I: THE CAUSES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOLIDARISM
The word “solidarity,” formerly a term of exclusively legal import,[1249]
has during the last twenty years been employed to designate a doctrine
which has aroused the greatest enthusiasm—at least in France. Every
official speech pays homage to the ideal, every social conference ends
with an expression of approval. Those who wish to narrow the scope
of industrial warfare as well as those who wish to extend the bounds
of commercial freedom base their demands upon “a sense of social
solidarity,” and it is becoming quite a common experience to find writers
on ethics and education who have fallen under its spell. The result is
that no history of French economic doctrines can pass it by.[1250]
The fundamental idea underlying the doctrine of solidarity, namely, that
the human race, taken collectively, forms one single body, of which
individuals are the members, is not by any means new. St. Paul and
Marcus Aurelius among the writers of antiquity, not to mention Menenius
Agrippa’s well-known apologue, gave expression to this very idea in terms
almost identical with those now commonly used.[1251]
Nor was the importance of heredity wholly lost upon the ancients. The
hereditary transmission of moral qualities was a doctrine taught with the
express sanction of a revealed religion. This doctrine of original sin
is perhaps the most terrible example of solidarism that history has to
reveal. Turning to profane history, we are reminded of the line of Horace:
_Delicta majorum immeritus lues!_
We must also remember that it was always something more than a mere
theory or dogma. It was a practical rule of conduct, and as such was
enjoined by law, exhorted by religion, and enforced by custom, with the
result that what was preached was also practised with a thoroughness that
is quite unknown at the present day. We have an illustration of this in
the collective responsibility of all the members of a family or tribe
whenever one of their number was found guilty of some criminal offence. A
survival of this pristine custom is the Corsican vendetta of to-day.
Finally, there is that other aspect of solidarity which is based upon
division of labour and the consequent necessity of relying upon the
co-operation of others for the satisfaction of our wants. The Greek
writers had caught a glimpse of this interdependence many centuries
before the brilliant exposition of Adam Smith was given to the world.
All the manifold aspects of the doctrine, whether biological,
sociological, moral, religious, legal, or economic, were obviously
matters of common knowledge to the writers of antiquity. But each phase
of the subject seemed isolated from the rest, and it was not until the
middle of the nineteenth century that it dawned upon thinkers that there
was possibly something like unity underlying this apparent diversity.
It has already been impressed upon us that Pierre Leroux and a few of
the disciples of Fourier, as well as Bastiat, had realised something
of the value of the doctrine of solidarity and of the appropriateness
of the term. But it was reserved for Auguste Comte to appreciate its
full possibilities. “The new philosophy, viewed as a whole, emphasises
the intimacy that exists between the individual and the group in their
different relations, so that the conception of social solidarity
extending throughout time and embracing the whole of humanity has become
a fairly familiar idea.”[1252]
It is necessary, however, to inquire somewhat more closely into the
success of the new doctrine in holding the attention both of the public
and of economists. It is possible that the seed would have borne little
fruit but for the presence of extraneous circumstances which helped to
impress the public with a sense of the importance of these new theories.
Nothing has left a deeper impression upon the public or afforded a
better illustration of the infinite possibilities of the new doctrine
than the study of bacteriology. The prevalence of certain contagious
maladies or epidemics had been too terribly prominent in the history
of the human race to require any confirmation; but it was something to
learn that the most serious diseases and maladies of all kinds were
communicated from man to man by means of invisible bacilli. It was now
realised that men who were supposed to be dying a natural death were in
reality being slowly murdered. It was with something like horror that men
learned that the consumptive, the hero of a hundred sentimental tales,
every day expectorated sufficient germs to depopulate a whole town.
Such “pathological” solidarity is being more closely interwoven every
day by the ever-increasing multiplicity and rapidity of the means of
communication. The slow caravan journey across the desert was much more
likely to destroy the vitality of the bacilli picked up at Mecca than
the much more rapid railway journey of the future, which will speed the
pilgrim across the sandy wastes in a few hours. The traveller of former
days, who went either afoot or on horseback, ran less risk of infection
than his descendant of to-day, who perhaps only spends a few hours in the
metropolis.
Sociology has also brought its contingent of facts and theories.[1253]
The sociologist stakes his reputation upon being able to prove that the
fable of the body and its members is no fable at all, but a literal
transcription of actual facts, and that the union existing between
various members of the social body is as intimate as that which
exists between the different parts of the same organism. Such is the
fullness and minuteness with which the analogy has been pushed even
into obscure points of anatomical detail that it is difficult not to
smile at the _naïveté_ of its authors. It is pointed out that so close
is the resemblance between the respective functions in the two cases
that the term “circulation” does duty in both spheres, and a comparison
is instituted between nutrition and production, reproduction and
colonisation, and accumulation of fat and capitalism. In Florence during
the Middle Ages the _bourgeois_ were spoken of as the fat people, the
workers as the small people. The organs also are very similar. Arteries
and veins have their counterpart in the railway system, with its network
of “up” and “down” lines. The nervous system of the one becomes the
telegraphic system of the other, with its rapid communication of news
and sensations. The brain becomes the seat of government, the heart is
the bank; and between the two, both in nature and in society, there is a
most intimate connection. Even the white corpuscles have a prototype in
the police force, whose duty is to rush to the seat of disorder and to
attempt to crush it immediately.
