BURNSIDE IN EAST TENNESSEE
Organizing and arming the loyalists--Burnside concentrates near
Greeneville--His general plan--Rumors of Confederate
reinforcements--Lack of accurate information--The Ninth Corps in
Kentucky--Its depletion by malarial disease--Death of General Welsh
from this cause--Preparing for further work--Situation on 16th
September--Dispatch from Halleck--Its apparent purpose--Necessity to
dispose of the enemy near Virginia border--Burnside personally at
the front--His great activity--Ignorance of Rosecrans's
peril--Impossibility of joining him by the 20th--Ruinous effects of
abandoning East Tennessee--Efforts to aid Rosecrans without such
abandonment--Enemy duped into burning Watauga bridge
themselves--Ninth Corps arriving--Willcox's division garrisons
Cumberland Gap--Reinforcements sent Rosecrans from all
quarters--Chattanooga made safe from attack--The supply
question--Meigs's description of the roads--Burnside halted near
Loudon--Halleck's misconception of the geography--The people
imploring the President not to remove the troops--How Longstreet got
away from Virginia--Burnside's alternate plans--Minor operations in
upper Holston valley--Wolford's affair on the lower Holston.
For a week after the capture of Cumberland Gap Burnside devoted
himself to the pleasing task of organizing the native loyalists into
a National Guard for home defence, issuing arms to them upon
condition that they should, as a local militia, respond to his call
and reinforce for temporary work his regular forces whenever the
need should arise. The detailed reports from the upper valley
reported the enemy under Jones at first to be 4000, and later to be
6000 strong. These estimates came through cool-headed and prudent
officers, and were based upon information brought in by loyal men
who had proven singularly accurate in their knowledge throughout the
campaign. Point was added to these reports by the experience of one
of his regiments. A detachment of 300 men of the One Hundredth Ohio
had been sent to support a cavalry reconnoissance near Limestone
Station on the railroad, whilst Burnside was investing Cumberland
Gap, and these had been surrounded and forced to surrender by the
enemy. This showed the presence of a considerable body of
Confederates in the upper valley, and that they were bold and
aggressive. It was the part of prudence to act upon this
information, and Burnside ordered all his infantry except one
brigade to march toward Greeneville. Two brigades of cavalry were
already there, and his purpose was to concentrate about 6000
infantry, try to obtain a decisive engagement with the Confederates,
and to punish them so severely that the upper valley would be safe,
for a time at least, from invasion by them, so that he might be free
to withdraw most of his troops to co-operate with Rosecrans in a
Georgia campaign, if that alternative in Halleck's plans should be
adopted. He felt the importance of this the more, as the news
received from Virginia mentioned the movement of railway
rolling-stock to the East to bring, as rumor had it, Ewell's corps
from Lee to reinforce Jones. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx.
pt. iii. pp. 661, 717.] The sending of the railway trains was a
fact, but the object, as it turned out, was to transport
Longstreet's corps to reinforce Bragg. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 731.] Of
this, however, Burnside had no intimation, and must act upon the
information which came to him.
The Ninth Corps began to arrive at Cincinnati from Vicksburg on the
12th of August, half of it coming then, and the second division
arriving on the 20th. It was reduced to 6000 by casualties and by
sickness, and was in a pitiable condition. Being made up of troops
which had served in the East, the men were not acclimated to the
Mississippi valley, and in the bayous and marshes about Vicksburg
had suffered greatly. Malarial fevers ate out their vitality, and
even those who reported for duty dragged themselves about, the mere
shadows of what they had been. General Parke reported their arrival
and was then obliged to go upon sick-leave himself. General Welsh,
who had distinguished himself at Antietam, reported that his
division must recuperate for a few weeks before it could take the
field. He made a heroic effort to remain on duty, but died suddenly
on the 14th, and his loss was deeply felt by the corps. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. iii. p. 45.] Potter's division was
as badly off as Welsh's, and both were for a short time scattered at
healthful camps in the Kentucky hills. Each camp was, at first, a
hospital; but the change of climate and diet rapidly restored the
tone of the hardy soldiery.
