_January 28, 1799._
_Extract of a letter from Rufus King, Esq., Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States at London, to the
Secretary of State, dated November 16, 1798._
"The annexed arrêt would appear extravagant and incredible,
if it proceeded from any other authority; but mankind is so
accustomed to the violence and injustice of France, that we
almost cease to express our surprise and indignation at the
new instances that she continues to display."
[TRANSLATION.]
_Decree of the Executive Directory, of October 29, 1798._
The Executive Directory, upon the report of the Minister of
Foreign Relations, considering that the fleets, privateers,
and ships, of England and Russia, are in part equipped by
foreigners.
Considering that this violation is a manifest abuse of the
rights of nations, and that the powers of Europe have not
taken any measures to prohibit it. Decrees:
1st. Every individual, native (_ou originaire_) of friendly
countries, allied to the French Republic, or neutral,
bearing a commission, granted by the enemies of France, or
making part of the crews of ships of war, and others,
enemies, shall be by this single fact declared a pirate,
and treated as such, without being permitted in any case to
allege that he had been forced into such service by
violence, threats, or otherwise.
2d. The Executive Directories of the Batavian, Lagurian,
Cisalpine, and Roman Republics, shall be instructed to this
effect.
3d. The provisions contained in the first article shall be
notified to those powers which are neutral or allied to the
French Republic.
4th. The Ministers of Exterior Relations is charged with
the execution of the present arrêt which shall be printed
in the Bulletin of the Laws.
(Signed)
TERILHARD, _President_.
The message and documents were read, and ordered to lie on the table.
TUESDAY, January 29.
THOMAS SUMTER, from South Carolina, appeared and took his seat in the
House.
FRIDAY, February 1.
JOHN FOWLER, from Kentucky, appeared and took his seat in the House.
_Remonstrance of Georgia._
On motion of Mr. BALDWIN, the House resolved itself into a Committee of
the Whole on the report of a select committee on the petition and
remonstrance of the Legislature of Georgia; and the resolution reported
by that committee being under consideration, its adoption was opposed
principally by Mr. ALLEN.
Mr. NICHOLAS thought the following resolution would be less
exceptionable than the one reported, and it was agreed to--55 votes
being in its favor.
"_Resolved_, That provision ought to be made by law for
complying with such treaty as the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES may think proper to make with the Creek Indians, and
for obtaining possession, in behalf of the State of
Georgia, of the lands lying within the country of
Tallassee, or other lands on the frontier of the said
State, which may be deemed equivalent thereto, and that
---- dollars be appropriated therefor."
The committee rose, and after some further remarks from Mr. ALLEN, the
resolution was concurred in--59 votes being in its favor. It was then
referred to the select committee to report a bill.
The House adjourned to Monday.
THURSDAY, February 7.
_Augmentation of the Navy._
On motion of Mr. JOSIAH PARKER, the House resolved itself into a
Committee of the Whole on the bill for the augmentation of the Navy,
and fixing the pay of the captains of ships or vessels of war; when the
first section being under consideration--
Mr. GALLATIN moved to strike out the words "six ships of war, of a size
to carry, and which shall be armed with not less than seventy-four guns
each; and these shall be built or purchased within the United States;"
in order to take the sense of the committee on the propriety of
building, at present, ships-of-the-line. When this subject was last year
before the House, the general opinion was, that during the present war,
considering the crippled state of the French navy, frigates and vessels
of a smaller size, were sufficient to protect our vessels on our own
coast, and in the West India seas; nor did that opinion seem to have
undergone any material alteration; for, although the Secretary of the
Navy, and the select committee, had reported that the expense of
building the six seventy-four gun ships now proposed, would amount to
$2,400,000, yet the appropriation asked for the present year was only
one million of dollars. It was not expected that much more than
one-third of the work necessary to send those ships to sea, could be
executed during the present year. It was not expected that they could be
finished in less than two or three years. They were not wanted for any
immediate purpose. The proposed measure was not therefore a measure of
defence. It was a project of a general nature. The question is, whether
it be proper, at the present time, to lay the foundation of a navy, of a
fleet, that might be able, hereafter, to give us a certain weight in
relation to European nations; which might be able to cope with the
fleets of those nations: and it was in order to bring that question
fairly before the Committee of the Whole that he had made his motion.
Should that motion prevail, it would not affect the building of the six
sloops of war which were said to be immediately wanted, in addition to
our present naval force, for the purpose of protecting our commerce. It
would merely prevent the building, at present, of a fleet which was
supposed, by the friends of the bill, to be wanted only for future
purposes.
This led him naturally to consider the expense of that navy. It is
stated by the Secretary of the Navy, that the annual expense of a 74-gun
ship will exceed 216,000 dollars, and that therefore the annual expense
of six of these ships will be about 1,300,000 dollars. That the building
and equipping a 74-gun ship, exclusive of military stores, will be
342,700 dollars; and that the military stores will cost 48,000 dollars;
so that the first building and equipping six of these vessels will cost
about 2,400,000 dollars. This is the first expense, but nothing is said
of the yearly repairing and building which will be necessary to keep up
a fleet of this kind. It is estimated, in the navies of Europe, that a
ship-of-the-line will last from 12 to 15 years; so that, besides
ordinary repairs, the whole expense of building would have to be
renewed every 12 or 15 years.[43] It would have been desirable, and it
might have been expected, that the select committee should have laid
before the House an estimate of the peace establishment of a navy to the
extent proposed, in order to have enabled the House to have formed a
just opinion on the main question. This they have not done; but
supposing the other estimates to be perfectly correct; supposing that
the expense would not overrun the calculations laid before the House,
and, if so, it would be the first time it had not done it; supposing,
according to those calculations, that a 74-gun ship will hereafter cost
us less than two-thirds of what 44-gun frigates have heretofore cost us;
it results, that the first necessary expense (including $150,000 for
docks and timber) will exceed, for six ships only, two millions and a
half of dollars; and that the annual expense of supporting them, when in
commission, exclusively of annual repairs, and of building new ships,
necessary to supply those that from time to time will become unfit for
service, will amount to 1,300,000 dollars.
