UNITED STATES, _January 18, 1798_.
This Message, with the papers accompanying it, was referred to the same
Committee of the Whole to whom was referred the report on the petition
of William Bell.
_Diplomatic Intercourse Bill._
Mr. NICHOLAS inquired with what sums the blanks in the bill were to be
filled.
Mr. HARPER said he proposed to fill the first with $40,000, and the last
with $28,650.
Mr. NICHOLAS conceived this to be a good time for the House to attempt
to bring back the establishment of the diplomatic corps to the footing
on which it was settled at the commencement of the Government, and
continued down till the year 1796; and to prevent in future the probable
increase which he apprehended from the recent examples, he thought it
necessary to take a view of this subject, not only from the increase of
expense, but from a variety of other considerations. It is not the
manner in which a Government is constituted which makes its operations
easy and certain. But the execution of the powers of the Government
itself is no more to be considered than the nature of its formation; for
I do believe there is a tendency in all Governments like ours to produce
a union and consolidation of all its parts into the Executive
department; and that the limitation and connection of the parts with
each other, as settled in the constitution, would be destroyed by the
influence I have mentioned, unless there is a constant operation on the
part of the Legislature to resist this overwhelming power. I think we
have the most convincing proofs that a representative Government can be
made most oppressive and burdensome, and yet preserve all the forms
which are given to it by a constitution; and the Legislature shall
appear to act upon its own discretion, whilst that discretion shall have
ceased to exist. Where the Executive has an influence over the
Legislature, and the Government is a representative one, the Executive
is capable of carrying its views into effect in a manner superior to
what can be accomplished even in the most despotic monarchy; the
mischief will be carried farther in the former case than in the latter,
because the people will be more inclined to submit to the decisions of a
Government of its own choosing than to one which rules them by
hereditary right; monarchs cannot carry their oppressions so far,
without resistance, as republics. Under this general view of the
subject, he conceived it to be the duty of the Legislature to guard
cautiously its own independence, and to limit, as far as consistent with
the general welfare, the influence of Executive patronage.
He conceived that this extension of influence of one branch of the
Government over another was strictly guarded by the constitution, which
was framed on the principle of checks and balances--of departments
acting and controlling each other; but he was sorry to see the idea of
patronage drawn into a closer compass than it had formerly been, as it
increased the evil. He was sorry for it, because it tended to manifest a
circumstance which had been sought to be concealed. Every insinuation
that there was a division between the Government and the people had been
repelled as an insidious and malignant design; but the Administration,
by acting on a new principle, which he was too well assured was the
fact, had established the idea that there was a division between it and
a considerable portion of the people. The evidence of this fact had been
long shown, and he feared the operation of circumstances of this nature
on the public mind.
He gave it as his opinion on our foreign intercourse, that the United
States would be benefited by having no Ministers at all. He did not
think that we could be benefited by any sort of compact these foreign
agents could form for us, for we only bound ourselves by any treaty we
entered into, as we are totally incapable of enforcing the execution of
the stipulations made by other nations by any offensive measures. It
might be thought necessary to make commercial arrangements with some
European powers; but, he asked, if they had the force to make a foreign
country conform to its engagements? No gentleman would say that they
had; therefore such regulations only tended to entangle ourselves,
without rendering commerce any efficient aid. He would, therefore, leave
our commerce to seek its own markets totally disembarrassed. All the
protection we could furnish it with, consisted in officers of another
grade than those mentioned in this bill: Consuls who should reside in
the seaports, and not Ministers Plenipotentiary residing in the
interior.
He did not intend by the motion he was about to make, that the whole
diplomatic establishment should be destroyed at this time, but merely to
reduce it to what it had been before the late increase. With this view
he proposed to alter the bill so as to direct that there should be
appropriated $9,000 for a Minister Plenipotentiary at London, and $9,000
more for another near the French Republic, and that the PRESIDENT be
left at liberty to reduce the Ministers Plenipotentiary at Berlin,
Madrid, and Lisbon, to Ministers resident, which would diminish their
salaries one-half--a resident Minister being of a lower grade has only
$4,500 per annum. He then went into a detail of the proceedings of the
first Congress, in order to show that it was admitted on all sides by
that body, that the constitution vested the power of specifying and
limiting the salaries of foreign Ministers and Consuls; he read the
speeches of Mr. LAWRENCE, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. W. SMITH, of South Carolina,
Mr. SEDGWICK, Mr. HUNTINGTON, and several others, from the Congressional
Register, by which it appeared, that there was but one opinion on their
powers under the Constitution; and showed from hence, that the only
reason why the House did not undertake to enumerate and fix the salaries
of foreign Ministers in detail, arose merely from the want of
information as to the places where they should be fixed, and the sum
necessary to cover their expenses. As his construction corresponded with
that of the gentleman who fixed the principles upon which the Government
was put in motion, he was encouraged to expect his motion would succeed,
seeing that the House had now had sufficient experience to enable them
to say what were the regulations proper to be made.
