are to
be attacked or protected; in taking advantage of a superiority due to
the possession of well-organized interior lines. Such are the ancient
basic principles, that, in various combinations, have been applied by
contending armies since the dawn of military science.
_Examples._ When the Germans attacked on the Yser front, their purpose
was twofold: 1st. To outflank the left wing of the Franco-Anglo-Belgian
Army; 2d. To force their way towards Calais and Dunkirk so as to
prevent England from using those harbours for the concentration of her
armies in France.
After her failure on the Yser front, Germany made use of her
superiority in interior lines, composed of the railway lines existing
before the war, supplemented by new ones built as they were needed
for military operations. Owing to her central geographical position,
Germany is able at all times to dispatch forces from the heart of her
Empire to the various fronts; from Russia to the French Front, and
_vice versa_. To these interior lines is due the facility with which
she has quickly concentrated large masses of troops at any desired
point, notably on the Roumanian front at the end of 1916.
When she had firmly consolidated her Western Front she rapidly
collected all her available forces on the Eastern Front in an effort to
crush the Russians.
When, in February, 1916, the Germans launched the gigantic attack
against Verdun, it was with a twofold strategic purpose: 1st. To pierce
the French line between right wing and centre and resume the march on
Paris. 2d. In case of a partial success, to strengthen themselves by
the occupation of Verdun, with a view to preventing the French armies
from reaching the right bank of the Meuse, while at the same time
guarding their own left wing and their communications with Metz, should
circumstances ever force them to withdraw behind the Meuse.
During the autumn of 1915 the French attempted to avail themselves of
the comparative weakness of the Germans due to their campaign against
Russia. A favourable issue would have taken them to Vouziers-Rethel,
and very possibly have caused all the German lines to be withdrawn from
around Rheims and Soissons.
We might vary these examples. Quite recently, the British troops have
resumed the attack planned in 1915 by the French in Artois. They will
gradually free the North of France and Flanders.
TACTICS. Let us now consider tactical operations as they are conducted
on the battlefield. The formidable field entrenchments constructed by
the Germans have compelled both combatants to transform their artillery
and to change the armament of their infantry.
The manner in which the different arms are employed on the battlefield
has changed but little.
The field artillery has been enormously developed and it has been
necessary to constantly increase the power of the cannons and
howitzers. We shall later on discuss this subject more fully.
The definition of tactics as given by General Pétain, the French
Generalissimo, in the course of his lectures at the “École de Guerre”
has not been modified by the creation of these improved weapons. He
said: “The Artillery conquers the positions, the Infantry occupies
them.”
We will take for example a quite recent military feat which strikingly
establishes the distinction between the strategical and the tactical
operations.
On the 22d day of last October (1917), the French Army in the North,
east of Soissons, scored one of the most important successes of the
year. This operation, carried out on a nine-mile front, was essentially
tactical. It had for object the capture of very important positions
forming a salient in the French lines, which furnished the Germans with
facilities for an offensive return to Soissons. The capture by the
French of _Vaudesson-Allemant_ and the _Malmaison fort_ eliminated the
salient, opened the road to Laon, and exposed the German lines on the
Ailette to an enfilading fire.
This tactical operation was evidently a part of a vast strategical
plan matured by the French and British Commanders-in-Chief. The general
purpose of these operations aims at forcing the Germans to abandon the
North of Belgium and to retreat in France. All the tactical operations
being carried on in Flanders, on the Aisne, in Champagne and Lorraine,
are parts of this single plan and have the same object in view.
[Illustration: BATTLE FIELD OF THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE OF THE 22d OCTOBER,
1917.]
The rapid campaign just conducted by Marshal von Mackensen against the
Italians in the Julian Alps, like that he led in 1916 in the Dobrutcha
and Roumania, are evidences that the old principles of war, and
especially those practised by Napoleon, are still fully adhered to by
the German armies.
=2. Violation of the laws of warfare. Influence of science.= We must
acknowledge that, although the Germans had hoped in 1914 for a quick
victory gained by a few overwhelming blows, they had also, during their
forty-four years military preparation, provided for the possibility
of a check, and had equipped themselves with a mighty artillery which
enabled them to hold the Western Front while fighting against Russia.
France had to make great efforts to complete her armament in 1915.
Germany had already accomplished this in a great measure before the war
commenced.
It was reserved for German science, if not to render war more bloody
(the weapons used in 1914 sufficiently fulfilled this purpose), to
violate all the laws of warfare enacted by all the Governments, even by
the German Government itself.
German science has given birth to gigantic cannon which no law forbids
(we shall speak of these further on), but German science will bear,
in the judgment of History, the responsibility of having added to
the horrors of war an unprecedented ferocity and savagery by the
introduction of asphyxiating gases, tear-producing gases, and burning
liquids.
But we may add that Germany in her turn already suffers greatly herself
from her inventions; the Allies having been compelled to adopt and use
similar and often much improved weapons.
=3. Fighting units.= The fighting units are composed of a variable
number of tactical units. The tactical unit is the Division, the
composition of which will hereafter be described. It includes infantry,
cavalry, artillery, and engineers. It ought to possess also, and we
hope it will soon, a special service of aviation.