If these premises are true, and he knew they could not be contradicted,
the conclusion must be most forcible that it is improper at present to
build a navy, especially since there is no immediate demand for it. But
if once the foundation of a large navy is laid, no one can say where it
will stop. The Secretary of the Navy does not suppose that six 74-gun
ships will be sufficient. He supposes twelve necessary; six are now
proposed merely as an entering wedge. And when once twelve
ships-of-the-line are obtained, if our commerce and coast, extensive as
they are, must be effectually protected, these will not be deemed
sufficient. He drew this conclusion from the naval force of European
nations. Our tonnage exceeds that of any European nation, except Great
Britain and Holland; and if we must have a navy to protect our commerce,
it must bear some proportion to the extent of our coast, to the amount
of our tonnage, and to the navies of the European nations. And upon what
terms are we to cope with the powers of Europe with respect to any navy?
It would be recollected that when last year there was a mutiny on board
the British fleet, in order to put an end to it, the sailors' wages were
advanced to one shilling sterling per day, equal to thirty shillings
sterling, or six dollars and two-thirds per month, whilst we give our
seamen seventeen dollars a month, so that we pay nearly three times as
much for men to supply our navy, as England does.
Mr. G said, he would not detain the committee longer at present, though
he meant to have made some observations with respect to the expense of
navies to those nations who support them in order to show that the
expense of them far exceeds the benefits derived from them. If reference
were had to European nations, it would be found, Mr. G. said, that
navies were used more as engines of power, than as a protection to
commerce. Even with respect to Great Britain, which is the only nation
which has succeeded in effecting any material object by a navy, though
she has obtained a preponderancy at sea, and has been mistress of it for
the last hundred years, yet it has been the means of involving her in
almost continual war, and the support of it has always been attended
with enormous expense. He believed he was correct, when he stated that
from 1776 to 1789, the average expense of the navy of Great Britain
(including a period of seven years of war and six of peace) was six
millions of pounds sterling a year. Now, said Mr. G., if we calculate
the rate at which we shall be obliged to pay for every thing
appertaining to a navy, what will be the sum necessary to support a navy
of any extent here? Suppose a navy should only be one-tenth part of the
British, and instead of 120 ships-of-the-line, we should be content with
twelve. The expense, according to the British rate of expenditure, would
be £600,000 sterling, nearly three millions of dollars a year; but when
we know that we pay three times as much for our seamen as they do, it is
impossible precisely to calculate what the expense would be.
In relation to European nations, it would be found, that none had ever
derived any advantage from a navy, except Great Britain. It has been
said (and by high authority) that an extensive commerce cannot be
maintained without a navy. In answer to this it may be said, that Spain
has always had a considerable navy, but very little commerce; their
tonnage compared with ours was insignificant, yet theirs is the third
navy in Europe. Holland, for a time, had a powerful navy; but they gave
it up, as more expensive than beneficial, since the wars of Queen Anne.
Yet their commerce, on this account, never diminished in any
considerable degree. They are the second commercial nation in Europe;
and they never suffer for want of a navy, except when they become a
party in war; he conceived, therefore, that a navy is not necessary to
protect commerce. At this time, Mr. G. knew that the commerce of Holland
was in a great degree annihilated; but so was that of France and Spain,
notwithstanding their powerful navies. Holland being at the door of
Great Britain, may, in time of war, be altogether blocked up by the
fleets of that nation. Fortunately that was not our situation.
Mr. G. concluded by saying, that as he believed commerce might exist
independently of a navy; that a navy would cost far more than it would
ever benefit the country; and knowing our finances were not such as to
admit of the expense, he must hope his motion would prevail.
FRIDAY, February 8.
_Augmentation of the Navy._
The House then went into Committee of the Whole on the bill for
augmenting the Navy, Mr. GALLATIN'S motion for striking out what
relates to 74-gun ships being under consideration.
Mr. JOSIAH PARKER hoped this amendment would not be agreed to. He was
happy to find, however, that the gentleman from Pennsylvania did not go
farther, and oppose the whole force, as he had heretofore always opposed
every thing like a navy. Indeed, he has acknowledged that our infant
navy has done some service, though he does not give to it all the credit
which the committee who reported this bill thinks it deserves. He
attributes the fall in insurance to other objects than the navy, because
he says it has fallen more on vessels to Europe, where our navy could
have had no effect, than to the West Indies, where that effect was more
likely to be produced. But the gentleman should have recollected that
the fall to Europe may have been occasioned by the vigilance of the
British navy; but in the West Indies, the British, or at least the
officers of the British men of war, seemed rather to countenance, than
prevent, the depredations of the French; as, in many instances, they
have suffered captures to be made by the French, and immediately
afterwards recaptured the vessels, and by that means obtained a salvage
upon them. Nor did he suppose the British Government would regret these
depredations, since they knew such treatment would serve to rouse the
resentment of this country against her enemy. Mr. P. supposed that the
saving produced by our navy had even been greater than the committee had
supposed, as, by the report made yesterday on the subject of our
exports, it appears they have been ten millions more than the committee
calculated them at. He allowed that our navy had not been the sole cause
of safety to our commerce; the British navy had also contributed greatly
to it. But it would be recollected that when this navy was first fitted
out, French privateers and picaroons were not only upon our coast, but
in our very bays; and, but for these measures, there can be no doubt,
but our shores would at this time have swarmed with French privateers,
which the British would have suffered, in order to widen the breach
between the two countries.