Mr. HARPER supposed it would be remembered by all those gentlemen who
had attended to the business of Congress for several years past, that
the doctrine of the gentleman from Virginia was by no means new. The
subject of foreign intercourse was never taken up, without that
gentleman, or some other who agreed with him in sentiment, advancing
these opinions; they never failed to speak of the danger to be
apprehended from Executive influence, from its power to appoint foreign
Ministers; that foreign intercourse was unnecessary; that our public
affairs abroad were not to be attended to, and that commerce ought to be
given up, or left to shift for itself. Nor was this a doctrine confined
to this country, or this age. Whenever a set of gentlemen in any country
found their views opposed by the measures of Government, they became
vexed, and attributed the proceedings of those who differed from them in
opinion to any motive rather than the public good. The desire of
Executive favor, or Executive offices, was an usual charge, and it was
at this day well understood. It would also be remembered, that whenever
the subject of foreign intercourse had been discussed, though these
objections had been constantly made to it, they had been as constantly
disregarded by the Congress of the United States. The good sense of the
country had weighed these objections in the balance, and declared them
wanting; and he trusted the same fate would now meet them as heretofore.
In aid of the $40,000 per annum, originally granted for this purpose,
Mr. H. said, various supplementary appropriations had been made. First,
a sum of $20,000, then a sum of $23,000, and, in March last, $17,000,
and, in addition to this, $14,000 for a particular appointment. The
House had, therefore, not only deemed it expedient to continue the
original act, but to make additional appropriations from year to year.
He thought the good sense of the country had never been more firmly
shown than on this subject. But now a new course was to be taken, and
all former proceedings declared to have been wrong. But it was said this
country had no need of foreign ministers, and that commerce might be
left to itself. He did not believe the House would think so. Did not the
United States trade with all the nations of the earth? How, then, was it
possible to do without accredited agents to attend to our concerns in
foreign countries? Were we to give up our commerce? There were
gentlemen, he knew, who would answer, Yes. They would tell the House,
commerce was a bad thing, and that it rather ought to be outlawed than
protected. But was this the sense of the country? Was it the sense of
that House? Would they discard the property of that class of citizens
who depended upon it for their support and their wealth? Or would they
be ready to forfeit the revenue arising from it? Mr. H. said he had
often heard of the dangerous nature of foreign intercourse; but it was
the discovery of a few men who believed that every thing which had been
done by this Government had been radically wrong. He trusted, however,
the House would adhere to what it had so frequently sanctioned, and that
the proposed amendment would not be agreed to.
Mr. GALLATIN believed that there were a number of people in the United
States--people otherwise enlightened, and who, upon all common subjects,
possessed sound understandings--who were fully convinced that there was
a faction existing within the United States, and even within the walls
of that House, who wished to demolish the Government; and he further
believed that this opinion was supported by such declarations as had
been made by the gentleman from Connecticut. He should be sorry that
such a belief should be considered as dangerous to the safety of the
community. Nor could he consider the determination of the Executive to
employ only such persons as are of the same political opinions with
themselves, as of such a nature as to produce fatal consequences, and
that Government, on that account, was unworthy of confidence. He
believed that such a line of conduct must flow from the present state of
parties in America, divided as the people were upon many important
occasions. To say, therefore, that the Executive employed persons of
consonant political opinions to its own, was not to say the Government
did not deserve confidence. But if the committee turned their attention
to the amendment proposed, it only went to declare that ministers to
London and Paris should not have a salary of more than $9,000 a year;
and that ministers to other parts of Europe should not have more than
$4,500. In support of this amendment, it was said that this was the
ground upon which this Government first fixed the business of foreign
intercourse. He believed this statement correct. Until the year 1796,
there was no minister plenipotentiary except at Paris and London; at
other places there were no higher grades than ministers resident. Hence
the committee might be led to argue the propriety of bringing back our
foreign political intercourse to what it was before that period. He said
foreign political intercourse; because he thought the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. HARPER) had blended two subjects together, viz:
foreign commercial intercourse, and foreign political intercourse. He
did not believe it was the opinion of any gentleman in that House that
commerce ought to be left to shift for itself, unattended to. He
believed it was well understood that our commerce in foreign countries
was attended to by our consuls and not by our ministers plenipotentiary;
and consuls would exist if we had no ministers at all. Therefore, all
that gentleman's arguments, which tended to show that the amendment
would affect our commercial intercourse, had no foundation whatever.
