Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to amend the report of the committee, by making it
read as follows:
"Stenographers may be admitted under the direction of the
Speaker, who shall assign to them such places on the floor,
as shall not interfere with the convenience of the House."
On this amendment a further debate ensued; after which, the yeas and
nays were called, and were--yeas 27, nays 51.
Another motion was then made and seconded to amend the said amendment,
by inserting after the words, "stenographers shall," the following
words, "until otherwise ordered by the House;"
And, the question being thereupon taken, it passed in the negative.
And the main question being put, that the House do agree to the
amendment for an additional rule, as reported from the Committee of the
whole House, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas, 47, nays 28.
_Resolved_, That this House doth agree to the said standing rules and
orders, as amended.
MONDAY, January 11.
Another member, to wit, SETH HASTINGS, from Massachusetts, produced his
credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.
_Mediterranean Trade._
Mr. RANDOLPH moved a resolution directing the Secretary of the Treasury
to lay before the House an estimate of the value of the exports of the
United States, for the last five years, to ports situated within the
Straits of Gibraltar, discriminating articles of American growth from
other productions.
Mr. RANDOLPH observed that he was aware of the inability of the
Secretary to distinguish precisely the exports of the United States,
carried to the Mediterranean ports of France and Spain, from those
carried to their other ports. But still he thought it probable that the
Secretary might be able to furnish information that would be valuable.
Mr. S. SMITH said, that when the report was made by the Secretary, it
would be a report of deception. A great part of our trade to the
Mediterranean had been lopped off in consequence of the war.
Mr. SMITH afterwards remarked that, on the report being made, he feared
the inquiry would be, whether we should give up the protection of the
Mediterranean trade, or not. Gentlemen would probably go into a
calculation of figures; and if the expense of protection appeared to be
greater than the benefit of the trade, they might be for withholding
protection. There was one description of trade to the Mediterranean,
which we could obtain no estimate of, which was however very
important--the tonnage of American shipping employed in going from
European ports to the Mediterranean, and from the Mediterranean to
European ports, and American shipping employed between the East Indies
and the Mediterranean. This trade the Government was as much bound to
protect, as it was bound to protect the landed interest of the country.
Still, Mr. S. knew not that it would be proper to oppose the passage of
a resolution that asked for information.
Mr. SMILIE knew not what information we could receive; but he knew that
whatever it should be, it could do no harm.
Mr. NICHOLSON remarked, that the House would not be in a worse situation
after the report, than it was now. For himself, he was in a state of
total ignorance, and he believed a large part of the House was also
ignorant of the extent of our Mediterranean trade. It was impossible
that the House could be deceived by the report; as, if any part of it
should be calculated to deceive us, his colleague would be able to
detect its errors. He had heard, and that too from commercial men, that
our Mediterranean trade was not valuable, and not worth the expense of
the squadron fitted out to protect it. He was at a loss to decide
between these opinions and those of his colleague.
Mr. MITCHILL spoke in favor of the resolution.
Mr. GRISWOLD had no objection to obtaining the estimate, if desired by
gentlemen; not that he supposed the report could present the information
that was desired. With regard to our Mediterranean trade, it was well
known, that lately, owing to our contest with Algiers, our fish and oil
went in European bottoms, which could not be noticed in the Treasury
statements, as they went first to other ports.
Mr. EUSTIS was perfectly willing to obtain the report, that the great
increase in our trade to the Mediterranean should be seen; from which
its great value would fully appear, and its claim to encouragement.
Mr. VARNUM suggested the propriety of a reference to a select committee,
which, from the documents before the House, could select the desired
information.
Mr. RUTLEDGE feared, that the call for this information would delay the
passage of an important bill before the House for the protection of our
Mediterranean commerce. He hoped, in order as promptly as possible to
obtain information, the Secretary of the Treasury would be called upon
for it. With respect to the protection of our trade in the
Mediterranean, it was, in his opinion, unimportant what its extent was.
We were bound to protect the commerce of our citizens in all its
ramifications, whether great or small.
The resolution was then agreed to.
THURSDAY, January 14.
Another member, to wit, JOHN DAWSON, from Virginia, appeared, was
qualified, and took his seat in the House.
WEDNESDAY, January 20.
_Military Peace Establishment._
The House then took up the amendment to the bill fixing the Military
Peace Establishment.
Mr. BAYARD moved to strike out the office of Brigadier General. He said
there could not be any occasion for such an officer, as the men were
scattered over the whole extent of our frontiers and Atlantic coast, and
placed in small divisions.
This brought on a debate which was continued until after three o'clock.
The question was taken by yeas and nays for striking out--36 against it,
54 for it.
Mr. BAYARD moved to strike out the office of colonel, and add one to the
number of majors; but it was not agreed to.
The bill proposed to give those officers who should be deranged, three
months' pay when they were dismissed from the service.
Mr. GRISWOLD moved to strike out "three months," that a greater
compensation might be given to those who have grown gray in the service
of their country. He thought more was due to them than what the bill
proposed to allow.
Mr. VARNUM said, his own opinion was in favor of a greater compensation;
but he owed it to a majority of that House, to yield his opinion to what
they had fixed it at. He said there was nothing due to those officers,
as nothing had been promised them.
Mr. MITCHILL was in favor of striking out, for the purpose of inserting
a compensation proportionate to the length of time the officers had been
in service.
Mr. BACON differed as to the principle laid down by gentlemen. When
officers were wanted, there was great competition for the appointments.
They were desirous to receive the pay and emoluments. He did not think
there was any thing due to them.
Mr. S. SMITH was for pursuing some system in this business, and keeping
to a uniform principle. When a reduction was made in 1796, six months'
pay and subsistence was granted. He would be in favor of that at this
time.
Mr. DANA believed those officers accepted their appointments under an
idea of its being the permanent Peace Establishment, and therefore
something was due to them when dismissed from the public service.
Mr. SMILIE said, they knew the terms on which they entered the service,
and they entered voluntarily. How could any thing, then, be due to them?
It would be more proper to give the men something when disbanded than to
provide for the officers. It was not long since that about forty were
wanted, and there were thirteen hundred applications. Men could not
always be obtained. When the ten regiments were ordered to be raised,
the officers were soon obtained; but, after recruiting a long time, the
proper number of men could not be procured.
The question for striking out was taken by yeas and nays--for it 26,
against it 56.
Mr. S. SMITH made a motion to raise it to the same as was granted in
1796.
Mr. EUSTIS advocated it, but it was not carried, there being 26 for it,
and 45 against it.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading to-morrow.
THURSDAY, January 21.
_Military Peace Establishment._
An engrossed bill fixing the Military Peace Establishment of the United
States was read the third time.
Mr. BAYARD observed that he should vote for the bill, because he thought
it better than the former system, and it would be of much saving as to
expense. He was, however, very far from being pleased with a part of
that bill, that part relating to the Brigadier General and his
aide-de-camp. This office he knew to be a perfect sinecure; no such
officer was necessary; he could have no duties to perform. He would not,
however, vote against the whole bill on account of this.
Mr. RUTLEDGE.--The first section was very disagreeable to him, as it
went to the establishment of a perfect sinecure. He was willing to do
homage to the merit of the officer who was to benefit; but he rather
thought it would be more consonant with justice, if money must be
needlessly sported with, to suffer such money to be given to those who
have been long in service--some fifteen or twenty years--and who are now
by this bill suddenly forced to quit their present, to seek some new way
of obtaining a livelihood, in circumstances, many of them perhaps, not
enviable.
Mr. R. was not pleased with the so great reduction of the artillery; he
thought the retention of the artillery of more importance than that of
the infantry. He had hoped the artillery would have been retained to
keep in order the forts already built in different parts of the United
States; the small number remaining was quite incompetent to preserving
them in order, or preserving them from decay. The Secretary of War
mentions one fort in South Carolina. There are, sir, four forts in the
harbor of Charleston alone, some of which must go to decay. He should
vote for the bill because it went to make great reductions of expense,
which reductions circumstances now allow us to afford; but the sinecure
was obnoxious to him, and he was not pleased with the reduction of the
artillery.
On the question that the bill do pass, it was resolved in the
affirmative--yeas 77, nays 12.
_Mediterranean Trade._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on
the bill for the protection of the commerce and seamen of the United
States in the Mediterranean and adjoining seas.
Mr. BAYARD offered an amendment, the purport of which, was to give to
the President the power of granting letters of marque and reprisal, to
affect Algiers and Tunis as well as Tripoli. Mr. B. thought that it
would be unsafe to neglect a cautionary step like this, because there
was great danger, from the similarity of religion and manners, of a
union taking place between Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli; they may be
brought into the war with Tripoli against us. It would be a matter of
prudence to be prepared.
Mr. DANA thought it very probable that further information would be
received from the Barbary powers, when we shall be the better enabled to
judge what will be expedient. He did not like the appearance of the
amendment; it seemed to invite war.
Mr. BAYARD considered there was a great difference between the Barbary
powers and civilized nations; it was on account of the perfidiousness
of those powers, that he wished it left to the direction of the
President to exercise the power vested in him when he should think
proper; there was no trusting to them. He wished the President to do
this by the authority of law; this would prevent those doubts that have
been expressed by some, of the constitutionality of his measures the
last spring and summer; though for his part he was disposed to approbate
the proceedings of the Executive on that occasion. As to its having the
appearance of threatening, he did not think so; nor did he believe it
would have any effect on those powers; he hardly believed that the Dey
of Algiers ever read the acts of Congress.
Mr. DANA was opposed to considering the subject at present; he was for
postponing till further information should be received.
