COTTON MOUNTAIN
Floyd cannonades Gauley Bridge--Effect on Rosecrans--Topography of
Gauley Mount--De Villiers runs the gantlet--Movements of our
forces--Explaining orders--A hard climb on the mountain--In the post
at Gauley Bridge--Moving magazine and telegraph--A balky
mule-team--Ammunition train under fire--Captain Fitch a model
quartermaster--Plans to entrap Floyd--Moving supply trains at
night--Method of working the ferry--of making flatboats--The Cotton
Mountain affair--Rosecrans dissatisfied with Benham--Vain plans to
reach East Tennessee.
On the 1st of November the early morning was fair but misty, and a
fog lay in the gorge of New River nearly a thousand feet below the
little plateau at the Tompkins farm, on which the headquarters tents
were pitched. General Rosecrans's tents were not more than a hundred
yards above mine, between the turnpike and the steep descent to the
river, though both our little camps were secluded by thickets of
young trees and laurel bushes. Breakfast was over, the fog was
lifting out of the valley, and I was attending to the usual morning
routine of clerical work, when the report and echo of a cannon-shot,
down the gorge in the direction of Gauley Bridge, was heard. It was
unusual, enough so to set me thinking what it could mean, but the
natural explanation suggested itself that it was one of our own
guns, perhaps fired at a target. In a few moments an orderly came in
some haste, saying the general desired to see me at his tent. As I
walked over to his quarters, another shot was heard. As I
approached, I saw him standing in front of his tent door, evidently
much excited, and when I came up to him, he said in the rapid,
half-stammering way peculiar to him at such times: "The enemy has
got a battery on Cotton Mountain opposite our post, and is shelling
it! What d' ye think of that?" The post at the bridge and his
headquarters were connected by telegraph, and the operator below had
reported the fact of the opening of the cannonade from the mountain
side above him, and added that his office was so directly under fire
that he must move out of it. Indeed he was gone and communication
broken before orders could be sent to him or to the post. The fact
of the cannonade did not disturb me so much as the way in which it
affected Rosecrans. He had been expecting to be attacked by Lee in
front, and knew that McCook was exchanging shots across the river
with some force of the enemy at Miller's Ferry; but that the attack
should come two miles or more in our rear, from a point where
artillery had a plunging fire directly into our depot of supplies
and commanded our only road for a half-mile where it ran on a narrow
bench along New River under Gauley Mountain cliffs, had been so
startling as to throw him decidedly off his balance. The error in
not occupying Cotton Mountain himself was now not only made plain,
but the consequences were not pleasant to contemplate. I saw that
the best service I could render him for the moment was to help him
back into a frame of mind in which cool reasoning on the situation
would be possible. I have already stated the contrast between my own
sense of care when in sole command and the comparative freedom from
it when a senior officer came upon the field; and I now realized how
much easier it was for a subordinate to take things coolly. I
therefore purposely entered into a discussion of the probabilities
of the situation, and drew it out at length enough to assist the
general in recovering full control of himself and of his own
faculties. We could not, from where we stood, see the post at Gauley
Bridge nor even the place on Cotton Mountain where the enemy's
battery was placed, and we walked a little way apart from our staff
officers to a position from which we could see the occasional puffs
of white smoke from the hostile guns. From our camp the road
descended sharply along the shoulders of steep hills covered with
wood for a mile and a half, till it reached the bottom of the New
River gorge, and then it followed the open bench I have mentioned
till it reached the crossing of the Gauley. On the opposite side of
New River there was no road, the mass of Cotton Mountain crowding
close upon the stream with its picturesque face of steep inclines
and perpendicular walls of rock. The bridge of boats which Rosecrans
had planned at Gauley Bridge had not been built, because it had been
found impossible to collect or to construct boats enough to make it.