Mr. P. hoped when the quantity of shipping, and the number of seamen we
employ, is considered--that these are the means of bringing us from
foreign countries all that we desire to have from thence, and that they
thereby fill our treasury with money--gentlemen will not hesitate to
allow our commerce a competent protection. No nation, except Great
Britain, exceeds this country in the number of vessels and men engaged
in this service, yet no nation has done so little to protect them. He
trusted we should be allowed to have a sufficient navy to protect our
commerce and coast, and to cause us to be respected abroad.
The British Government, Mr. P. said, has 141 sail-of-the-line,
(according to Steele's list, which he had lately seen,) and these,
according to the opinion of the first statesman and politician that
England ever possessed, Lord Chatham, require as many thousand seamen;
not that each vessel requires 1000 men, but it is necessary to have this
number in order to employ their frigates and sloops of war, not that the
ships of the line require 1000 men; yet, though Britain has this immense
navy, she has not double the number of merchant vessels and seamen which
this country possesses. If, said Mr. P., these six 74-gun ships and six
sloops are agreed to, we shall not want more than 12,000 seamen to man
our navy. At present we have only 4,000; and the whole annual expense
will be 4,230,149 dollars. Mr. P. believed, in order to give us
efficient protection, we ought to have eleven sail-of-the-line; but as
he considered six to be as many as our present finances will allow, he
should be satisfied with that number.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania wished to be informed as to the expense
of a peace establishment of our navy. A large navy in time of peace
would be unnecessary; he should wish it, however, to be kept on a
respectable footing. Many of our ships, Mr. P. said, will last much
longer than the gentleman from Pennsylvania had supposed; some of them,
he doubted not, would last forty or fifty years. The British have ships
which have been in service thirty years; when poorly built they may not
last more than seven years. He had not made an estimate of what would be
the expense of a peace establishment with respect to the navy; nor did
he know what force the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES might think it
necessary to maintain in time of peace, but he supposed it would be
small, and a single officer and thirty men would be sufficient to take
care of a ship where she is laid up in ordinary: that only a few of the
best ships would be kept, and the others sold.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania had represented the expense of a navy in
this country as being much greater than in England; but when he spoke of
the pay of British sailors being only one shilling sterling a day, he
was certainly mistaken. They have at least a guinea and an half a month,
which is seven dollars; and ours average fourteen dollars, which is
double to that of England. If the same means were taken here that are
taken in England, of raising men by means of press-gangs (which,
however, he rejoiced never could be suffered in this country,) they
might, perhaps, be gotten on easier terms, as the Government might
follow the example of Great Britain, by fixing the pay and pressing the
men. He would much rather pay higher wages; especially when it is
considered that a very small part of the money paid to seamen will ever
go out of the country; they spend their money freely, and the United
States will not, therefore, lose it.
And as to the number of men employed in the navy, if they were not thus
employed in our own service, they would go abroad, since this is the
employment they choose; indeed, if all our citizens were employed in
cultivating the ground, our produce would be so great, and sell for so
little, as to make it scarcely worth the trouble of raising. And if we
do not provide for our own defence, we shall be at the mercy of every
foreign power which chooses to insult or ill-treat us. The interests of
commerce and agriculture must always go hand in hand; and farmers who
now get so much better a price for their product than they heretofore
got, ought to be the first in supporting a navy sufficient to protect
our vessels in carrying that produce to foreign countries. When they see
their interests more clearly, Mr. P. trusted they would, like the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, be ready to allow that our navy is of
service. It would be happy for us, and for the world, Mr. P. said, if
there were no use for navies, and nations might be permitted to carry
their productions wherever they pleased without annoyance; but, while
nations continue to make war upon each other, we must expect to come in
for our share of the evils of such a system, and it will be necessary to
have some force not only to guard against injuries, but to keep foreign
belligerent nations in check, lest we should throw our force into the
scale against them. The French Directory, said Mr. P., have lately
passed a decree, which ought to be considered as a declaration of war
against the world, "that the citizens of neutral countries found on
board of any of their ships shall be considered and punished as
_pirates_!" Where is the man, exclaimed he, who will not defend his
country and his fellow-citizens against such a decree?
Mr. P. said he would take the liberty of quoting the authority, on the
subject of a navy, of a gentleman who deservedly ranked high in public
estimation, and whom he was proud to call his countryman. The authority
he referred to was Mr. Jefferson's Notes on Virginia. He read the
following extract.