Mr. GILES was against the amendment; he thought it had the appearance of
inviting them to an attack, of challenging them to combat, of irritating
and provoking them: he believed there would be ample time to act on this
matter hereafter, when they would have a better knowledge of
circumstances, and of what to expect.
Mr. BAYARD said he was by no means disposed to withdraw his motion. You
are at war with one of these nations; the others are connected with them
by their religion and habits, by their government some, and by their
interest more. I have been told that there is no connection between my
amendment and the bill; but I am confident there is the same connection
that there is between Tripoli and the other powers; and it is proper to
extend the bill so as to embrace Tunis and Algiers, as well as Tripoli.
The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. DANA) says there are no doubts on
his mind but that the President has a constitutional right, as the
Commander-in-chief of the army and navy, to do as he has done; but it
should be remembered that many have doubts; and why should the gentleman
be opposed to this amendment, which will preclude all doubt on the
subject.
The amendment was not carried.
_Direct Taxes._
The House then went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for
amending the act for laying and collecting a direct tax.
The first section repeals the thirteenth section of the act of 1798,
which prescribes that lands on which taxes remain unpaid for one year,
shall be sold subject to the right of redemption within two years after
sale.
Mr. RANDOLPH stated that the provisions proposed to be repealed were
unsusceptible of execution, inasmuch as the expenses of advertising
required, exceeded in many cases by four or five times, the amount of
the tax, and which exceeded the per centage allowed; and inasmuch as no
person would buy the land offered for sale, when he might be deprived of
it by a redemption within two years.
Documents were read which substantiated this statement.
Mr. S. SMITH opposed the repeal, as going to deprive the owners of lands
of the right of redemption; which he deemed a valuable provision;
without which the owners of land, particularly non-residents, would be
deprived of their property, without a knowledge of the tax imposed, or
being able, however desirous, to pay it.
Mr. RUTLEDGE also opposed the repeal, as imposing hardships upon those
who have not paid the tax, which were not imposed upon those who have
paid. He further stated that the non-payment in the Southern States had
arisen, not from indisposition to pay, but from want of collectors to
carry the law into execution; the compensation allowed having been so
inadequate as in many districts to have disabled the Government from
obtaining officers.
Messrs. GRISWOLD, MILLEDGE, STANLEY, and MORRIS, delivered their
sentiments against the first section; when, on motion of Mr. MACON, the
committee rose, and asked leave to sit again, which was granted.
FRIDAY, January 22.
Another member, to wit, ROBERT WILLIAMS, from North Carolina, appeared,
produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.
MONDAY, January 25.
_Import Duties._
Mr. NICHOLSON called up the resolution he laid on the table on Friday,
for instructing the Committee of Ways and Means to report generally on
the subject of impost duties.
Mr. LOWNDES wished to amend it so as to direct the attention of that
committee particularly to the articles of salt, brown sugar, coffee, and
Bohea tea.
This the SPEAKER considered out of order, as resolutions on those
subjects were then before the House.
Mr. RUTLEDGE and Mr. BAYARD wished to withdraw the resolutions they had
offered on the articles of salt, brown sugar, &c.
Mr. SPEAKER considered the resolutions in possession of the House, as
they had been debated, and the previous question taken on them, and no
motion could be made while another motion was pending.
Mr. BAYARD asked for information whether it was in order for him to
state that he withdrew his resolution?
Some conversation took place as to points of order.
The question on the resolution was called for.
Mr. DANA said there was no instruction given to the committee by the
resolution of December 13, to make a report on the subject of imposts
and tonnage. He was pleased to see this resolution moved by the
gentleman from Maryland, as it showed his belief to be that the subject
was not referred to the committee.
Mr. DANA expressed his wish that two things should be referred to the
Committee of Ways and Means: First, a general view of the duties of
imposts and excise that they might be contrasted; and, secondly, that
certain articles should be specifically referred to them.
Mr. NICHOLSON said the gentleman from Connecticut was very much mistaken
as to the object of his resolution. It was not that he did not think the
subject before the committee, but as so much had been said about the
former general reference, he wished to prevent the gentleman from
Connecticut from quibbling respecting the reference.
[Here Mr. N. was called to order by Mr. GRISWOLD. The SPEAKER declared
it as his opinion that the gentleman was in order. Mr. BAYARD appealed
to the House, and called the yeas and nays, which were agreed to be
taken.]
_Internal Revenues--Expenses of collection compared with Custom House
Duties._
Mr. BAYARD called up the following resolution, which he had some days
previously laid upon the table, viz:
"_Resolved_, That the Secretary of the Treasury be required
to lay before this House an account, in detail, of the
expenses incurred in the collection of the internal
revenues of the United States; distinguishing, where the
same may be practicable, the expenses attending the
collection in each branch of the said revenue, and, also,
an estimate of reduction of said expenses which may
conveniently be made."
The resolution having been read, Mr. B. said: As it is extremely
possible, Mr. SPEAKER, that it is designed that this resolution shall
share the same fate with that which the resolution of the gentleman from
New York experienced this morning, I shall be allowed at least by
publicly stating, to justify to the world, the motive which induced me
to bring it forward. [Mr. B. alluded to a resolution offered by Mr. T.
MORRIS, the object of which was, to direct the Secretary of the Treasury
to state to the House the amount of stamp duties collected in each
State, distinguishing what part was paid by the commercial cities. When
the resolution was taken up there was a call for the question. Nothing
was said against the propriety of it. It being merely a call for
information, and considered so much a matter of course to agree to such
resolutions when no opposition was made to them, it was not supposed
necessary to say any thing on the propriety and reasonableness of the
resolution. Yet, to the astonishment of its friends, when the question
was put, there were for it 34, against it 54.]
Gentlemen are infinitely deceived, said Mr. B., if they think our object
is, by any particular mode of proceeding, to gain an unfair advantage of
public opinion. If such a suspicion be entertained, our conduct has been
viewed with a jaundiced eye. It is a motive which never has, and I hope
never will direct our measures. If popularity is to be gained only by a
prostitution of principle to ignorant and unthinking prejudice, we are
content to forego it. I am far from being indifferent to public opinion;
the approbation of our fellow-citizens is the only reward we can expect
for our services; but it is a reward no honest man will seek, if it is
to be acquired only by artifice and deception.
I have avowed and avowed sincerely, that I am disposed to go hand and
hand with gentlemen in the reduction of public burdens. When it was
necessary I assisted in imposing them--now that circumstances permit I
more cheerfully co-operate in taking them off. My true object is to make
the most of our situation; not to be deluded by empty theories, or
speculative systems, but, by an enlarged view of the various interests
of the country, to discover by the reduction of what taxes the society
would be the most substantially benefited.
The reduction of the Military Establishment creates considerable
savings; other retrenchments are contemplated in the Navy and civil
administration. These savings enable us to dispense with certain taxes;
but is it not wise to examine diligently the operation of the several
taxes which exist, and, after being informed by the various views which
belong to the subject, to exonerate the community from those which, with
the least benefit, are the most burdensome?
One great objection to the internal taxes is the expense of collection.
I wish to know the particulars of this expense in order to see whether
it may not be curtailed. I wish also to be informed of the expenses
attending each branch of the revenue, for the purpose of judging whether
it may not be expedient to retain some branches, while it may be wise to
part with others. These are my objects; do they not entitle us to the
information asked?
We know in one instance, that the expense in collecting the stamp duty
is less than five per cent. This appears by the report of the Secretary
of the Treasury; but we are not informed of the particular expenses
belonging to the other branches of the revenue.
Sir, said Mr. B., I must rely that the resolution will be agreed to;
there is not a precedent in our annals or opposition to such a
resolution; if, however, one is now to be introduced, I think it proper
that the names of those gentlemen should hereafter appear by whom it was
resisted, and by whom it was established. He therefore hoped the
question would be taken by yeas and nays.
The Clerk, at the request of Mr. RANDOLPH, read an extract from the
report of the Secretary of the Treasury, as follows:
"It will appear by the same statement, [M,] that while the
expenses of collection on merchandise and tonnage, which
are defrayed out of the revenue, do not exceed four per
cent., those on permanent internal duties amount to almost
twenty per cent. This, however, is an inconvenience which,
on account of the great number of the individuals on whom
the duties are raised, and of their dispersed situation
throughout the whole extent of the United States, must,
more or less, attach to the system of internal taxation so
long as the wants of Government shall not require any
considerable extension, and the total amount of revenue
shall remain inconsiderable."
Mr. T. MORRIS.--If the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH)
thinks that the extract of the report of the Secretary of the Treasury,
the reading of which he has called for, furnishes the information
demanded by my honorable friend from Delaware, he is mistaken. The
Secretary's report gives you a general estimate of the expense of
collecting the aggregate of the internal taxes, but does not specify the
charge falling on each separate tax. From the statement exhibited by the
Secretary, it appears that it costs twenty per cent. to collect the
whole of the internal taxes; but if the detailed statement asked for by
the gentleman from Delaware is furnished, it will appear that the
collection of some of those taxes does not cost more than five or six
per cent. To show how unfair it is to connect together the expense
attending the collection of all the internal taxes, I need only refer
gentlemen to an authority which I believe they will not dispute. If my
memory, sir, is not very incorrect, it will appear by a publication of
the present Secretary of the Treasury, written in the year 1796, that
the tax on country distilleries cost in its collection near thirty per
cent.; that on city distilleries about nineteen. These, sir, and other
reasons, may evince the propriety of repealing the tax on country
distilleries; but because this tax is expensive in its collection,
because it may be liable to objections, does it follow that other taxes,
such as the tax on carriages, on refined sugars, &c., which fall on the
rich, and which are not expensive in the collection, does it follow, I
say, that because it may be proper to repeal the first, that these are
to fall too? It is, sir, in order to be enabled to make proper
discrimination, to be enabled to know which of these taxes ought to be
repealed, and which retained, that the gentleman from Delaware has moved
his resolution. And here, sir, let me be permitted to express a hope,
that the resolution now before you may not meet with the silent negative
which was the fate of one intended also to procure information, and
which I had the honor of laying on your table. I did and do still
believe, sir, that the majority of this House could not have been
actuated by proper motives in refusing that information. [Here Mr.