General Willcox, who commanded the Indiana district, belonged to the
corps, and asked to be returned to duty with it. He was allowed to
do so on the 11th of September, and the War Department sent with him
a new division of Indiana troops which had been recruited and
organized during the summer. Burnside had ordered recruits and new
regiments to rendezvous in Kentucky, and prepared to bring them as
well as the Ninth Corps forward as soon as the latter should be fit
to march. Every camp and station at the rear was full of busy
preparation during the last of August and the beginning of
September, and at the front the general himself was now
concentrating his little forces to strike a blow near the Virginia
line which would make him free to move afterward in any direction
the General-in-Chief should determine.
On the 16th of September Hascall's division was echeloned along the
road from Morristown back toward Knoxville; White's division passed
Knoxville, moving up the valley to join Hascall. Hartsuff, who
commanded the Twenty-third Corps, had been disabled for field work
by trouble from his old wounds and was at Knoxville. Burnside was
also there, intending to go rapidly forward and overtake his
infantry as soon as they should approach Greeneville. In the night
the courier brought him a dispatch from Halleck, [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxx. pt. iii. p. 617.] dated the 13th, directing a
rapid movement of all his forces in Kentucky toward East Tennessee,
where the whole Army of the Ohio was to be concentrated as soon as
possible. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. ii. p. 550.] He also directed
Burnside to move his infantry toward Chattanooga, giving as a reason
that Bragg might manoeuvre to turn Rosecrans's right, and in that
case Rosecrans would want to hand Chattanooga over to Burnside so
that he himself could move the whole Army of the Cumberland to meet
Bragg.
There was nothing in this dispatch which intimated that Rosecrans
was in any danger, nor was Burnside informed that Bragg had been
reinforced by Longstreet's corps. On the other hand, his information
looked to Ewell's joining Jones against himself. The object Halleck
had in view seemed to be to get the Ninth Corps and other troops now
in Kentucky into East Tennessee as rapidly as possible, and then to
move the whole Army of the Ohio down toward Rosecrans. It certainly
could not be that he wished Cumberland Gap abandoned, and the trains
and detachments coming through it from Kentucky left to the tender
mercies of Jones and his Confederates, who could capture them at
their leisure and without a blow. It was equally incredible that the
government could wish to stop the organization of the loyalists just
as weapons were being distributed to them, and to abandon them to
the enemy when their recent open demonstrations in favor of the
Union would make their condition infinitely worse than if our troops
had never come to them. The rational interpretation, and the one
Burnside gave it, was that the alternative which had been stated in
the earlier dispatch of the 11th had been settled in favor of a
general movement southward instead of eastward, and that this made
it all the more imperative that he should disembarrass himself of
General Jones and establish a line on the upper Holston which a
small force could hold, whilst he with the rest of the two corps
should move southward as soon as the Ninth Corps could make the
march from Kentucky. This was exactly what General Schofield did in
the next spring when he was ordered to join Sherman with the Army of
the Ohio; and I do not hesitate to say that it was the only thing
which an intelligent military man on the ground and knowing the
topography would think of doing. To make a panicky abandonment of
the country and of the trains and detachments _en route_ to it,
would have been hardly less disgraceful than a surrender of the
whole. To Burnside's honor and credit it should be recorded that he
did not dream of doing it. He strained every nerve to hasten the
movement of his troops so as to get through with his little campaign
against Jones by the time the Ninth Corps could come from Kentucky,
and if he could accomplish it within that limit, he would have the
right to challenge the judgment of every competent critic, whether
he had not done that which became a good soldier and a good general.
On the 17th of September the concentration of Burnside's infantry
toward Greeneville had so far progressed that he was preparing to go
personally to the front and lead them against the enemy. It is
noticeable in the whole campaign that he took this personal
leadership and activity on himself. In Hartsuff's condition of
health it would have been within the ordinary methods of action that
the next in rank should assume command of the Twenty-third Corps,
and that the department commander should remain at his headquarters
at Knoxville. But Hartsuff was able to attend to office business,
and so Burnside practically exchanged places with him, leaving his
subordinate with discretion to direct affairs in the department at
large, whilst he himself did the field work with his troops. He had
done it at Cumberland Gap when he received the surrender of Frazer;
he was doing it now, and he was to do it again, still later, when he
met Longstreet's advance at the crossing of the Holston River.