We were therefore still dependent on the ferry. Whilst the general
and I were talking, Colonel De Villiers galloped up, having crossed
at the ferry and run the gantlet of skirmishers whom he reported as
lining the other side of New River opposite the unsheltered part of
our road. He had recently reported for duty, having, as he asserted,
escaped in a wonderful way from captivity in Libby Prison at
Richmond. [Footnote: The Confederates claimed that he had been
allowed to act as hospital attendant on parole, and that he violated
his obligation in escaping. We had no means of verifying the facts
in the case.] His regiment was at the bridge and he was the senior
officer there; but, in his characteristic light-headed way, instead
of taking steps to protect his post and re-establish the telegraph
communications, he had dashed off to report in person at
headquarters. As he was willing to take the risks of the race back
again, he was allowed to go, after being fully instructed to set up
a new telegraph office in a ravine out of range of fire, to put the
ferry-boat out of danger as soon as he should be over, and prepare
the ordnance stores to be moved into the valley of Scrabble Creek at
night. I begged the general to be allowed to go back with De
Villiers, as the thing I most feared was some panic at the post
which might result in the destruction of our stores in depot there.
He, however, insisted on my staying at headquarters for a time at
least.
Information of the attack was sent to the brigades up the river, and
Schenck, who was farthest up, was directed to push out scouting
parties and learn if there was any advance of the enemy from Sewell
Mountain. Benham, who was nearest, was ordered to send down part of
his brigade to meet the efforts of the enemy to stop our
communication with Gauley Bridge. The battery of mountain howitzers
under Captain Mack of the regular army was also ordered to report at
headquarters, with the intention of placing it high up on Gauley
cliffs, where it could drop shells among the enemy's skirmishers on
the opposite bank of the river. An hour or two passed and the
detachment from Benham's brigade approached. It was the Thirteenth
Ohio, led by one of its field officers, who halted the column and
rode up to General Rosecrans for orders. The general's manner was
still an excited one, and in the rapidity with which his directions
were given the officer did not seem to get a clear idea of what was
required of him. He made some effort to get the orders explained,
but his failure to comprehend seemed to irritate Rosecrans, and he
therefore bowed and rode back to his men with a blank look which did
not promise well for intelligent action. Noticing this, I quietly
walked aside among the bushes, and when out of sight hurried a
little in advance and waited at the roadside for the column. I
beckoned the officer to me, and said to him, "Colonel, I thought you
looked as if you did not fully understand the general's wishes." He
replied that he did not, but was unwilling to question him as it
seemed to irritate him. I said that was a wrong principle to act on,
as a commanding officer has the greatest possible interest in being
clearly understood. I then explained at large what I knew to be
Rosecrans's purposes. The officer thanked me cordially and rode
away. I have ventured to give this incident with such fulness,
because subsequent events in Rosecrans's career strengthened the
impression I formed at the time, that the excitability of his
temperament was such that an unexpected occurrence might upset his
judgment so that it would be uncertain how he would act,--whether it
would rouse him to a heroism of which he was quite capable, or make
him for the time unfit for real leadership by suspending his
self-command. [Footnote: See Crittenden's testimony in Buell Court
of Inquiry, Official Records, vol. xvi. pt. i. p. 578. Cist's
account of Chickamauga, Army of the Cumberland, p. 226, and chap,
xxvii., _post_.]