RANDOLPH called Mr. MORRIS to order, saying that he had no right to
impeach the motives of members. Mr. M. observed that for his part he was
at a loss to know what was considered disorderly in that House, but that
he would submit to the correction of the Chair. The SPEAKER determined
him to be in order, and Mr. M. proceeded.] With regard, sir, to the
course of proceeding which gentlemen have lately adopted, persevering
in an inflexible silence, rejecting every proposition made by a member
in the minority, without deigning to show its fallacy, refusing public
documents for our information and that of our fellow-citizens, without
showing, or even pretending to show, that they are unnecessary, I can
only say that it militates against all my ideas of propriety. I have
always hitherto supposed that every Representative on this floor had a
right to be heard; that he had a right to call on the majority for their
reasons both when they supported and opposed public measures. Gentlemen
may, if they please, meet in what they have denominated caucuses when
power was in other hands; they may then confer together about the
measures in which they may think proper to unite; but, sir, if their
debates are to take place there, and there alone, if we are not to be
furnished here by them with the reasons which induce them to adopt
public measures, they ought at least to open their doors to the
minority, in order that, if they cannot hear their arguments in the
proper place, they may not close them altogether. I trust, sir, that
gentlemen themselves will see the impropriety of persevering in this
line of conduct, and that they will consent to pay, if not to gentlemen
in the minority, at least to their propositions, the attention and
respect which they may deserve.
Mr. GRISWOLD said, that he presumed the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
RANDOLPH) had requested that the extract from the report of the
Secretary of the Treasury might be read, and which the House had just
heard, for the purpose of proving that the resolution under
consideration ought to pass. Indeed that report, and the statement to
which it referred, evinced in the most satisfactory manner that the
information required by the resolution was absolutely necessary for the
purpose of enabling the House to decide understandingly on the
proposition, which it was expected would soon be brought forward, for
abolishing the internal taxes. The Secretary in his report had declared
that the expense of collecting the internal taxes amounted nearly to
twenty per cent. on the amount collected. It appeared, however, from the
statements to which the Secretary had alluded, that the tax on stills,
the carriage tax, the tax on licenses, on sales at auction, and the tax
on refined sugar, had been included in one class, and the expense of
collecting all those taxes, without distinguishing the charges on each
branch, had been stated to be nearly twenty per cent., whilst the
expense of collecting the stamp duty, another branch of the internal
taxes, was short of five per cent., varying only a fraction from the
charges on the revenue from impost and tonnage. These statements might
be satisfactory as far as they went, but it was obvious that in
examining the branches of a revenue, with a view to the expense of
collection, it became necessary to ascertain the precise charge which
had fallen on each branch, and to obtain this necessary information, and
which the report and statements had left defective, the resolution had
been principally brought forward. And what had rendered this information
peculiarly necessary at this time was the ground which had been taken in
opposition to the internal taxes. The only argument which he had heard
against those taxes, and which did not equally apply to the impost, was
drawn from the great expense which had arisen in the collection. To
enable the House, therefore, to decide whether the fact existed on which
that argument had been founded, it became necessary to inquire in the
manner proposed by the resolution whether the extraordinary expense with
which those taxes had been charged might not be diminished, and whether
the expense really existed in relation to each description of them.
Mr. G. said that he presumed no gentleman was prepared to say that the
general expense of collection might not be diminished, and so far was he
from believing that every branch of the internal taxes was subjected to
the charge of nineteen or twenty per cent., he was perfectly confident
that if gentlemen would agree to the resolution, the detailed
statements, which the Secretary would furnish in obedience to it, would
prove that the expense of collecting certain branches of those taxes
would fall much short of the sum at which the same has been estimated.
The consent of the House, said Mr. G., to every call for information,
had formerly been so much a matter of course, that he should not have
troubled the House with any remarks upon so plain a question as the
present, had not the experience of this day proved, that gentlemen were
not always to be indulged by the House with the information which they
required; and the profound silence which had at this time been observed
by those gentlemen who could either admit or reject the resolution,
appeared to indicate a determination on their part to refuse the
important and necessary information required by the resolution. He did
presume, however, that upon this occasion the House would consent to the
resolution, and more particularly, as the report of the Secretary of the
Treasury, which had been read at the request of the gentleman from
Virginia, proved so clearly the necessity of passing it.
Mr. HUGER could not reconcile it with his sense of duty, to give a
silent vote on the present occasion, nor could he but lament the strange
and novel course of proceeding which gentlemen had thought proper to
adopt. The intention, it would seem, was to repeal the internal taxes,
right or wrong, and at all events; and so determined were gentlemen on
carrying this favorite project into execution, that every thing like
previous investigation, or even a wish to gain information on the
subject, was hooted at and treated with the most sovereign contempt.
Every, the smallest, reduction on taxes of any other description, was
avowedly to be excluded, nor was any proposition to this effect deemed
worthy of even a moment's consideration. The measure proposed, however,
interested in a very particular manner that part of the community he had
the honor to represent. They paid, it was true, a small portion of the
internal taxes, but the various other taxes upon salt, brown sugar,
coffee, &c., and the duties on imposts generally, fell more immediately
and far more heavily on them. Was it not natural, therefore, that he
should have some hesitation on the subject; that he should feel anxious
to see this project thoroughly and completely investigated; that he
should wish to receive every possible information which might either
tend to satisfy his mind as to the expediency of repealing the internal
taxes only, to the total exclusion of all others, or enable him to
propose some other project, equally beneficial perhaps to the public at
large, and which might at the same time accord better with the immediate
interests of his constituents?
His constituents, he was proud to say it, had ever contributed with
alacrity and cheerfulness to the wants and exigencies of the Union. They
were prepared and willing, he was confident, to do so still; and he made
not the least doubt but that they would readily subscribe to the
exclusive repeal of the internal taxes, and submit, without a murmur, to
the continuation of all the other taxes, however burdensome to
themselves, provided they are convinced and well satisfied that this
measure was fairly and impartially adopted for the welfare of the whole,
and not for the benefit of the one at the expense of the other division
of the country. It was for this purpose, therefore, that he wished the
present motion to be adopted, and that he had desired the attention of
the Committee of Ways and Means to be directed, particularly, to those
articles of importation and of general use and necessity, such as salt,
sugar, coffee, common teas, &c. He was desirous that these and similar
items should be compared with the carriage tax, the tax on licenses to
retail spirituous liquors, and various other similar items of the
internal taxes, and that the House might be furnished with such
information with respect to both, as might enable him to judge, whether
there might not be a partial repeal as well of some of the external as
internal taxes, and not a total and exclusive reduction of the latter,
as was contemplated; whilst all the former, however grievous and
inconvenient, were to be retained. Did he then ask any thing which was
unreasonable or improper? Could any possible inconvenience accrue from
allowing him to obtain the information he desired? If not, why refuse to
indulge him in what he deemed useful, and what (at the worst) could only
be regarded by gentlemen themselves as superfluous information? Was it
fair; was it becoming; did it comport with that civility and politeness
which was due from the one to the other, by citizens of a common
country, assembled together for the express purpose of consulting upon
their common interests, to treat thus cavalierly what must at least be
allowed to be a respectable minority?
With respect to the two only reasons which had ever been offered in
favor of the exclusive repeal of the internal tax, viz: the expense and
number of officers required to collect it, was it not the immediate and
precise object of the resolution under debate to inquire whether it was
not possible to devise some means by which these inconveniences might be
obviated, or at least greatly lessened? And what objection could there
be to the inquiry? Were gentlemen perfectly and entirely convinced that
nothing of the kind could be done, or were they apprehensive that the
thing was in itself so feasible, that an inquiry of this kind would
throw a stumbling-block in the way of the project already determined on,
which although he would freely acknowledge, that as an abstract
proposition it was expedient as much as possible, and to collect your
taxes at as small an expense, and by means of as few agents as
conveniently could be done, yet there was another still more important
maxim which ought never to be lost sight of: this was, that the burdens
of the Government, as well as the advantages which flowed from it,
should be fairly, equally, impartially, and equitably distributed among
every description of the citizens, in whatever part of the country they
resided. If, therefore, it did happen, that a few more officers and a
somewhat greater percentage were required to collect the taxes in one
than in another part of the country, this alone would most certainly and
indubitably not be a sufficient reason to do away all the taxes in the
one, and throw the whole burden of the Government on the inhabitants of
the other.