Returning to the question of foreign political intercourse: Was it
proper to bring it back to what it was eighteen months ago? And, before
he proceeded further, he would observe that, though the gentleman from
South Carolina had been tolerably correct in his statements of the
business, he was mistaken in one point, in which he would set him right.
He had stated that the first additional appropriation was $20,000; but
this sum was not appropriated for foreign intercourse, but for defraying
the expense of the suits of our merchants in London. On the first of
January, 1796, there remained a balance of unexpended appropriation for
this object, of $30,000. To that day no extraordinary appropriation had
been made; the whole allowance was $40,000 a year, which was found to be
more than sufficient. On the 28th of May, 1796, an estimate was sent by
the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, stating the sums already
appropriated for foreign intercourse, and that $23,500 were yet wanting,
in order to change the establishment which had till that day existed, by
sending Ministers Plenipotentiary to Madrid and Lisbon, instead of
Ministers Resident. This estimate, he just stated, was received on the
28th of May, and the law received the signature of the PRESIDENT on the
first of June, so that it could not have received a very full discussion
(being passed just as the session was about to close) and he thought
there was good reason for examining the thing again. The next
appropriation was made in the second session of the fourth Congress. In
that session, he allowed, the additional appropriation was passed after
full discussion. It was made upon an estimate stating $17,900 wanted;
and, during last session, an appropriation was made for a Minister to
Berlin, of $13,500.
The committee had been told that it would evince great versatility if
they were all at once to change what had already been done. But it must
be recollected, than when the change in the system was first made, it
underwent little discussion; and he would venture to say, that our
business abroad was as well done from the year 1786 to 1796, as it had
been done since. As the question was whether a larger or a smaller sum
of money should be appropriated, he would call upon gentlemen in favor
of the larger sum, to show what benefit was derived from Madrid and
Lisbon by the change; what necessity there was for a Minister at Berlin,
and what good was to be derived from giving a larger salary than $4,500.
The gentleman from Connecticut had said, why send a Minister
Plenipotentiary to London or Paris, any more than the other Courts? This
was done at first, and the mover, he supposed, wished not to innovate
upon the law as originally passed.
But they were told it was improper, upon this floor, to say any thing
about patronage, and that all arguments of that kind are well
understood, and are by no means novel in their nature; that such
complaints are made under all forms of Government by discontented people
out of office. To say that these complaints are well understood, was
the same as to say that the ground upon which they complained was also
well understood: it was to acknowledge, that persons who were in the
favor of the Executive had some advantages which persons in the other
party desired or envied. To admit of one position, was to admit of the
other. But, if no particular advantage was to be derived from
Governmental patronage, then the cause of jealousy, according to this
doctrine, must cease.
Our Government, he said, was in its child-hood; and if this patronage
had any existence, it could not of course be as yet alarming. But he
desired gentlemen to look at all Governments where this power was placed
in the Executive, and see if the greatest evil of the Government was not
the excessive influence of that department. Did not this corruption
exist in the Government which was constituted most similarly to ours, to
such a degree as to have become a part of the system itself, and without
which, it is said, the Government could not go on? Was it not,
therefore, prudent to keep a watchful eye in this respect? He did not,
however, speak against the power itself; it was necessary to be placed
somewhere. The constitution had placed it in the Executive power. If the
same power had been placed in the Legislature, he believed they would
have been more corrupt than the Executive. He thought, therefore, the
trust was wisely placed in the Executive; and though it was right to
keep grants of money within proper bounds, in order to prevent the abuse
of power, yet it was proper to grant all that was necessary.