Soon after noon I obtained permission to go to Gauley Bridge and
assume command there; but as the road along New River was now
impracticable by reason of the increased fire of the enemy upon it,
I took the route over the top of Gauley Mountain, intending to reach
the Gauley River as near the post as practicable. I took with me
only my aide, Captain Christie, and an orderly. We rode a little
beyond the top of the mountain, and sending the orderly back with
the horses, proceeded on foot down the northern slope. We soon came
to the slashing which I had made in August to prevent the enemy's
easy approach to the river near the post. The mist of the morning
had changed to a drizzling rain. We had on our heavy horsemen's
overcoats with large capes, cavalry boots and spurs, swords and
pistols. This made it toilsome work for us. The trees had been
felled so that they crossed each other in utmost confusion on the
steep declivity. Many of them were very large, and we slid over the
great wet trunks, climbed through and under branches, let ourselves
down walls of natural rock, tripped and hampered by our
accoutrements, till we came to the end of the entanglement at what
we supposed was the edge of the river. To our dismay we found that
we had not kept up stream far enough, and that at this point was a
sheer precipice some thirty feet high. We could find no crevices to
help us climb down it. We tried to work along the edge till we
should reach a lower place, but this utterly failed. We were obliged
to retrace our steps to the open wood above the slashing. But if the
downward climbing had been hard, this attempt to pull ourselves up
again,--
"... superasque evadere ad auras,"--
was labor indeed. We stopped several times from sheer exhaustion, so
blown that it seemed almost impossible to get breath again. Our
clothes were heavy from the rain on the outside and wet with
perspiration on the inside. At last, however, we accomplished it,
and resting for a while at the foot of a great tree till we gained a
little strength, we followed the upper line of the slashing till we
passed beyond it, and then turned toward the river, choosing to
reach its banks high up above the camp rather than attempt again to
climb through the fallen timber. Once at the water's edge we
followed the stream down till we were opposite the guard post above
the camp, when we hailed for a skiff and were ferried over.
It was now almost dark, but the arrangements were soon made to have
wagons ready at the building on the Kanawha front used as a
magazine, and to move all our ammunition during the night to the
place I had indicated in the ravine of Scrabble Creek, which runs
into the Gauley. The telegraph station was moved there and
connection of wires made. We also prepared to run the ferry
industriously during the night and to put over the necessary
trainloads of supplies for the troops above. A place was selected
high up on the hill behind us, where I hoped to get up a couple of
Parrott guns which might silence the cannon of the enemy on Cotton
Mountain. I was naturally gratified at the expressions of relief and
satisfaction of the officers of the post to have me in person among
them. They had already found that the plunging fire from the heights
across the river was not a formidable thing, and that little
mischief would happen if the men were kept from assembling in bodies
or large groups within range of the enemy's cannon.
The fatigues of the day made sleep welcome as soon as the most
pressing duties had been done, and I went early to rest, giving
orders to the guard at my quarters to call me at peep of day. The
weather cleared during the night, and when I went out in the morning
to see what progress had been made in transferring the ammunition to
a safe place, I was surprised to find the train of wagons stopped in
the road along the Gauley in front of the camp. General Rosecrans's
ordnance officer was of the regular army, but unfortunately was
intemperate. He had neglected his duty during the night, leaving his
sergeant to get on without guidance or direction. The result was
that the ordnance stores had not been loaded upon the waiting wagons
till nearly daylight, and soon after turning out of the Kanawha road
into that of the Gauley, the mules of a team near the head of the
train balked, and the whole had been brought to a standstill. There
was a little rise in the road on the hither side of Scrabble Creek,
where the track, cutting through the crest of a hillock, was only
wide enough for a single team, and this rise was of course the place
where the balky animals stopped. The line of the road was enfiladed
by the enemy's cannon, the morning fog in the valley was beginning
to lift under the influence of the rising sun, and as soon as the
situation was discovered we might reckon upon receiving the fire of
the Cotton Mountain battery. The wagon-drivers realized the danger
of handling an ammunition train under such circumstances and began
to be nervous, whilst the onlookers not connected with the duty made
haste to get out of harm's way. My presence strengthened the
authority of the quartermaster in charge, Captain E. P. Fitch,
helped in steadying the men, and enabled him to enforce promptly his
orders. He stopped the noisy efforts to make the refractory mules
move, and sent in haste for a fresh team. As soon as it came, this
was put in place of the balky animals, and at the word of command
the train started quickly forward. The fog had thinned enough,
however, to give the enemy an inkling of what was going on, and the
rattling of the wagons on the road completed the exposure. Without
warning, a ball struck in the road near us and bounded over the rear
of the train, the report of the cannon following instantly. The
drivers involuntarily crouched over their mules and cracked their
whips. Another shot followed, but it was also short, and the last
wagon turned the shoulder of the hill into the gorge of the creek as
the ball bounded along up the Gauley valley. It was perhaps
fortunate for us that solid shot instead of shrapnel were used, but
it is not improbable that the need of haste in firing made the
battery officer feel that he had no time to cut and adjust fuses to
the estimated distance to our train; or it is possible that shells
were used but did not explode. It was my first acquaintance with
Captain Fitch, who had accompanied Rosecrans's column, and his cool
efficiency was so marked that I applied for him as quartermaster
upon my staff. He remained with me till I finally left West Virginia
in 1863, and I never saw his superior in handling trains in the
field. He was a West Virginian, volunteering from civil life, whose
outfit was a good business education and an indomitable rough energy
that nothing could tire.