Mr. RUTLEDGE confessed himself much puzzled by the new forms of
proceeding this day adopted. Ever since he had had the honor of a seat
in Congress, it had been invariably the practice, when measures were
proposed not agreeable to the majority, for them to offer their
objections to them. This had ever been the practice, and the experience
of its convenience offered strong reasons for its continuance. When the
majority stated their objections to any measure, the minority in
sustaining it answered them fully; thus, both sides acted
understandingly, and when the proceedings of the National Legislature
went out to the people, they were at the same time informed of the
reasons under which their Representatives had legislated. This had not
only been the usage in Congress, but the form of proceeding in all
representative bodies with whose history we are acquainted. Even in the
British House of Commons, which gentlemen had often and emphatically
styled a mockery of representation, so great is the respect paid to
public opinion, that the majority deem it their duty to assign in debate
the reasons of their conduct. Although the Minister in England has quite
as much confidence in the strength of his majority as gentlemen here can
have in theirs, yet, in feeling power, he does not forget right, and
his regard for public opinion is so great, that he never secures his
measures by a silent vote. In these days of innovation, we, it seems,
are to pursue a different course. When the resolution offered this
morning by his honorable friend from New York (Mr. MORRIS) was taken
into consideration, not a voice was raised against it. This profound
silence made us expect a unanimous vote; but, in consequence, he
supposed, of some outdoor arrangements, it was rejected by this silent
majority. He had seen many deliberative assemblies, but never before
witnessed such a procedure. He would not say whether this was respectful
towards the minority, who, we have been told from high authority, have
their equal rights--he would not say whether it was dignified as it
regarded the majority, but, without pretending to any spirit of
prophecy, he would venture to say it could not be deemed politic or wise
by the people of this country.
When the doors of Congress were open, and persons admitted to take the
debates, the people expected to be fully informed of the views and
motives which governed the votes of their Representatives. But it seems
our constituents are not to be treated with this heretofore common
civility. In proposing measures we are obliged to guess at what
gentlemen feel against them, (for they say nothing,) and to defend them,
without knowing in what they are objectionable to those who govern in
this House. This kind of governing is but ill calculated to produce
harmony, to restore social intercourse, and to heal the wounds inflicted
on society by the spirit of party.
The question was taken, and it passed in the negative--yeas 37, nays 57.
_Duties on Imports._
Mr. RUTLEDGE called up for consideration the resolution which he moved
on Friday, on which the previous question was then taken, viz:
"_Resolved_, That the Committee of Ways and Means be
instructed particularly to inquire into the expediency of
reducing the duties on brown sugar, coffee, and bohea tea."
Mr. GRISWOLD hoped the resolution would be decided upon.
Mr. RUTLEDGE hoped the reference would obtain. These articles paid the
highest rate of duties and were of the first necessity. In looking over
the rates of duties on imports, he saw many articles that were taxed
enormously high. Those in the resolution were of the first necessity,
the duty high, and laid when they were at war prices; while the people
received war prices for their produce, they could with convenience pay
for these articles, though high. The object of the resolution was merely
to inquire, and he did not see how it could interfere with any object
gentlemen have in view.
Mr. DANA.--I beg liberty to tender the homage of my profound respects,
for the dignified situation in which gentlemen have now placed
themselves, and congratulate them on their silence. There is something
peculiarly impressive in this mode of opposing every thing that is
urged. It is seldom that gentlemen have exhibited such a remarkable
appearance of a philosophical assembly.
"That dumb Legislature will immortalize your name"--is said to have been
the language of a certain distinguished General to a certain nominal
Abbé, who has been represented as having pigeon-holes full of
constitutions of his own making. During the memorable night at St.
Cloud, when the French Council of Ancients, and Council of Five Hundred,
were adjourned--to meet no more--it may be recollected, the powers of
executive government were provisionally committed to three persons,
styled Consuls, and two of them were the General and the Abbé. From each
of the Councils, twenty-five members were selected, to compose a
commission, and assist the provisional Consuls in preparing a
constitution for France. Of the numerous projects of constitutions
presented by the Abbé, it is said no part was finally adopted except the
plan of a dumb Legislature. This, the General instantly seized with
apparent enthusiasm, exclaiming to the Abbé, "that dumb Legislature will
immortalize your name!" And it was determined to have a _corps
legislatif_ that should vote, but not debate.
It was scarcely to be expected that any thing like this would soon take
place in our own country. But it is the prerogative of great geniuses,
when in similar circumstances, to arrive at the same great results,
although with some difference in the process. Nor can I forbear offering
my tribute of admiration, for the genius who has projected a mode of
proceeding among us, that so nearly rivals the plan adopted in France. I
know not to whom is due the honor of this luminous discovery. After
ascribing to him, however, all merited glory, permit me to examine the
force of the argument relied on by gentlemen in opposition to the
proposed resolution.
Their argument is silence. I hope to be excused if I do not discuss this
subject in the most satisfactory manner; as silence is a new species of
logic, about which no directions have been found in any treatise on
logic that I have ever seen. It will be my endeavor to reply to
gentlemen by examining some points which may be considered as involved
in their dumb arguments.
One of these points is--that certain members of this House have pledged
themselves to their constituents, for repealing all the internal taxes.
They may have declared their opinions to this effect, before the
election; and, being chosen under such circumstances, may now deem
themselves bound in honor not to vary. The terms assented to between
their constituents and themselves may, therefore, be viewed by them as
the particular rule of their own conduct. But is this House to be
regarded in the same light with the English House of Commons, during
the early period of their history, when the knights of shires, and the
representatives of cities and boroughs, were instructed on what terms
they should bargain with the Crown for special privileges, and were
limited to the price agreed on by their constituents? The situation of
gentlemen who have thus pledged themselves to vote for repealing the
internal taxes, must be irksome, indeed, if on mature consideration they
should believe it more proper and more beneficial for the country to
have other taxes reduced. Those who have entered into a stipulation of
this sort, so as to feel it as a point of honor, are so peculiarly
circumstanced that they might think it too assuming in me, were I so
much as to express a desire that they would vote for reducing some of
the duties on imports, instead of repealing all the internal taxes. It
is to be hoped, the number of members who have pledged themselves in
this manner, does not exceed twenty-five or thirty.
Another point involved in this argument of silence is, that other
gentlemen may have pledged themselves to these, and given them a promise
of support on this subject. It must be acknowledged that this was more
than was required on account of their seat in this House. If any
gentlemen have absolutely so pledged themselves to their constituents,
it must indeed be difficult to convince them. On this point, their minds
must be so differently constituted from mine, that there does not seem
to be any common principle between us that can be assumed as the basis
of argumentation.
Another point is, the Executive has recommended a repeal of all the
internal taxes, and not any reduction of the impost. And will gentlemen
act upon this as a sufficient reason for their conduct? Is it now to
become a principle, that the Executive is to deliberate, and the
Legislature to act, and that no measure is to be adopted unless proposed
by the Executive? Would it not be better for the country to abolish this
House, and to avoid useless expense, if it is to be nothing more than
one of the ancient Parliaments of France, employed to register the
edicts of a master?
The silence of the gentlemen may also be considered as having relation
to their great desire for the harmony of social intercourse. To prevent
its being disturbed in the House by debating, they may have come to a
determination that all the great questions shall be settled by gentlemen
of a certain description, when met in nocturnal conclave, and be only
voted upon in this place. If such be the fact, it seems but reasonable
that any of the members of this House should be admitted in meetings of
the conclave, as delegates from the territorial districts are admitted
into Congress, with a right to debate, although not to vote. If,
however, this is thought too much, gentlemen should at least have
galleries provided, so that other members of the Legislature might be
admitted as spectators, and have the opportunity of knowing the reasons
for public measures.
The question was called for, when Mr. EUSTIS begged the Speaker would
state it, as, in listening to the arguments of the gentleman from
Connecticut, he had forgotten it.
Mr. RUTLEDGE said he was much pleased by the question of the honorable
gentleman from Massachusetts. When gentlemen ask, What is the question?
it is to be hoped that they will respect its merits; but, from the scene
this day acted, he had learned that the only inquiry with gentlemen
would be, from what side does this come?
The question was then taken by yeas and nays, and lost--yeas 35, nays
58.
TUESDAY, January 26.
_Territorial Government for the District of Columbia._
Mr. SPRIGG reported a bill for the government of the Territory of
Columbia.
[The bill establishes a Legislature, chosen by the taxable citizens of
the United States one year resident in the Territory, composed of a
House of Representatives, to consist of twenty-five members, seven
whereof to be chosen by the district of Rock Creek, seven from the part
west of Rock Creek, and eleven by the county of Alexandria. The Governor
to be appointed by the President of the United States. The Territory to
pay the Legislature, and the United States the Governor. The judges to
hold their offices during life, unless removed by the President on the
application of two successive Legislatures.]
Referred to the Committee of the whole House on Tuesday next.
A memorial and remonstrances of sundry inhabitants of the county and
town of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, was presented to the
House and read, praying that Congress will not agree to any plan, or
pass any bill respecting the government of the said District, which
shall, by the establishment of a subordinate Legislative or subordinate
Executive, or otherwise, tend to unite under its power, the two parts of
the district, as separated by the river Potomac.--Referred to the
Committee of the whole House last appointed.
THURSDAY, January 28.
_Lieutenant Sterret, his Officers and Crew._
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of
a select committee of the nineteenth instant, on the resolutions of the
Senate, in the form of joint resolutions of the two Houses, "in respect
to Lieutenant Sterret, the officers, and crew of the United States'
schooner Enterprise;" to which Committee of the whole House were also
referred the said resolutions of the Senate; and, after some time spent
therein, the SPEAKER resumed the chair, and Mr. Davis reported that the
committee had had the said report and resolutions under consideration,
and directed him to repeat to the House their disagreement to the said
resolutions of the Senate, and their agreement to two resolutions
contained in the report of the select committee thereupon, in the form
of joint resolutions of the two Houses; which he delivered in at the
Clerk's table.
