RETURN TO WEST VIRGINIA
Ordered to the Kanawha valley again--An unwelcome surprise--Reasons
for the order--Reporting to Halleck at Washington--Affairs in the
Kanawha in September--Lightburn's positions--Enemy under Loring
advances--Affair at Fayette C. H.--Lightburn retreats--Gauley Bridge
abandoned--Charleston evacuated--Disorderly flight to the
Ohio--Enemy's cavalry raid under Jenkins--General retreat in
Tennessee and Kentucky--West Virginia not in any Department--Now
annexed to that of Ohio--Morgan's retreat from Cumberland
Gap--Ordered to join the Kanawha forces--Milroy's brigade also--My
interviews with Halleck and Stanton--Promotion--My task--My division
sent with me--District of West Virginia--Colonel Crook
promoted--Journey westward--Governor Peirpoint--Governor
Tod--General Wright--Destitution of Morgan's column--Refitting at
Portland, Ohio--Night drive to Gallipolis--An amusing
accident--Inspection at Point Pleasant--Milroy ordered to
Parkersburg--Milroy's qualities--Interruptions to movement of
troops--No wagons--Supplies delayed--Confederate retreat--Loring
relieved--Echols in command--Our march up the valley--Echols
retreats--We occupy Charleston and Gauley Bridge--Further advance
stopped--Our forces reduced--Distribution of remaining
troops--Alarms and minor movements--Case of Mr. Summers--His
treatment by the Confederates.
In war it is the unexpected that happens. On the 4th of October my
permanent connection with the Army of the Potomac seemed assured. I
was in command of the Ninth Corps, encamped in Pleasant Valley,
awaiting the renewal of active operations. My promotion to the rank
of Major-General had been recommended by McClellan and Burnside,
with the assurance that the permanent command of the corps would be
added. On that evening an order came from Washington directing me to
return to the Kanawha valley, from which our troops had been driven.
I was to report in person at Washington immediately, and would there
get detailed directions. The order was as much a surprise to my
immediate superiors as it was to me, and apparently as little
welcome. We all recognized the necessity of sending some one to the
Kanawha who knew the country, and the reasonableness, therefore, of
assigning the duty to me. McClellan and Burnside both promised that
when matters should be restored to a good footing in West Virginia
they would co-operate in an effort to bring me back, and as this was
coupled with a strong request to the War Department that my
promotion should be made immediate, [Footnote: McClellan to Halleck,
Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 383.] acquiesced with
reasonably good grace.
Going to Washington on the eth, I received my orders and
instructions from Halleck, the General-in-Chief. They were based
upon the events which had occurred in the Kanawha valley since I
left it in August. The information got by General Stuart from Pope's
captured quartermaster had led to a careful examination of the
letter-books captured at the same time, and Lee thus learned that I
had left 5000 men, under Colonel Lightburn, to garrison the posts
about Gauley Bridge. The Confederate forces were therefore greater
than ours in that region, and General Loring, who was in command,
was ordered to make at once a vigorous aggressive campaign against
Lightburn, to "clear the valley of the Kanawha and operate
northwardly to a junction" with the army of Lee in the Shenandoah
valley. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 1069;
_Id._, vol. xii. pp. 940-943, 946. This correspondence fully
justifies Pope's suspicion that Lee then planned to operate by the
Valley of Virginia.] Loring marched, on the 6th of September, with a
column which he reported about 5000 strong, expecting to add to it
by organizing recruits and militia as Floyd had done in the previous
year. His line of operations was by way of Princeton, Flat-top
Mountain and Raleigh C. II. to Fayette C. H. His forces do not seem
to have been noticeably increased by recruiting till ours had
retreated out of the valley.
Lightburn's advanced positions were two,--a brigade under Colonel
Siber of the Thirty-seventh Ohio being at Raleigh C. H. and another
under Colonel Gilbert of the Forty-fourth Ohio, near the Hawk's
Nest, and at Alderson's on the Lewisburg road. A small post was kept
up at Summersville and one at Gauley Bridge, where Lightburn had his
headquarters, and some detachments guarded trains and steamboats in
the lower valley. Gauley Bridge was, as in the preceding year, the
central point, and though it was necessary to guard both the
Lewisburg and the Raleigh roads on the opposite sides of the New
River gorge, a concentration on the line the enemy should take was
the plain rule of action when the opposing armies were about equal.
Or, by concentrating at Gauley Bridge, my experience had proved that
we could hold at bay three or four times our numbers. In either
case, fighting in detail was to be avoided, and rapid concentration
under one leader to be effected.
On the approach of the enemy Siber was withdrawn from Raleigh C. H.
to Fayette, and Gilbert to Tompkins farm, three miles from Gauley
Bridge, but the brigades were not united. On the 10th of September
Loring attacked Siber at Fayette, in the intrenchments made by
Scammon in the winter. Siber repulsed the efforts of Loring to drive
him out of his position, and held it during the day. Three companies
of the Fourth Virginia under Captain Vance, and a squad of horse
were sent by Lightburn from Gauley Bridge to Siber's assistance, but
the latter, being without definite orders and thinking he could not
hold the position another day, retreated in the night, setting fire
to a large accumulation of stores and abandoning part of his wagons.
He halted on the ridge of Cotton Hill, covering the road to Gauley
Bridge, and was there joined by five companies of the Forty-seventh
Ohio, also sent to his assistance by Lightburn. Loring followed and
made a partial attack, which was met by the rear-guard under Captain
Vance and repulsed, whilst Siber's principal column marched on to
Montgomery's ferry on the Kanawha.
