NOTE 1, p. 24.—This is not quite a correct representation of Mr.
Erskine’s declaration. He had not said that all discussion was rendered
“impossible,” but that the treatment of the French minister by the
English Government was “so harsh and irritating as to defeat all the
objects of negotiation.” As a matter of fact, informal communications
continued to pass between the two governments. But the agents of France
were not accredited, and this fact threw upon England, in the judgment
of the French, the responsibilities of the war. See “Parliamentary
History,” xxxiv., 1289.
NOTE 2, p. 30.—By the Treaty of Westphalia, which in 1648 established
the international relations of modern Europe, the river Scheldt was
closed to general commerce out of consideration for Holland. It
remained thus closed till 1792, when after the battle of Jemappes,
in which the French defeated the Austrians and Prussians, a passage
was forced by the French down to the sea. As England was the especial
protector of Holland it was but natural that Pitt should protest
against the act, not only as a national affront, but also as an
expression of willingness on the part of France to set aside at her
convenience the provisions of the great Treaty of Westphalia.
NOTE 3, p. 31.—The cause of this incorporating of Savoy was the famous
meeting at Mantua in May of 1791. The Count d’Artois, brother of Louis
XVI., the Emperor of Austria, the King of Spain, and the King of
Sardinia, had secured an agreement from those monarchs to send 100,000
men to the borders of France in the hope that the French, terrified by
the alliance and by such an army, would seek peace by submitting to the
Bourbon king, and asking for mediation. Though the plan was rejected by
Louis, it none the less showed the animus of the allies. The details
may be seen in Mignet, 101, and in Alison, tenth ed., ii., 412. On
the 27th of November, 1792, the National Convention annexed Savoy and
erected it into a department of France in direct opposition to the
Constitution of the Republic, which declared that there should be no
extension of the territory.
NOTE 4, p. 32.—By the decree alluded to, the National Convention
declared that they would “grant fraternity and assistance to all those
peoples who wish to procure liberty.” They also charged their generals
to give assistance to such peoples, and to defend all citizens that
have suffered or are now suffering in the cause of liberty. Within ten
days after the passage of this decree an English society sent delegates
to Paris, who presented at the bar of the Convention a congratulatory
address on “the glorious triumph of liberty on the 10th of August.”
The President of the Convention replied in a grandiloquent speech, in
which among other things he said: “The shades of Hampden and Sydney
hover over your heads, and the moment without doubt approaches when
the French will bring congratulations to the National Convention of
Great Britain. Generous Republicans! your appearance among us prepares
a subject for history!” By nonsense of this kind the French were
constantly deceived in regard to the attitude of England.
NOTE 5, p. 35.—This was not the language of exaggeration. The decree
of December 15, 1792, required the French generals wherever they
marched, to proclaim “the abolition of all existing feudal and manorial
rights, together with all imposts, contributions, and tithes”; to
declare “the sovereignty of the people and the suppression of all
existing authorities”; to convoke the people “for the establishment of
a provisional government”; to place “all property of the prince and
his adherents, and the property of all public bodies, both civil and
religious, under the guardianship of the French Republic”; to provide,
as soon as possible, “for the organization of a free and popular form
of government.” This was literally a declaration of war against all
governments then existing in Europe. The decree is given in the _Ann.
Reg._, xxxiv., 155.
NOTE 6, p. 39.—The orator then proceeds to explain certain causes
of misunderstanding which are of no general interest, and therefore
are omitted. To this explanation he also attaches further proofs of
the hostile purpose of France, and of the fact that England had no
connection with Austria and Prussia at the time of their first attack.
The passage seems to be an unnecessary elaboration of what has gone
before, and therefore is also omitted.
NOTE 7, p. 41.—This province, which, from 1305 to 1377, was the
residence of the popes, continued till the French Revolution to belong
to the papal government. It was seized in 1790, and the next year was
incorporated into France, where it has since remained.
NOTE 8, p. 41.—This is not quite accurate. The meeting at Mantua had
been held, and the monarchs of Austria, Spain, and Sardinia had made
the agreement already described above. That the army of 100,000 did not
march against France, was not from any lack of purpose on their part,
but from the irresolution of Louis XVI.