The House then proceeded to consider the said report and resolutions:
Whereupon, the resolutions of the Senate, to which the Committee of the
whole House reported their disagreement, being twice read at the Clerk's
table, in the words following, to wit:
_Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled_, That, as a
testimony of the high sense they entertain of the nautical
skill and gallant conduct of Lieutenant Andrew Sterret,
commander of the United States' schooner Enterprise,
manifested in an engagement with, and in the capture of, a
Tripolitan corsair, of superior force, in the Mediterranean
Sea, fitted out by the Bey of that Regency to harass the
trade, capture the vessels, and enslave the citizens, of
these States, the President of the United States be
requested to present Lieutenant Sterret with a gold medal,
with such suitable devices thereon, as he shall deem
proper, and emblematic of that heroic action, and the mercy
extended to a barbarous enemy, who three times struck his
colors twice, and recommenced hostilities: an act of
humanity, however unmerited, highly honorable to the
American flag and nation; and that the President of the
United States be also requested to present to each of the
Lieutenants, Porter and Lawson, of the Navy, and Lieutenant
Lane of the Marines, who were serving on board the
Enterprise in the engagement, and contributed, by their
gallant conduct, to the success of the day, a sword, with
such suitable devices as the President may deem fit.
"_Be it further resolved_, In consideration of the intrepid
behavior of the crew of the Enterprise, under the orders of
their gallant commander, and their receiving no prize
money, the corsair being dismantled and released after her
capture, that one month's pay, over and above the usual
allowance, be paid to all the other officers, sailors, and
marines, who were actually on board and engaged in that
action; for the expenditure of which charge Congress will
make the necessary appropriation."
The question was taken that the House do concur with the Committee of
the whole House in their disagreement to the same, and resolved in the
affirmative.
The resolutions contained in the report of the select committee, to
which the Committee of the whole House reported their agreement, being
twice read, in the words following, to wit:
"_Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled_, That
they entertain a high sense of the gallant conduct of
Lieutenant Sterret, and the other officers, seamen, and
marines, on board the schooner Enterprise, in the capture
of a Tripolitan corsair, of fourteen guns and eighty men.
"_Resolved_, That the President of the United States be
requested to present to Lieutenant Sterret a sword,
commemorative of the aforesaid heroic action; and that one
month's extra pay be allowed to all the other officers,
seamen, and marines, who were on board the Enterprise when
the aforesaid action took place."
The question was taken that the House do concur with the Committee of
the whole House in their agreement to the same, and resolved in the
affirmative.
_Ordered_, That the said resolutions be engrossed, and read the third
time to-morrow.
MONDAY, February 8.
_Imprisonment for Debt._
Mr. SMILIE called up his resolution that a committee be appointed to
revise the laws respecting imprisonment for debts due the United States.
His objects, he said, were two; to secure the debtor's property, and to
inflict some penalty or provide some remedy instead of imprisonment for
life.
Mr. RUTLEDGE was opposed to imprisonment for life, where the debtor gave
up his whole property, and was unable to pay all. He had known, in South
Carolina, revenue officers imprisoned for debts due the United States,
who had been many years confined; men of good character, men of honesty,
but who, through ignorance of transacting certain business, or their
misfortunes, were unable to pay. He knew an individual of that State who
had applied to that House for relief; his petition was referred to the
Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary felt a delicacy in interfering
in the case; the petition was not granted; and the person had now been
in jail five years, though his inability to pay did not arise from
having wasted the public money, or from aught but misfortune; for he was
acknowledged to be a man of good character. He was averse to such
cruelty. Hence the necessity of making some provision that the innocent,
when distinctions can, as in most instances, be made, may not be
subjected to cruel punishments, that were of no benefit to the United
States. Why send him to jail? Why lock him up there? Why prevent his
being able to support his family?
Mr. SMILIE.--It is the case that when you exceed in making your laws
what is reasonable, those laws, as the present concerning debtors to the
United States, will not be executed. The present law cannot be put in
execution. He wished some sufficient penalty. This was not the proper
stage to give his sentiments; were it, he should say, he thought the
defaulter ought to give up the property, and perhaps be imprisoned a
period. But the Legislature are not the proper judges, and ought not to
interfere; the Legislative and Judicial Departments should be kept
separate. We want some uniform law, operating on all according to their
demerit.
The subject was postponed till to-morrow.
FRIDAY, February 12.
_State Balances._
Mr. THOMAS called up his motion respecting State Balances, which is as
follows:
"_Resolved_, That a committee be appointed to inquire into
the expediency of extinguishing the claims of the United
States for certain balances, which, by the Commissioners
appointed to settle the accounts between the United States
and the individual States, were reported to be due from
several of the States to the United States, and that the
said committee have leave to report by bill or otherwise."
Mr. BAYARD hoped the resolution would prevail. The debtor States, not
satisfied with the settlement made by the Board of Commissioners, had
asked for information respecting the grounds on which it had been made.
The information had been imperiously refused. In his opinion it was but
right, if the debtor States did not dispute the validity of the debts
due to the creditor States, that they should agree to expunge the claims
against the debtor States. Indeed, he had been assured that the
commission was not instituted with a view of sustaining any charges
against the debtor States, but for ascertaining the amount due to the
creditor States, and funding them; and he believed it had been so
understood at the time. This was an affair not determinable by the
ordinary rules applied to individual cases. Many of the States, not
expecting a settlement, had kept no accounts or vouchers; and however
great the supplies they contributed under such circumstances, they
received no credits for them; while those States which had been most
careful in the preservation of vouchers, shared a different and a better
fate.
Mr. B. believed it was the true policy of the creditor States to agree
to the extinguishment of these balances. He believed they never could be
paid, because no State allowed them to be due. They would not,
therefore, be paid voluntarily; and he knew of no force in the United
States to compel payment. Why, then, keep up a source of irritation,
which could do no possible good, and which could only tend to repel some
States from that constitution, which we all ought to endeavor to make
the object of general affection?
Mr. SOUTHARD said, he had yet heard no reason that convinced him that
the resolution offered was just or proper. It would be recollected that
this contract was made under the confederation. In the establishment of
our independence, great and various exertions had been made. In the
contributions made, great inequalities took place, which were
unavoidable. Generally, where the war existed, the States became
creditor States. It was just that those States which had contributed
more than their share should be repaid, and that those who had paid less
should make up the deficiency. If the debtor States were not to pay
their balances, why settle the accounts? To relinquish the payment would
be, in his opinion, not only unjust but unconstitutional. The
constitution says, "All debts contracted, and engagements entered into,
before the adoption of this constitution, shall be as valid against the
United States, under this constitution as under the Confederation;" and
the present Government had recognized those debts as just. The gentleman
from Delaware says, the settlement is not just. But this was barely the
suggestion of his own mind. To sustain it, he ought to have shown its
defects; but this he had not done.
Mr. MITCHILL was in favor of the resolution, as he believed a refusal to
adopt it would be attended with unpleasant sensations. He judged so from
an historical review of the business. The several States had associated
together for their common defence, and, in the eye of equity, whatever
that defence required, should constitute a common charge. The accounts
of expenses thus incurred were not settled till the new Government was
established. That Government fixed the mode of settlement; it appointed
a board of referees, to report the debts and credits of the respective
States. In this report, it was the fortune of certain States,
notwithstanding the greatness of their contributions, to be reported
debtor States. These States became debtors from the independent spirit
with which they asserted their sovereign rights. Not relying on the
general contributions, they furnished great supplies without making any
charge to the Union; by exerting all their strength, they paid as they
went, and preserved no vouchers of what they paid. This, he averred, was
the case as to the State which he had the honor in part to represent; a
State as willing as able to contribute, and which did contribute to a
great extent; but which had neglected to preserve her vouchers, the
preservation of which would have made her a creditor State. He believed,
therefore, that in equity, the States were not bound to pay these
balances. But to this it is replied, the award is final. He would not
agree to that; he denied it. Besides, there was a want of coercive power
in the United States to enforce those demands. From this consideration
alone, we ought to proceed with lenity, and endeavor to make the
settlement a peaceable one. As in other circumstances, we ought to make
a virtue of necessity.
Mr. S. SMITH said, he did not rise to take any part in the debate, but
in order to bring the subject directly before the committee. To do
which, he moved so to amend the resolution as to make it read,
"Resolved, That it is expedient to extinguish the claims," &c.
Mr. LOWNDES hoped the amendment would not be agreed to. He did not see
the expediency of volunteering a relinquishment of the claims
established against several of the States. The amendment was calculated
to take the committee by surprise. The original resolution went merely
to consider the expediency of a relinquishment; the amendment involved
the principle itself.
Mr. HILL was desirous the amendment should not be made, not from any
indisposition himself to agree to it, but from a regard to the
sentiments of other gentlemen. Even if it was ascertained that these
debts had arisen on a just consideration, yet, in his opinion, they
ought to be extinguished, from the principle that, in our Government,
whatever hazarded the harmony of the Union, ought to be avoided.
Precedents were not wanting in which sacrifices were made to this
principle. He alluded to the quieting the claims under Connecticut
rights. But, whatever might be the general ideas on this subject
elsewhere, he knew not a man in North Carolina, who did not believe the
adjustment iniquitous. To show the committee how the citizens of that
State felt, he would state a case that had occurred before the Board of
Commissioners. Two claims had been made, both for the same amount and
the same description of supplies, one on one side and one on the other
side, of Pedee River; one in North, and the other in South Carolina;
and, in one case, seven shillings had been allowed, and in the other,
only sixpence for the bushel of wheat. The business generally was
entitled to the attention of Congress. It had, in fact, already been
attended to at different times. New York had extinguished eight hundred
thousand dollars of her balance under certain provisions applied to her
case.