Meanwhile Lightburn had called in Gilbert's force to Gauley Bridge
during the night of the both, and placed them opposite the ferry
connecting with Siber, which was just below Kanawha Falls and in the
lower part of the Gauley Bridge camp. On Siber's appearance at the
ferry, Lightburn seems to have despaired of having time to get him
over, and directed him to march down the left bank of the river,
burning the sheds full of stores which were on that side of the
stream. When Captain Vance with the rear-guard reached the ferry,
the buildings were blazing on both sides of the narrow pass under
the bluff, and his men ran the gantlet of fire, protecting their
heads with extra blankets which they found scattered near the
stores. Vance easily held the enemy at bay at Armstrong's Creek, and
Siber marched his column, next morning, to Brownstown, some
twenty-five miles below Kanawha Falls, where steamboats met him and
ferried him over to Camp Piatt. There he rejoined Lightburn.
Gilbert's artillery was put in position on the right bank at
Montgomery's Ferry, and checked the head of Loring's column when it
approached the Kanawha in pursuit of Siber. Lightburn had ordered
the detachment in post at Summersville to join him at Gauley, and
Colonel Elliot of the Forty-seventh Ohio, who commanded it, marched
down the Gauley with his ten companies (parts of three regiments)
and a small wagon train. He approached Gauley Bridge on the 11th,
but Lightburn had not waited for him, and the enemy were in
possession. Elliot burned his wagons and took to the hills with his
men, cutting across the angle between the Gauley and the Kanawha and
joining Gilbert's column near Cannelton. A smaller detachment, only
a little way up the Gauley, was also left to its fate in the
precipitate retreat, and it also took to the hills and woods and
succeeded in evading the enemy. It was about ten o'clock in the
morning when Loring's head of column approached the Kanawha and drew
the fire of Gilbert's guns. After about an hour's cannonade across
the river, Lightburn gave the order to retreat down the right bank,
after burning the stores and blowing up the magazine at Gauley
Bridge. Loring found men to swim across the river and extinguish the
fires kindled on the ferry-boats, which were soon put in use to
ferry Echols's brigade across. This followed Lightburn down the
right bank, whilst Loring himself, with Williams's and Wharton's
brigades, marched after Siber down the left. The over-hanging cliffs
and hills echoed with the cannonade, and the skirmishers exchanged
rifle-shots across the rapid stream; but few casualties occurred,
and after Elliot joined the column, it marched with little
interruption to Camp Piatt, thirteen miles from Charleston, where
Siber met them, and the steamboats he had used passed down the river
to the Ohio.
Siber's brigade continued its retreat rapidly to Charleston, passed
through the town and crossed the Elk River. Gilbert's brigade also
retired, but in better order, and it kept up a skirmish with the
advance-guard of Echols's column which was following them. When
Gilbert reached the outskirts of Charleston, he checked the advance
of the enemy long enough to enable the quartermasters at the post to
move their trains across the Elk; but the haste of the evacuation
was so great that the stores in depot there were not removed, and
were burned to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands. Gilbert
retired across the Elk, and the suspension bridge was destroyed.
Loring's artillery made a dash for a hill on the left bank of the
Kanawha, which commanded the new position taken up by Lightburn's
troops, and the Confederate battery soon opened an enfilade fire
across the river, taking the line of breastworks along the Elk in
flank and in reverse. The trains and the stragglers started in
direst confusion on the road to Ravenswood on the Ohio, which
offered a line of retreat not subject to the enemy's fire. Siber's
brigade followed, Gilbert's continued to bring up the rear. The road
down the Kanawha was abandoned because it was in range of artillery
from the opposite side of the river throughout its whole course down
the valley. The road to Ripley and Ravenswood was therefore taken,
and the flying troops were met at those towns on the Ohio by
steamboats which conveyed part of them to Point Pleasant at the
mouth of the Kanawha, where the whole command was concentrated in
the course of a few days. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt.
i. pp. 1058-1060.] Siber's loss was 16 killed, 87 wounded, and over
100 missing. Gilbert reported 9 men killed and 8 wounded, with about
75 missing; but as the enemy do not enumerate any captured prisoners
in their reports except a lieutenant and 10 men, it is evident that
the missing were mostly men who outran the others. Loring's losses
as reported by his surgeon were 18 killed and 89 wounded. The enemy
claim to have captured large numbers of wagons, horses, mules, and
stores of all kinds which Loring estimated at a million dollars'
worth, besides all that were burned.
It was a panicky retreat after the hot little fight by Siber's
brigade at Fayette C. H., and it is not worth while to apply to it
any military criticism, further than to say that either of the
brigades intrenched at Gauley Bridge could have laughed at Loring.
The river would have been impassable, for all the ferry-boats were
in the keeping of our men on the right bank, and Loring would not
dare pass down the valley leaving a fortified post on the line of
communications by which he must return. The topography of the wild
mountain region was such that an army could only pass from the lower
Kanawha to the headwaters of the James River by the road Loring had
used in his advance, or by that leading through the post of Gauley
Bridge to Lewisburg and beyond. The Confederate War Department seem
to have thought that their forces might have passed from Charleston
to the Ohio, thence to Parkersburg, and turning east from this town,
have made their way to Beverly and to the Valley of Virginia by the
route Garnett had used in the previous year. They would have found,
however, as Loring told them, that it would have been easy for the
National forces to overwhelm them with numbers while they were
making so long and so difficult a march in a vast region most of
which was a wilderness.
Lightburn's position had been made more embarrassing by the fact
that a cavalry raid under Brigadier-General Jenkins was passing
around his left flank while Loring came upon him in front. Jenkins
with a light column of horse moved from Lewisburg by way of the
Wilderness Road to northwestern Virginia, captured posts and
destroyed stores at Weston, Buckhannon, and Roane C. H., and made a
circuit to the lower Kanawha, rejoining Loring after Lightburn's
retreat. Little real mischief was done by this raid, but it added to
the confusion, and helped to disturb the self-possession of the
commanding officer. In this way it was one of the causes of the
precipitate retreat.