"But the actual habits of our countrymen attach them to
commerce. They will exercise it for themselves. Wars, then,
must sometimes be our lot; and all the wise can do, will be
to avoid that half of them which would be produced by our
own follies, and our own acts of injustice; and to make for
the other half the best preparations we can. Of what nature
should these be? A land army would be useless for offence,
and not the best nor safest instrument of defence. For
either of these purposes, the sea is the field on which we
should meet an European enemy. On that element it is
necessary we should possess some power. To aim at such a
navy as the greater nations of Europe possess, would be a
foolish and wicked waste of the energies of our countrymen;
it would be to pull on our own heads that load of military
expense which makes the European laborer go supperless to
bed, and moistens his bread with the sweat of his brow. It
will be enough if we enable ourselves to prevent insults
from those nations of Europe which are weak on the sea,
because circumstances exist which render even the stronger
ones weak as to us. Providence has placed their richest and
most defenceless possessions at our door--has obliged their
most precious commerce to pass, as it were, in review
before us. To protect this, or to assail us, a small part
only of their naval force will ever be risked across the
Atlantic. The danger to which the elements expose them here
are too well known, and the greater danger to which they
would be exposed at home, were any general calamity to
involve their whole fleet. They can attack us by detachment
only; and it will suffice to make ourselves equal to what
they may detach. Even a smaller force than what they may
detach will be rendered equal or superior by the quickness
with which any check may be repaired with us, while losses
with them will be irreparable till too late. A small naval
force, then, is sufficient for us, and a small one is
necessary. What this should be, I will not undertake to
say. I will only say, it should by no means be so great as
we are able to make it."
Mr. P. perfectly concurred in this opinion. He had frequently expressed
it. But the gentleman from Pennsylvania says we have no money, and
therefore we ought neither to have a navy nor any thing else, to defend
ourselves at home or at sea. He tells the House that our revenue will
not exceed ten millions, and that if we agree to have these ships built,
we shall want twelve millions. Mr. P. trusted that if these two millions
were wanted the ways and means will be found, rather than that we shall
suffer our commerce to be destroyed, and lose all our credit as a nation
abroad. Admitting, said Mr. P., that our debt is a hundred millions of
dollars, it must be recollected that its increase has been owing to a
number of causes which could not be avoided, amongst which was our war
with the Indians, the Western insurrection, our treaty with Algiers, and
the building of vessels for the protection of our commerce; but if our
debt is fifteen millions more now than it was at the commencement of the
present Government, our numbers have greatly increased since that time,
so that he supposed, considering the number of individuals who have to
bear it, it is not so heavy, in proportion to our population, as it was
at that time. Having the ability, therefore, he trusted there would be
found the will to provide a respectable naval force to protect us at
home, our commerce abroad, and leave us in a situation to be more
respected by foreign nations than we have heretofore been, and therefore
hoped the present motion would be rejected.
Mr. HARPER.--Notwithstanding, Mr. Chairman, the subject now before the
committee, the usefulness of a Naval Establishment for the United
States, has been so frequently and so fully discussed on former
occasions, I deem it important to enter once more into a particular
consideration of it, less on account of the general reasons so often
urged against the measure, than of those particular objections, founded
on the supposed state of our pecuniary resources, whereby it has, at
this time, been assailed.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania has proved, as he thinks, that no
possible navy could be equal to the protection of our commerce, extended
as it is. And how has he proved this? By the example of other
nations--of Holland, Spain, and Great Britain. Spain, he says, has a
very considerable navy, perhaps the third in Europe, and yet no
commerce. Holland found herself unable to support her navy, and even
while she supported it, was unable to protect her trade; and therefore
she gave it up, and yet, after she had done so, continued to possess a
very great commerce. Even Britain, according to him, mistress of the
ocean as she has been for a century past, has not fully protected her
trade by her marine; which, in the mean time, has cost her more than the
whole sum which her trade has yielded--and, therefore, she would have
been better without a navy. This, Mr. Chairman, is the calculation of a
schoolboy, not of a statesman; of the counting-house, not of the
cabinet; and if the judgment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania were not
warped on this, as on so many other occasions, by his particular
political system, he would be one of the last persons in the world to
present the subject in a point of view so much beneath a mind of the
least political discernment. The gentleman, in fact, forgets that
Britain is indebted to her navy, not for her commerce only, but for her
independence; not only for the dominion of the seas, but for her
existence as a nation. Every man, who is in the smallest degree versed
in history, knows that Great Britain, but for her navy, must long since
have been a province of France. Had not Britain been mistress of the
ocean, France would long since have been not only her mistress, but
mistress of the rest of Europe. That great people, uniting within itself
all the sources of military, pecuniary, and maritime strength, has never
ceased to contend for universal empire, with immense means, vast genius,
boundless ambition and unwearied perseverance, since the period when,
two centuries ago, its provinces became united under one Government, and
its immense resources, managed and called into activity by a minister
whose mind was equal to his station, were directed to the increase of
its power and extension of its limits. How has Britain been enabled to
check this formidable career, to maintain her own power, and to arrive
at her present high pitch of consequence in the scale of nations? Not by
her population, which is little more than one-third of that possessed by
France; nor by her insular situation, which heretofore could not protect
her from invasion and conquest; nor by her military power, which, when
compared with that of France, has never been considerable--but by her
navy. It was that navy, and the wealth which commerce, protected by it,
poured into her lap, that enabled her to support with glory so unequal a
contest, to call to her aid the military force of Germany, and thus to
establish a counterpoise to the power of France. But for this naval
force, and the commerce which it protected and cherished--but for this
union, cemented by the money, and aided by the maritime preponderance of
England--France, combining, as she did, greater means of strength of
every kind than any other nation, or even than all the nations of
Europe united, except Germany and Great Britain, must long since have
established her dominion over all. England must have fallen first, being
unable, without the command of the sea, to save herself from invasion;
and then the powers of the Continent, deprived of the pecuniary aid
wherewith England was enabled by her commerce, under the protection of
her navy, to supply and unite them, would have bent, one after another,
beneath her formidable and continually augmenting strength. Even now
this same navy enables England to ride secure amidst the most terrible
storm wherewith the political world has ever been afflicted; to brave
all the tremendous dangers by which she has been threatened; to baffle
every attempt against her safety, or that of her remotest possessions;
and amidst the dismay, the humiliation, or the total overthrow of so
many powers, to triumph over her rival, whose strength, always
formidable, is exercised, not more by her extension of territory and of
influence, than by the consternation wherewith her successes have
stricken other States, by the disunion and feebleness which has
characterized their counsels, by the terrible weapon of internal
commotion with which she threatens, or has actually assailed them, and
by the unheard of despotism of her own Government, which enables it to
employ, in a degree hitherto unexampled in the history of civilized men,
the physical forces of the nation, in executing its plans of plunder and
conquest. This same navy enables England not only to maintain thus
gloriously a conflict so dreadful and so unequal, but to stand the
barrier between independence and universal dominion, between liberty and
the most degrading despotism, between civilization and the barbarism of
the dark ages--to become the citadel of property, the storehouse and the
banker of the world, and to render all nations, with their own consent,
tributary, by means of her commerce, to the support of her greatness.