The sociological analogy, ingenious rather than scientific, did not have
a very long vogue.[1254] But it has at least supplied a few conclusions
which are thoroughly well established, and which serve as the basis of
the solidarist doctrine. Among these we may mention the following:
(_a_) That solidarity in the sense of the mutual dependence of members
of the same body is a characteristic of all life. Inorganic bodies are
incomplete simply because they are mere aggregates. Death is nothing but
the dissolution of the mysterious links which bind together the various
parts of the living organism, with the result that it relapses into the
state of a corpse, in which the various elements become indifferent to
the presence of one another and are dissipated through space, to enter
into new combinations at the further call of nature.
(_b_) That solidarity becomes more perfect and intimate with every rise
in the biological scale. Completely homogeneous organisms scarcely differ
from simple aggregates. They may be cut into sections or have a member
removed without suffering much damage. The section cut off will become
the centre of independent existence and the amputated limb will grow
again. In the case of some organisms of this kind reproduction takes the
form of voluntary or spontaneous segmentation. But in the case of the
higher animals the removal of a single organ sometimes involves the death
of the whole organism, and almost always imperils the existence of some
others.
(_c_) That a growing differentiation of the parts makes for the greater
solidarity of the whole. Where every organ is exactly alike each is
generally complete in itself. But where they are different each is just
the complement of the other, and none can move or exist independently of
the rest.
One has only to think of the treatment meted out to the innovator by
primitive tribes to realise the tremendous solidarity of savage society.
The “boycotting” familiar in civilised countries provides a similar
example.
Political economy, in addition to an unrivalled exposition of division
of labour (which, as we have seen, was not unknown in classical times),
has adduced several other incidental proofs of solidarity, such as bank
failures in London or Paris and short time in the diamond or automobile
industry as the result of a crisis in New York or an indifferent rice
harvest in India. To take a simpler case, consider how easy it would
be for the secretary of an electrical engineers’ union to plunge whole
cities into darkness. The general strike, the latest bugbear of the
_bourgeoisie_, owes its very existence to the growing sense of solidarity
among working men. A sufficient number of workmen have only to make up
their minds to remain idle and society has either to give way to their
demands or perish.
Add to this the remarkable development which has taken place in the
spreading of news and the perfecting of telegraphic communication, by
which daily and even hourly men of all nations are swayed with feelings
of sorrow or joy at the mere recital of some startling incident which
formerly would have influenced but a very small number of people.[1255]
Such agencies are not unworthy of comparison with those subtle human
sympathies which are known by the name of spiritualism or telepathy.
Thus from every side, from the limbo of occultism as well as from the
full daylight of everyday life, the presence of numberless facts goes to
show that each for all and all for each is not a mere maxim or counsel
of perfection, but a stern, practical fact. The good or bad fortune of
others involves our own well-being or misfortune. The _ego_, as someone
has said, is a social product. These are some of the founts from which
the stream of solidarism take its rise.
But that is not all. The doctrine of solidarity had the good fortune
to appear just when people were becoming suspicious of individualist
Liberalism, though unwilling to commit themselves either to collectivism
or State Socialism.
In France especially a new political party in process of formation was on
the look-out for a cry. The new creed which it desired must needs be of
the nature of a _via media_ between economic Liberalism on the one hand
and socialism on the other. It must repudiate _laissez-faire_ equally
with the socialisation of individual property; it must hold fast to the
doctrine of the rights of man and the claims of the individual while
recognising the wisdom of imposing restrictions upon the exercise of
those rights in the interests of the whole community. This was the party
which called itself Radical then, but now prefers to be known as the
Radical-Socialist party. German State Socialism as expounded about the
same time was closely akin to it. But the German conception of the State
as something entirely above party was an idea that was not so easily
grasped in France as in Prussia. History in the two countries had not
emphasised the same truths. Solidarism, so to speak, is State Socialism
in a French garb, but possessed of somewhat better grace in that it does
not necessarily imply the coercive intervention of the State, but shows
considerable respect for individual liberties.[1256]
The new word performed one final service by usurping the functions
of the term “charity,” which no one was anxious to retain because of
its religious connection. The other term, “fraternity,” which had
done duty since the Revolution of 1848, was somewhat antiquated by
this time, and charged with a false kind of sentimentalism. The word
“solidarity,” on the contrary, has an imposing, scientific appearance
without a trace of ideology. Henceforth every sacrifice which is demanded
in the interests of others, whether grants to friendly societies or
workmen’s associations, cheap dwellings, workmen’s pensions, or even
parish allowances, is claimed, not in the interests of charity, but of
solidarity. And whenever such demand is made the approved formula is
always used—it is not a work of charity, but of solidarity, for charity
degradeth whereas solidarity lifteth up.
II: THE SOLIDARIST THESIS
The current is seldom very clear when the tributaries are numerous, and
the stream must deposit its sediment before it becomes limpid. So here
much greater precision was needed if the doctrine was ever to become
general in its scope or even popular in its appeal.