NOTE 9, p. 42.—In this statement, too, Pitt was not correct. The
Declaration of Pilnitz did not leave “the internal state of France to
be decided by the king restored to his liberty, _with the free consent
of the states of the kingdom_;” but asked that the other powers would
not refuse to employ jointly with their Majesties the most efficacious
means, in proportion to their forces, to place the King of France “in
a state to settle in the most perfect liberty the foundations of a
monarchical government, _equally suitable to the rights of sovereigns_
and the welfare of the French.” They made no allusion to the “states
of the kingdom”; but did indicate a purpose to settle the foundations
of the government in accordance with the rights of sovereigns—that is
to say, their own rights. Fox’s statement, given in the speech that
follows, was far better. He said: “It was a declaration of an intention
on the part of the great powers of Germany to interfere in the internal
affairs of France, for the purpose of regulating the government against
the opinion of the people.” The Declaration of Pilnitz was made by the
Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, in consequence of their
belief that “the situation of the King of France was a matter of common
interest to all the European sovereigns.” The Declaration is given at
length in Alison, 10th ed., ii., 415.
NOTE 10, p. 47.—Mr. Pitt then entered into a criticism of some
expressions uttered by Erskine, not only in his speech, but also in a
pamphlet on the subject of the war. The criticism brought out a reply
and a rejoinder which are of little interest and are therefore omitted.
NOTE 11, p. 50.—Reference is here made to the fact that when in 1797
America demanded redress from France for her wanton attacks on American
commerce, the officers of the French Government hinted that the payment
of £50,000 by the Americans to the French officials would, perhaps,
secure immunity. The letters proposing the payment of bribes, known as
the “X. Y. Z. Correspondence,” were ordered published by Congress, in
April of 1798. The English sent them everywhere throughout Europe to
excite feeling against France. In America the indignation aroused by
the suggestion of bribes gave rise to the cry: “Millions for defence,
not a cent for tribute.”
NOTE 12, p. 51.—When Bonaparte landed in Egypt in December, 1798, he
issued a proclamation in which, among other things, he exhorted the
teachers in the mosques to assure the people he had come in fulfilment
of prophecy: “Since the world has existed it has been written, that
_after having destroyed the enemies of Islamism, and destroyed the
cross_, I should come, etc.” This proclamation was published in the
_Annual Register_, (xi., 265,) and not unnaturally made considerable
sensation in England and in Europe.
NOTE 13, p. 52.—The French in Pondicherry sent emissaries throughout
India to organize societies for the propagation of their doctrines. The
members were bound by a series of oaths to do what they could for the
destruction of all kings and sovereigns. Hyder Ali and his son, Tippoo
Saib, were the agents and allies of the French in accomplishing this
work. These designs of the French in India were brought to an end by
the victories of Lord Cornwallis.—Green’s “English People,” Eng. ed.,
iv., 332.
NOTE 14, p. 65.—The treaty of Campo Formio was not negotiated by
the accredited ministers of the Directory, but by Napoleon on his
own responsibility. In explaining his haste, he gave as one of his
reasons the necessity of being free to act directly against England.
In one of his confidential letters he said: “It is indispensable for
our government to destroy the English monarchy”; and again: “Let us
concentrate all our activity on the marine and destroy England; that
done, Europe is at our feet.”—Confidential letter to the Directory,
Oct. 18, 1797. Alison, 10th ed., iv., 347.
NOTE 15, p. 94.—The orator in this connection then proceeds to give at
some length his reasons for attempting negotiations in 1796–97. These,
as having no direct bearing on the subject discussed, are omitted.
NOTE 16, p. 113.—For an explanation of what was done at Mantua, see
Note 3, p. 31. On the Declaration of Pilnitz, see Note 9, p. 42.
NOTE 17, p. 116.—See notes 4 and 5 above.
NOTE 18, p. 119.—Reference is here made to the Treaty of September 26,
1786. Mr. Fox argued this question at greater length in a letter to his
Westminster constituents. Pitt maintained that England in 1800 was not
bound by that treaty inasmuch as the French Government which had made
the treaty had been destroyed by the Revolution. In reply Fox declared
that if the Revolution had swept away the obligation to obey that
treaty, it must have also swept away the obligation to obey all others.
But Pitt had often acknowledged the binding force of obligations
entered into before the Revolution. Hence the treaty of 1786 was
still in force; and according to it the dismissal of M. Chauvelin was
equivalent to a declaration of war.
NOTE 19, p. 121.—When the Duke of Brunswick invaded France in July
of 1792 at the head of the Austrian and Prussian forces he published
a manifesto which did every thing possible to put his masters in the
wrong. The burden of the proclamation was that the French had usurped
the reins of administration in France, had disturbed order, and had
overturned the legitimate government. He declared that the allied
armies were advancing “to put an end to anarchy in France, to arrest
the attacks made on the altar and the throne, and to restore to the
king the security and liberty he was deprived of.” The manifesto
furthermore said that the “inhabitants of towns who dared to stand on
the defensive would instantly be punished as rebels with the rigors of
war, and their houses demolished and burned.” This proclamation not
only showed that the principal object of the war was an interference
with the domestic policy of France, but it greatly inflamed the
animosities of the French against the foreign powers. See Mignet, “Fr.