What, then, Mr. Chairman, must we think of that political system which
estimates the British navy by a calculation of the sums which it has
cost to maintain it; forgetting that, without this navy, there would
have been no wealth to supply these sums, and, perhaps, no nation to pay
them; that without this navy, Great Britain, instead of holding her
present exalted station among the powers of the earth, must long since
have sunk into a secondary and unimportant State; and, probably, into
the condition of a province of that very rival against whom she now so
nobly and so gloriously contends! Is it too much to say of such a
calculation, that it is a paltry calculation, unworthy of a statesman,
and befitting only a schoolboy?
But even the navy of Great Britain, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has
told us, formidable as it is, has not afforded complete protection to
her commerce. How, then, he asks, can we expect to protect our commerce
by a navy? If the gentleman means by "protection" the total prevention
of captures at sea, it is certain that no nation ever did, or ever can
protect its commerce, in that scale. But that is not the true idea of
"protection," which means nothing more than such a degree of safety as
may enable the merchants of a nation, taken as a body, to pursue their
commercial enterprises without discouragement, or eventual loss. This is
all the protection that is ever attempted, or that is necessary; and
this, I contend, we have it in our power to give.
Respecting the navy of Holland, the gentleman from Pennsylvania falls
into a mistake equally remarkable. Holland, he tells us, has no navy,
and yet maintains a very great commerce. Formerly she had a navy, but
could not maintain it, and was forced to give it up. But where did that
gentleman learn that Holland has no navy? Had she no navy in the
American war, when with great gallantry, though with unequal success,
she fought the English at sea? Had she no navy when she fitted out the
formidable armament under De Winter, in October, 1797, which, after a
dreadful conflict, was defeated rather by the superior address of the
British Admiral, than the superior force or bravery of his fleet? Do we
not know, that even now, after this fatal defeat, she possesses, in her
different harbors, a much more numerous fleet than is proposed by the
present bill for the United States? How then could the gentleman from
Pennsylvania say that Holland has no navy? He ought to have known that
until the marine of France and Spain were destroyed, in the present war,
that of Holland was sufficient to turn the scale in their favor and
against England; which gave her not only security for her commerce, but
respectability and weight among the maritime powers of Europe.
As to the other assertion of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that
Holland a long time ago found her navy too burdensome for her resources,
and therefore gave it up, it is equally erroneous. Holland, as we have
seen, never gave up her navy, and even now, exhausted and ruined as she
is by French fraternity and internal revolution, maintains a much
greater one than is proposed for the United States. There is, indeed, a
period in her history, the close of the last and the beginning of the
present century, when she ceased to be ranked with the first maritime
powers of Europe; but that happened, not through the want of means, but
a mistake in policy. Before that period her system had been wholly
maritime. All her resources were applied to her navy. A maritime armed
neutrality was her great object, and she long preserved it with success.
Her commerce, fostered by her marine, spread over every sea; and the
Northern maritime States, guided to the same policy by her influence,
acknowledged her as their umpire, their mediator, and their safeguard.
The great powers courted her alliance and respected her rights. She
interfered with weight in their disputes. Her village of the Hague
became the centre of their most important negotiations. She disputed
the empire of the seas with them singly; and, at one time, she held the
united forces of France and England in check at sea, and finally
compelled the French armies to retreat from her territory, which they
had overrun and occupied. All this she effected by means of her navy,
and of the resources which it had furnished to her by the protection of
her commerce.
At this period she altered her system, and instead of cherishing her
marine, and confining herself solely to the maintenance of her commerce,
by an armed maritime neutrality at the head of the Northern Powers, she
engaged in the land wars of the great military powers, and made
exertions disproportionate to her strength, whereby her resources were
exhausted. Into this fatal mistake she was drawn by the aspiring
ambition, the popularity, and the heroism of one of her own citizens,
stimulated and aided by the aggressions, the insults, and the alarming
encroachments of the French Monarch, Louis XIV., at the zenith of his
glory, evidently aspiring to universal dominion. William III., placed by
his birth and personal merit at the head of the Dutch nation, saw those
objects of French ambition, and roused his own country to resistance.