M. Léon Bourgeois, one of the leaders of the Radical-Socialist party,
to his eternal credit attempted some such clarification by employing
the term “solidarity,” hitherto so vaguely metaphysical, in a strictly
legal fashion to designate a kind of quasi-contract. Quite a sensation
was caused by M. Bourgeois’s work—a result due alike to the prominent
position of the author and the opportune moment at which the book
appeared. The greatest enthusiasm was shown for the new doctrine,
especially in the universities and among the teachers in 100,000
elementary schools. An equally warm welcome was extended to it in
democratic circles, where the desire for some kind of lay morality had
by this time become very strong. It becomes necessary, accordingly, to
give a more detailed analysis of the theory than was possible within the
compass of the small volume in which it was first expounded.[1257]
In the first place it must be noted that the doctrine connotes something
more than the mere application or extension of the idea of natural
solidarity to the social or moral order. On the contrary, it is an
attempt to remove some of the anomalies of natural solidarity. A firm
belief in the injustice of natural solidarity, or at least a conviction
that things are so adjusted that some individuals obtain advantages which
they by no means deserve while others are burdened with disadvantages
which are none of their seeking, lies at the root of the doctrine. There
is a demand for intervention in order that those who have benefited by
the accidents of natural solidarity should divide the spoils with those
who have been less fortunate in drawing prizes in the lottery of life.
It is for Justice to restore the balance and correct the abnormalities
which a fickle sister has created. Just as it has been seen that man
may utilise the forces of nature, against which he formerly was wont to
struggle, to further his own ends, so solidarity puts forth a claim for
the co-operation of Justice to correct the anomalies begotten of brute
strength, believing that only in this way is real advance possible or any
kind of improvement even remotely attainable.
Natural solidarity[1258] tells us that as a result of the division of
labour, of the influence of heredity, and of a thousand other causes
which have just been described, every man owes either to his forbears
or his contemporaries the best part of what he has, and even of what
he himself is. As Auguste Comte has put it, “We are born burdened with
all manner of social obligations.” Nor is it an uncommon thing to meet
with the word “debt” or “obligation” in the articles of the French
Constitution. In the Constitution of 1793, for example, the duty of
public assistance is spoken of as a sacred debt. But the term was loosely
employed in the sense of _noblesse oblige_ or _richesse oblige_, every
individual being left free to carry out the obligation as best he could
in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. It is necessary,
however, to transform the duty into a real debt, to give it a legal
status, and when not voluntarily performed a legal sanction as well.
If we are anxious to know exactly how this is to be done we have only
to turn to Articles 1371-81 of the Civil Code, where in the chapter
dealing with quasi-contracts we shall come across a section headed “Of
Non-conventional Contracts.”
The title would seem to imply the validity of debts not explicitly
contracted—that is to say, the existence of obligations which have
not involved any volitional undertaking on the part of either party
concerned. The first case, that of injury inflicted upon others, whether
wilfully or not, is referred to as quasi-misdemeanour, and other
instances mentioned in the section are spoken of as quasi-contracts.
Illustrations, which are plentiful enough, include payments made when not
really due, attention to the business of another without any definite
mandate authorising such interference, the obligation of the inheritor of
property to pay off debts incurred by the previous owner, the recognition
of the common interest which people living in the same neighbourhood
possess, and which also exists between those who own property and those
who lease it, between those who use it and those who inherit it.
Wherever anything of the nature of a quasi-contract exists we may be
tolerably certain that it is the product of _de facto_ or natural
solidarity. Such solidarity may take its rise in the mere fact of
propinquity or the mere feeling of neighbourliness; but more often than
not it involves a measure of control over the lives of others, which is
one of the outstanding features of a _régime_ of division of labour. Then
follow the familiar phenomena of fortunes amassed to the detriment of
others through the acquisition of unearned increment and the operation of
the laws of inheritance—the source of so many inequalities. Nor must we
forget the prejudicial effect of quasi-misdemeanour upon the fortunes
of others. The result is that the whole of society seems built, if not
upon an original explicit contract, as Rousseau imagined, at least upon
a quasi-contract; and seeing that this quasi-contract receives the tacit
submission of the parties concerned, there is no reason why it should not
be legally binding as well.
Now the existence of a debt implies that someone must pay it, and the
next question is to determine who that someone ought to be.
Obviously it can only be those who have benefited by the existence of
natural solidarity—all those who have amassed a fortune, but whose
fortune would be still to make but for the co-operation of a thousand
collaborators, both past and present. Such individuals have already
drawn more than their share and have a balance to make up on the debit
account. This debt should certainly be paid. It is all the better if it
is done voluntarily, as an act of liberality arising out of goodness of
heart—_quia bonus_, as the Gospel narrative puts it, of the rich good
man. But this is hardly probable. Most people will pay just when they
are obliged to; but such people have no right to consider themselves
free, and no claim to the free disposal of their goods until they have
acquitted themselves honourably.[1259] Individual property will be
respected and free when every social debt which it involves has been
adequately discharged, and not before then.[1260] Until this is done it
is useless to speak of the existence of competition.
The next question is to determine who is to receive payment. Payment
ought to be made to those who, instead of benefiting by the existence
of natural solidarity, have suffered loss through its operation—the
disinherited, as they are rightly called.[1261] All those who have not
received a fair share of the total wealth produced by the co-operation
of all naturally find themselves in the position of creditors. It is
not easy to name them, perhaps, but the State can reach them a helping
hand in a thousand different ways. State action of this kind was formerly
spoken of as public assistance; nowadays it is termed solidarity or
mutual insurance.