In preparation for an absence of some days, he wrote, on the date
last mentioned, a long dispatch to General Halleck, in the nature of
a report of the state of affairs at that date. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxx. pt. iii. p. 717.] He explained the failure of the
telegraph and the efforts that were making to get it in working
order. He gave the situation of the troops and stated his purpose to
attack the enemy. He noticed the report of Ewell's coming against
him and promised stout resistance, finding satisfaction in the
thought that it would give Meade the opportunity to strike a
decisive blow against Lee's reduced army. He reported the condition
of his trains and cattle droves on the road from Kentucky, and the
contact of his cavalry in the south part of the valley with
Rosecrans's outposts. The bridge over the Hiwassee at Calhoun, he
said, could be finished in ten days, and the steamboat at Kingston
would soon be completed and ready for use. All this promised better
means of supply at an early day, though at present "twenty-odd cars"
were all the means of moving men or supplies on the portion of the
railroad within his control.
Later in the same day he received Halleck's dispatch of the 14th,
which said it was believed the enemy would concentrate to give
Rosecrans battle, and directed him to reinforce the latter with all
possible speed. [Footnote: Burnside's dispatches of the 17th in
answer to Halleck's seem to show that both those of 13th and 14th
were received by him after he had written the long one in the
morning. The internal evidence supports this idea, and his second
dispatch on the 17th acknowledges the receipt of Halleck's two
together. Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. iii. p. 718. In his
official report, however, Burnside says the dispatch of 13th was
received "on the night of the 16th" (Official Records, vol. xxx. pt.
ii. p. 550), and I have followed this statement, although his report
was not written till November, 1865, when lapse of time might easily
give rise to an error in so trifling a detail. The matter is of no
real consequence in the view I have taken of the situation.] Still,
no information was given of the movement of Longstreet to join
Bragg, and indeed it was only on the 15th that Halleck gave the news
to Rosecrans as reliable. [Footnote: Official Records, xxx. pt. ii.
p. 643.] Burnside must therefore regard the enemy concentrating in
Georgia as only the same which Rosecrans had been peremptorily
ordered to attack and which he had been supposed to be strong enough
to cope with. No time was stated at which the battle in Georgia
would probably occur. To hasten the work in hand, to put affairs at
the Virginia line in condition to be left as soon as might be, and
then to speed his forces toward Chattanooga to join in the Georgia
campaign, was plainly Burnside's duty. If it would be too rash for
Rosecrans to give battle without reinforcements, that officer was
competent to manoeuvre his army in retreat and take a defensible
position till his reinforcements could come. That course would be
certainly much wiser than to abandon East Tennessee to the enemy,
with all the consequences of such an act, quite as bad as the loss
of a battle. As matters turned out, even such instantaneous and
ruinous abandonment would not have helped Rosecrans. It was now the
afternoon of the 17th of September. The battle of Chickamauga was to
begin in the early morning of the 19th and to end disastrously on
the 20th. One full day for the marching of troops was all that
intervened, or two at most, if they were only to reach the field
upon the second day of the battle. And where were Burnside's men?
One division at Greeneville and above, more than two hundred miles
from Chattanooga, and the other near New Market and Morristown, a
hundred and fifty miles. Burnside's "twenty-odd cars" were confined
to a section of the railroad less than eighty miles long, and could
hardly carry the necessary baggage and ammunition even for that
fraction of the way. The troops must march, and could not by any
physical possibility make a quarter of the distance before
Rosecrans's fate at Chickamauga should be decided. The authorities
at Washington must bear the responsibility for complete ignorance of
these conditions, or, what would be equally bad, a forgetfulness of
them in a moment of panic.
But Burnside did not know and could not guess that a battle was to
be fought so soon. All he could do was to prepare to carry out the
wishes of the War Department as speedily as could be, without the
total ruin of East Tennessee and all he had accomplished. Such ruin
might come by the fate of war if he were driven out by superior
force, but he would have been rightly condemned if it had come by
his precipitate abandonment of the country. He did more to carry out
Halleck's wish than was quite prudent. He stopped the troops which
had not yet reached Greeneville and ordered a countermarch. He
hastened up the country to make the attack upon the Confederates
with the force he already had in their presence, and then to bring
the infantry back at once, hoping the cavalry could hold in check a
defeated enemy.