Mr. G. concluded, by saying, that if he thought it was proper that our
political intercourse should be extended, he should not support the
amendment; but as the conviction was strong upon his mind that our
foreign political intercourse had at least been as expensive as it ought
to be; that it was owing, in a great degree, to our political
intercourse with foreign nations, that our present critical situation
was produced; that this intercourse produced more evil than good to us;
that he wished to bring the business back to the state in which it stood
in 1796. If the wisdom of future Legislatures shall think proper to
abolish the establishment of foreign political intercourse altogether,
it must be left to them to decide. He himself thought it would be going
too far to do so at present. He believed, situated as we were, it was
necessary to have some political intercourse; but he believed it would
be best, by degrees, to decline it altogether.
Mr. SITGREAVES.--The constitution and laws of the country had made
certain offices necessary, and left it to the Executive to fill them as
he pleased; and was it for that House to attempt to control this
discretion? If it were executed to the injury of the people, the
constitution had pointed out the remedy to be by impeachment. But where
was the crime, the offence, or the impropriety, of the conduct ascribed
to the Executive, if it had been adopted? Would gentlemen say that the
Executive ought to appoint persons to office who professed an opinion
contrary to its own? Did gentlemen suppose that there was such a want of
integrity in this department of Government, that it adopted a political
opinion which it did not believe to be right? And, if it were believed
to act from principle, would it be prudent or right to admit to a
participation in the execution of the important duties of Government
persons whose sentiments were not in unison with those of the Executive,
and who could only create discord and confusion, where nothing but
harmony and union ought to prevail? If the Executive acted upon just
principles, it would endeavor to give singleness of design to its
operations, and it could only do this by admitting persons into the
Government who thought with it. This would be a right, prudent, and
honorable conduct; and where it had been deviated from (as he had before
observed), Government had received an awful lesson for its future
conduct.
The question whether that House had the power to interfere with the
Executive authority, by withholding appropriations, had been fully
discussed in a former Congress, and the opinion of the country was not
now to be fixed on this subject. For that part of the House who thought
the constitution had not vested them with the authority of controlling
the Executive, it was sufficient to say that the Executive had thought
it necessary to introduce the change in the diplomatic department, which
was complained of, and that they felt themselves bound to carry his
determination into effect; but those who think that the House of
Representatives may control the Executive in this respect, will of
course act accordingly.
Mr. BALDWIN said he perceived there was a real difference of opinion
between the gentleman last up and himself. The gentleman supposed the
diplomatic establishment was fixed by the Executive, and the Legislature
had nothing to do with it but to provide the money. Every person must
see, even from a cursory view of the constitution, that this was
designed to be a Government of departments, Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial, to be kept distinct as far as possible. It was the business of
the Legislature to establish offices by law; it was the business of the
Executive to fill those offices. It would appear, from tracing back the
law, now proposed to be continued, that it originated in this manner. He
had not been notified of the subject as being likely to be called up
to-day, and was not prepared to be as particular as he could wish as to
facts. He had endeavored to refresh his recollection since it had been
under discussion, and he found that it originated from the Speech of the
PRESIDENT, at the opening of the second session of the first Congress,
in which he said, "that the interests of the United States required that
our intercourse with other nations should be facilitated by such
provisions as will enable me to fulfil my duty in that respect; and to
this end, that the compensations to be made to the persons who may be
employed, should, according to the nature of their appointments, be
defined by law." This part of the Speech was referred to a committee,
and from that originated this law. Want of information, at that early
time in the Government, prevented their being as particular as they
wished. They fixed a sum to each grade, and a sum beyond which the whole
amount should not extend; limited the law to a short period, that it
might be open to be corrected by experience. The present motion, if he
had understood it, proposed now to be a little more particular in the
establishment, by fixing the sum for particular places--to do the very
thing then recommended by the PRESIDENT. The same has always been the
intention of every succeeding Congress, which was the reason why they
continued it only for short periods, leaving it open to such amendments
as should be suggested by experience. These ideas of the offices being
first to be established by law, appeared not only to be the sense of the
former PRESIDENT, and of each succeeding Congress, as he had stated, but
appeared also to be the opinion of the present PRESIDENT. At the last
session he thought that a higher grade of office was necessary at
Algiers: this he stated in a message to Congress--that as there were
great expenditures of money on that coast, he thought it necessary that
an establishment should be made which would enable him to appoint a very
confidential person, on whom the other officers there should be
dependent, and who should control their proceedings and expenditures.