Called, at length, to the Government of England, he communicated to that
nation his own martial ardor. He finally succeeded in forming a
confederacy to check the progress of France. Of this confederacy,
Holland, his native country, was induced by his influence to become a
principal member. At the head of it he struggled against the power of
France, with unequal means, and sometimes with unprosperous fortune, but
with a genius and perseverance not to be subdued, and a heroism rarely
to be equalled. After his death, the impulse which his mind had given to
his own and other countries continued to be felt, and the confederacy
was renewed under his successor, on a different occasion, but with the
same views. At length its object was altered. France was completely
humbled and Europe secured against her enterprises, but the strength of
Holland was undermined in the struggle. The vast armies which she had
kept up had loaded her with debts. Her operations for so many years, by
land, had drawn off her attention from her marine; and from that moment
it declined, while that of England rose gradually on its ruins.
Hence, Mr. Chairman, the downfall of the maritime greatness of Holland.
Her resources were not equal to the maintenance of fleets and armies, of
both maritime and military strength. While she was left to attend solely
to her maritime concerns, she continued to be powerful, respected, and
prosperous; but her situation on the Continent, in the neighborhood of a
great and ambitious military power, drew her, perhaps unnecessarily,
into land wars, to which her strength was unequal, and, of course, her
naval power declined. But still she continued for a century to keep up a
navy sufficient to form a considerable weight in the scale, and to
secure attention to her rights as a nation; and under this security her
commerce continued to flourish, in a greater or less degree, till a
domestic revolution, aiding and aided by foreign oppression, dried up
all its sources.
What, then, Mr. Chairman, is the instruction which we may draw from this
example? A nation whose population never exceeded two millions and a
half, and whose territory, compared with ours, is but a mere speck on
the surface of the globe, a mere garden spot, was able to maintain a
most formidable marine, while it attended to that object solely, to
extend its commerce under the protection of this marine, and to maintain
not only an equal, but a distinguished rank, among the great powers of
Europe, by whose territories it was surrounded, and by whose formidable
armies it was liable to be invaded. Even this nation, after a mistake in
its policy, or the pressure of inevitable circumstances, it had been
induced to divert its attention from its marine to land wars, to exhaust
its resources, and burden itself with debts too great for its means, by
these disproportionate efforts, still was able to preserve a navy
sufficient to give respectability to its flag, and a degree of safety to
its commerce. Even now, when its resources are dried up by anarchy, or
diverted by foreign exaction into the coffers of another nation; when
its territory is curtailed, and its population reduced to one million
and a half; when it is compelled to maintain an army of 25,000 men for
France, still it has a navy greater than we propose. Shall it, then, be
said, that this country, with probably six millions of population, most
rapidly increasing, with an extent of territory capable of containing
fifty millions, with a commerce greater than that of Holland ever was,
and with more tonnage and sailors than she ever possessed, is not able
to support such a navy as she, even since the commencement of her
downfall, has always supported, and still supports? Yes, it is said by
the gentleman from Pennsylvania; but the good sense of this House and of
this country will, I trust, correct his mistake, as it has so often done
heretofore.
But if it were true, Mr. Chairman, that Holland had afforded no
protection to her commerce by the navy which she has been able to keep
up, does it follow that the same thing will happen to us? Will the same
navy be more efficacious in our case, than in the case of Holland, or
Spain, or Portugal? This must be taken for granted in order to give any
solidity to the argument of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and yet
nothing can be more untrue. Those States are situated at the very door
of the great maritime powers, and their dominions are also exposed to
invasion by land. They must, therefore, either singly or by combinations
with other powers, contend against the whole maritime force of those
great States, and must maintain navies adequate to that purpose. But we
are under no such necessity. Placed at a vast distance from those great
powers, and in the neighborhood of those possessions which contribute
most to the support of their commerce and their navies, we can attack
them in a weak, and yet a vital part, with our whole force, while but a
small part of their force can at any time be brought to act against us.
It is with this part only that we shall have to contend, should they at
any time drive us into a war. Let us take England as an instance. Her
great and valuable possessions lie at our threshold. The uniform course
of the trade-winds compels all her vast and rich commerce with those
possessions, to pass almost in sight of our shores. The force which she
can send to protect this commerce and annoy us, in case of a rupture,
will not be her whole force, but that part of it only which she can
spare from Europe, after securing her preponderance there. France,
notwithstanding the prostrate condition of her navy at present,
possesses maritime means which will speedily enable her to raise it up
again, whensoever those means come to be directed, as one day they must,
by a Government of some understanding. This navy, and the maritime
combinations which will be formed under its protection, England must
watch and keep under. Her existence will depend upon it. She will,
therefore, have but little force to spare which she can bring to act
against us. A comparatively small maritime force, therefore, will compel
her to respect us, and to avoid a quarrel with us by all just and
reasonable means.
It follows that a moderate navy, a much smaller one than Holland, Spain,
or even Portugal, have supported, would be sufficient for our
protection, aided by the peculiar advantages of our situation. Those
nations, inconsiderable as they are when compared to us in population,
wealth, and extent of territory, have supported navies which, however
unequal to that of England, have yet afforded some degree of protection
to their trade, rendered their flags in some degree respectable, and
given them a weight in the scale, a consequence among nations, which
otherwise they could not have had. And shall not we, with our great and
increasing resources, and the peculiar advantages of our situation, be
able to effect still more?
Mr. NICHOLAS said this question was different from any former question,
with respect to the Navy, which had been before the House. Whatever
gentlemen may have heretofore said with respect to the advantages of a
navy for the protection of our commerce, they must agree that the
present question has a different aspect, as no man can say that
seventy-four gun ships are calculated to resist the kind of force which
has heretofore made attacks upon our commerce in the West Indies.