The necessity of delivering a blow at General Jones was afterwards
criticised by Halleck, but it was in accordance with the sound rules
of conducting war. To have called back his troops without a fight
would have been to give the enemy double courage by his retreat, and
his brigades would have been chased by the exulting foe. They would
either have been forced to halt and fight their pursuers under every
disadvantage of loss of prestige and of the initiative, or have made
a precipitate flight which would have gone far to ruin the whole
command as well as the Tennessee people they had just liberated. It
is true that this involved an advance from Greeneville upon
Jonesboro, but the cavalry were already in contact with the enemy
near there, and this was the only successful mode of accomplishing
his purpose. [Footnote: Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, in their "Life of
Lincoln," give the draft of a letter to Burnside which Mr. Lincoln
wrote but did not send, in which he expressed his surprise that
Burnside should be moving toward Virginia when they at Washington
were so anxious to have him in Georgia. Mr. Lincoln's judgments of
military affairs were excellent when he was fully possessed of the
facts; and I have elaborated somewhat my statement of the
circumstances in East Tennessee, and of the distances, etc., to show
how little they were known or understood in Washington. Nicolay and
Hay's Lincoln, vol. viii. p. 166.]
Making use of the portion of the railroad which could be operated,
Burnside reached Greeneville on the 18th and rode rapidly to
Jonesboro. On the 19th a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Foster
attacked the enemy at Bristol, defeated them, tore up the railroad,
and destroyed the bridges two miles above the town. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. ii. p. 592.] Foster then returned to
Blountsville, and marched on the next day to Hall's Ford on the
Watauga, where, after a skirmishing fight lasting several hours, he
again dislodged the enemy, capturing about fifty prisoners and a
piece of artillery with slight loss to himself. These were flanking
movements designed to distract the attention of the enemy whilst
Burnside concentrated most of his force in front of their principal
position at Carter's Station, where the most important of the
railway bridges in that region crosses the Watauga. To impress his
opponent with the belief that he meant to make an extended campaign,
Burnside, on the 22d, notified Jones to remove the non-combatants
from the villages of the upper valley. Foster's brigade of cavalry
was again sent to demonstrate on the rear, whilst Burnside
threatened in front with the infantry. The enemy now evacuated the
position and retreated, first burning the bridge. This was what
Burnside desired, and the means of resuming railway communication to
support an advance toward Knoxville being taken from the
Confederates for a considerable time, he was now able to put all his
infantry except two regiments in march for Knoxville. A brigade of
cavalry with this small infantry support at Bull's Gap was entrusted
with the protection of this region, and by the help of the home
guards of loyal men, was able to hold it during the operations of
the next fortnight. Burnside's purpose had been, if he had not been
interrupted, to have pressed the Confederates closely with a
sufficient force in front to compel a retreat, whilst he intercepted
them with the remainder of his army, moving by a shorter line from
Blountsville. He made, however, the best of the situation, and
having driven the enemy over the State line and disengaged his own
troops, he was free to concentrate the greater part of them for
operations at the other end of the valley.
The Ninth Corps was now beginning to arrive, and was ordered to
rendezvous first at Knoxville. Willcox had assembled his division of
new troops, mostly Indianans, and marched with them to Cumberland
Gap, where he relieved the garrison of that post, and was himself
entrusted by Burnside with the command of that portion of the
department, covering the upper valleys of the Clinch and Holston as
well as the lines of communication with Cincinnati and the Ohio
River.
