CUBAN TACTICS.
There was one incident which occurred in the early part of the
disturbances which caused a certain amount of excitement in the United
States, as it was thought that it would prove to be a repetition of the
Virginius affair.
On the 8th of March, 1895, the ship Allianca was bound from Colon to New
York. She was following the usual track of vessels near the Cuban shore.
But, outside the three mile limit, she was fired upon by a Spanish
gunboat. President Cleveland declared this to be an unwarrantable
interference by Spain with passing American ships. Protest was promptly
made by the United States against this act as not being justified by a
state of war; nor permissible in respect of a vessel on the usual paths
of commerce, nor tolerable in view of the wanton peril occasioned to
innocent life and property. This act was disavowed by Spain, with full
expression of regret, and with an assurance that there should not be
again such just cause for complaint. The offending officer was deposed
from his command. All this was eminently satisfactory, and the United
States took no further action in the matter.
The chief battle of the campaign, while Campos still remained
governor-general, was that fought at Bayamo, in July, 1895. Campos
himself commanded in person, and for the first time the Spaniards, ever
vain-glorious and self-confident, became aware of the mettle of the men
arrayed against them.
The Spanish forces numbered some five thousand men, while the Cubans had
not much more than half that number. It was the Spanish strategy,
however, to divide their men into detachments, and the Cubans were quick
to take advantage of this. The fight was a long and bloody affair, but
finally the victory, although not pronounced, remained with the Cubans.
The Spanish forces were more or less demoralized, and their loses were
heavy. Thirteen Spanish officers were killed, while the Cubans lost two
colonels. The Cubans admitted that fifty of their number were killed or
disabled, but they claimed that the loss of the Spaniards was over three
hundred.
It is impossible to tell much from the Spanish accounts, as they were
far from being complete and were highly colored. It has been the same
way in the present war, as witness the laughable "one mule" report, with
which all are familiar.
In this engagement, General Santocildes was killed. It is said that
Santocildes sacrificed his own life to save that of his friend and
superior, Campos.
There are two very different stories told of the attitude of Antonio
Maceo toward Campos in this battle. One is to the effect that he did not
know that Campos was commanding in person, but when he was told of it
the following day, he said:
"Had I known it, I would have sacrificed five hundred more of my men,
and I would have taken him dead or alive! Thus with one blow I would
have ended the war."
The other is quite different, and has been very generally believed
amongst the Cubans. It is to the effect that, during the fight, Maceo
recognized Campos, and, pointing him out to his men, ordered them not to
harm him, as he was a soldier who made war honorably.
Murat Halstead relates two incidents of the battle of Bayamo, which,
however, he declares must be taken with a large grain of salt. One,
which comes from an insurgent authority is as follows:
"Campos only saved himself by a ruse. Taking advantage of the Cubans'
well-known respect for the wounded, he had himself placed in a covered
stretcher, which they allowed to pass, without looking inside the cover.
When outside of the Cuban lines he was obliged to walk on foot to
Bayamo, through six miles of by-paths, under cover of the darkness, only
accompanied by a colored guide."
The other tells that a son of Campos, who was a lieutenant, was
captured, but released with a friendly message to his father, who of
course, was expected to follow so admirable an example.
Whether these anecdotes are true or not, one thing is certain. After the
battle, Maceo collected the wounded, whom the Spaniards left upon the
field in their retreat, and treated them in the most humane manner
possible. He wrote to Campos the following letter:
* * *
"To His Excellency, the General Martinez Campos:
"Dear Sir--Anxious to give careful and efficient attendance to the
wounded Spanish soldiers that your troops left behind on the
battle-field, I have ordered that they be lodged in the houses of the
Cuban families that live nearest to the battle-ground, until you send
for them.
"With my assurance that the forces you may send to escort them back will
not meet any hostile demonstrations from my soldiers, I have the honor
to be, sir,
"Yours respectfully,
"Antonio Maceo."
* * *
While Maceo was thus maneuvering in the eastern part of the island, the
general-in-chief, Maximo Gomez, was fighting in Camaguey. The population
in the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba had risen
almost to a man, and the movement was well under way in the province of
Santa Clara.
Several encounters took place, the most important being the attack upon
the little city of Cascorro, which Gomez succeeded in capturing. He
found there a large quantity of arms and ammunition, of which the Cubans
were greatly in need.
Gomez proved himself quite as magnanimous as Maceo. The wounded were all
cared for to the best of his ability, and the prisoners were returned to
the Spanish leaders. This example, however, seems to have been utterly
lost upon the Spaniards.
The insurgent forces, under Gomez, were at this time divided into six
portions, operating in the six provinces, and commanded by Antonio
Maceo, Aguerre, Lacret, Carillo, Suarez and Jose Maceo. Suarez was
afterwards cashiered for cowardice, and replaced by Garcia.