Congress concurred in this opinion, passed a law for the establishment
of the office, and then the Executive appointed the officer. For these
reasons he considered the question within their proper powers, and
fairly open to their deliberation.
At the close of the revolutionary war, the disposition of forming many
treaties, and having extensive diplomatic connections with European
powers, was carried even further than it has been since. It was among
their first national acts, and discovered marks of youth and
inexperience; a few years convinced them that they had gone too far,
that this country had little to expect from treaties, and much to lose,
and that many diplomatic connections were more frequently the cause of
perplexity and embarrassment, than of any national advantage. The
Congress under the articles of confederation were extricating themselves
from that policy as fast as possible; as these expired in course, they
were careful not to renew them. For several of the last years of that
Congress he well recollected that clusters of candidates for these
appointments, supported by powerful interests and connections, were
uniformly resisted; and, if he mistook not, when this Government came
into operation, this country had but one Minister in Europe. The
conviction on this subject was so strong, and experience had so fully
settled it as the true policy, that it remained immoveable for some time
after organizing the present Government. All appropriations for foreign
Ministers were refused at the first session, as far as he recollected.
At the second session it was urged, in the Speech of the PRESIDENT, as
before stated, and enforced by more particular explanations to
individuals, as designed to be for temporary purposes, respecting the
Northern forts and the property that was withheld. Under these
explanations a law passed, as before explained. It was true, this policy
had been of late, in some measure, departed from. He thought experience
had already been useful to them in this course also, and ought to
administer caution to them in seeking to intermingle in European
politics. Ambassadors and Ministers cannot be entirely indifferent to
the characters and events with which they are constantly surrounded; the
share they take is very apt to be exchanged between the countries to
which they belong. He did not wish to be too particular on that point;
he was persuaded facts enough presented themselves to the recollection
of every member, to confirm his remark. It might be said that on this
also we have an awful lesson. If evil had been experienced from this
cause, he hoped it would operate as a reason to endeavor to diminish it.
He thought it not unreasonable for the House to interpose their
restraining power as to granting money, and the more particular
establishment of the officers, and thus aid the other departments of the
Government in bringing back, by degrees, this part of our policy to its
former principles, so well sanctioned by experience. Whether the present
motion was well timed, or whether it was best to give it another short
limitation, before we went into a definite establishment, was another
question, on which he was willing to hear more remarks. Informed as he
was at present, he should vote for the motion, and thought they might
make some amendments to the former bill, already suggested by
experience, and which would be useful.
The committee rose, and had leave to sit again.
FRIDAY, January 19.
_Foreign Intercourse._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the
bill providing the means of foreign intercourse, when
Mr. PINCKNEY rose. He understood the amendment was intended to confine
our Ministers Plenipotentiary to London and Paris, and that no higher
grade than Ministers Resident should be employed in any other country.
He was opposed to this change at this time, and to the mode proposed of
doing the business, if the time were seasonable. It was proper that at
this juncture our Ministers should remain as they were, as it was
prudent to derive all the influence and advantage we could from the
situation of our agents in Europe, who would not only be enabled to
communicate more correct information from thence, than could be derived
from any other source, but who could also explain the motives and
objects of this Government, and by that means remove any unfavorable
impressions which may be attempted to be given with respect to this
country; and thereby put our business in the best train for securing the
neutral standing which we have taken. He was against it for another
reason. To change the diplomatic intercourse in the way proposed, would
be forcing upon the Executive a measure contrary to its wishes. It would
also be affording testimony to the charge heretofore made, that there
was a division in the Government and the people--a situation in which
many wished to see us. He should be sorry to afford the appearance of
one department of Government having forced upon another a change of
measures of which they are the competent judges, and upon which they
have acted. As it was well known that there was a very intimate
connection between Spain and Holland, and the country with whom we have
at present a misunderstanding, he should be unwilling to deprive this
country of the advantages to be derived from having Ministers at those
places; besides, if our Ministers were to be recalled from thence, it
would be considered as an extraordinary proceeding; and might be
construed as intended to be hostile to them. Whatever influence Spain or
Holland may have in the councils of the country which he had alluded to,
by continuing our Ministers there, it was probable that weight would
operate in our favor. There was an additional reason with respect to
Spain. It was well known that we had points yet to settle with that
country. Our treaty with that power was not yet carried into effect, and
negotiations might at this time be going on in relation to it, which
might be frustrated by the recall of our Ministers.