In the days immediately preceding the battle of Chickamauga, Halleck
had urged reinforcements forward toward Rosecrans from all parts of
the West. Pope in Minnesota, Schofield in Missouri, Hurlbut at
Memphis, and Sherman at Vicksburg had all been called upon for help,
and all had put bodies of troops in motion, though the distances
were great and the effect was a little too much like the proverbial
one of locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen. As
there was no telegraphic communication with Burnside, the
General-in-Chief gave orders through the adjutant-general's office
in Cincinnati directly to the Ninth Corps and to the detachments of
the Twenty-third Corps remaining or assembling in Kentucky, to march
at once into East Tennessee. An advisory supervision of the
department offices in Cincinnati had been left with me, and Captain
Anderson, the assistant adjutant-general, issued orders in General
Burnside's name after consultation with me. General Parke cut short
his sick-leave, and, though far from strong, assumed command of the
Ninth Corps and began the march for Cumberland Gap. The guards for
the railways and necessary posts were reduced to the lowest limits
of safety, and every available regiment was hurried to the front.
By the end of September Burnside's forces were pretty well
concentrated between Knoxville and Loudon, the crossing of the
Holston River. It had now been learned that Bragg's army had
suffered even more than Rosecrans's in the battle of Chickamauga,
and notwithstanding the rout of the right wing of the Cumberland
Army, the stubborn fighting of the centre and left wing under Thomas
had made the enemy willing to admit that they had not won a decisive
victory. Our army was within its lines at Chattanooga, and these had
been so strengthened that General Meigs, who had been sent out in
haste as a special envoy of the War Department, reported to Mr.
Stanton on the 27th of September that the position was very strong,
being practically secure against an assault, and that the army was
hearty, cheerful, and confident. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xxx. pt. iii. p. 890.] Meigs was himself a distinguished officer of
the Engineer Corps as well as quartermaster-general, and the weight
of his opinion at once restored confidence in Washington. He saw at
a glance that the only perilous contingency was the danger of
starvation, for the wagon roads over the mountains on the north side
of the Tennessee were most difficult at best, and soon likely to
become impassable. The army was safe from the enemy till it chose to
resume the offensive, provided it could be fed. He concluded his
dispatch by saying, "Of the rugged nature of this region I had no
conception when I left Washington. I never travelled on such roads
before." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. iii. p. 890.] It
was only too evident that Halleck shared this ignorance, and had
added to it a neglect to estimate the distances over these mountains
and through these valleys, and the relations of the points, he
directed Burnside to hold, with the immediate theatre of Rosecrans's
operations.
On the same date as Meigs's report, Burnside was also sending a full
statement of his situation and an explanation of his conduct.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 904.] The telegraphic communication was opened
just as he finished his dispatch, and for the first time he had the
means of rapid intercourse with army headquarters. He patiently
explained the misconceptions and cross purposes of the preceding
fortnight, and showed how impossible and how ruinous would have been
any other action than that which he took. Halleck had said that it
would now be necessary to move the Army of the Ohio along the north
side of the Tennessee till it should be opposite Chattanooga and
reinforce Rosecrans in that way. Burnside pointed out that this
would open the heart of East Tennessee to Bragg's cavalry or
detachments from his army. He offered to take the bolder course of
moving down the south side of the rivers, covering Knoxville and the
valley as he advanced.
Mr. Lincoln replied by authorizing Burnside to hold his present
positions, sending Rosecrans, in his own way, what help he could
spare. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 905.] Halleck's answer was an amazing
proof that he had never comprehended the campaign. He reiterated
that Burnside's orders, before leaving Kentucky and continuously
since, had been "to connect your right with General Rosecrans's
left, so that if the enemy concentrated on one, the other would be
able to assist." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 906.] If this meant anything,
it meant that Burnside was to keep within a day's march of
Rosecrans; for two days was more than enough to fight out a battle
like Chickamauga. Yet he and everybody else knew that Burnside's
supply route from Kentucky was through Cumberland Gap, and he had
warmly applauded when Burnside turned that position, and by
investing it in front and rear, had forced Frazer to surrender. He
had explicitly directed Burnside to occupy and hold the upper
Holston valley nearly or quite to the Virginia line, and one gets
weary of repeating that between these places and Chattanooga was a
breadth of two hundred miles of the kind of country Meigs had
described and more than ten days of hard marching. His present
orders are equally blind. Burnside is directed to reinforce
Rosecrans with "all your available force," yet "East Tennessee must
be held at all hazards, if possible." To "hold at all hazards" might
be understood, but what is the effect of the phrase "if possible"?