Mr. BACON said, if the object of the motion was to go into a new
liquidation of the old accounts between the United States and the
several States, it would not only take up every day of the present
session, but the work would be left unfinished for our successors. These
debts had been incurred in a common cause, in which each State was
equally interested, and towards which each State was bound equally to
contribute. When Congress made requisitions on this principle, they were
accompanied by a promise that there should be a final liquidation. This
liquidation was made; the settlement was complete. But this settlement
is now objected to, and what is to be done? Why we must annul the
contract. This might satisfy some of the States, but he was sure it
would dissatisfy others. He saw, therefore, no end to be answered by the
motion. We must either set aside all that had been done, and begin _de
novo_, to which this body is incompetent, or rest satisfied with what is
already done.
Mr. R. WILLIAMS observed, that since he had held a seat in the House,
this subject had been almost every session called up. The more he had
heard it discussed, the more he became convinced of the necessity of
getting it out of the way. He found that whenever it was brought up, all
was imagination. One State contended that it had contributed largely,
and another, that its exertions had not been surpassed.
We are asked, why relinquish these balances before we are solicited by
the States? He would reply that North Carolina never had recognized the
debt, and, in his opinion, never would apply for its extinguishment. He
was in favor of the amendment, because the principle ought to be
decided here, and not in a select committee. What, indeed, could such
committee report? There were no vouchers or books whereon the settlement
had been made to be got at. All they could do, then, would be to report
the balances alleged to be due, which any member could at any time
learn.
It seemed almost useless to go into arguments to show the injustice of
the claim, and of consequence, the justice of the resolution. It had
been justly said, that those States which had contributed the most, had,
by the report of the Commissioners, the most to pay; and this was
peculiarly so with the State of North Carolina.
Mr. W. had forborne to dwell on the injustice of these demands. But were
he to enter on that branch of the discussion, he should say that the
very act of destroying all the vouchers was of itself sufficient to
justify any suspicion. He should say, that for what, in some States,
there had been an allowance of one hundred pounds, North Carolina had
not been allowed twenty shillings. Could, then, gentlemen talk of moral
obligation, and say that this was a just debt?
Mr. T. MORRIS said, it was contended that the accounts should be opened
anew and re-examined. The fears, therefore, of the gentleman from
Massachusetts, were entirely visionary. The resolution was a simple one.
It proposes to inquire into the expediency of doing away these debts.
The amendment goes to determine the principle here. He thought it proper
the principle should be settled here. But gentlemen say they want
information. If so, after the amendment is agreed to, they may move for
a postponement. If the amendment were carried, he would himself move a
postponement.
It had been said that New York had had eight hundred thousand dollars of
her debt remitted by the United States. But how did the case really
stand? New York had availed herself of the act of Congress, not because
she acknowledged the debt to be just, but because she preferred doing
something to remaining in the situation towards the United States in
which she stood. It was strange, then, to hear gentlemen say that New
York had been favored. What was the fact? North Carolina, according to
the gentleman, had not, and would not, pay one cent; and New York had
discharged a greater sum than was due by all the other debtor States,
with the exception of Delaware. She was, therefore, instead of being
favored, placed in a worse situation than any other State. It was from
the existence of this state of things that he wished a final decision to
be made this session. New York having agreed to make certain payments to
the United States, it was important to her to know whether the United
States meant to enforce payment by the other States. Her situation would
be truly unfortunate, if after agreeing to pay, the United States
suffered her claims against the other States to sleep. She would not
only have to pay her quota of the debts, but would see no prospect of
deriving her share of benefit from the payments of the other debtor
States.
Mr. MACON said the subject was a very old one, which had occupied much
time every session for many years, and he thought it would be as well to
try the question now as at any other time. No information of a select
committee could throw any new light upon it.
There was a fact which ought to have great weight with the committee.
One of the Commissioners who made the settlement, who was a member of
this House, had, after the settlement, proposed a resolution to
extinguish the balances of the debtor States; and he had stated, as a
reason for this measure, that the principle adopted by the board had
operated very harshly upon particular States. Mr. M. had it from
authority not to be questioned, that in the settlement by the
Commissioners, teams, with the usual number of horses, had not produced
twenty shillings.
This subject had hung over our heads for eight years, and no scheme was
yet devised for collecting the balances. How could they be collected?
Congress had, it is true, authorized expenditures by the States in the
erection of fortifications; but this very act was a tacit confession of
the impracticability of getting the money into the public Treasury. As
to a settlement with North Carolina, it was involved in great
difficulty. In the act of cession of lands by that State to the United
States, it was provided that the territory ceded should be pledged to
pay a proportional share of the balance due the United States. How could
that share be estimated?
Mr. M. regretted that this subject had been brought up. He should not
himself have been for bringing it up, for he thought the claims of the
United States not worth a rush. The truth was, the States had all
exerted themselves in one great and common cause; they had done their
best; they had acted with great glory. As to the State which he
represented, he would ask if the first blood that had been spilled after
that shed at Boston was not in North Carolina? and that was the blood of
brother against brother. He desired not, however, to make comparisons,
which were always unpleasant, but to show that North Carolina had no
reason to shrink from an inquiry which would demonstrate that she had
fully contributed her share in the common cause, without meaning to
assert that she had done more than other States. Let, then, Congress
decide at once, and abandon the claims altogether, or devise some plan
for collecting them, that we may know how we stand.
Mr. DANA said, I hope the amendment will not be agreed to. However
gentlemen may be possessed of a wholesale intellect, that enables them
to decide on interesting questions without a moment's reflection, I
confess I am not blessed with so happy an intuition. I do not know that
I have ever been called upon to form an opinion on this subject. As to
a reference of it to a committee, I think their investigation may be
useful, and after we get that, we may take time to decide. But now the
plan is changed, and we are called upon to decide at once the principle.
This mode of transacting business may be called an economy of time. You
may give it the name, but it is not the substance. For my part, I desire
to proceed according to our old plan, and go through the slow process of
investigation. This is my way, and gentlemen may rest assured that this
mode of hurrying business is not the way to save time, but to lose it.
Mr. BAYARD declared himself in favor of the amendment, and he could not
think, notwithstanding the remarks of his honorable friend from
Connecticut, that any gentleman in the House was unprepared to vote upon
it. The subject had been frequently discussed, and he believed that the
House was then as well prepared for a decision as they would be for a
century to come. It involved but a single principle; and, as to
information, he could scarcely tell what information was wanted. He felt
much of the indifference of the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr.
MACON.) He was sure the United States had neither the right, nor the
power to recover these balances; and he repeated it as his opinion, that
it had not been the original intention that the debtor States should pay
them. Will gentlemen recollect that the commission was instituted under
the old Confederation. Had Congress, then, a right to do any thing to
bind the sovereignties of the independent States? All they could do was
to pass resolutions making requisitions, which the States might or might
not comply with. They could appoint Commissioners to settle the
accounts, but could they impose the debts upon the States? No, they
could not. It, therefore, never could have been contemplated that they
would establish those debts. The only effect that could have been
contemplated, was, that the creditor States might rely that, on a
settlement, Congress would assume their balances.
On the question being put, the amendment was lost--yeas 41, nays 46.
When the original resolution for referring to a select committee the
consideration of the expediency of extinguishing the balances was
carried.
_Ordered_, That Mr. THOMAS, Mr. BAYARD, Mr. DANA, Mr. HILL, and Mr.
BUTLER, be appointed a committee, pursuant to the said resolution.
And the House adjourned.
TUESDAY, February 16.
_Judiciary System._
The House then went into Committee of the Whole on the Judiciary bill
from the Senate.[66]
Mr. HENDERSON.--I should not rise to offer my opinion on the great
question before the committee, were I not placed in a situation
different from that in which I have been since I have had the honor of a
seat in this House. The Legislature of the State of North Carolina, one
of whose representatives I am on this floor, have seen proper to
instruct their Senators and to recommend to their Representatives in
Congress, to use their exertions to procure a repeal of the law passed
the last session of Congress, for the more convenient organization of
the Courts of the United States, and the bill on your table has for its
object the repeal of this law, and as I shall probably vote against its
passage, a decent respect for the opinions of those who have framed and
sent forward those resolutions, demands that I should give the reasons
which influence my conduct.
The people of America have obtained and established that the powers of
Government shall be vested in three great departments; the Legislative,
the Executive, and the Judicial. They have said that there shall be a
House of Representatives, the members of which shall be chosen by the
people of the several States every second year. Though this House is
composed of members chosen by the people immediately; though they can
have no other interest than the great community from which they were
sent; though they must return to the common mass in the short period of
two years; yet enlightened America did not see proper to intrust the
power of making laws to this body alone; they knew that the history of
man, and the experience of ages, bore testimony against the safety of
committing this high power to any one Assembly not checked by any other
body. They have therefore erected another branch of the Legislature,
called the Senate, the members of which are not to be elected by the
people immediately, but by the sovereignties of the several States; they
are to be chosen for six years, and not for two; and the qualifications
requisite to entitle those to a seat is different from that of a member
of this House. To these bodies are given the power of initiating all
laws; but after a bill has passed both of these Houses, before it
becomes of binding obligation on the nation, it must be approved of by
the President; it is a dead letter until life is given by the Executive.