Several circumstances combined to make Lightburn's disaster
embarrassing to the government. West Virginia had not been connected
with any military department after Pope's command had been broken
up. McClellan's authority did not extend beyond his own army and its
theatre of operations. Halleck could hardly take personal charge of
the affairs of remote districts. Thus the Kanawha valley had dropped
out of the usual system and was an omitted case. The embarrassment
was increased by the fact that Buell was retreating out of Tennessee
before Bragg, Morgan had evacuated Cumberland Gap and was making a
painful and hazardous retreat to the Ohio, and the Confederate
forces under Kirby Smith were moving directly upon Cincinnati.
Lightburn's mishap, therefore, was only the northern extremity of a
line of defeats extending through the whole length of the Ohio
valley from Parkersburg to Louisville. The governors of West
Virginia and Ohio were naturally alarmed at the events in the
Kanawha valley, and were earnest in their calls upon the War
Department for troops to drive Loring back beyond the mountains and
for an officer to command them who knew something of the country.
Halleck seems to have been puzzled at the condition of things, not
having realized that Pope's retirement had left West Virginia "in
the air." It took a week, apparently, to get satisfactory details of
the actual situation, and on the 19th of September the first
important step was taken by annexing the region to the Department of
the Ohio, then commanded by Major-General Horatio G. Wright, whose
headquarters were at Cincinnati. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xvi. pt. ii. p. 328.] Wright was directed to provide for the
recovery of lost ground in West Virginia as rapidly as possible, but
the campaign in Kentucky was the more important and urgent, so that
no troops could be spared for secondary operations until the
Confederates had ceased to threaten Cincinnati and Louisville.
On the 1st of October Halleck again called General Wright's
attention to the need of doing something for West Virginia. Governor
Peirpoint, of that State, represented the Confederates under Loring
as about 10,000 in number, and this reflected the opinion which
Lightburn had formed during his retreat. It became the basis of
calculation in the campaign which followed, though it greatly
exaggerated Loring's force. Three days later Brigadier-General
George W. Morgan was known to have reached the Ohio River with the
division he had brought from Cumberland Gap, and General Halleck
outlined a plan of action. He ordered Morgan's division to be sent
to Gallipolis to take part in the advance into the Kanawha valley,
where some new Ohio regiments were also to join them. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 381.] He at the same time
called me to Washington to receive instructions under which I was to
take command of the whole force operating on the Kanawha line.
Brigadier-General Milroy had already (September 25th) been ordered
to proceed thither with his brigade, which was in Washington and was
part of Banks's forces garrisoning the capital. [Footnote: _Id._,
pp. 355, 359.] He was moved through Pennsylvania to Wheeling by
rail, and thence down the Ohio River to Point Pleasant at the mouth
of the Kanawha.
My order to leave the Army of the Potomac reached me on Saturday
evening. Much business had to be closed up before I could properly
turn over the command of the Ninth Corps, but I was able to complete
it and make the journey to Washington so as to report to General
Halleck on Monday morning. He received me very kindly, and explained
the necessity they were under to send some one to the Kanawha valley
who knew the country. He was complimentary as to my former service
there, and said my return to that region would meet the earnest
wishes of the governors of West Virginia and Ohio, as well as the
judgment of the War Department and of himself. To compensate for
separating me from the command of the Ninth Corps, it had been
decided to make my promotion at once and to put the whole of West
Virginia under my command as a territorial district. He inquired
into some details of the topography of the Kanawha valley and of my
experience there, and concluded by saying that reinforcements would
be sent to make the column I should lead in person stronger than the
10,000 attributed to Loring. My task would then be to drive back the
enemy beyond the mountains. When that was accomplished, part of the
troops would probably be withdrawn. The actual position of Milroy's
brigade was not definitely known, and Governor Peirpoint of West
Virginia had asked to have it sent to Clarksburg. This gave me the
opportunity to urge that my own Kanawha division be detached from
the Ninth Corps and sent back to Clarksburg, where with Milroy they
would make a force strong enough to take care of that part of the
State and to make a co-operative movement toward Gauley Bridge. This
also was granted, and immediate promotion was given to Colonel Crook
so that he might command the division, and a promise was made to do
the like for Colonel Scammon, who would then be available for the
command of the division still under Lightburn, whose retreat was
strongly condemned as precipitate. No soldier could object to an
arrangement so satisfactory as this, and though I still preferred to
remain with the Army of the Potomac, I could only accept the new
duty with sincere thanks for the consideration shown me. The
General-in-Chief accompanied me to the room of the Secretary of War,
and Mr. Stanton added to my sense of obligation by warm expressions
of personal good-will. His manner was so different from the brusque
one commonly attributed to him that I have nothing but pleasant
remembrances of my relations to him, both then and later. My own
appointment as major-general was handed me by him, the usual
promotions of my personal staff were also made, and directions were
given for the immediate appointment of Crook to be brigadier.
I called to pay my respects to the President, but he was in Cabinet
meeting and could not be seen. I had a short but warmly friendly
visit with Mr. Chase later in the day, and was ready to leave town
for my new post of duty by the evening train. The Secretary of War
directed me to visit Wheeling and Columbus on my way, and then to
report to General Wright at Cincinnati before going to the Kanawha
valley. This was in fact the quickest way to reach the mouth of the
Kanawha River, for the fall rains had not yet come to make the Ohio
navigable, and from Columbus to Cincinnati, and thence by the
Marietta Railway eastward, was, as the railway routes then ran, the
best method of joining my command. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
was interrupted between Harper's Ferry and Hancock (about fifty
miles) by the Confederate occupation of that part of Virginia.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 393, 394.]
General Crook was ordered to march the division from its camp in
Pleasant Valley to Hancock, where trains on the western division of
the railway would meet him and transport the troops to Clarksburg.