It must amount in substance to authority to do exactly what Burnside
was doing,--to hold East Tennessee with as small means as he thought
practicable, and to reinforce Rosecrans with what he could spare.
It was, on the whole, fortunate for the country that Burnside was
not in telegraphic communication with Washington sooner. Had he been
actually compelled to abandon East Tennessee on the 13th or 14th of
September, incalculable mischief would have followed. The Ninth
Corps was _en route_ for Cumberland Gap, and it with all the trains
and droves on the road must either have turned back or pushed on
blindly with no probability of effecting a junction with the
Twenty-third Corps. Even as it was, the terror in East Tennessee,
when it became known that they were likely to be abandoned, was
something fearful. Public and private men united in passionate
protests, and the common people stood aghast. Two of the most
prominent citizens only expressed the universal feeling when, in a
dispatch to Mr. Lincoln, they used such language as this,--
"In the name of Christianity and humanity, in the name of God and
liberty, for the sake of their wives and children and everything
they hold sacred and dear on earth, the loyal people of Tennessee
appeal to you and implore you not to abandon them again to the
merciless dominion of the rebels, by the withdrawal of the Union
forces from East Tennessee." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx.
pt. iv. p. 401. ]
With the evidence of the ability of the Army of the Cumberland to
hold its position at Chattanooga, there came a breathing spell and a
quick end of the panic. It was seen that there was time to get all
desirable reinforcements to Rosecrans from the West, and Hooker was
sent with two corps from the East, open lines of well-managed
railways making this a quicker assistance than could be given by
even a few days' marches over country roads. The culmination of the
peril had been caused by the inactivity of the Army of the Potomac,
which had permitted the transfer of Longstreet across four States;
and now Hooker was sent from that army by a still longer route
through the West to the vicinity of Bridgeport, thirty miles by rail
below Chattanooga on the Tennessee River, but nearer fifty by the
circuitous mountain roads actually used. It became evident also that
Burnside's army could only subsist by making the most of its own
lines of supply through Kentucky. To add its trains to those which
were toiling over the mountains between Chattanooga and Bridgeport,
would risk the starvation of the whole. Until a better line could be
opened, Burnside was allowed to concentrate most of his forces in
the vicinity of Loudon, where he guarded the whole valley. His
cavalry connected with Rosecrans on the north side of the Tennessee,
and also held the line of the Hiwassee on the left.
On the last day of September Burnside reported the concentration of
his forces and submitted three alternate plans of assisting
Rosecrans: [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx. pt. iii. p. 954.]
First, to abandon East Tennessee and move all his forces by the
north bank of the Tennessee River to Chattanooga. This was what
Halleck had seemed to propose. Second, to cross the Holston and
march directly against Bragg's right flank whilst Rosecrans should
attack in front. This was essentially what Grant afterward did,
putting Sherman in a position similar to that which Burnside would
have taken. Third, to march with 7000 infantry and 5000 cavalry
entirely around Bragg by the east, and strike his line of
communications at Dalton or thereabouts. This had a strong
resemblance to the strategy of Sherman next spring, when he forced
Johnston out of Dalton by sending McPherson to his rear at Resaca.
Burnside added to it the plan of a march to the sea, proposing that
if Bragg pursued him, he should march down the railroad to Atlanta,
destroying it as thoroughly as possible, and then make his way to
the coast, living on the country.
The last of these plans was that which Burnside preferred and
offered to put into immediate execution. Neither of them was likely
to succeed at that moment, for Rosecrans was so far demoralized by
the effects of his late battle that he was in no condition to carry
out any aggressive campaign with decisive energy. He declared in
favor of the first [Footnote: _Id._, pt. iv. p. 72.] (for they were
communicated to him as well as to Halleck), and this only meant that
he wanted his army at Chattanooga reinforced by any and every means,
though he could not supply them, and the fortifications were already
so strong that General Meigs reported that 10,000 men could very
soon hold them against all Bragg's army. The plans, however, give us
interesting light on Burnside's character and abilities, and show
that he was both fertile in resources and disposed to adopt the
boldest action. Halleck in reply said that distant expeditions into
Georgia were not now contemplated, nor was it now necessary to join
Rosecrans at Chattanooga. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xxx. pt.
iv. p. 25.] It was sufficient for Burnside to be in position to go
to Rosecrans's assistance if he should require it. He was, however,
to "hold some point near the upper end of the valley," which kept
alive the constant occasion for misunderstanding, since it implied
the protection and occupation of all East Tennessee, and the general
there in command was the only one who could judge what was necessary
to secure the object. The necessity for activity soon showed itself.