The President is elected not by the people, not by the Legislatures of
the several States, not by either House of Congress, but by Electors
chosen by the people. He is to hold his office during four years. This
is the second great department of the Government. It will be easily
discovered from this cursory view of our constitution, the caution and
jealousy with which the people have conferred the power of making laws,
of commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. But, sir,
after this law was made, after its authoritative mandate was
acknowledged by the nation, it became necessary to establish some
tribunal to judge of the extent and obligation of this law. The people
did not see proper to intrust this power of judging of the meaning of
their laws, either to the Legislative or to the Executive, because they
participated in the making of these laws; and experience had shown that
it is essential for the preservation of liberty that the Judicial and
Legislative authorities should be kept separate and distinct. They
therefore enacted a third department, called the Judicial, and said that
"the Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The judges both of the Supreme and inferior courts
shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times
receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office."
It is admitted, I understand, by all parties, by every description of
persons, that these words, "shall hold their offices during good
behavior," are intended as a limitation of power. The question is, what
power is thus to be limited and checked? I answer, that all and every
power which would have had the authority of impairing the tenure by
which the judges hold their offices, (if these words were not inserted,)
is checked and limited by these words; whether that power should be
found to reside in Congress, or in the Executive. These words are broad
and extensive in their signification, and can only be satisfied by being
construed to control the Legislative as well as the Executive power. But
gentlemen contend that they must be confined to limiting the power of
the President. I ask gentlemen, what is there in the constitution to
prove their signification to this end alone? When you erect a court and
fill it with a judge, and tell him in plain, simple language, that he
shall hold his office during good behavior, or as long as he shall
behave well; what, I beseech you, sir, will any man, whose mind is not
bewildered in the mazes of modern metaphysics, infer from the
declaration? Certainly that the office will not be taken from him until
he misbehaves; nor that he will be taken from the office during his good
behavior. Under this impression he enters upon his duty, performing it
with the most perfect satisfaction to all persons who have business
before him; and the Legislature, without whispering a complaint,
abolishes the office and thereby turns out the judge. The judge is told
this is no violation of the compact; although you have behaved well,
although we have promised that as long as you did behave well you should
continue in office, yet, there is now no further necessity for your
services, and you may retire. These words, "during good behavior," are
intended to prevent the President from dismissing you from office, and
not the Legislature from destroying your office. Do you suppose, sir,
that there is a man of common understanding in the nation, whose mind is
not alive to the influence of party spirit, that would yield his assent
to this reasoning? I hope and believe there is not. But, sir, how is it
proved that the President would have had the power of removing the
judges from their office, if these words, "during good behavior," had
not been inserted in the constitution? Are there any words in that
instrument which give the President expressly the power of removing any
officer at pleasure? If there are, I call upon gentlemen to point them
out; it does not result from the fashionable axiom, that the power which
can create can destroy. The President can nominate, but he can appoint
to office only by the advice and consent of the Senate. Therefore, it
would follow, if the power of displacing results from that of creating,
that the Senate should participate in displacing as well as creating
officers. But however this may be, it is certainly a mere constructive
power which he has exercised, because the Legislature have, from motives
of expediency, acknowledged that he had it. If the constitution does not
necessarily give the President the right of removing officers at
pleasure, and if that right depend upon Legislative acts or
constructions, where would have been the necessity for inserting these
emphatic words as a check and limitation of Executive power, where
without them the President has no such power? You are taking great pains
to control a power which does not exist. The persons who framed our
constitution knew that a power of removal in ordinary cases must exist
somewhere. They took care, therefore, that in whatever hands it might
fall, the language of the constitution respecting the tenure of the
office of a judge should be co-extensive with the whole power of
removal, whether it should reside in one or in more hands.
But it has been said that the powers of each Congress are equal, and
that a subsequent Legislature can repeal the acts of a former; and as
this law was passed by the last Congress, we have the same power to
repeal it which they had to enact it. This objection is more plausible
than solid. It is not contended by us that legislatures who are not
limited in their powers have not the same authority. The question is not
what omnipotent Assemblies can do, but what _we_ can do under a
constitution defining and limiting with accuracy the extent and
boundaries of our authority. The very section in the constitution (sec.
third, art. first) which I have read, is a proof against the power of
every Congress to repeal the acts of their predecessors. In the latter
part of the eighth section it is proposed that the judges shall receive
for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office; and yet the salary was ascertained and
fixed by a former Congress. The same observations may be made with
respect to compensation for the President, which can neither be
increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been
elected. It is not competent for this Congress to vary the compensation
to him which has been fixed by a prior Legislature. It is clearly seen,
upon a little investigation, that the position which gentlemen take is
too extensive, and leads immediately to a destruction of the
constitution. It does away all check, and makes the Legislature
omnipotent. It has been asked, that if a corrupt and unprincipled
Congress should make an army of judges, have not a subsequent Congress
the right of repealing the law establishing this monstrous judicial
system? I answer that they have not; the same mode of reasoning which
attempts to prove this right from an abuse of power will also prove that
you may lessen the compensation of your judges. May not equal oppression
be imposed upon the people by giving your judges exorbitant salaries as
by increasing their numbers? May not the same corrupt and unprincipled
motive which would lead men to the raising of an army of judges lead
them to squander the public money? And may they not, instead of giving
their judges two thousand dollars a year, give them two hundred
thousand? And yet, sir, if it were to take place, I know of no authority
under the constitution to lessen that exorbitant compensation. The
Government of our country is predicated upon a reasonable confidence in
those who administer our public affairs. They must have the power of
acting for the public welfare, and this would never have been given them
if the possible abuse of this power were a sufficient reason for
withholding it.
Again, sir, the construction which gentlemen on the other side of the
House contend for, tends to the concentration of Legislative and
Executive powers in the same hands. If Congress, who have the power of
making laws, can also displace their judges by repealing that which
creates the offices they fill, the irresistible consequence is, that
whatever law is passed the judges must carry into execution, or they
will be turned out of office. It is of little importance to the people
of this country whether Congress sit in judgment upon their laws
themselves, or whether they sit in judgment upon those who are appointed
for that purpose. It amounts to the same despotism; they in fact judge
the extent and obligations of their own statutes by having those in
their power who are placed on the sacred seat of justice. Whatever the
Legislature declares to be law must be obeyed. The constitutional check
which the judges were to be on the Legislature is completely done away.
They may pass ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, suspend the writ
of habeas corpus in time of peace, and the judge who dares to question
their authority is to be hurled from his seat. All the ramparts which
the constitution has erected around the liberties of the people, are
prostrated at one blow by the passage of this law. The monstrous and
unheard of doctrine which has been lately advanced, that the judges have
not the right of declaring unconstitutional laws void, will be put into
practice by the adoption of this measure. New offences may be created by
law. Associations and combinations may be declared treason, and the
affrighted and appalled citizen may in vain seek refuge in the
independence of your courts. In vain may he hold out the constitution
and deny the authority of Congress to pass a law of such undefined
signification, and call upon the judges to protect him; he will be told
that the opinion of Congress now is, that we have no right to judge of
their authority; this will be the consequence of concentrating Judicial
and Legislative power in the same hands. It is the very definition of
tyranny, and wherever you find it, the people are slaves, whether they
call their Government a Monarchy, Republic, or Democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I see, or think I see, in this attempt, that spirit of
innovation which has prostrated before it a great part of the old
world--every institution which the wisdom and experience of ages had
reared up for the benefit of man. A spirit which has rode in the
whirlwind and directed the storm, to the destruction of the fairest
portion of Europe; which has swept before it every vestige of law,
religion, morality, and rational government; which has brought twenty
millions of people at the feet of one, and compelled them to seek refuge
from their complicated miseries in the calm of despotism. It is against
the influence of this tremendous spirit that I wish to raise my voice,
and exert my powers, weak and feeble as they are. I fear, sir, on the
seventh of December, it made its appearance within these walls, clothed
in a gigantic body, impatient for action. I fear it has already begun to
exert its all-devouring energy. Have you a judiciary system extending
over this immense country, matured by the wisdom of your ablest and best
men? It must be destroyed. Have you taxes which have been laid since
the commencement of the Government? And is the irritation consequent
upon the laying of taxes worn off? Are they paid exclusively by the
wealthy and the luxurious part of the community? And are they pledged
for the payment of the public debt? They must be abolished. Have you a
Mint establishment, which is not only essentially necessary to protect
the country against the influx of base foreign metals, but is a splendid
attribute of sovereignty? It must be abolished. Have you laws which
require foreigners coming to your country to go through a probationary
state, by which their habits, their morals, and propensities may be
known, before they are admitted to all the rights of native Americans?
They must be repealed, and our shores crowded with the outcasts of
society, lest oppressed humanity then should find no asylum on this
globe!
THURSDAY, February 18.
A message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
transmitting a letter from the Secretary of War on the subject of
certain lands in the neighborhood of our military posts, on which it
might be expedient for the Legislature to make some provisions. A letter
was also received from the Governor of Indiana, on the same subject. The
said Message and letter were read, and ordered to lie on the table.
_The Judiciary Bill._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on
the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act to repeal certain acts
respecting the organization of the Courts of the United States and for
other purposes."
Mr. STANLEY.--Mr. Chairman, every measure which is brought under the
consideration of a Legislature must first be tested by its expediency.
Unhappily, in the present instance, another question arises--its
constitutionality. I will endeavor, concisely, to examine the subject on
both those points. And, first, as to the expediency of the measure. In
order to form a correct estimate between the present Judiciary system of
the courts of the United States and that for which it was substituted,
it is proper to take a comparative view of both.