During the evening of the 1st of November General Benham's brigade
came to the post at Gauley Bridge to strengthen the garrison, and
was encamped on the Kanawha side near the falls, where the widening
of the valley put them out of range of the enemy's fire. The ferry
below the falls was called Montgomery's and was at the mouth of Big
Falls Creek, up which ran the road to Fayette C. H. A detachment of
the enemy had pushed back our outposts on this road, and had fired
upon our lower camp with cannon, but the position was not a
favorable one for them and they did not try to stay long. After a
day or two we were able to keep pickets on that side with a flatboat
and hawser to bring them back, covered by artillery on our side of
the Kanawha.
During November 2d Rosecrans matured a plan of operations against
Floyd, who was now definitely found to be in command of the hostile
force on Cotton Mountain. It was also learned through scouting
parties and the country people that Lee had left the region, with
most of the force that had been at Sewell Mountain. It seemed
possible therefore to entrap Floyd, and this was what Rosecrans
determined to attempt. Benham was ordered to take his brigade down
the Kanawha and cross to the other side at the mouth of Loup Creek,
five miles below. Schenck was ordered to prepare wagon bodies as
temporary boats, to make such flatboats as he could, and get ready
to cross the New River at Townsend's Ferry, about fifteen miles
above Gauley Bridge. McCook was ordered to watch Miller's Ferry near
his camp, and be prepared to make a dash on the short road to
Fayette C. H. I was ordered to hold the post at Gauley Bridge,
forward supplies by night, keep down the enemy's fire as far as
possible, and watch for an opportunity to co-operate with Benham by
way of Montgomery's Ferry. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. v. p.
254.] Benham's brigade was temporarily increased by 1500 picked men
from the posts between Kanawha Falls and Charleston. He was expected
to march up Loup Creek and cut off Floyd's retreat by way of Raleigh
C. H., whilst Schenck should co-operate from Townsend's Ferry. On
the 5th the preparations had been made, and Benham was ordered to
cross the Kanawha. He did so on the night of the 6th, but except
sending scouting parties up Loup Creek, he did nothing, as a sudden
rise in New River made Rosecrans suspend the concerted movement, and
matters remained as they were, awaiting the fall of the river, till
the 10th.
For a week after the 1st, Floyd's battery on Cotton Mountain fired
on very slight provocation, and caution was necessary in riding or
moving about the camp. The houses of the hamlet were not purposely
injured, for Floyd would naturally be unwilling to destroy the
property of West Virginians, and it was a safe presumption that we
had removed the government property from buildings within range of
fire, as we had in fact done. Our method of forwarding supplies was
to assemble the wagon trains near my lower camp during the day, and
push them forward to Gauley Mount and Tompkins farm during the
night. The ferry-boat at Gauley Bridge was kept out of harm's way in
the Gauley, behind the projection of Gauley Mount, but the hawser on
which it ran was not removed. At nightfall the boat would be manned,
dropped down to its place, made fast to the hawser by a
snatch-block, and commence its regular trips, passing over the
wagons. The ferries, both at the bridge and at Montgomery's, were
under the management of Captain Lane of the Eleventh Ohio and his
company of mechanics. [Footnote: Captain P. P. Lane of Cincinnati,
later colonel of the regiment.] We had found at points along the
Kanawha the gunwales of flatboats, gotten out by lumbermen in the
woods and brought to the river bank ready to be put into boats for
the coal trade, which had already much importance in the valley.