About the 6th of October General Jones was reported to be showing a
disposition to be aggressive, and Burnside determined to strike a
blow at him again and with more force than that which had been
interrupted a fortnight before. Willcox was ordered from Cumberland
Gap to Morristown with his four new Indiana regiments; the Ninth
Corps (having now only about 5000 men present for duty) was moved up
the valley also, whilst the Twenty-third Corps, with two brigades of
cavalry, was left in its positions near Loudon. The rest of the
cavalry, under Shackelford, accompanied the movement up the valley
of which Burnside took command in person. Leaving the cavalry post
at Bull's Gap and advancing with his little army, he found the enemy
strongly posted about midway between the Gap and Greeneville.
Engaging them and trying to hold them by a skirmishing fight, he
sent Foster's cavalry brigade to close the passage behind them.
Foster found the roads too rough to enable him to reach the desired
position in time, and the enemy retreating in the night escaped. The
pursuit was pushed beyond the Watauga River, and a more thorough
destruction was made of the railroad to and beyond the Virginia
line. Considerable loss had been inflicted on the enemy and 150
prisoners had been captured, but no decisive engagement had been
brought about, Jones being wary and conscious of inferiority of
force. Willcox was left at Greeneville with part of the cavalry,
while Burnside brought back the Ninth Corps to Knoxville. The
activity was good for the troops and was successful in curbing the
enemy's enterprise, besides encouraging the loyal inhabitants. There
was now a lull in affairs till November, broken only by a mishap to
Colonel Wolford's brigade of cavalry on the south of the Holston,
where he was watching the enemy's advanced posts in the direction of
Athens and Cleveland. Burnside had sent a flag of truce through the
lines on the 19th of October, and the enemy taking advantage of it,
delivered an unexpected blow upon Wolford, capturing 300 or 400 of
his men and a battery of mountain howitzers, together with a wagon
train which was several miles from camp. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xxxi. pt. i. p. 273.] Wolford heard that his train was
attacked and sent two regiments to protect it. These were surrounded
by a superior force, and Wolford then brought up the rest of his
command, only 700 strong, and made a bold effort to rescue his
comrades. This he did, with the loss of the prisoners mentioned and
the howitzers, which were taken after they had fired their last
cartridge. The wagons were burned, but the men bravely cut their way
out. Approaching Loudon, they were met by General Julius White with
infantry reinforcements. The tables were now turned on the
Confederates, who fled over the Hiwassee again, losing in their turn
about 100 prisoners. [Footnote: _Id._, pp. 5, 6.]
APPENDIX A
_List of Letters and Dispatches relating to the campaign in the
Great Kanawha valley, 1861, which are not found in the publication
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate armies (see
footnote, chapter iv. p. 60)._
Letters and Dispatches of General McClellan to General J. D. Cox, of
dates July 6th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 20th, August 1st.
Letters and Dispatches of General J. D. Cox to General McClellan, of
dates July 4th, 6th, 10th, 17th.
Letters and Dispatches of General Rosecrans to General Cox of dates
July 26th, 29th, 31st, four of August 5th, one of August 6th, 8th,
two of 13th, three of 16th, one of 17th, 18th, two of 20th, one each
of 26th, 27th, 29th, 30th.
Letters and Dispatches of General Cox to General Rosecrans, of dates
August 6th, 7th, 10th, 19th, 28th, two each of 30th and 31st, one of
September 2d (enclosing Colonel Tyler's report of engagement at
Cross Lanes), 3d, 9th, 22d, October 5th (order of withdrawal from
Sewell Mountain), two of October 7th, one each of 8th, 9th, three of
10th, one of 16th.