A group of two or three and sometimes four Divisions constitutes an
Army Corps. The union of three, four, or five Army Corps forms an
Army. In this war, two or three armies placed under one Command form
an Army Group. Four or five of these Army Groups exist on the French
Front. The general organization of the British differs but little from
that of the French armies. Whatever difference there may be exists
rather in the organization of the rear than in that of the front. The
British occupying a much shorter front, dispose of a proportionately
larger number of men. Though the bulk of their forces have been but a
short time in France, they have received from their women workers very
intelligent and valuable assistance, and, having at their disposal
larger appropriations of money, have been able to do much more than
France towards perfecting the organization at the rear.
The Army Corps and the Division must be organized so as to be entirely
and under all circumstances self-sufficient. They may, however, rely
upon any reserve forces that the surrounding armies may place at their
disposal, according to the work assigned to them.
A GLANCE AT THE NORMAL COMPOSITION OF A DIVISION
The real fighting unit is the Division. We purposely do not call it
a Division of infantry. The Division forms a whole by itself. It is
composed of all the different arms in the proportions that have been
deemed necessary to the efficiency of the whole body.
INFANTRY. Besides its Staff, which is the voice of the Command,
a Division normally includes two brigades of infantry of two
regiments each. The necessities of the present war have compelled the
belligerents to reduce to three regiments many of their Divisions, and
only the crack Divisions selected for attack have been kept up to four
regiments.
ARTILLERY. Each Division includes, under the command of a colonel:
1st. One regiment of field artillery with three groups, each of three
batteries each of four 75 mm. cannon;
2d. One regiment of heavy artillery with one group of 155 mm.
quick-firing cannon;
3d. One battery of trench guns, the number and the size of which vary.
ENGINEERS. A French Division includes one half battalion of sappers
and miners, which is not sufficient; two battalions at least ought to
be attached to it. The rapidity and solidity with which the German
entrenchments are constructed is due to the great number of engineer
battalions which our enemy possesses.
CAVALRY. A Division also includes two squadrons of cavalry. In the
trenches they are dismounted and used as connection-agents (_agents de
liaison_). Their duties will be considered at another point.
AVIATORS. A Division ought to possess its own aviation corps; planes
for reconnoitring, planes for directing the fire of artillery and the
movements of infantry, and swift battle-planes without the protection
of which all other flying-machines are exposed to great dangers.
We cannot insist enough on the necessity for the American Army to be
uncompromising concerning the perfect organization of its aviation.
Reasons which we lack space to discuss have so far prevented the French
section of aviation from having the complete general organization it
ought to have.
SUPPLY. All the services for the supply of munitions, and for the
repair and renewal of material, are centralized in a divisional Park.
To the supply of munitions we shall devote a special chapter.
The supply of provisions is entrusted in a Division to a sub-commissary
of stores. The Commissariat Department is part of the general service
at the Army base, and its study would lead us beyond the limits
assigned to this exposé.
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. Every Division has its own medical department.
On this point, too, we shall abstain from entering into details.
Let us however remark that the medical service is still susceptible
of much improvement. In spite of continuous improvements in its
organization, in spite of the generous assistance of our Allies, of
neutral countries, and particularly of our American friends, the recent
engagements have proven:
1st. The insufficiency of the means at hand for rapidly collecting the
wounded on the battlefield;
2d. The insufficiency, near the battlefield, of large field hospitals
for the operations that cannot be delayed;
3d. The lack of special hospitals just out of range of the enemy’s
guns, where the severely wounded (_grands blessés_), and particularly
the abdominal cases, can remain as long as necessary. It is generally
acknowledged that those who have been wounded in the abdomen require
immediate surgical aid, and cannot be removed to a distance without
undue risk. Such dangerously injured men should therefore be provided
with “Rest hospitals,” where they can remain until able to be
transported to the base.
The transportation of the wounded should be the object of a very
close study. The trains for the transfer of the grave cases should be
further improved, their speed increased, and their appointments so
arranged as to allow the wounds to be dressed during the trip. Many
cases of gangrene would thus be avoided.
This is said without prejudice to the wonderful improvements which have
been made during the last three years. The devoted service rendered to
France by her military Medical Corps cannot be too highly praised.
American army surgeons, who have benefited by the vast experience and
wonderful skill of Dr. Alexis Carrel at the War Demonstration Hospital
in New York, will be able to do more for the relief of suffering and
the saving of life than their ablest French confrères could accomplish
three years ago.
THE COMMAND. The characteristic qualities of a “Chief” in the present
war must be:
1st. A very great physical endurance to render possible a great
activity. The General commanding a Division must actually see with
his own eyes every detail of the enemy’s positions. He must acquaint
himself with the nature of the ground occupied by his adversary as well
as with the strength of the latter’s defences. Such inspections will
often take him to the trenches, where his presence will keep up the
spirits of his men better than any exhortation written at a distance.