The payment may take the form either of a voluntary contribution to help
some solidarist effort or other, or an obligatory contribution levied by
the State. Some advocate progressive taxation, for if it be true that
profits tend to grow progressively in proportion as an increase in the
variety and strength of the means of production takes place, why not a
progressive tax as well?[1262] Besides, the tax would be of a semi-sacred
character, because it would mean the discharging of an important social
debt. Nor is there anything very extravagant in the demand that the
State should see that everyone makes a contribution in proportion to
his ability, seeing that the natural function of the State is to be the
guardian of contracts.[1263]
It is still more difficult to assess the rate of payment. The conditions
under which payment would be made, says M. Bourgeois, would be such
as the associates themselves would have adopted had they been free to
discuss the terms of their engagement. In other words, everything must
be regulated as if society were the result of an express convention, or
rather of a retroactive contract mutually agreed upon. The difficulty is
to determine the conditions which individual associates would demand as
the price of their adhesion to the terms of the contract. We shall have
to imagine what they would demand were they able to make fresh terms.
But we are not much farther ahead after all, for the individual
himself knows nothing at all about it. Renouncing the attempt to solve
the insoluble, one has to fix some kind of minimum claim which the
disinherited may reasonably expect to see fulfilled. Such a minimum claim
would be a guarantee against the ordinary risks of life. Society would
become a kind of association for mutual insurance, with the good and bad
fortune spread out equally over everybody.[1264]
But a quasi-contract is something very different from this. Contracts and
quasi-contracts are based upon the giving and receiving of equivalent
values, _do ut des_, whereas mutual insurance is a kind of substitute for
direct liability. A contract is essentially individualistic—mutualism is
primarily socialistic.
This idea of a quasi-contract contributed not a little to the success of
M. Bourgeois’s theory, but it makes no vital contribution to the doctrine
itself, and he might very easily have omitted it altogether.[1265] It is
nothing better than an artifice, almost a logomachy, invented for the
express purpose of affording some kind of justification for demanding a
legal contribution by treating it as an implicit or retroactive contract.
It is more of a concession to individual liberty than anything else.
A taxpayer grumbles at a tax which goes to provide pensions for the
old, but it is pointed out to him that the contribution is owing from
him in virtue not of an explicit agreement perhaps, but at least of a
quasi-agreement.
But what useful purpose can be served by such ironical subterfuge? If
it can be shown that owing to inferior moral education the law must
have the making of a conscience for those who have none, and must
enforce a certain minimum of social duties which appear necessary for
the preservation of life and the perpetuation of social amenities, what
is that but a form of State Socialism? If it is pointed out, on the
other hand, that moral progress consists in transforming debts into
duties[1266] rather than _vice versa_, one readily realises that it
is best to multiply the number of free institutions of a solidarist
complexion, such as mutual aid and co-operative societies, trade unions,
etc.
Another objective which the quasi-contract theory had in view was to
supply the debtor with a kind of guarantee that nothing would be
required of him beyond the exact equivalent of his debt.[1267] But, as we
have already noted, it would be a somewhat illusory guarantee, because
it is almost impossible to determine the amount of the debt in the first
place. Since the amount of this debt is in some way to be fixed by law it
may be well to begin with it.
Should the legislator find himself driven to accept M. Bourgeois’s
valuation, the demands made upon the taxpayer will not be so exorbitant
after all. The whole mass of obligations is summed up under three heads:
1. Free education for all classes of the community. Intellectual capital
more than any other kind of capital is a collective good, and should
never be other than common property, upon which every one may draw
whenever he wishes. A necessary corollary would be a shorter working day.
2. A minimum of the means of existence for everybody. It is difficult to
imagine a retroactive contract which refuses to grant men the right to
live. Regarded in this light, the “guarantism” of Sismondi and Fourier,
the “right to work” of Louis Blanc and Considérant, gain new significance
and throb with fresh vitality.
3. Insurance against the risks of life, which, being fortuitous, are
escaped by none. We know the promptness with which the feeling of kinship
is aroused whenever one of these accidents happens on a scale somewhat
larger than usual and assumes the proportions of a catastrophe. Why
should it be otherwise when a single individual falls a victim to the
fickleness of fate?
* * * * *
If M. Bourgeois has given his theory a distinctly politico-legal bias, M.
Durkheim has taken good care to approach the question from the standpoint
of moralist and sociologist.
M. Durkheim draws a distinction between two kinds of solidarities.
The first of these, which he regards as a quite inferior type, depends
upon external resemblances, and is of a purely mechanical character, like
the cohesion of atoms in a physical body. The other, which consists of a
union of dissimilars, is the result of division of labour, and of such is
the union between the various members of the human body. Durkheim regards
this kind of unity as of immense significance, not so much because of its
economic consequence as of its important moral results, “which might even
supply the basis of a new moral order.” Seeing that individuals really
follow divergent paths, the struggle for existence cannot be quite so
keen as it is generally supposed to be,[1268] and this differentiation
between the individual and the mass enables the former to dissociate
himself from the collective conscience. Durkheim’s desire was to see the
new ethic developed by the professional associations; hence the important
_rôle_ which trade unionism holds in his philosophy.