Under the former system, there were six judges of the Supreme Court of
the United States, who held two sessions of the Supreme Court in each
year, at the seat of Government. Those judges also held in each State a
circuit court, two terms in each year, in which the judge of the
district was associated with the circuit judge. The organization of the
district courts having jurisdiction, principally, of matters affecting
the revenue and admiralty causes, not being connected with the present
question, need not be examined. From the errors of this system resulted,
first, a delay of justice. The judges bound to hold courts in succession
at remote parts of the continent, were continually travelling; from the
variety of accidents to which travellers are subjected in this country,
from the condition of roads and overflowing of rivers, it frequently
happened that the judges failed in their attempts to get to the courts,
or arrived so late that little business was done. Suitors, jurors, and
witnesses, were subjected to the trouble and expense of attending courts
without the accomplishment of their business; hence resulted a delay of
justice. In the State to which I belong, during the few years existence
of the former system, this was the case frequently.
Another great evil resulting from that system was, its tendency to
lessen the character and respectability of the Federal bench. Those best
acquainted with the profession of the law will most readily admit, that
even a life of patient study is unequal to the complete attainment of
principles and rules; and that much labor and industry are necessary to
preserve that which is gained. Consequently, that extent of legal
knowledge, correctness of judgment, and respectability of character,
which should designate the persons qualified for this important trust
were seldom to be found, but in men far advanced in years. Men
possessing these qualifications, not inured to labor, are seldom equal
to the fatigue of their duty; or, if at the time of appointment, fast
approaching to the infirmities of age, were not to be expected to
relinquish the enjoyments of private life for an office, which, however
honorable, subjected them to the fatigue of a day laborer. The office,
with its incumbrances, was, as it were, offered to the lowest bidder.
And men best qualified to honor the bench, were driven from it. True it
is, men have been found eminently uniting virtue and talents, who have
accepted the office under all its distressing circumstances, but we owe
this rather to their patriotism than to the advantages of the situation.
Let it also be remembered that, in some instances, gentlemen who would
have adorned the seat of justice of any country, were compelled to
relinquish their seats; and in others, refused to accept the
appointment.
Another error of that system was, that the judges of the Supreme Court,
the court in the last resort, before whom the errors of the inferior
circuit courts were to be corrected, were the same men who presided in
those circuit courts. With great deference for the opinions of gentlemen
who prefer that system, I pronounce my opinion, that its errors were
radical; that those who justly estimated the importance to our interest
and national character, of a speedy and correct administration of
justice, ought to have desired a change. The present system has happily
obviated these errors. The States are divided into six circuits; in each
State is appointed one judge, called a circuit judge; the judges of the
States, composing one circuit, ride together into the States of their
circuit, and together hold the court. The much smaller distance which
those judges have to travel than the circuit judges, under the former
system, secure their due attendance; a portion of their time is left
them to study and reflection, and the same persons presiding at
successive terms, a uniformity of decision is preserved. The six former
judges hold the Supreme Court, with original constitutional jurisdiction
in matters of the utmost national importance, and appellate
jurisdiction, in certain cases, where the sum in dispute is two thousand
dollars; they are also the court in which the errors of the circuit
court are examined and corrected.
It is objected against the act proposed to be repealed, that a dangerous
patronage is created by it for the President. I shall pass over what I
consider an inconsistency in this objection coming from gentlemen who
profess that implicit confidence is due to the man chosen by the people,
who, in his appointments, speaks not less the voice of the people than
the voice of God, and examine the weight of the objection. If this
apprehended patronage means the power of appointing the Judiciary, that
power is given by the constitution, and is the same, whether the power
of the Judiciary be vested in six or in sixteen judges. If it fear an
undue control over the people in favor of the Executive, through the
Judiciary, make the judges as independent as we contend they are and
ought to be, and they are placed beyond the necessity of descending to
the practice of improper means to preserve Executive favor.
We have been told, sir, that it is necessary the judges should ride into
the States to gain a knowledge of the laws by which, in many cases, they
are to decide. Until this occasion I have never heard that the laws of a
country could only be acquired in the atmosphere of that country where
they are in force. Nine-tenths of the decisions in our State courts and
Federal courts turn on questions of common law; yet, has it ever been
suggested that an American judge was incompetent to decide on common law
questions, because he had not studied in England? No, sir, the knowledge
in both cases may be acquired in the closet. To these observations
permit me to add, that the remonstrances from the bar of Philadelphia,
composed of gentlemen no less celebrated for the respectability of their
private than of their professional character, who, on this occasion, so
interesting to the welfare of their country, have sacrificed their
political prejudices, strongly expressing their decided preference of
the present system to the former, is, to my mind, conclusive, that it
ought to be preferred. I am, therefore, of opinion, that it is
inexpedient to pass the present repealing bill; and so long as my
opinion is supported by the respectable authority I have just alluded
to, and opposed only by the objections which I have noticed, I shall
feel satisfied that opinion is correct.
In approaching the second question which I proposed to examine--the
constitutionality of the measure--whether I reflect on the magnitude of
the question on the one hand, or my inability on the other, I am,
indeed, humbled before the undertaking.
Without examining whether Government, according to the modern opinion,
should be founded on the reason and sense of justice of man, it is
certain our Government is calculated to guard against his weakness and
his wickedness. Our Government has been particularly cautious on this
subject; it has left nothing to the hazard of reason or sense of
justice; it has carefully delegated powers to three distinct
departments, and separated these departments by boundaries plainly
marked and formed, each so as not to control, at least to check, the
other. The Legislative powers, though vested in men chosen frequently
and by the people themselves in one branch, and by the immediate agents
of the people in the other, are nevertheless the object of suspicion and
caution. Their powers, far from resting on their discretion or sense of
expediency, are expressly and cautiously limited. The Executive
conditional veto forms one check on the Legislature; the Judiciary, I
shall contend, are a check on both. Here, permit me to say, that from
the spirit and the words of our constitution, I infer that the Judiciary
are a co-ordinate department with the Executive and Legislative. The
framers of our constitution, satisfied that the powers of well-organized
Governments ought to be divided into three branches--Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial--have nowhere expressly declared there shall be
such departments, but, after premising the objects of the Government,
proceed to ordain how the Legislature shall be composed; and article
two, section two, declares, "The power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America; he shall hold his office during the term
of four years," and prescribes the mode of election. Article three,
section one, also declares, "The Judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and the judges of
the supreme and inferior courts shall hold, &c., during good behavior.
By comparing these sections of the constitution, it appears the
Judiciary and the Executive are expressly created by the constitution,
and nothing is left to the discretion of Congress, as to the existence
of these departments; they are created by the same words; and if the
Legislature claim a right to put down the Judiciary at pleasure, before
the happening of that event till which the constitution secures their
offices--their misbehavior--they may as well assume the right to remove
the President before the happening of that event till which his office
is secured, to wit, the expiration of four years. I shall attempt to
establish as a first principle, that the Judiciary are a check on the
Legislature, and thence to show first, that, by the spirit of our
constitution, the Judiciary ought to be independent, beyond the control
or influence of either of the other departments of power; and secondly,
that, by the words of the constitution, they are so secured.
First, then, that the Judiciary are a check on the Legislature. In the
constitution, we find certain powers delegated to Congress; we also find
they are prohibited from exercising certain powers; among which are,
they shall pass no _ex post facto_ law, no bill of attainder, no law
respecting religion, &c. Should, unhappily, a Legislature be found who,
from weakness or wickedness, or the union of both, should transgress the
bounds prescribed, what is the security of the citizen? After all the
experience derived from the example of other Governments, after all the
deliberation and wisdom of our sages who framed the constitution, are we
left, in this important instance, as under the despotism of a monarch,
to seek redress through the throes and convulsions of a revolution? No,
sir. The Judiciary are our security. The Legislature may enact
penalties, and denounce punishments against those who do not yield
obedience to their unconstitutional acts; their penalties cannot be
exacted, nor punishments inflicted, without the judgment of a court. The
judges are to expound the law, and that fundamental, paramount law, the
constitution. To this purpose they are sworn to support the
constitution. While the Judiciary firmly, independently, and uprightly,
discharge their duty and declare the act of the Legislature contrary to
the constitution, to be void, the Legislature are checked, and the
citizen shielded from oppression and persecution. But, ask gentlemen,
whence do the courts derive this power, and the honorable gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. THOMPSON) says, we are contending for this common law
doctrine, that the courts are a check on the Legislature. If I
misunderstood the gentleman, I trust he will correct me. Sir, that
gentleman, I am willing to presume, knows, what I assure him no
gentleman with whom on this occasion I act, is ignorant of, that this is
not a common law doctrine; that in England their courts have no check on
the Legislature--their Parliament are emphatically styled omnipotent,
and if they violate the few natural rights that remain to the citizens,
they have no remedy but in a resort to revolutionary principles; it was
the want of this check to the oppressions of their rulers, which has
produced civil wars, and driven one monarch from his kingdom, and sent
another to the scaffold. This power exists in no other Government,
because under no other Government does there exist a Legislature with
limited powers; under our Government it is the very essence, the
constitution of a court, the oath enjoined on them to support the
constitution. The exercise and the admission of this right are not new
in America; instances must be in the recollection of every gentleman. I
will cite a few most prominent: The honorable member (Mr. THOMPSON) has
been pleased to call the attention of the committee to the examples
drawn from his State; I beg leave to profit from the same source. In
1787, the Legislature of that State passed an act making new
arrangements in the jurisdiction of the courts. The judges, among whom
was that venerable gentleman mentioned by the member from that State,
whose merits and worth command the sincere homage of my respects,
protested against this act, and refused to carry it into effect; the
Legislature acquiesced, and the law was repealed.