Mr. N. was far from believing that our armed vessels had produced the
effect which the committee, who reported this bill, stated them to have
done. He thought the gentleman from Pennsylvania had adduced many
sufficient reasons for the fall which had taken place in the price of
insurance, independent of our navy; and that, therefore, the committee
were wholly mistaken that the advantages already derived from our navy
have exceeded the cost of it; and that, if it had been established
several years ago, it would have proved a great saving to the United
States.
Mr. N. confessed he had always been opposed to a naval force for the
purpose of warring with European nations, and whether the force now
proposed is considered as necessary for defence or offence, it must have
that character. The propriety of a naval force for this purpose never
appeared to him in a questionable point of view; he thought every
consideration of policy and interest forbids it. We are well informed,
said he, by the best historians, that the British navy has been the
means of sinking that nation to its present state; for he could not
admire, like the gentleman from South Carolina, the splendor and
prosperity of a nation, which is brought into such a situation as to
render it doubtful whether it can exist for a day, a month, or any other
period. If the navy of Great Britain, then, commenced under different
circumstances from those in which we are placed--which, according to the
gentleman from South Carolina, was not only for the protection of her
commerce, but as a defence against neighboring nations, and to guard
against the worst revolutionary principles--has nearly ruined that
country by the immense sums necessary for its support, shall we, who,
according also to the confession of that gentleman, have nothing to fear
from European nations--[Mr. HARPER interrupted Mr. N. to deny that he
had said we had nothing to fear from Europe. He had said we had nothing
to fear but from the sea.] Mr. N. said this was the way in which he
understood the gentleman, and that no danger exists of any invasion by a
land force. If this is the case, the use to which a navy can be put will
only be to defend our commerce from cruisers, and passing fleets. We
have not, therefore, half the inducements to the establishment of a navy
which influence European nations, and many powerful reasons against such
a force.
The European nations have, most of them, distant colonies, which they
have to protect, and with which they have to keep up a constant
communication across the ocean, which renders a navy in some degree
necessary. But all the European nations commenced their navies under the
delusion that a small force would only be necessary, and that one or two
ships would give them an ascendency over other nations. Can we expect
this, said Mr. N.? No; we begin the business with fewer inducements than
any other nation ever begun a navy, and without necessity; for it is
acknowledged we have nothing now to apprehend from invasion, (and if we
had, this force could not be provided in time,) we have no colonies to
protect, and no intercourse which calls for a naval force.
We cannot, therefore, said Mr. N., embark in this business with the same
motives which influenced all European nations in establishments of this
kind. They built small navies because they would be equal to cope with
the small navies of their neighbors; but we are about to begin the
business with a navy staring us in the face, the most formidable that
any man could suppose to exist. According to his colleague, the British
have 140 sail-of-the-line; and yet our navy is undertaken with the
avowed purpose of keeping her, as well as the other nations of Europe,
in check. Mr. N. asked whether we could ever hope to succeed in a plan
of this kind? We certainly could not, since Great Britain would always
even in war have more than a sufficient force to meet all the ships
which we can build. Besides, if our situation, as gentlemen say, will
make a small force so operative in our hands in time of European wars,
will not our possessing it be sufficient to produce war with Great
Britain, when it is always a sufficient cause for war, in the opinion of
Great Britain, for any other maritime power to put a few more ships in
commission than their ordinary establishment? And, if Congress were to
order the building of fifty ships, it would only increase the certainty
of this effect. How is a naval force to guard us, which Great Britain
can destroy, whenever she pleases, even in time of war? For she has
frequently ships sufficient on our coast to destroy all the vessels
which are contemplated to be built. In short, this navy will be the
means of keeping this country in continual broils. On the first
appearance of arming any additional vessels on the part of Great
Britain, for whatever cause, we must set on foot a negotiation to
combine the other powers of Europe in our favor; and this country will
become the centre of intrigue and tricks for the agents of every
country.
But the gentleman from South Carolina says, this is the cheapest mode of
defence; but does the gentleman prove this? Can he prove that
£10,000,000 sterling is only the third part of the expense of defence,
as he says? Does he not recollect how much of the revenue of that
country goes to pay the interest of their enormous debt, and, therefore,
cannot be considered as a part of the expenditure for defence? The
gentleman will find, on reflection, he is much mistaken in his
calculation in this respect. The gentleman from South Carolina has been
loud in his encomiums on the British navy, on account of its usefulness
to the world; and he calls the calculation of the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, relative to the expenses of a navy, a paltry, schoolboy
calculation, because it has not taken into view this usefulness. That
gentleman, said Mr. N., only referred to the British navy so far as it
was useful in the way gentlemen say they expect ours to be advantageous.
But from the contradictions which the gentleman from South Carolina
seemed to run into on this subject, he did believe that he had not an
eye to a navy, merely for the defence of our commerce; he appeared to
wish that this country should take a stand like that of Great Britain,
that the safety of the world may, at a future day, depend upon us, as
it now does upon Great Britain. Mr. N. believed the ambition of this
country, the pride of its Government, and naval commanders, will all
operate this way; and we may, one day or other, if we proceed with this
navy scheme, be as aspiring, as domineering, as any other nation in the
world, and by this means be embroiled in continual war, and be saddled
with a debt equal to that of Great Britain.
Mr. N. believed there existed no good reason for going into the
establishment of a navy at all, because he believed it would never be
really useful to this country; but if it should be otherwise determined
by a majority of Congress, this, he thought, of all times the most
improper to commence the work.