Without disputing the validity of the distinction thus made, we may be
allowed to question the advisability of treating one kind of solidarity
with such contempt and of showing such enthusiasm for the other. Our hope
is that the future lies with the former kind. For what is the object of
evolution if it is not to make what seems similar really alike? The world
is not merely marching in the direction of greater differentiation; it
is also moving towards a deeper unity. This seems a well-established
fact, at least so far as the physical world is concerned. Mountains are
brought low and the hollow places filled. Heat is dissipated throughout
space, causing minute gradations of temperature, and the establishment of
a kind of final equilibrium.[1269] The same law applies to human beings.
Differences of caste, of rank, of manners and customs, of language and
measurements, are everywhere being obliterated. And it seems by this
time a tolerably well-established fact that the wars of the past were
wars between strangers—strangers in race or religion, in culture or
education—and consequently it was between people who were dissimilar
that they appeared most violent. Therefore the march towards unity also
represents a movement in the direction of peace.[1270]
Such a conception of solidarity seems more akin to the ideal which we
have formed respecting it, and has by far the greatest moral value; for
if I am to be responsible for the evil that has befallen another, or
to be considered an accomplice in the evil which he has done, that can
only be just in proportion to the extent to which that other is also
myself.[1271] The practical result will be a preference for such modes
of association as will group men together according to some general
characteristic—a co-operative association rather than a trade union; for
while the interest of the latter is in opposition both to that of the
producer and that of the public, the method of association in the former
case is the most general imaginable, for everyone at some time or other
must be regarded as a consumer.
III: THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF SOLIDARIST DOCTRINES[1272]
There is no such thing as a Solidarist school in the sense in which we
speak of a Historical, a Liberal, or a Marxian school. Solidarity is a
banner borne aloft by more than one school, and a philosophy that serves
to justify aims that are occasionally divergent. As we have already had
occasion to point out, the solidarists are more of a political party than
a doctrinal school, and their best work has been done in association
with the Radical-Socialist party. Behind them is the State Socialist
or “interventionist” school. It has been suggested that the social
legislation of the last twenty years, such as the regulations governing
the conditions of labour, factory and general hygiene, insurance against
accidents and old age, State aid for the aged and the disabled,[1273]
the establishment of societies for mutual credit, rural banks and cheap
cottages, and school clinics, all of which are the direct outcome of
preaching solidarity, as well as the grants in aid of these objects which
are paid out of the progressive taxation levied upon inherited wealth or
extraordinary incomes of such as have plucked the fruit from the tree of
civilisation to the deprivation of those who caused that fruit to grow,
should be known as “the laws of social solidarity.”
Nor are workmen the only class who are likely to benefit by the adoption
of this principle. The Protectionist or Nationalist party claims to be
the party of solidarity, as well as the mutualists, who employ the term
oftener than anyone else. When the taxpayer complains about the taxes
which he has to pay in order to grant a bounty to certain proprietors or
manufacturers, and the consumer grumbles because the levying of import
duties results in increasing his cost of living, the reply is that the
spirit of solidarity demands that preference should be given to their own
kith and kin.[1274]
Fiscal reform, with its twofold attribute of a progressive tax at one
end of the scale and total exemption at the other, also claims to be
solidarist. Progressive taxation is justified on the ground that those
who have made their fortunes are the debtors of society, while exemption
at the other end is only fair, seeing that the disinherited have nothing
to give, but have already a strong claim upon society.
However closely akin to State Socialism practical solidarism may appear,
the fact that the latter may achieve its results merely by means of
associationism is sufficient to distinguish it from the former. The
result is that it has given quite a fresh impetus to the associative
movement. Syndicalists, mutualists, and co-operators vie with one another
in their anxiety to swear allegiance to the principle of free solidarism
as distinct from the forced solidarism of the State Socialists.[1275] It
is not that they fail to recognise the necessity for the latter and its
superiority over free competition, but on moral grounds they think that
such forced solidarism is even inferior to competition. It is imperative,
however, that we should make some distinction between such heterogeneous
elements as enter into the composition of the solidarist party.
The syndicalists, who come first, will hear of nothing except trade
unionism, which is to become the basis of a new economic organisation
and a new kind of ethics. The sense of solidarity is in this case
very strong, because the _syndicat_ poses as the sworn foe of the
_bourgeoisie_. Nothing develops this sense like a struggle, and the
struggle becomes a means of discipline. The attempts made by the trade
unionists to enforce this solidarity, not only upon their own members,
but also upon workmen who are unwilling to enrol themselves as members of
the union, the antagonism shown for the _jaunes_, and the advent of the
solidarist or sympathetic strike, constitute one of the most interesting
aspects of the syndicalist movement.
Next came the mutualists, who are loudest and most persistent in
their appeal to solidarity.[1276] It is not difficult to understand
this when we realise the battle which they wage against the ills of
life—invalidity, old age, poverty, and death. It is just here that men
most feel the need of sticking together. But if we are to judge by the
sacrifices which they make, the sense of solidarity among the mutualists
themselves is not very great. They are loud in their demands that the
State or the commune, or even voluntary subscribers, should complete
what they have begun,[1277] and that the State should delegate to them
the task of establishing workmen’s pensions and of dispensing State aid.