Mr. NICHOLAS wished to explain his intentions in bringing forward this
amendment. He believed the gentleman last up would find they nearly
corresponded with his own. He had no idea of putting an immediate veto
upon the Ministers at present employed. He considered this bill, though
passed with a limitation, as a permanent system, and a subsequent clause
of the bill would enable the committee to fix the time at which the
salaries of Ministers should cease. His wish was to put a limit to this
extension of Executive power. He reminded the gentleman from South
Carolina that Holland was not concerned in this bill, as we had only a
Minister Resident there. If the subject were further dilated upon, he
should offer some further remarks upon it.
Mr. N. SMITH was surprised to hear the gentleman last up considered that
as a permanent provision which was limited to a duration of two years.
This law was merely temporary in its nature, and if he only contemplated
some future regulations in our foreign intercourse, his amendment was
not now necessary. However competent it was for the Legislature to
settle the salary of Ministers, it was clear the Legislature had no
power, by the constitution either to determine the number of foreign
Ministers to be employed, where they should be sent, or what should be
their grade. Under the general power of making treaties, vested in the
President, he had the power of sending Ministers where he pleased; also
in the power intrusted to him of executing the law (not only the
municipal, but the law of nations) it was necessary he should have this
power.
In a word, all relations were in the hands of the Executive; all our
foreign intercourse was to him, and from him. Of course, he was the only
judge of what was proper in this business. This being the case, it
should seem as if that House had nothing to do with respect to the
propriety of sending a Minister to Berlin, or in relation to other
grades of Ministers, though they had the power of fixing their salaries.
But it was contended by the gentleman from Georgia and others, that, by
regulating these salaries, the Legislature had the power of preventing
the extension of their establishment. This brought up an old question;
but it was a very important one, and he did not regret that it was
frequently drawn into discussion. He thought the great landmarks of our
constitution could not be too well understood. He did not mean, however,
to extend his observations on this subject. It was said, this was a
Government of departments and checks, and of course, that the
Legislature ought to check the Executive in its operations. That this
was a Government of departments and checks, to a certain extent, he
should readily allow; but that it was so to the extent which had been
represented, he did deny. Our Government was divided into three
departments, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; each of these had
checks and balances in its own department. The President was checked by
the Senate; the Legislature was checked by the President and Senate; the
Judiciary was checked by having certain appeals, writs of error, &c. So
far from one department checking the other, it was necessary that all
the parts should act in unison like a clock, and the moment one part
declined to act, the Government could not proceed. It was not in the
power of the Legislature to reverse the decision of the lowest court,
and should it then be said that they could judge over the head of the
Executive? This remark was applicable to all the departments. No one
department was a favorite of the constitution. Every act of a department
ought to be considered as well done. This being the case, whenever the
President had appointed a Minister, and done it constitutionally, when
he informed the Legislature thereof, they might do any thing and every
thing but doubt the propriety of establishing the Minister.
Mr. HARPER.--As to the general policy of the present motion, as
connected with the foreign relations of this country, Mr. H. said that
he would add two or three remarks on that subject, and then conclude.
The motion went, he said, to reduce the appointments and salaries of
three ministers: those to Madrid, Lisbon, and Berlin; and in support of
the motion, it was alleged that the last of these Ministers was entirely
unnecessary, and that the other two had been improperly, because
unnecessarily, raised from Ministers Resident to Ministers
Plenipotentiary. To him it was a sufficient answer to these allegations
to say, that the President had thought otherwise; because, the
President, being charged by the constitution with the foreign relations
of the country, must be invested with the means necessary for conducting
them with effect; and was infinitely better qualified by this situation
to judge what those means were, and how they ought to be used, than the
House can pretend to be. One of these means was the appointment of
foreign Ministers, which was expressly vested in the President by the
constitution. When the President, therefore, had thought fit to appoint
foreign Ministers, or to alter their grades, he had exercised a
constitutional power, and it did not lie with the House of
Representatives to object or judge. To him, therefore, Mr. H. said, it
was a sufficient answer to all those objections to say that the
President had thought otherwise. To others, who might hold different
opinions from him on this subject, he thought it was a sufficient answer
to be told that the House of Representatives, as well as the President,
had thought differently, and had sanctioned the changes which he had
thought proper to make in this respect, by voting money to carry them
into effect. This the House had done expressly in all the three cases
contemplated by the present motion.