Mr. J. WILLIAMS then moved to strike out what relates to 18-gun vessels,
on the ground that the thirty-nine small vessels which we have are
sufficient. The motion was negatived without a division.
Mr. J. PARKER proposed filling up the blanks in the section fixing the
pay of captains in the Navy, with an advance from $75 to $100 per month
to captains of 74's, and others in proportion; except the masters of
vessels under 20 guns, which were proposed to be lowered.
Some objection, however, being made to this, and particularly to the
mode of doing the business, this being the first time that the subject
had been before the House, the section was moved to be struck out, and
carried.
The committee then rose, and the House having concurred in the amendment
reported,
Mr. NICHOLAS renewed the motion for striking out the 74-gun ships, and
called the yeas and nays upon it. They were taken and stood, yeas 40,
nays 54, as follows:
YEAS.--Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Richard Brent, Robert
Brown, Samuel J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, William Charles,
Cole Claiborne, John Clopton, John Dawson, Joseph
Eggleston, Lucas Elmendorph, William Findlay, John Fowler,
Albert Gallatin, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, John A.
Hanna, Carter B. Harrison, Jonathan N. Havens, Joseph
Heister, David Holmes, Walter Jones, Edward Livingston,
Matthew Locke, Nathaniel Macon, Blair McClenachan, Joseph
McDowell, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Thompson J. Skinner,
William Smith, Richard Sprigg, Richard Stanford, Thomas
Sumter, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Philip Van Cortlandt,
Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham Venable, and Robert Williams.
NAYS.--John Allen, George Baer, jun., Bailey Bartlett,
James A. Bayard, Jonathan Brace, David Brooks, Stephen
Bullock, Christopher G. Champlin, James Cochran, William
Craik, Samuel W. Dana, John Dennis, George Dent, William
Edmond, Thomas Evans, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Jonathan
Freeman, Henry Glenn, Chauncey Goodrich, William Gordon,
Roger Griswold, William Barry Grove, Robert Goodloe Harper,
Thomas Hartley, William Hindman, Hezekiah L. Hosmer, James
H. Imlay, John Wilkes Kittera, Samuel Lyman, James Machir,
William Matthews, Daniel Morgan, Lewis R. Morris, Harrison
G. Otis, Isaac Parker, Josiah Parker, Thomas Pinckney, John
Read, John Rutledge, jun., James Schureman, Samuel Sewall,
Thomas Sinnickson, Samuel Smith, Richard Dobbs Spaight,
Peleg Sprague, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark
Thompson, Thomas Tillinghast, John E. Van Alen, Peleg
Wadsworth, Robert Waln, and John Williams.
The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for a third reading [and
passed by the same vote].[44]
THURSDAY, February 14.
_Relations with France._
Mr. LIVINGSTON called up for consideration the resolution which he
yesterday laid upon the table, calling upon the PRESIDENT for any
information which he may possess touching the suspension of the French
arrêt, declaring neutral citizens pirates when found on board the
vessels of belligerent powers; which being read,
Mr. L. called the yeas and nays upon it. He said he understood that,
since yesterday, a member of this House had applied at the office of the
Secretary of State, and had been informed that some information had been
received relative to this subject. Perhaps the gentleman would himself
state to the House what he had learned from that office.
Mr. HARPER said, he had only to state, that he had made inquiry at the
office of the Secretary of State, and had been informed that a letter
had been received from our Minister in London, enclosing an extract from
the _Redacteur_ (supposed to be an official French paper) stating that
the Executive Directory had suspended the edict in question. This
extract, he understood, does not state the reason of this suspension;
but our Minister writes it was owing to a threat of the British
Government to retaliate upon French citizens within their power.
The yeas and nays were taken, and stood--52 to 38.
_Naval Pay._
On motion of Mr. JOSIAH PARKER, the House resolved itself into a
Committee of the Whole, on the bill fixing the pay of captains of ships
and vessels of the United States; and after some amendments, the bill
was reported, and ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.
[This bill provides "that all vessels in the service of the United
States, mounting 20 guns and upward, be commanded by captains; those not
exceeding 18 guns (except galleys, which are to be commanded as
heretofore provided by law,) by masters or lieutenants, according to the
size of the vessel, to be regulated by the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES; that the pay of a captain, commanding ships of 32 guns and
upward, be $100 dollars per month, and eight rations per day; of
captains, commanding ships of 20 and under 32 guns, $75 a month, and six
rations a day; of a master-commandant, $60 per month, and five rations
per day; and of lieutenants who may command the smaller vessels, $50
dollars per month, and four rations per day; that whenever any officer
as aforesaid shall be employed in the command of a squadron, in separate
service, the allowance of rations to such commanding officer shall be
doubled during the continuance of such command, and no longer, except in
case of a commanding officer of the Navy, whose allowance, while in
service, shall always be at the rate of sixteen rations per day."]
FRIDAY, February 8.
_Relations with France._
The following Message was received from the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES:
_Gentlemen of the House of Representatives_:
In pursuance of the request, in your resolve of yesterday,
I lay before you such information as I have received,
touching a suspension of the arrêt of the French Republic,
communicated to your House by my Message of the 28th of
January last. But if the execution of that arrêt be
suspended, or even if it were repealed, it should be
remembered that the arrêt of the Executive Directory of the
2d of March, 1797, remains in force, the third article of
which subjects explicitly and exclusively American seamen
to be treated as pirates, if found on board ships of the
enemies of France.