For myself and staff, we took the uninterrupted railway line from
Washington to Pittsburg, and thence to Wheeling, where we arrived on
the evening of October 8th. The 9th was given to consultation with
Governor Peirpoint and to communication with such military officers
as were within reach. We reached Columbus on the both, when I had a
similar consultation with Governor Tod and his military staff in
regard to new regiments available for my use. Leaving Columbus in
the afternoon, we arrived at Cincinnati late the same night, and on
Saturday, the 11th, I reported to General Wright.
He was an officer of the engineer corps of the regular army, a man
of fine acquirements and of a serious and earnest character, whose
military service throughout the war was marked by solidity and
modesty. If there seemed at first a little _hauteur_ in his manner,
one soon saw that it was a natural reserve free from arrogance. The
sort of confusion in which everything was, is indicated by the fact
that he knew nothing of my whereabouts when informed from Washington
that I would be ordered to the Kanawha, and on the same day (6th
October) addressed a dispatch to me at Point Pleasant whilst I was
receiving instructions from General Halleck in Washington.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xvi. pt. ii. p. 579.] Our personal
consultation established a thoroughly good understanding at once,
and as long as I remained under his orders, I found him thoroughly
considerate of my wishes and appreciative of my suggestions and of
the conduct of my own part of the work to be done.
Morgan's division, after reaching the Ohio River, had been moved to
Portland on the Marietta Railroad, the nearest point to Gallipolis,
which was twenty-five miles away and nearly opposite the mouth of
the Great Kanawha. His retreat had been through a sparsely settled
country, much of which was a wilderness, rugged and broken in the
extreme. His wagons had broken down, his teams were used up, his
soldiers were worn out, ragged, and barefoot. [Footnote: _Id._, pt.
i. p. 990.] Many arms and accoutrements had been lost, and the
command was imperatively in need of complete refitting and a little
rest. The men had been largely recruited in East Tennessee and
Kentucky, and were unwilling to serve in any other theatre of war.
The Tennesseans, indeed, were reported to be mutinous at the news
that they were to be sent to the Kanawha valley. General Wright
issued orders for the refitting of the command, and promised such
delay and rest as might be found practicable. He detached three
regiments to serve in Kentucky, and directed their place to be made
good by three new Ohio regiments then organizing. The division was
permitted to remain at Portland till imperatively needed for my
movement.
There were no trains running on the railroad on Sunday, and Monday
morning, the 13th October, was the earliest possible start on the
remainder of my journey. I left Cincinnati at that time, and with my
personal staff reached Portland in the afternoon. Morgan's division
was found to be in quite as bad condition as had been reported, but
he was in daily expectation of the new equipments and clothing, as
well as wagons for his baggage-train and fresh horses for his
artillery. It was stated also that a paymaster had been ordered to
join the division, with funds to pay part at least of the large
arrears of pay due to the men. This looked hopeful, but still
implied some further delay. Uneasy to learn the actual condition of
affairs with Lightburn's command, I determined to reach Gallipolis
the same night. Our horses had been left behind, and being thus
dismounted, we took passage in a four-horse hack, a square wagon on
springs, enclosed with rubber-cloth curtains. Night fell soon after
we began our journey, and as we were pushing on in the dark, the
driver blundered and upset us off the end of a little sluiceway
bridge into a mud-hole. He managed to jump from his seat and hold
his team, but there was no help for us who were buttoned in. The mud
was soft and deep, and as the wagon settled on its side, we were
tumbled in a promiscuous heap into the ooze and slime, which
completely covered us. We were not long in climbing out, and seeing
lights in a farm-house, made our way to it. As we came into the
light of the lamps and of a brisk fire burning on the open hearth,
we were certainly as sorry a military spectacle as could be
imagined. We were most kindly received, the men taking lanterns and
going to our driver's help, whilst we stood before the fire, and
scraped the thick mud from our uniforms with chips from the farmer's
woodyard, making rather boisterous sport of our mishap. Before the
wagon had been righted and partly cleaned, we had scraped and
sponged each other off and were ready to go on. We noticed, however,
that the room had filled with men, women, and children from the
neighborhood, who stood bashfully back in the shadows, and who
modestly explained that they had heard there was a "live general"
there, and as they had never seen one, they had "come over." They
must have formed some amusing ideas of military personages, and we
found at least as much sport in being the menagerie as they did in
visiting it. Our mishap made us wait for the moon, which rose in an
hour or so, and we then took leave of our entertainers and our
audience and drove on, with no desire, however, to repeat the
performance. We made some ten miles more of the road, but found it
so rough, and our progress so slow, that we were glad to find
quarters for the rest of the night, finishing the journey in the
morning.
On reaching my field of duty, my first task was to inspect the
forces at Point Pleasant, and learn what was necessary to make a
forward movement as soon as Morgan's troops should reach me. General
Wright had originally expected that inclusive of Milroy's and
Morgan's troops, I should find at the mouth of the Kanawha, on
arriving there, some 20,000 men. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xix. pt. ii. p. 402.] In fact, however, Lightburn's diminished
command had only been reinforced by three new Ohio regiments (the
Eighty-ninth, Ninety-first, and Ninety-second) and a new one from
West Virginia (the Thirteenth), and with these his strength was less
than 7300, officers and men, showing that his original command was
sadly reduced by straggling and desertion during his retreat.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 522.] The new regiments were made up of good
material, but as they were raw recruits, their usefulness must for
some time be greatly limited.
Two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry with a howitzer
battery were at Guyandotte, under Colonel Jonathan Cranor of the
Fortieth Ohio, and the Fifth West Virginia was at Ceredo near the
mouth of the Big Sandy River. They had been stationed at these
points to protect the navigation of the Ohio and to repel the
efforts of the Confederate Cavalry General Jenkins to "raid" that
region in which was his old home. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xix. pt. ii. pp. 459, 522.] They formed, a little later, the Third
Brigade of the Kanawha division under Crook.