Containing as they do some members of the middle classes as well as
employees, they show no pronounced revolutionary leanings, nor have they
even a plan of social reorganisation.
Co-operation, on account of its scope and the variety of its aims, has
some claim to be regarded as in a measure a realisation of the ideals of
solidarism. But co-operation presents a twofold aspect with different
programmes and aims that are not always easily reconcilable. The oldest
movements in which the fraternal tradition of 1848 may still be viewed
in all its pristine vigour are the producers’ associations, of which we
have already spoken. Their ideal is to emancipate the worker by setting
up a kind of industrial republic, and they make a practical beginning
with “guarantism,” which Sismondi expected the masters to give and
which Fourier thought would naturally follow the establishment of the
Phalanstère.[1278] But however rosy the prospects may be they can never
affect more than a very small proportion of the working classes.
Distributive societies have met with a greater measure of success. Their
membership is reckoned by the million, and in some towns in England,
Germany, and Switzerland the members actually comprise the majority of
the population. Such is the colossal magnitude of the “wholesale” that it
might even alter the whole character of commercial organisation—that is,
if we are to judge not merely by the record of its transactions, but also
by the feeling of awe which it inspires in the minds of merchants in all
countries, who are already claiming the protection of their respective
Governments. Although the number of such societies is rapidly increasing
in France, they have never had quite the same practical influence there,
simply because they have been lacking in the true spirit of solidarity.
Curiously enough, these French co-operators have formulated a most
ambitious programme of social reform, which is wholly inspired by the
experience of the Rochdale Pioneers.[1279]
The gospel of solidarity has even penetrated into the rural districts,
and although the temperament of the peasant is strongly individualistic
it is already beginning to bear fruit in the shape of numerous
associations of various kinds. The most interesting of these is the
mutual credit society, which implies collective responsibility for social
debts.[1280]
This by no means exhausts the practical consequences of the solidarist
ideal. One notable result which has already shown itself is a serious
modification of the whole conception of the rights and attributes of
private property. The old formula in which property was spoken of as
a social trust rather than as a strictly individualistic right at the
_dominium ex jure Quiritium_, but which until quite recently was nothing
more than a mere metaphor, becomes a reality under the inspiration of
this new doctrine of solidarity. Once it is realised that property is
simply the result of the unconscious co-operation of a large number of
causes, most of which are impersonal, the tendency will be to eliminate
it altogether or to adapt it more and more to collective ends. M. Alfred
Fouillée,[1281] a French philosopher, aptly put this aspect of the
question when he spoke of social co-proprietorship being grafted on to
individual property.
The modifications introduced into the study of jurisprudence by
emphasising its solidarist aspect are occasionally spoken of as
“juridical socialism,” a term that is not very clear, to say the least.
The jurists who have undertaken the task of applying this new principle
to the study of jurisprudence have not merely adopted the quasi-contract
theory as the basis of their work of reconstruction, but have also
refused to recognise any absolute rights of property; in other words,
they claim that the proprietor has other responsibilities besides the
mere exercise of those rights (_qui suo jure utitur neminem lædere
videtur_).
Instead of emphasising the new principle known as the “abuse of rights,”
they prefer to claim the complete subjection of all private rights to the
public weal. They point to a thousand instances in which a proprietor
ought to be held responsible, though through no fault of his own, for the
results following from the discharge of his economic duties.[1282] The
existence of such a thing as an acquired right is also denied, chiefly on
the ground that fictitious rights of this kind bar the way to progress by
setting up a claim for indemnity.[1283]
IV: CRITICISM
Notwithstanding the popularity of the term “solidarity” and the numerous
attempts made to give effect to the doctrine of which we have just given
a summary account, it would be a mistake to imagine that the theory has
met with sympathy everywhere. On the contrary, it has been subjected to
the liveliest criticism, especially by the Liberal economists.
It is not that the Liberals deny the existence of solidarity or
disapprove of the results which follow from its operation. The discovery
of the law of solidarity under the familiar aspect of division of
labour and exchange constitutes a part of their own title to fame, and
extravagant were the eulogiums which they bestowed upon its working.
They do, however, hold firmly to the belief that economic solidarity is
quite sufficient, and that it is also the best imaginable, despite the
fact that it may be our duty to organise it afresh. Is it possible to
improve upon a system of division of functions which gives everyone,
every day of his life, the equivalent of the service which he has
rendered to society? Bastiat in his fable _The Blind and the Paralytic_
compares this distribution of social effort to an understanding between
two such persons, whereby the blind does the walking and the maimed
indicates the direction.
Members of this school are strongly of the opinion that it is quite
enough to let this principle of each for all work itself out under
the pressure of competition. And as a matter of fact is it not to the
interest of the producer to consult the wants and tastes and even the
fancies of the public? Altruism pursued in this spirit, as it well
might be, manifests itself as an incessant desire to satisfy the wants
of others, and even to live for others. It loses none of its force by
becoming, instead of a mere ideal, a professional necessity which no
producer can afford to neglect without running the risk of failure.[1284]
And it is not only between producers and consumers, but also between
capital and labour, that such solidarity exists. Neither can produce
without the other, and the interest of both is to have as large a produce
as possible. A similar kind of solidarity exists among nations. The
richer our neighbours are the better chance of our finding an outlet for
our products.