Rev.,” 143; v. Sybel, ii., 29.
NOTE 20, p. 128.—It is an interesting fact that in the early part of
1792 Louis XVI. sent to the King of England, through Chauvelin and
Talleyrand, asking the English Government to intercede to prevent
military action on the part of Austria and Prussia. Louis appears to
have seen that war on the part of the German powers, though intended to
restore Louis himself to his former influence and authority, could only
result in evil. Louis said: “I consider the success of the alliance,
in which I wish you to concur with as much zeal as I do, as of the
highest importance; I consider it as necessary to the stability of the
respective constitutions of our two kingdoms; and I will add that our
union ought to command peace to Europe.” The proposal was rejected, and
a few weeks later Louis made a second attempt. He now asked the King to
interpose, and by his wisdom and influence, “avert, while there is yet
time, the progress of the confederacy formed against France, and which
threatens the peace, the liberties, and the happiness of Europe.” This
proposition, too, was rejected July 8, 1792, and before the end of the
month France was invaded by the allied armies under Brunswick.
NOTE 21, p. 134.—General Suwarroff, one of the most extraordinary men
of his time, had begun his career in the days of Frederick the Great,
and had contributed much to the fame of the Russians for bravery at
the terrible battle of Kunnersdorf. Though now nearly seventy years of
age he showed an energy that made his name a terror wherever he went.
The campaign against Praga is described in Alison, 10th ed., iii., 517
_seq._ For his far more remarkable campaign in Italy, see vol. v., 45
_seq._
NOTE 22, p. 142.—The allusion here is to the Treaty of Campo Formio,
signed Oct. 17, 1797, by which a large part of the Venetian territory
was turned over to Austria in consideration of the annexation of
Belgium and Lombardy to France. The machinations by which this
transaction was brought about were among the most perfidious in the
whole career of Napoleon. In regard to the alleged reason of giving up
Venice Napoleon wrote to the Directory: “I have purposely devised this
sort of rupture, _in case you may wish to obtain five or six millions
from Venice_.” See Lanfrey’s “History of Napoleon,” 1, 100; and Adams’
“Democracy and Monarchy in France,” 162.
NOTE 23, p. 143.—The Emperor Paul I., father of Alexander I. and of
Nicholas, was probably already insane at the time Fox was speaking. He
had long shown a meddlesome disposition, and had interfered with the
internal concerns of nearly all the countries on the Baltic as well as
with those of Spain. Pitt on a former occasion had said of him: “There
is no reason, no ground, to fear that this magnanimous prince will ever
desert a cause in which he is so sincerely engaged.” But in spite of
this prediction he did desert the allies and make peace with France. In
view of these facts Fox’s ironical use of the word “magnanimous” was a
peculiarly forcible hit.
NOTE 24, p. 151.—In this conjecture Fox was not far from the language
subsequently used by Napoleon. He said: “I then had need of war;
a treaty of peace which should have derogated from that of Campo
Formio, and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every
imagination.” He then went on to say that Pitt’s answer was what he
desired, that “it could not have been more favorable,” and that “with
such impassioned antagonists he would have no difficulty in reaching
the highest destinies.”—“Memoirs,” i., 33.
NOTE 25, p. 151.—In a speech some months before, Pitt had defended
his action in regard to Holland by saying that “_from his knowledge
of human nature_” he knew that it must be successful. It proved a
lamentable failure, hence the irony of Fox’s emphasis.
NOTE 26, p. 154.—Virgil (Æneid, xi., 313): “Valor has done its utmost;
we have fought with the embodied force of all the realm.”
Pitt on a former occasion had said that the contest ought never to be
abandoned till the people of England could adopt those words as their
own.
NOTE 27, p. 167. References to Washington were made from the fact that
news of his death, which occurred December 14, 1799, had just been
received in England. In the passage that follows, Fox alludes to the
time Dundas was a member of North’s Government, and when it was the
fashion of his party to denounce Washington.
NOTE 28, p. 170.—The facts as stated by Fox were only too true, and
the British officer alluded to was none other than Lord Nelson. The
insurgents had capitulated, on condition that persons and property
should be guaranteed, and the articles had been signed by the Cardinal,
the Russian commander, and even by Captain Foote, the commander of
the British force. Nelson arrived with his fleet about thirty-six
hours afterward, and at once ordered that the terms of the treaty be
annulled. The garrison were taken out under the pretence of carrying
the treaty into effect, and then were turned over as rebels to the
vengeance of the Sicilian Court. Southey in his “Life of Nelson” (vi.,
177) calls this deplorable event “A stain upon the memory of Nelson
and the honor of England. To palliate it would be in vain; to justify
it would be wicked; there is no alternative for one who will not make
himself a participator in guilt, but to record the disgraceful story
with sorrow and with shame.” Lady Hamilton, with whom Nelson was
infatuated and who was the favorite of the Queen of Naples, was the one
who led Nelson into committing the outrage.