I found General Milroy in command as the ranking officer present,
and he had sent Cranor's command down the river. When Governor
Peirpoint learned that Milroy's brigade had passed Wheeling on his
way to the Kanawha, he applied urgently to General Wright to send
him, instead, from Parkersburg by rail to Clarksburg to form the
nucleus of a column to move southward from that point upon the rear
of Loring's forces. Wright assented, for both he and Halleck
accepted the plan of converging columns from Clarksburg and Point
Pleasant, and regarded that from the former place as the more
important. [Footnote: _Id_. p. 402.] If directions were sent to
Milroy to this effect, they seem to have miscarried. Besides his
original brigade, some new Indiana regiments were ordered to report
to him. He had, with characteristic lack of reflection and without
authority, furloughed the Fifth West Virginia regiment in mass and
sent the men home. I gave him a new one in place of this, ordered
him to reassemble the other as soon as possible, and to march at
once to Parkersburg, proceeding thence to Clarksburg by rail. The
new troops added to his command enabled him to organize them into a
division of two brigades, and still other regiments were added to
him later. Milroy was a picturesque character, with some excellent
qualities. A tall man, with trenchant features, bright eyes, a great
shock of gray hair standing out from his head, he was a marked
personal figure. He was brave, but his bravery was of the excitable
kind that made him unbalanced and nearly wild on the battle-field.
His impulsiveness made him erratic in all performances of duty, and
negligent of the system without which the business of an army cannot
go on. This was shown in his furlough of a regiment whilst _en
route_ to reinforce Lightburn, who was supposed to be in desperate
straits. It is also seen in the absence of Official Records of the
organization of his command at this time, so that we cannot tell
what regiments constituted it when his division was assembled at
Clarksburg. He is described, in the second Battle of Bull Run, as
crazily careering over the field, shouting advice to other officers
instead of gathering and leading his own command, which he said was
routed and scattered. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xii. pt. ii.
pp. 342, 362-364.] Under the immediate control of a firm and steady
hand he could do good service, but was wholly unfit for independent
responsibility. His demonstrative manner, his boiling patriotism,
and his political zeal gave him prominence and made him a favorite
with the influential war-governor of Indiana, Oliver P. Morton, who
pushed his military advancement.
The Kanawha division left the Army of the Potomac on the 8th of
October and reached Hancock on the 10th. There it crossed the track
of a raid of the Confederate cavalry into Pennsylvania, under
Stuart. By McClellan's order one brigade was sent to McConnelsville
to intercept the enemy, and the other was halted. [Footnote: _Id_.,
vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 62-78.] By the 13th Crook had been allowed to
concentrate the division at Hancock again, but was kept waiting for
orders, so that he was not able to report to me his arrival at
Clarksburg till the 20th. Colonel Scammon was on a short leave of
absence during this march, and was promoted. [Footnote: His new rank
dated from 15th October, that of Crook from 7th September. Army
Register, 1863.] He reported to me in person in his new rank of
brigadier a little later. The brigades of the Kanawha division were
commanded by the senior colonels present.
The increase of troops in the district made immediate need of
transportation and munitions and supplies of all kinds. The Kanawha
division had not been allowed to bring away with it its admirably
equipped supply train, but its energetic quartermaster, Captain
Fitch, came with the troops, and I immediately made him chief
quartermaster of the district. Milroy's division had no wagons,
neither had Morgan's. The fall rains had not yet raised the rivers,
and only boats of lightest draught could move on the Ohio, whilst
navigation on the Kanawha was wholly suspended. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 433.] Four hundred wagons and two
thousand mules were estimated as necessary to supply two moving
columns of ten thousand men each, in addition to such trains as were
still available in the district. Only one hundred wagons could be
promised from the depot at Cincinnati, none of which reached me
before the enemy was driven out of the Kanawha valley. I was
authorized to contract for one hundred more to be built at Wheeling,
where, however, the shops could only construct thirty-five per week,
and these began to reach the troops only after the 1st of November.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 535-537.] We hoped for rains which would give
us navigation in the Kanawha in spite of the suffering which wet
weather at that season must produce, and I ordered wagons and teams
to be hired from the country people as far as this could be done.
Similar delays and trouble occurred in procuring advance stores and
equipments. Part of Morgan's men were delayed at the last moment by
their new knapsacks coming to them without the straps which fasten
them to the shoulders. General Wright blamed the depot officers for
this, and took from me and my subordinates all responsibility for
the delays; [Footnote: ., pp. 438, 475.] but the incidents make an
instructive lesson in the difficulty of suddenly organizing a new
and strong military column in a region distant from large depots of
supply. It also shows the endless cost and mischief that may result
from an ill-advised retreat and destruction of property at such
posts as Gauley Bridge and Charleston. To put the local
quartermasters at Gallipolis and other towns on the Ohio side of the
river under my command, General Wright enlarged the boundaries of my
district so as to include the line of Ohio counties bordering on the
river. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 381, 421.]