Moreover, none of these _solidarités_ but is essentially just, since
everyone receives the exact equivalent of what he gives. What can the new
doctrine of solidarity add to this, unless it be, perhaps, an element of
pure parasitism?[1285]
For what is the essence of the new doctrine if it is not that those
members of society who are possessed of a certain superiority of
position, either material or intellectual (which is very often the result
of the greater contribution which they have made to the material or
intellectual capital of society), by a bold inversion of their material
positions should find themselves treated as the debtors of such as
have not succeeded? The natural result is that there are springing up
everywhere in society whole classes who are living upon the claims of
solidarity, just as their predecessors lived upon the claims of Christian
charity. More daring than their forbears, they have none of the humility
of the ordinary beggar, but boldly demand their due; not for the love
of God, as was wont with the true mendicant, but in the name of some
quasi-contract, with a policeman within hailing distance lest the debtor
should not acquit himself in a sufficiently graceful fashion. Hence
the swarm of pensioners and semi-invalids, of unemployed who patronise
the relief works, and of victims of accidents more or less real, of
parents who have their children reared for nothing, of manufacturers and
proprietors who make a profit directly or indirectly out of the existence
of public rights, and of public servants who in the name of professional
solidarity trample national solidarity underfoot and sacrifice the
interests both of taxpayer and consumer.
The economists have never held the doctrine that commutative justice by
itself—mere _do ut des_—is enough. Adjacent to the realm of justice lies
the domain of charity. But to annex this zone to the dominion of justice
and to claim solidarity as a justification seems utter futility.
There is no avoiding this dilemma. Either they get the equivalent of what
they give, which is the case under a system of free exchange, or they
do not—in which case they must be either getting more or less. In other
words, they are either parasites or destitutes—a case of exploitation or
of charity.
It is further pointed out that the whole trend of evolution appears to
give no countenance to this doctrine of solidarity, and that consequently
it is of the nature of a retrograde movement. Even in the biological
realm we come across what looks like a persistent effort to attain
independence or autonomy, a struggle on the part of the individual to
free himself from the trammels of his descent.[1286] Such must be the
explanation of the recent heroic efforts to leave the earth and rise
towards the skies, and the consequent exultation which the aviator
feels when he finds that he has overcome the force of gravity and
broken the last link which bound man to his mother earth. Turning
to criminal law, we are met with similar considerations there. The
collective responsibility of the whole family or tribe seemed quite just
to the primitive mind, and the sons of the Atridæ and the descendants
of Adam suffered with hardly a murmur for the sins committed by their
parents.[1287] But to us the doctrine is simply revolting. Whenever such
penalties are demanded by nature we can only submit with the best grace
that we can command. We are reluctantly bound to admit that the innocent
does suffer for the faults of others—that the child perishes because the
parent was a drunkard. But we, at any rate, regard such things as evil,
and valiantly struggle against them. We are not much given to raising
altars to Eumenides. When solidarity breeds contamination we seek to
counteract it by a strict individualism that immunes. The innumerable
fetters that had been riveted together by the old co-operative _régime_
were ruthlessly torn off by the French Revolution. Why attempt to forge
new chains by giving to each individual a hypothetical claim upon his
fellows?
The moralists in their turn have also raised objections. They want to
know what new principle of morality solidarity professes to teach. When
it has been shown that my neighbour’s illness may easily compass my own
death, what new feeling will the mere proving of this beget in me? Will
it be love? Is it not much more likely to reveal itself as a desire to
keep him as far from me as possible—to get rid of him altogether like
a plague-stricken rat, or at least to see that he is locked up in some
sanatorium or other? I may perhaps be found more willing to contribute
towards the upkeep of the sanatorium, but the dominant motive will be
fear, or self-interest, if that word seems preferable.[1288]
Thus solidarity, while it does not seem to contain any new doctrine of
love, tends to weaken and to suppress the sense of responsibility by
treating society as a whole, or at least the social environment, as the
source of our errors, our vices and crimes. Individual responsibility,
however, is the very basis of morality.
Such are the criticisms preferred by individualist economists. It would
be a mistake to imagine, however, that the socialists, the anarchists,
or the syndicalists have treated the doctrine with any greater degree of
indulgence. The proposal to reconcile masters and workmen, rich and poor,
in a kind of silly, sentimental embrace is a menace to socialism and a
denial of the principle of class war.[1289]
All such criticism, however, utterly fails to convince us. It may be
well, perhaps, to get rid of the coercive element in the discharge of
social debt, but that does not do away with the valuable contribution
made by solidarity both to social economics and to ethics.
Solidarity by itself does not furnish a principle of moral conduct,
since it is just a natural fact, and as such it is non-moral. Whenever
we imagine that solidarity is something evil, that judgment in itself is
a proof that we have had recourse to some criterion outside solidarity
itself by which to judge of its good or evil features. It is quite
possible also that the idea may be exploited for the profit of the
egoist. If solidarity is nothing but a mere cord binding us together
it may quite possibly happen that it will be used to exalt some people
and to pull others down, and the number brought low may even exceed the
number raised up. We need not be surprised if occasionally we find that
instead of increasing the power of good we have extended the opportunity
for evil. But we must speed the coming of these new powers in the hope
that in the end good will triumph over evil. Solidarity by itself cannot
furnish a rule of moral conduct to such as have none already; but,
granting the existence of a moral principle, it matters not whether
it be egoism or altruism, solidarity supplies us with a leverage of
incomparable strength.