These gunwales were single sticks of timber, sixty or eighty feet
long, two or three feet wide, and say six inches thick. Each formed
the side of a boat, which was built by tying two gunwales together
with cross timbers, the whole being then planked. Such boats were
three or four times as large as those used for the country ferries
upon the Gauley and New rivers, and enabled us to make these larger
ferries very commodious. Of course the enemy knew that we used them
at night, and would fire an occasional random shot at them, but did
us no harm.
The enemy's guns on the mountain were so masked by the forest that
we did not waste ammunition in firing at them, except as they
opened, when our guns so quickly returned their fire that they never
ventured upon continuous action, and after the first week we had
only occasional shots from them. We had planted our sharpshooters
also in protected spots along the narrower part of New River near
the post, and made the enemy abandon the other margin of the stream,
except with scattered sentinels. In a short time matters thus
assumed a shape in which our work went on regularly, and the only
advantage Floyd had attained was to make us move our supply trains
at night. His presence on the mountain overlooking our post was an
irritation under which we chafed, and from Rosecrans down, everybody
was disgusted with the enforced delay of Benham at Loup Creek. Floyd
kept his principal camp behind Cotton Mountain, in the position I
have already indicated, in an inaction which seemed to invite
enterprise on our part. His courage had oozed out when he had
carried his little army into an exposed position, and here as at
Carnifex Ferry he seemed to be waiting for his adversary to take the
initiative.
To prepare for my own part in the contemplated movement, I had
ordered Captain Lane to build a couple of flatboats of a smaller
size than our large ferry-boats, and to rig these with sweeps or
large oars, so that they could be used to throw detachments across
the New River to the base of Cotton Mountain, at a point selected a
little way up the river, where the stream was not so swift and
broken as in most places. Many of our men had become expert in
managing such boats, and a careful computation showed that we could
put over 500 men an hour with these small scows.
From the 5th to the both Rosecrans had been waiting for the waters
to subside, and pressing Benham to examine the roads up Loup Creek
so thoroughly that he could plant himself in Floyd's rear as soon as
orders should be given. Schenck would make the simultaneous movement
when Benham was known to be in march, and McCook's and my own
brigade would at least make demonstrations from our several
positions. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. v. pp. 255, 261-265.]
From my picket post at Montgomery's Ferry I had sent scouts up the
Fayette road, and by the 9th had discovered such symptoms of
weakness in the enemy that I thought the time had come to make an
effort to dislodge the battery and get command of the crest of
Cotton Mountain overlooking my camp. On the both I made a combined
movement from both my upper and lower camps. Colonel De Villiers was
ordered to take all of the Eleventh Ohio fit for duty (being only
200 men), and crossing by the small boats, make a vigorous
reconnoissance over the New River face of Cotton Mountain, reaching
the crest if possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Enyart of the First
Kentucky was directed to cross below the falls with a similar force,
and push a reconnoissance out on the Fayette road, whilst he also
should try to co-operate with De Villiers in clearing the enemy from
the heights opposite Gauley Bridge. The place at which De Villiers
crossed was out of sight and range from the enemy's battery. His
first boat-load of forty men reached the opposite shore safely, and
dividing into two parties, one pushed up the New River to a ravine
making a somewhat easy ascent toward the crest, whilst the others
skirmished up the almost perpendicular face of the rocks where they
landed. The remainder of the men of the Eleventh were put over as
fast as possible, and joined their colonel in the ravine mentioned,
up which they marched to a little clearing high up the hill, known
as Blake's farm, where the advanced party had found the enemy. The
battery was withdrawn as soon as De Villiers' approach at the Blake
farm was known, supports being sent to the outpost there to check
our advance. The men of the Eleventh, led by Major Coleman, attacked
sharply, drove back the enemy, and succeeded in extending their
right to the crest above the recent position of the battery. They
were of course stretched out into a mere skirmish line, and I
directed them to hold the crest without advancing further till
Enyart should be heard from. He also found the enemy indisposed to
be stubborn, and skirmished up the opposite side of the mountain
till he joined hands with De Villiers on the top. The enemy seemed
to be increasing before them, and our men held their position as
directed, having relieved us from the hostile occupation of ground
commanding our camps. Enyart's reconnoitring party sent toward
Fayette advanced a mile on that road and remained in observation,
finding no enemy. I reported our success to Rosecrans, and doubtful
whether he wished to press the enemy in front till Benham and
Schenck should be in his rear, I asked for further instructions.