Mr. GALLATIN said the committee had been told, in the course of the
debate, by some gentlemen, that this attempt to reduce the number of our
Ministers was unconstitutional; by others, that it was inexpedient; and
even some gentlemen, who agreed to the general expediency of the
measure, believed it would be attended with inconvenience from our
present foreign relations.
In relation to the constitutionality of the thing, he did not believe,
whatever doctrine was supported with respect to treaties, that upon this
occasion the committee should be told that they were interfering with
the constitutional power vested in the President. It was true that he
had the general power of appointing Ambassadors, but it was not less
true that the Legislature had the sole and exclusive power to provide
for all the expenses of the Union. Hence arose the idea of ours being a
Government of departments, so formed as to be a check upon each other.
But the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. N. SMITH) said there was no such
thing as a check of departments; that each was distinct; and, though
each had checks within itself, none of them checked the other. And to
illustrate his position, he introduced the simile of a clock, at the
same time that he told them that the Executive Department was the
main-spring which put the clock in motion, whilst Mr. G. supposed he
meant that the other branches were merely the hands, which moved as they
were directed. But if there was any act which could not be done but by
all the branches, each had its share in deciding upon the propriety of
it. When a treaty was made it had been argued that that House had
nothing to do but carry it into effect; but here it was said that the
House were bound to provide for every Ambassador appointed; and if, by
withholding salaries, they obliged the President to send Ministers
Resident where he wished to send Ministers Plenipotentiary, they would
act inconsistently with the constitution. Though gentlemen might make
speeches on this subject, they must know that where the Legislature had
a right to act, it had a right to deliberate and to use its discretion.
It was true treaties had been made, but no treaty had been made since
the adoption of the present Government, by Ministers Resident at any
Court at the time. If any benefits were derived to the country from the
British treaty, they must be attributed to the Envoy Extraordinary, and
not to our Minister at that court. And when our treaty with Spain was
concluded, it was necessary to send a Minister Resident to another Court
to do the business. Since our treaties were always made by special
Envoys, what advantage could it be to have numerous Ministers
Plenipotentiary in Europe? In the present critical situation of the
country, agitated as it was to the centre, was it not to be apprehended
that our Ministers would participate, in some degree, in the party
spirit which there abounded, and rank themselves on one side or the
other, which would have a tendency to draw this country into a vortex
from which we were so happily separated by the Atlantic? We were the
only nation, he said, who possessed a Government on a firm foundation,
in which civil and religious liberty was fully recognized; we,
therefore, enjoyed what the people of Europe were seeking after. We have
nothing to wish, except to remain in our present situation. Why, then,
should we hazard the being involved in European broils? He had before
stated that Consuls were equal to every commercial regulation, and he
had heard nothing to change his opinion. Seeing, therefore, that these
diplomatic agents were rather dangerous than useful, he thought it time
to put a stop to their increase.
Mr. BAYARD began his observations by remarking, that the gentleman from
Virginia had said that it was not his design that his motion should have
an immediate effect upon the Ministers at present employed. If the
gentleman was sincere in his avowal, it was clear that he did not
understand his own motion; for whatever amendment was introduced into
the third section, which the gentleman had intimated might be so amended
as to give the regulation a distant operation, as it only related to the
sum of money to be appropriated, it would not enable the President to
employ a Minister Plenipotentiary, besides those at London and Paris, at
a higher salary than $4,500.