In short, it teaches us three important lessons:
1. It shows us that all the good which has happened to others has added
to our own well-being, and that all the evil that has befallen them has
done us harm, and that consequently we ought to encourage the one and
discourage the other, so that a policy of indifferent abstention is no
longer possible for any of us.
The mode of action prescribed may be frankly utilitarian, but there is
an element of triumph in getting the egoist to forget himself and to
remember others, even though it be but for a time. A heart that beats
for others, though the reason perhaps be selfish, is a somewhat nobler
heart. It is doubtful whether we can ever get pure altruism without some
admixture of self-interest. The Gospel only asks that we should love our
neighbour as ourselves. Solidarity makes a similar demand, neither more
nor less, but undertakes to prove that the neighbour is really myself.
2. It shows us how the results of our actions return upon ourselves with
their harvest of suffering or joy a thousand times increased. This gives
it its character for solemnity and majesty which has made it such an
exceedingly favourable instrument for moral education. To our care is
entrusted the welfare of souls, and just as we are led to see that we
never really had a right to say that this or that matter was no concern
of ours, so we also find ourselves relieved of that other equally heinous
maxim, namely, that certain matters concern ourselves alone. Far from
weakening the sense of responsibility, as some writers maintain, it is
obvious that it increases it indefinitely.
3. It is true that in a contrary fashion it renders us more indulgent
of the faults of others, by showing how often we have been unconscious
accomplices in their crime. Morally this is a gain, for it helps us to be
more indulgent towards others, but more severe upon ourselves.
From the standpoint of sociological evolution we are confronted with
the dissolution of many of the older forms of solidarity and with the
emergence of new ones. What really takes place is an extension of the
circle of solidarity through the family, the city, and the nation
until it reaches humanity—such expansion being accompanied by a doubly
fortunate result. On the one hand corporate egoism becomes so ennobled
and extended that it includes the whole of humanity, with the result that
the strife between antagonistic interests becomes less acute. The old
argument from independence had already grown blunt in the struggle with
division of labour. Degree of independence is not the sole measure of
personality. The savage beneath his ancestral tree is independent, and
so perhaps is Ibsen’s hero in revolt against society. The king on his
throne, on the other hand, who never speaks except in the plural number,
is always conscious of his dependence. But the savage because of his
independence is powerless, whereas the king because of his dependence is
very powerful. Solidarity, whether it be like the rope that binds the
Alpine climber to his guide which may lead them both to the abyss, or
like the patriotism that rivets the soldier’s gaze upon his country’s
flag, cannot detract from individuality. If it be true, as was said
just now, that the crystal is the earliest effort of the individual to
render itself independent of its environment, we must never forget that
it is also the earliest realisation of true solidarity in the form of
association.
As to the argument of the economists that mere exchange is the only form
of solidarity that is at all compatible with the demands of justice, all
the schools whose fortunes we have followed in the course of this volume
have declared against this view, not excepting even the Mathematical
school, the latest offspring of the Classical tradition. Esau’s bargain
with Jacob, the contracts between the Congo Company and the blacks, or
between the _entrepreneur_ and the home-worker, are irreproachable from
a Hedonistic standpoint (see p. 540). But no one would consider such
primitive exchanges, which, as Proudhon eloquently remarks, savour of
retaliation—an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth—as evidence of the
existence of solidarity.
Even if we conceived of exchange as a balance the two sides of which
are in equilibrium, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the
contracting parties fare rather differently when they do not start on a
footing of complete equality. There is always a Brennus ready to throw
his sword into the scales.
It is only natural that we should ask ourselves what is to be done under
such circumstances. Must we be content simply to resign ourselves to
our fate? This seems inevitable if it be true, as the economists seem
to suggest, that human relations depend entirely upon exchange and
its derivatives—selling, lending, wage-earning, etc. But it is quite
otherwise when these human relations are regarded as the outcome of
association, whether professional, mutualist, or co-operative.[1290]
In this spirit the worker subscribes to his union with a view to
increasing its strength. Undoubtedly he reckons upon getting a higher
wage, but there is no necessary relation between his membership of the
union and the eventual rise in wages which he expects. The mutualist
supports his society in the hope that he may add to the general feeling
of security. Undoubtedly in his case again he reckons upon the society
paying his doctor should he fall ill, but scores of members pass through
life without making any demand upon their society at all, contributing
much more than they withdraw. In this way the good lives pay for the bad
ones. The member of the co-operative society, in a similar fashion, is
more concerned about a fuller satisfaction of his need than he is about
the amount of profit that he can get out of it. In short, whereas under
a competitive system each one tries to get rid of his neighbour, under
a _régime_ of association everyone would try to make some use of him.
The object of solidarity is to substitute “each for all” as a principle
of action instead of “each for himself.”[1291] Every step taken in this
direction, whether we wish it or no, implies a movement away from the
_régime_ of exchange in the direction of solidarity.