In August, 1895, Maceo joined his chief at a place called Jimaguaya,
where Gomez had called to him a large proportion of the Cuban forces,
which numbered at that time about thirty thousand.
And against these undisciplined soldiers was arrayed a regular army of
over eighty-five thousand men, not counting the armed volunteers.
The odds were terribly against the Cubans, but Gomez and Maceo were
confident of success.
It should be mentioned here that there were quite a number of women
fighting under Maceo, and these women did heroic service. In fact, the
Cuban women have given innumerable proofs of their devotion, body and
soul, to the cause of "Cuba Libre."
Gomez' objective point was Havana, and between Jimaguaya and Havana,
there were over fifty thousand Spanish soldiers.
When Gomez started, he had about twelve thousand men, which he divided
into three columns. He was quite well aware that the fighting must be of
the guerilla stamp. In fact, it was the only species of warfare
possible.
He therefore instructed his lieutenants to have recourse to strategy, to
foil the enemy at every point. The one object was to reach Havana.
"In the event of a forced battle," he said finally, "overthrow them!
Pass over them and on to Havana!"
The march was begun, the instructions being followed to the letter.
Actual combat was everywhere avoided. The Spanish papers constantly had
reports like this: "After a few shots the rebels ran away." They did not
understand that this was exactly Gomez' tactics, and he was succeeding,
too.
Every day the insurgents advanced further and further west. At the end
of a fortnight they reached the trocha of Jaruco, which had been
constructed in the centre of the island. This trocha was occupied by a
large and important Spanish force.
Gomez ordered Maceo to make a feigned attack upon the northern portion
of the trocha. The Spaniards rushed there in a body, and Gomez, who had
counted upon this very thing, crossed the southern part, which was left
unprotected, without striking a blow.
As soon as Maceo knew that Gomez had passed over in safety, he
immediately disappeared with his men, and soon after managed to rejoin
his chief.
It was a very clever ruse, and Campos, whose headquarters were then in
Santa Clara realized that he had been outgeneralled. He ordered a
hurried march to Cienfuegos, and there took command.
The evasive movements of the insurgents continued, and again and again
was Campos outflanked.
With but little difficulty the Cubans crossed two other trochas, and
finally entered the Province of Matanzas, which Campos had felt positive
could never be invaded; the Spaniards meanwhile constantly retreating,
nearer and nearer to the capital.
At last, Campos determined to force an open conflict. He told his
lieutenants where they were to meet him.
This was in December, 1895.
Campos lay in wait for Maceo's forces at a point between Coliseo and
Lumidero.
It seemed at first as if the insurgents were caught in a trap, and would
be forced to accept a battle in the open, which could not fail to be
disastrous to them.
But a happy thought came to Maceo, and, in connection with this plan, he
issued his orders.
Suddenly, the cane-fields which surrounded the camp of the Spaniards
burst into flame, and on each side was a great blazing plain. Campos
knew that he had once more been foiled, and he gave the order to retreat
at once.
This battle, if battle it can be called, had important results. It
enabled Gomez to reach Jovellanos, a city which commanded the railroad
lines of Cardenas, Matanzas and Havana. These lines Gomez destroyed as
well as every sugar plantation upon his route.
As to the destruction of the sugar fields and the reason therefor, we
shall have something to say later on.
Campos, completely outwitted and vanquished in his attempts to stop the
onward progress of the insurgents, now fell back upon Havana, which he
reached Christmas Day.
His reception in the capital was anything but a pleasant one. The
Spaniards there had clamored from the very beginning for revenge without
mercy, and they looked upon the successive checks which the army had
received as little less than criminal. They demanded of the
governor-general the reason for his repeated defeats, and even
threatened him personally.
There were three political parties in Cuba, the Conservatives, the
Reformists and the Autonomists. Campos met the leaders of these parties
in an interview, and asked for their opinions. The consultation was very
unsatisfactory, and as a result Campos proposed his resignation to which
the ministry made no objection.
Shortly after, his resignation was sent in and accepted. He sailed for
Spain the 17th of January, his place being temporarily filled by General
Sabas Marin.
In spite of Martinez Campos' failure to subdue the insurrection, nothing
but the greatest sympathy and respect can be felt for him, at least out
of Spain, where, speaking in a general manner, humanity has no place,
and gratitude is an unknown quantity.
Campos' services to his country had been great, including, as they did,
the pacification of Cuba in the Ten Years War, the quelling of a revolt
in Spain itself, and the restoration and support of the Spanish
monarchy. At an advanced age, when he should have been enjoying a well
deserved rest, he was sent away to fight a difficult war, and to risk
the tarnishing of his laurels as a military commander.
All praise to Martinez Campos for his pure patriotism, his unswerving
rectitude, his magnanimity and his exalted ideas of honor! This praise
even the enemies of his country cannot refuse to him.