There are also missing numerous ones from and to Colonel Tyler,
Colonel W. Sooy Smith, Colonel J. V. Guthrie, and other officers.
APPENDIX B
_Letters of Generals R. B. Hayes and George Crook as to the
discipline and conduct of the Kanawha Division in the campaign of
September, 1862. The death of President Hayes has removed any
objections to the publication of his letter._
FREMONT, OHIO, 8th September, 1882.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--Your note of the 4th instant came during a brief
absence from home. I appreciate your kindness and your friendly
suggestions. After sleeping on it, I am not inclined to depart from
my custom in dealing with attacks upon me.... Besides, to give a
correct relation of the Reno altercation would be to disparage an
officer who died in battle a few days after the affair, and who
cannot now give his side of the controversy.
One of the brigades of the division was commanded by General Crook
and another by General Scammon, both regular army officers
conspicuous for attention to strictness of discipline. General
Scammon was at the time still colonel of the Twenty-third. The
regiment on that march repeatedly reported, as I was glad to do, not
a single absentee on the first roll-call immediately after the halt.
The altercation, in its general facts, was as you recall it. But the
occasion of it was this. The regiment halted to bivouac in a
stubble-field. The men got bundles of straw, or possibly of wheat
unthreshed, from a stack in the field to lie upon. General Reno saw
it. I was temporarily absent. The general, as you say, "in a rough
way" accosted the men, and as I returned, I heard his language and
retorted in behalf of my men, not in my own case at all, for he had
said nothing to me. Hence the row between us. I was told, while I
was lying wounded, [Footnote: During the battle of South
Mountain.--J. D. C.] that General Reno was greatly pleased by our
vigorous attack, and that he paid us a high compliment, expressing
gratification that our difficulty had gone no further than it did.
Now excuse my suggestion. Let officers tell the story whose names
are not called in question in the note referred to--say General
Scammon, General Crook, and yourself. I am grateful for your
attention to this misrepresentation, and hope you will not differ
widely from me as to the correctness of the course I take.
Sincerely,
(Signed) R. B. HAYES.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA, WHIPPLE BARRACKS,
PRESCOTT, A. T., November 27, 1882.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--Referring to your letter of the 3d instant asking
replies to certain queries with reference to the conduct of the
Kanawha Division during the Antietam campaign, I can only reply
generally. The twenty years which have elapsed make my memory
indistinct, and I can now recall only prominent features or
particular incidents in which I was especially interested. I
remember distinctly, however, that the Kanawha Division compared
favorably in discipline and general good conduct with the best
troops of the army. In my own brigade there was no straggling, or,
if any, so little that it did not come to my notice. I am quite sure
there was no pillaging in my brigade. My men probably took fence
rails for their bivouac fires, and straw and hay for their beds, but
to the best of my belief there was nothing done that could be called
pillaging.
I heard, at the time, something with reference to a controversy
between Generals Reno and Hayes, but if ever I knew what it was
about, I have forgotten it. In this matter it seems as if the
statement of General Hayes should be conclusive.
I am very glad that you have interested yourself in refuting the
numberless charges which the writers of personal histories have
found it convenient to lay against the Kanawha Division, and which
in almost every instance are base slanders. The _personnel_ of the
division should in itself be a sufficient refutation. The regiments
were mainly of '61 men from country districts who enlisted from
motives of patriotism, and as a rule were never disgraced by conduct
which many of the regiments enlisted in the large cities of the East
were notorious for throughout the army.
The Kanawha Division did not belong to the Army of the Potomac, and
it was therefore an easy matter to shift responsibility from its own
organization by throwing it on the shoulders of the troops serving
with it. The subsequent reputation of this division is in itself a
sufficient answer, and I challenge history to show an organization
which was more distinguished for all soldierly qualities than the
one you had the honor to command during the campaign, until the
death of Reno gave you the Ninth Corps.
You are at liberty to use this letter in any way you deem best, and
I am only sorry that I can do no more to assist you.
Very Sincerely, Your friend,
GEORGE CROOK, Brig. Gen'l.
To General J. D. Cox.