General Rosecrans authorized me to take over the rest of my
available force and press the enemy next day, as he was very
confident that Benham would by that time be in position to attack
him in rear. Accordingly I passed the Second Kentucky regiment over
the river during the night and joined them in person on the crest at
daybreak. The remainder of the First Kentucky, under Major Lieper,
was ordered to cross at Montgomery's Ferry later in the day, and
advance upon the Fayette road as far as possible. My climb to the
crest of Cotton Mountain was a repetition of the exhausting sort of
work I had tried on Gauley Mount on the 1st. I took the short route
straight up the face of the hill, clambering over rocks, pulling
myself up by clinging to the laurel bushes, and often literally
lifting myself from one great rocky step to another. This work was
harder upon officers who were usually mounted than upon the men in
the line, as we were not used to it, and the labor of the whole day
was thus increased, for of course we could take no horses. Resuming
the advance along the mountain crest, the enemy made no serious
resistance, but fell back skirmishing briskly, till we came to more
open ground where the mountain breaks down toward some open farms
where detachments of Floyd's forces had been encamped. Their baggage
train was seen in the distance, moving off upon the Fayette
turnpike. As we were now in the close neighborhood of the whole
force of the enemy, and those in our presence were quite as numerous
as we, I halted the command on the wooded heights commanding the
open ground below, till we should hear some sound from Benham's
column. Toward evening Major Lieper came up on our right to the
place where the Fayette road passes over a long spur of the mountain
which is known in the neighborhood as Cotton Hill. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. v. pp. 272-275, and map, p. 82, _ante_. The
greater mass in the angle of the rivers was not uniformly called
Cotton Mountain then, and in my report I spoke of passing along
those crests toward Cotton Hill, meaning this elevation on the
Fayette road.] Here he was halted, and nothing being heard from
co-operating columns, the troops bivouacked for the night.
Rosecrans had informed Benham of my advance and ordered him to push
forward; but he spent the day in discussing the topography which he
was supposed to have learned before, and did not move. [Footnote:
_Id_., pp. 266-268.] Schenck had not been put across New River at
Townsend's Ferry, because Rosecrans thought it hazardous to do this
whilst Floyd was near that point in force, and he intended that when
Floyd should be forced to attack Benham (whose command was now equal
to two brigades), it would withdraw the enemy so far that Schenck
would have room to operate after crossing. But as Benham had not
advanced, toward evening of the 11th Rosecrans sent him orders to
march immediately up the Kanawha to my position and follow Major
Lieper on the road that officer had opened to the top of Cotton
Hill, and as much further toward Fayette C. H. as possible, taking
Lieper's detachment with him; meanwhile I was ordered to keep the
remainder of my troops on the mountain in the position already
occupied. Benham was expected to reach Lieper's position by ten
o'clock that evening, but he did not reach there in fact till three
o'clock in the following afternoon (12th). [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. v. pp. 256, 273.] After some skirmishing with an
outpost of the enemy at Laurel Creek behind which Major Lieper had
been posted, nothing more was done till the evening of the 13th.