Some gentlemen have said, it was idle talk about this House having the
power to appropriate, without having the power at the same time to use
their discretion. He contended that the power of appointing Ministers
was vested in the President, and the House had no right to believe he
would abuse this power. It had been supposed by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, that he might appoint an indefinite number of Ministers;
and were the House, in that case, he asked, blindly to appropriate for
them? This question was predicated upon an abuse of power, whilst the
constitution supposed it would be executed with fidelity. Suppose he
were to state the question in an opposite light. Let it be imagined that
this country has a misunderstanding with some foreign power, and that
the Executive should appoint a Minister, but the House, in the plenitude
of its powers, should refuse an appropriation. What might be the
consequence? Would not the House have contravened the constitution, by
taking from the President the power which by it is placed in him? It
certainly would. So that this supposition of the abuse of power would go
to the destruction of all authority. The Legislature was bound to
appropriate for the salary of the Chief Justice of the United States,
and though the President might appoint a _chimney-sweeper_ to that
office, they would still be bound. The constitution had trusted the
President, as well as it had trusted that House. Indeed it was not
conceivable that the House could act upon the subject of foreign
Ministers. Our interests with foreign countries came wholly under the
jurisdiction of the Executive. The duties of that House related to the
internal affairs of the country; but what related to foreign countries
and foreign agents was vested in the Executive Department. The President
was responsible for the manner in which this business was conducted. He
was bound to communicate, from time to time, our situation with foreign
powers; and if plans were carried on abroad for dividing or subjecting
us, if he were not to make due communication of the design, he would be
answerable for the neglect.
TUESDAY, January 30.
_Breach of Privilege._
Mr. SEWALL then said, he believed the business which he had to lay
before the House would require secrecy, as it was a subject which would
considerably affect the feelings of the members of the House. He
therefore moved that the galleries might be cleared; which was
accordingly done, excepting the members and Clerk.
Mr. SEWALL then said, that he had been informed, in a manner which left
no doubt of the truth of the fact, that, in the presence of the House
whilst sitting, MATTHEW LYON, a member from the State of Vermont, did
this day commit a violent attack and gross indecency upon the person of
ROGER GRISWOLD, another member of this House; and in order to bring the
subject before the House, that he had prepared a resolution, which he
read in his place, and delivered in at the Clerk's table. A question was
then taken in the following words: Does the matter so communicated
require secrecy?
This motion passed unanimously in the negative, and the galleries were
opened.
The House then proceeded to consider the motion made by the member from
Massachusetts, which was read, as follows:
"_Resolved_, That Matthew Lyon, a member of this House, for
a violent attack and gross indecency committed upon the
person of Roger Griswold, another member, in the presence
of the House, whilst sitting, be, for this disorderly
behavior, expelled therefrom."
It was moved that this resolution be referred to a committee to be
denominated a Committee of Privileges, with instruction to inquire into
the whole matter of the said resolution, and to report the same with
their opinion thereon to the House.
The question was taken by yeas and nays, and decided in the affirmative,
49 to 44.
_Ordered_, That Messrs. PINCKNEY, VENABLE, KITTERA, ISAAC PARKER, R.
WILLIAMS, COCHRAN, and DENT, be a committee for the purpose.
A motion was then made that the House come to the following resolution:
"_Resolved_, That the House will consider it a high breach
of privilege if either of the members shall enter into any
personal contest until a decision of the House shall be had
thereon."
A motion was made to add the following words to the end thereof:
"And that the said Matthew Lyon be considered in the
custody of the Sergeant-at-arms until the further order of
the House."
The yeas and nays were taken upon this question and decided in the
negative--29 to 62.
THURSDAY, February 1.
_Breach of Privilege._
The SPEAKER informed the House that he had received a letter from a
member from Vermont, which he was requested to lay before them.
Mr. RUTLEDGE thought, that in all cases, when letters were sent to the
SPEAKER to be laid before the House, it would be proper for him to state
the substance of such communications before they are read, otherwise
improper matters might be brought before them.
The SPEAKER allowed that the suggestion was a proper one, and proceeded
to state the contents of the letter in his hand; which having done, the
reading of it was called for, and it was read as follow:
_To the Speaker of the House of Representatives_:
SIR:--As the attention of the House of Representatives has
been called to my conduct in a dispute with Mr. GRISWOLD on
a suggestion of its being a violation of the order of the
House, and the respect due to it from all its members, I
feel it incumbent on me to obviate the imputation of
intentional disrespect. Permit me, sir, through you, to
assure the House of Representatives that I feel as much as
any of its members the necessity of preserving the utmost
decorum in its proceedings; that I am incapable of an
intentional violation of its rule; and that, if, in the
present instance, I am chargeable with a disregard of them,
it is owing wholly to my ignorance of their extent, and
that the House of Representatives claimed any
superintendence over its members when not formally
constituted, and when they are not engaged in actual
business. If I have been mistaken in my understanding on
this subject, I beg the House to believe that my fault has
been without intention, and that I am very sorry that I
have deserved its censure. I am, sir, your obedient
servant,