On visiting Lightburn's command at Point Pleasant, I ordered a
brigade to be sent forward next day (15th) to Ten-mile Creek,
repairing the road and bridges, whilst a scouting party of
experienced men started out at once to penetrate the country by
circuitous ways and to collect information. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
433.] In two or three days bits of news began to arrive, with rumors
that Loring was retreating. The truth was that he in fact withdrew
his infantry, leaving Jenkins with the cavalry and irregular forces
to hold the valley for a time, and then to make a circuit northward
by way of Bulltown, Sutton, etc., gaining the Beverly turnpike near
the mountains and rejoining the infantry, which would march to join
Lee by roads intersecting that highway at Monterey. Such at least
was the purpose Loring communicated to the Confederate War
Department; but he was not allowed to attempt it. His instructions
had been to march his whole command by the route Jenkins was taking
and at least to hold the valley stubbornly as far as Charleston. On
receipt of the news that he was retreating, orders were sent him to
turn over the command to Brigadier-General John Echols, the next in
rank, and to report in person at Richmond. [Footnote: ., pp. 661,
667.] Echols was ordered immediately to resume the positions which
had been abandoned, and did so as rapidly as possible. Loring had in
fact begun his retreat on the 11th, three days before I reached
Gallipolis, but the first information of it was got after the
scouting had been begun which is mentioned above. By the 18th I was
able to give General Wright confirmation of the news and a correct
outline of Loring's plan, though we had not then learned that Echols
was marching back to Charleston. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xix. pt. ii. p. 449.] We heard of his return two or three days
later. As evidence of the rapidity with which information reached
the enemy, it is noteworthy that Lee knew my command had left the
Army of the Potomac for West Virginia on the 11th October, three
days after Crook marched from camp in Pleasant Valley. He reported
to Richmond that four brigades had gone to that region, which was
accurate as to the number, though only half right as to
identification of the brigades. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 662, 663.] On
the 13th he sent further information that I had been promoted and
assigned to command the district.
By the 20th there had been a slight rise in the Kanawha River, so
that it was possible to use small steamboats to carry supplies for
the troops, and Lightburn was ordered to advance his whole division
to Red House, twenty-five miles, and to remove obstructions to
navigation which had been planted there. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 456,
459.] One brigade of Morgan's division was in condition to move, and
it was ordered from Portland to Gallipolis. The rest were to follow
at the earliest possible moment. The discontent of the East
Tennessee regiments had not been lessened by the knowledge they had
that powerful political influences were at work to second their
desire to be moved back into the neighborhood of their home. On the
10th of October a protest against their being sent into West
Virginia was made by Horace Maynard, the loyal representative of
East Tennessee in Congress, a man of marked character and ability
and deservedly very influential with the government. [Footnote:
_Id_., vol. xvi. pt. ii. pp. 604, 635, 651.] Maynard addressed
Halleck a second time on the subject on the 22d, and on the 29th
Andrew Johnson, then military governor of Tennessee, wrote to
President Lincoln for the same purpose. It hardly need be said that
the preparation of those regiments would proceed slowly, pending
such negotiations. Their distant homes and families were at the
mercy of the enemy, and it seemed to them intolerable that their
faces should be turned in any other direction. I suggested an
exchange for new Ohio regiments, but as these were not yet filled
up, it could not be done. General Wright assured them that they
should be sent to Kentucky as soon as we were again in possession of
West Virginia. Most of these regiments came under my command again
later in the war, and I became warmly attached to them. Their drill
and discipline were always lax, but their courage and devotion to
the national cause could not be excelled.
It was not till the 23d that any of Morgan's men really entered into
the forward movement in the valley. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 474, 475.] On that day the brigade of Colonel
John F. DeCourcey (Sixteenth Ohio), composed of Ohio and Kentucky
troops, reached Ten-mile Creek and was ordered to march to Red House
the day after. [Footnote: Colonel DeCourcey was an Irishman of good
family, who took service in our army, and was a good officer. He
afterwards inherited an Irish baronage.] Lightburn was busy clearing
the river of obstructions and preparing to move to Pocataligo River
as the next step in advance. Of the other brigades belonging to
Morgan, that of Brigadier-General Samuel P. Carter, composed partly
of Tennesseans, was at Gallipolis, intending to enter the valley on
the 24th. The remaining brigade, under Brigadier-General James G.
Spears, was entirely Tennessean, and was still at Portland where the
paymaster had just arrived and was giving the regiments part
payment.
My purpose was to concentrate the force at Pocataligo, assume the
command in person, and attack the enemy in the positions in front of
Charleston, in which Wise had resisted me in the previous year. I
should have been glad to make the expected movement of a column from
Clarksburg under Crook and Milroy co-operate directly with my own,
but circumstances made it impracticable. The operations of the
Confederate cavalry under Jenkins were keeping the country north of
the Kanawha in a turmoil, and reports had become rife that he would
work his way out toward Beverly. The country was also full of rumors
of a new invasion from East Virginia. Milroy's forces were not yet
fully assembled at Clarksburg on the 20th, but he was ordered to
operate toward Beverly, whilst Crook, with the old Kanawha division,
should move on Summersville and Gauley Bridge. Both had to depend on
hiring wagons for transportation of supplies. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 459, 481, 482.] Separated as they
were, they would necessarily be cautious in their movements, making
the suppression of guerillas, the driving out of raiders, and the
general quieting of the country their principal task. Their rôle was
thus, of course, made subordinate to the movement of my own column,
which must force its own way without waiting for results from other
operations.
Half of Carter's brigade was, at the last moment, delayed at
Gallipolis, the clothing and equipments sent to them there being
found incomplete. Just half of Morgan's division with two batteries
of artillery were in motion on the 24th. On that day Lightburn was
moved to Pocataligo, about forty miles from the river mouth, where I
joined him in person on the 27th. A cold storm of mingled rain and
snow had made the march and bivouac very uncomfortable for a couple
of days. General Morgan accompanied me, and during the 28th the
active column of three and a half brigades was concentrated, two or
three other regiments being in echelon along the river below. Tyler
Mountain behind Tyler Creek was, as formerly, the place at which the
enemy was posted to make a stand against our further progress,
though he had no considerable force on the south side of the river
at the mouth of Scary Creek. Reconnoissances showed nothing but
cavalry in our immediate front, and it afterwards appeared that
Echols began a rapid retreat from Charleston on that day. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 685.] He had called to him
Jenkins with the greater part of the cavalry, and entrusted to the
latter the duty of holding us back as much as possible. Suspecting
this from evidence collected at Pocataligo, I determined to put
Siber's brigade and a battery, all in light marching order, on the
south side of the river, accompanied by a light-draught steamboat,
which the rise in the river after the storm enabled us to use as far
as Charleston. This brigade could turn the strong position at Tyler
Mountain, and passing beyond this promontory on the opposite side of
the river, could command with artillery fire the river road on the
other bank behind the enemy in our front. The steamboat would enable
them to make a rapid retreat if the belief that no great force was
on that side of the river should prove to be a mistake. Siber was
also furnished with a battery of four mountain howitzers, which
could be carried to the edge of the water or anywhere that men could
march. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 504, 509, 530.]