Floyd's report shows that he retired beyond Fayette C. H. on the
12th, having conceived the mistaken idea that Benham's column was a
new reinforcement of 5000 men from Ohio. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 287.]
Abandoning the hope of using Schenck's brigade in a movement from
Townsend's Ferry, Rosecrans now ordered him to march to Gauley
Bridge on the 13th, and joining Benham by a night march, assume
command of the moving column. Schenck did so, but Floyd was now
retreating upon Raleigh C. H. and a slight affair with his
rear-guard was the only result. Fayette C. H. was occupied and the
campaign ended. It would appear from official documents that Floyd
did not learn of Benham's presence at the mouth of Loup Creek till
the 12th, when he began his retreat, and that at any time during the
preceding week a single rapid march would have placed Benham's
brigade without resistance upon the line of the enemy's
communications. Rosecrans was indignant at the balking of his
elaborate plans, and ordered Benham before a court-martial for
misconduct; [Footnote: Official Records, vol. v. p. 669.] but I
believe that McClellan caused the proceedings to be quashed to avoid
scandal, and Benham was transferred to another department. It is
very improbable that Schenck's contemplated movement across New
River at Townsend's Ferry could have been made successfully; for his
boats were few and small, and the ferrying would have been slow and
tedious. Floyd would pretty surely learn of it soon after it began,
and would hasten his retreat instead of waiting to be surrounded. It
would have been better to join Schenck to Benham by a forced march
as soon as the latter was at the mouth of Loup Creek, and then to
push the whole to the Fayette and Raleigh road, Rosecrans leading
the column in person. As Floyd seems to have been ignorant of what
was going on in Loup Creek valley, decisive results might have
followed from anticipating him on his line of retreat. Capturing
such a force, or, as the phrase then went, "bagging it," is easier
talked of than done; but it is quite probable that it might have
been so scattered and demoralized as to be of little further value
as an army, and considerable parts of it might have been taken
prisoners.
Rosecrans had begun the campaign in August with the announced
purpose of marching to Wytheville and Abingdon in the Holston
valley, and thence into East Tennessee. McClellan had cherished the
idea of making the Kanawha line the base of operations into the same
region; still later Fremont, and after him Halleck did the same.
Looking only at the map, it seemed an easy thing to do; but the
almost wilderness character of the intervening country with its poor
and sparsely scattered people, the weary miles of steep
mountain-roads becoming impassable in rainy weather, and the total
absence of forage for animals, were elements of the problem which
they all ignored or greatly underestimated. It was easy, sitting at
one's office table, to sweep the hand over a few inches of chart
showing next to nothing of the topography, and to say, "We will
march from here to here;" but when the march was undertaken, the
natural obstacles began to assert themselves, and one general after
another had to find apologies for failing to accomplish what ought
never to have been undertaken. After a year or two, the military
advisers of the War Department began to realize how closely the
movements of great bodies of soldiers were tied to rivers and
railways; but they seemed to learn it only as the merest civilian
could learn it, by the experience of repeated failures of plans
based on long lines of communication over forest-clad mountains,
dependent upon wagons to carry everything for man and beast.
Instead of reaching Wytheville or Abingdon, Rosecrans found that he
could not supply his little army even at Big Sewell Mountain; and
except for a few days, he occupied no part of the country in advance
of my positions in August, then held by a single brigade in the
presence of the same enemy. It was not Floyd's army, but the
physical obstacles presented by the country that chained him to
Gauley Bridge. I shall have occasion hereafter to note how the same
ignoring of nature's laws came near starving Burnside's command in
East Tennessee, where the attempt to supply it by wagon trains from
Lexington in Kentucky or from Nashville failed so utterly as to
disappear from the calculation of our problem of existence through
the winter of 1863-64.