NOTE 29, p. 253.—The following portion of Mackintosh’s argument has
been universally admired. It was the common impression in England that
if the prosecution of Peltier was not energetically carried on by the
government, Napoleon would make the fact a pretext for declaring war.
The advocate probably supposed that the jury shared that belief. He
did not deem it wise to allude to it directly, but he proceeds with
great ingenuity and force to dwell on the advantages of peace, and then
having established a coincidence of feeling between himself and the
jury, he leads them to see that peace can in no way be so effectually
promoted as by sustaining the cause of justice throughout Europe, and
that in no way can justice be so surely maintained as by substantial
freedom of the press.
NOTE 30, p. 205.—Reference is made to the boastful question of Cicero,
in the second oration against Anthony: “How has it happened, Conscript
Fathers, that no one has come out as an enemy of the Republic, for
these last twenty years, who did not at the same time declare war
against me?”
NOTE 31, p. 207.—Mackintosh was wise enough to see that war was
inevitable. It came sooner, perhaps, than he anticipated. Only a few
days after the conclusion of the trial, the King sent a message to
Parliament that war could not be avoided, and hostilities broke out May
18, 1803. Under the circumstances the impressive passage that follows
on “the public spirit of a people” was peculiarly suggestive.
NOTE 32, p. 219.—The passage on the inherent characteristics of the
French Revolution is peculiarly interesting, as showing how completely
Mackintosh had changed his opinion since he wrote the Reply to
Burke. Probably he is the more explicit, because his pamphlet was so
universally known.
NOTE 33, p. 223.—This passage and what follows on the rule of the
Jacobins is the one of which Madame de Staël wrote in her “Ten Years
of Exile”: “It was during this stormy period of my existence that I
received the speech of Mr. Mackintosh; and there read his description
of a Jacobin, who had made himself an object of terror during the
Revolution to children, women, and old men, and who was now bending
himself double under the rod of the Corsican, who tears from him, even
to the last atom, that liberty for which he pretended to have taken
arms. This _morceau_ of the finest eloquence touched me to my very
soul; it is the privilege of superior writers sometimes unwittingly
to solace the unfortunate in all countries and at all times. France
was in a state of such complete silence around me, that this voice,
which suddenly responded to my soul, seemed to me to come down from
heaven—_it came from a land of liberty_.”
NOTE 34, p. 236.—Allusion is made to the fact, humiliating to every
Englishman, that Charles II. and James II. both received pensions from
Louis XIV.
NOTE 35, p. 252.—Aloys Reding, the Burgomaster of Schweitz, in 1798,
put himself at the head of a few followers and attacked the invading
French with so much energy that he broke their ranks and repelled them.
Afterward, however, he was overpowered and taken prisoner. After being
held in prison for a time he was driven into exile.
NOTE 36, p. 296.—At the conclusion of the trial, the jury without
hesitation found a verdict of “guilty.” But the subsequent history
of the case is one of peculiar interest. The judges decided that the
defendant Williams should suffer one year’s imprisonment at hard
labor. But before sentence was to be pronounced, Erskine declined
to go forward with the case and returned his retainer. The reason
was never made public till Erskine himself explained the matter in a
letter written in February of 1819 to the editor of Howell’s “State
Trials.” He was one day walking in a narrow lane in London when he felt
something pulling him by the coat, and, turning around, he saw a woman
in tears and emaciated with disease and sorrow. The woman pulled him
forward into a miserable hovel where in a room not more than ten or
twelve feet square were two children with confluent small-pox and the
wretched man whom he had just convicted. The man was engaged in sewing
up little, religious tracts, which had been his principal employment
in his trade. Erskine was convinced that Williams had been urged to
the publication of Paine by his extreme poverty and not by his will.
The advocate was so deeply affected by what he saw and heard that he
believed the cause for which he had pleaded would best be subserved by
the policy of mercy. He wrote to the Society in whose behalf he had
been retained by the crown urging such a course. His advice, after
due consideration, was rejected, whereupon Erskine abandoned the case
and returned the fees he had received. The incident is an admirable
illustration of the great advocate’s high ideal of professional ethics.
Erskine’s letter is given in Howell’s “State Trials,” xxvi., 714; and,
in part, in Erskine’s “Works,” i., 592.