On the right bank of the river (north side) the principal column of
two brigades (Toland's and DeCourcey's) advanced on the turnpike near
the stream, having one six-gun battery and a section of
twenty-pounder Parrots with them. What was present of Carter's
brigade was sent by the mountain road further from the stream, to
cover our left and to turn the flank of the Tyler Mountain position,
if a stubborn stand should be made there. A light six-gun battery
accompanied it. All moved forward simultaneously on the morning of
the 29th. [Footnote: _Ibid_.] The dispositions thus made rendered it
vain for the enemy's cavalry to offer any stubborn resistance, and
Jenkins abandoned Tyler Mountain on our approach, thus giving us
certain knowledge that he was not closely supported by the infantry.
Our advance-guard reached the Elk River opposite Charleston in the
afternoon, and I made personal reconnoissance of the means of
crossing. The suspension bridge had been ruined in Lightburn's
retreat, and the enemy had depended upon a bridge of boats for
communication with their troops in the lower valley. These boats had
been taken to the further bank of the river and partly destroyed,
but as the enemy had continued his retreat, we soon had a party over
collecting those that could be used, and other flatboats used in the
coal trade, and a practicable bridge was reconstructed before night
of the 30th. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 530.]
Meanwhile I entered the town with the advance-guard as soon as we
had a boat to use for a ferry, and spent the night of the 29th
there. We had friends enough in the place to put us quickly in
possession of all the news, and I was soon satisfied that Echols had
no thought of trying to remain on the western side of the mountains.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 515, 520.]
The column crossed the Elk late in the afternoon of the 30th, and I
pushed Toland's and Carter's brigades to Malden and Camp Piatt that
evening, Siber's brigade advancing to Brownstown on the other side
of the Kanawha River. Lightburn's division was ordered forward next
day to Gauley Bridge, Carter's brigade at Malden was ordered to send
strong parties southward into Boone County, to reconnoitre and to
put down guerilla bands. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 530.] DeCourcey's
brigade was halted at Charleston, and Spears' Tennessee brigade was
directed to remain at Gallipolis till further orders. Communication
was opened with Crook, who was ordered to press forward via
Summersville to Gauley Bridge as quickly as possible. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 520.] The retreating enemy
had burned the bridges, obstructed the roads with fallen timber, and
cut and destroyed the flatboats along the river; so that the first
and most pressing task was to reopen roads, make ferries and
bridges, and thus renew the means of getting supplies to the troops.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 536.] The river was still low, unusually so for
the season, and the water was falling. Every energy was therefore
necessary to get forward supplies to Gauley Bridge and the other
up-river posts, for if the river should freeze whilst low, the
winter transportation would be confined to the almost impassable
roads. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 537.] I reported to General Wright the
re-occupation of the valley, our lack of wagon-trains for further
advance, and all the facts which would assist in deciding whether
anything further should be attempted. I did not conceal the opinion
which all my experience had confirmed, that no military advantage
could be secured by trying to extend operation by this route across
the mountains into the James River valley.
On the 2d of November Brigadier-General Scammon reported for duty,
and I ordered him to Gauley Bridge to assume command of the division
which was then under Colonel Lightburn, who resumed the command of
his brigade. [Footnote: _Ibid_.] Scammon was directed to inspect
carefully all our old positions as far as Raleigh C. H., to report
whether the recent retreat of troops from Fayetteville had been due
to any improper location of the fortifications there, to examine the
road up Loup Creek, and any others which might be used by the enemy
to turn our position at Gauley Bridge, to state the present
conditions of buildings at all the upper posts, and whether any
storehouses had escaped destruction. In short, we needed the
material on which to base intelligent plans for a more secure
holding of the region about the falls of the Kanawha, or for a
further advance to the eastward if it should be ordered.
The information which came to me as soon as I was in actual contact
with the enemy, not only satisfied me that Loring's forces had been
greatly exaggerated, but led me to estimate them at a lower figure
than the true one. In reporting to General Wright on 1st November, I
gave the opinion that they amounted to about 3500 infantry, but with
a disproportionate amount of artillery, some twenty pieces. The
cavalry under Jenkins numbered probably 1000 or 1500 horse.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 531.] About the
first of October Loring, in a dispatch to Richmond, stated his force
at "only a little more than 4000," [Footnote: _Id_., p. 635.] which
probably means that the 5000 with which he entered the valley were
somewhat reduced by the sick and by desertions. He seems to refer to
his infantry, for Jenkins's command had been an independent one. It
would be reasonable, therefore, to put his total strength at some
6000 or a little higher. On our side, the column with which I
actually advanced was just about 9000 men, with 2000 more of
Morgan's command within reach, had there been need to call them up
from the Ohio River.