2d. The Chief must take in the situation at a glance. He must be
composed, and a man of prompt decision. Only on a thorough knowledge
of all the facts will he base his final dispositions for a fight. We
are of opinion that, especially in the present war, when a decision
has been taken or an order given, it is always advisable not to modify
these except in details of execution which cannot interfere with the
operation as a whole.
3d. During the battle, the Division General should establish his post
of command at a spot whence he may, if possible, see the ground where
his troops are engaged. He should, in any case, be where he can keep in
touch as long as possible with the generals or colonels of the infantry
under his command, and with his artillery and his information section.
4th. The Chief of any unit in war time is responsible for the physical
and moral condition of his troops. He will keep their spirit at a
high level if he proves to be as strict with himself as with his
subordinates. In all circumstances, he should treat them with justice
and kindness, but should be pitiless to bad soldiers.
He should by frequent personal inspections make sure that his troops
have good food, shoes, and clothing, and that their small arms and
artillery are perfectly kept, whatever the weather may be.
Some commanders of infantry Divisions, during the present war, have
neglected to take as good care of their artillery as of their infantry.
This is a mistake to be avoided. There are no more infantry Divisions.
Our Divisions are composed of all arms, each having a special utility,
and all must, without any discrimination, receive the care and
supervision of their Chief.
THE STAFFS. The unit commanders need the assistance of officers
thoroughly imbued with their thoughts, able to express and transmit
them faithfully.
_Chief of Staff._ In every unit we have a general or superior officer,
called “Chief of Staff.” In a Division taken as a unit, this officer
is entrusted with the direction of all the divisional services and the
services at headquarters. He is responsible to his commander for the
perfect working of all these services, and also for the wording and
prompt transmission of all orders.
While the task of inspecting the troops (especially the fighting
troops) rests with the General, the Chief of Staff should more
particularly inspect the non-combatant services and personnel, namely,
the Health, Supply, Treasury, and Post Office Departments.
_Staff-Officers._ It would be a great mistake to divide the
staff-officers otherwise than into two very distinct classes:
1st. Staff-Officers proper, who are the direct assistants of the Chief;
2d. Office Staff, entrusted with all the clerical work, except that
concerning the preparation and conduct of the operations, and the
report thereon.
The latter need not possess military science. They can efficiently
fulfil their duties if, as civilians, they have been trained to prepare
written reports, and they need not possess the physical endurance
necessary to the staff-officers proper.
To be efficient, a staff-officer needs to possess military science,
judgment, tact, physical strength, great activity, bravery, and
self-abnegation.
By adhering to the above classification, the American Army will have
no trouble in forming excellent staffs. In fact, it will not have
to triumph over a routine that three years of war has not entirely
eliminated from our old European armies. Too often we injudiciously
employ for tasks unfamiliar or unsuited to them officers capable of
rendering much greater services elsewhere.
The staff-officer will be efficient if he performs the following
briefly stated duties:
The staff-officer must complete by a minute reconnoitring the
inspections previously made by the General himself. He should never
hesitate to go to the very first lines, and it will be often necessary
for him to go under the protection of patrols of infantry, and
ascertain in person to what extent the first lines of the enemy have
been destroyed, how much damage has been done to the wire entanglements
and defences, etc.
The staff-officer must be a perfectly trained aërial observer. He
should also be competent to detect on the different photographs
furnished by the aviators the least damage done to the enemy’s works by
the successive projectiles. This task, which must be accomplished most
conscientiously, requires excellent eyesight.
We do not hesitate to say that, in the present war, it would be
criminal insanity to deliver an attack without being sure that the
enemy’s wire defences have been sufficiently damaged; at least to
such an extent as will allow the infantry to pass through them.
A staff-officer should not at this most important juncture trust
implicitly to the information furnished him in reports from the first
lines or found in the photographs taken by the aviation, but he ought
to go and see for himself and report minutely to his Chief.
These are dangerous missions: hence the need of having staff-officers
in reserve. It has been repeatedly proved that officers who have
not been trained at the Ecole d’Etat Major (staff school), but are
experienced and efficient men, quickly become excellent substitute
staff-officers.
Their principal duties may be summed up as follows:
Keep their Chief informed before, during, and after an operation.
Their office work ought to be limited to the writing of orders and
reports concerning the operations. This is easy of accomplishment when
the commander has a comprehensive grasp of the situation, and gives his
staff clear and concise orders, which they have only to put into effect
in due form.
The staff-officer must also act as an intelligence officer. As close to
the General’s headquarters as possible, a staff-officer must establish
a centre of information, where he will keep a force of men and all
the equipment that will enable him to keep in constant communication
with his General, with the infantry, the artillery, the captive
balloons, all the services of the aviation, etc. When a reconnoitring
aviator returns with some important information, unless he has been
able to communicate it by wireless, he lands as near as possible to
the intelligence bureau, gives to the staff-officer in charge an
account of what he has seen, and flies off. The staff-officer transmits
immediately to the proper quarter the information he has just received,
and it is his duty in all important cases to make sure that his message
has reached its proper destination. If telephonic communication has
been interrupted by any accident of battle, he must despatch some of
the estafettes, dispatch-runners, or carrier-pigeons at his disposal.