On the 8th of November Halleck telegraphed to General Wright that no
posts need be established beyond Gauley Bridge, and that about half
of my command should be sent to Tennessee and the Mississippi
valley. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 556, 557.] On the same day General
Wright formally approved my views as submitted to him, and ordered
Morgan's division to be sent to Cincinnati at once. [Footnote:
_Id_., p. 537.] It was thus definitively settled that my task for
the winter would be to restore the condition of affairs in West
Virginia which had existed before Loring's invasion, and organize my
district with a view to prompt and easy supply of my posts, the
suppression of lawlessness and bushwhacking, the support of the
State authorities, and the instruction and discipline of officers
and men. My first attention was given to the question of
transportation, for the winter was upon us and wagons were very
scarce. The plan of using the river to the utmost was an economy as
well as a necessity, and I returned to my former arrangement of
using batteaux for the shallow and swift waters of the upper river,
connecting with the movable head of steamboat navigation. A tour of
inspection to Gauley Bridge and the posts in that vicinity satisfied
me that they were in good condition for mutual support, and for
carrying on a system of scouting which could be made a useful
discipline and instruction to the troops, as well as the means of
keeping thoroughly informed of the movements of the enemy.
The line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was kept under the
control of General Kelley, and his authority extended to active
co-operation with the Army of the Potomac in keeping open
communication with Washington. In case of need, the commander of
that army was authorized to give orders to General Kelley direct,
without waiting to transmit them through my headquarters. General
Milroy was established on the Beverly front, communicating on his
left with General Kelley and on his right with General Crook, at
Gauley Bridge. General Scammon had his station at Fayette C. H.,
covering the front on the south side of New River, whilst Crook
watched the north side and extended his posts in Milroy's direction
as far as Summersville. Colonel Cranor remained on the Ohio near
Guyandotte, scouting the valley of the Guyandotte River and
communicating with Charleston and other posts on the Kanawha.
On the 12th of November reports were received from General Kelley
that authentic information showed that Jackson was advancing from
the Shenandoah valley upon West Virginia. Similar information
reached army headquarters at Washington, and in anticipation of
possible necessity for it, I directed Milroy to hold himself in
readiness to march at once to join Kelley, if the latter should call
upon him. I telegraphed General Wright that I did not think the
report would prove well founded, but it put everybody upon the alert
for a little while. Kelley had beaten up a camp of Confederates
under Imboden about eighteen miles above Moorefield on the south
branch of the Potomac, causing considerable loss to the enemy in
killed and wounded and capturing fifty prisoners. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. pp. 572, 573, 578, 585, 586.]
Some movement to support Imboden probably gave rise to the story of
Jackson's advance, but Lee kept both corps of his army in hand and
moved the whole down the Rappahannock soon afterward, to meet
Burnside's advance upon Fredericksburg.
The invasion of the Kanawha valley by Loring had stirred up much
bitter feeling again between Union men and Confederates, and was
followed by the usual quarrels and recriminations among neighbors.
The Secessionists were stimulated to drop the prudent reserve they
had practised before, and some of them, in the hope that the
Confederate occupation would be permanent, persecuted loyal men who
were in their power. The retreat of the enemy brought its day of
reckoning, and was accompanied by a fresh emigration to eastern
Virginia of a considerable number of the more pronounced
Secessionists. I have said [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 154.] that Mr.
George Summers, formerly the leading man of the valley, had
studiously avoided political activity after the war began; but this
did not save him from the hostility of his disloyal neighbors. Very
shortly after my re-occupation of Charleston he called upon me one
evening and asked for a private interview. He had gone through a
painful experience, he said, and as it would pretty surely come to
my ears, he preferred I should hear it from himself, before enemies
or tale-bearers should present it with such coloring as they might
choose. During the Confederate occupation he had maintained his
secluded life and kept aloof from contact with the military
authorities. Their officers, however, summoned him before them,
charged him with treason to Virginia and to the Confederate States,
and demanded of him that he take the oath of allegiance to the
Southern government. He demurred to this, and urged that as he had
scrupulously avoided public activity, it would be harsh and unjust
to force him to a test which he could not conscientiously take. They
were in no mood to listen to argument, and charged that his
acquiescence in the rule of the new state government of West
Virginia was, in his case, more injurious to the Confederate cause
than many another man's active unionism. Finding Mr. Summers
disposed to be firm, they held him in arrest; and as he still
refused to yield, he was told that he should be tied by a rope to
the tail of a wagon and forced to march in that condition, as a
prisoner, over the mountains to Richmond.
He was an elderly man, used to a refined and easy life, somewhat
portly in person, and, as he said, he fully believed such treatment
would kill him. The fierceness of their manner convinced him that
they meant to execute the threat, and looking upon it as a sentence
of death, he yielded and took the oath. He said that being in duress
of such a sort, and himself a lawyer, he considered that he had a
moral right to escape from his captors in this way, though he would
not have yielded to anything short of what seemed to him an imminent
danger of his life. The obligation, he declared, was utterly odious
to him and was not binding on his conscience; but he had lost no
time in putting himself into my hands, and would submit to whatever
I should decide in the matter. It would be humiliating and subject
him to misconstruction by others if he took conflicting oaths, but
he was willing to abjure the obligation he had taken, if I demanded
it, and would voluntarily renew his allegiance to the United States
with full purpose to keep it.
He was deeply agitated, and I thoroughly pitied him. My acquaintance
with him in my former campaign gave me entire confidence in his
sincerity, and made me wish to spare him any fresh embarrassment or
pain. After a moment's reflection, I replied that I did not doubt
anything he had told me of the facts or of his own sentiments in
regard to them. His experience only confirmed my distrust of all
test oaths. Either his conscience already bound him to the National
government, or it did not. In either case I could not make his
loyalty more sure by a fresh oath, and believing that the one he had
taken under duress was void in fact as well as in his own
conscience, I would leave the matter there and ask nothing more of
him. He was greatly relieved by my decision, but bore himself with
dignity. I never saw any reason to be sorry for the course I took,
and believe that he was always afterward consistent and steady in
his loyalty to the United States.