THE TEN YEARS' WAR.
For about fourteen years after 1854, the outbreaks in Cuba were
infrequent, and of little or no moment. To all intents and purposes, the
island was in a state of tranquility.
In September, 1868, a revolution broke out in the mother country, the
result of which was that Queen Isabella was deposed from the throne and
forced to flee the country.
This time Cuba did not proclaim her loyalty to the Bourbon dynasty, as
she had done some sixty years before. She had learned her lesson. She
knew now how Spanish sovereigns rewarded loyalty, and the fall of
Isabella, instead of inspiring the Cubans with sympathy, caused them to
rush into a revolution, an action which, paradoxical as it may seem, was
somewhat precipitate, although long contemplated.
All Cuba had been eagerly looking forward to the inauguration of
political reforms, or to an attempt to shake of the pressing yoke of
Spain. At first it was thought that the new government would ameliorate
the condition of Cuba, and so change affairs that the island might
remain contentedly connected with a country of which she had so long
formed a part.
But these hopes were soon dissipated, and the advanced party of Cuba at
once matured their plans for the liberation of the island from the
military despotism of Spain.
A declaration of Cuban independence was issued at Manzanillo in October,
1868, by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, a lawyer of Bayamo.
This declaration began as follows:
"As Spain has many a time promised us Cubans to respect our rights,
without having fulfilled her promises; as she continues to tax us
heavily, and by so doing is likely to destroy our wealth; as we are in
danger of losing our property, our lives and our honor under further
Spanish dominion, therefore, etc., etc."
Thus was inaugurated what was destined to prove the most protracted and
successful attempt at Cuban freedom, up to that time.
It is certain that the grievances of the islanders were many, and this
was even recognized to a certain extent in Spain itself.
In a speech delivered by one of the Cuban deputies to the Cortes in 1866
occurs this passage:
"I foresee a catastrophe near at hand, in case Spain persists in
remaining deaf to the just reclamations of the Cubans. Look at the old
colonies of the American continent. All have ended in conquering their
independence. Let Spain not forget the lesson; let the government be
just to the colonies that remain. Thus she will consolidate her dominion
over people who only aspire to be good sons of a worthy mother, but who
are not willing to live as slaves under the sceptre of a tyrant."
In 1868 the annual revenue exacted from Cuba by Spain was in the
neighborhood of twenty-six million dollars; and plans were in progress
by which even this great revenue was to be largely increased. Not one
penny of this was applied to Cuba's advantage. On the contrary, it was
expended in a manner which was simply maddening to the Cubans.
The officials of the island, be it understood, were invariably
Spaniards. The captain-general received a salary of fifty thousand
dollars a year; at this time, this sum was twice as much as that paid to
the President of the United States. The provincial governors obtained
twelve thousand dollars each, while the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba
and the Bishop of Havana were paid eighteen thousand dollars apiece. In
addition to these large salaries, there were perquisites which probably
amounted to as much again.
Even the lowest offices were filled by friends of Spanish politicians.
These officials had no sympathy with Cuba, and cared nothing for her
welfare, save in so far as they were enabled to fill their own pockets.
The stealing in the custom houses was enormous. It has been estimated at
over fifty per cent of the gross receipts. Every possible penny was
forced from the native planters under the guise of taxes and also by the
most flagrant blackmail.
By a system of differential duties, Spain still managed to retain a
monopoly of the trade to Cuba while the colonists were forced to pay the
highest possible rates for all they received from the mother country.
The rates of postage were absurdly outrageous. For instance there was an
extra charge for delivery. When a native Cuban received a prepaid letter
at his own door, he was obliged to pay thirty-seven and a half cents
additional postage.
The taxes on flour were so high that wheaten bread ceased to be an
article of ordinary diet. The annual consumption of bread in Spain was
four hundred pounds for each person, while in Cuba, it was only
fifty-three pounds, nine ounces. In fact, all the necessaries of life
were burdened with most iniquitous taxation.
Then again there was the interest on the national debt. While the
Spaniards paid three dollars and twenty-three cents per capita, six
dollars and thirty-nine cents, nearly double, was exacted from the
Cubans.
All these were the chief causes of the revolution which began in 1868,
and many of them still existed a few years ago and led to the last
revolution. By the way, there is but little chance but that it will
prove the last, bringing as its consequence, what has been struggled for
so long--the freedom of Cuba.
The standard of revolt in the Ten Years War, as has been stated, was
raised by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes. He was well known as an able lawyer
and a wealthy planter. In the very beginning, he was unfortunately
forced to take action before he had intended to do so, by reason of news
of the projected outbreak reaching the authorities in Havana.
A letter carrier, who from his actions gave rise to suspicions, was
detained at Cespedes' sugar plantation, La Demajagua, and it was found
that he was the bearer of an order for the arrest of the conspirators.
With this information, immediate action became necessary. Cespedes
deemed it expedient to strike at once, and with only two hundred poorly
equipped men, he commenced the campaign at Yara.
This place was defended by a Spanish force too strong for the
insurgents. But Cespedes was not long in attracting to himself a most
respectable following.
At the end of a few weeks he found himself at the head of fifteen
thousand men. The little army, however, was anything but well provided
with arms and ammunition. Among them were many of Cespedes' former
slaves whom the general promptly liberated.
Attacks were made on Las Tunas, Cauto Embarcardero, Jiguana, La Guisa,
El Datil and Santa Rita, in almost every case victory remaining with the
insurgents.
On the 15th of October it was decided to attack Bayamo, an important
town of ten thousand inhabitants. On the 18th the town was captured. The
governor, with a small body of men, shut himself up in the fort, but a
few days after was forced to capitulate.
For the relief of Bayamo, a Spanish force under Colonel Quiros,
numbering, besides cavalry and artillery, about eight hundred infantry,
started out from Santiago de Cuba, but was defeated and driven back to
Santiago with heavy losses.
The Spanish general, Count Valmaseda, was sent from Havana into the
insurrectionary district, but was attacked and forced to return,
leaving his dead on the field.
Afterwards Valmaseda, who had increased his force to four thousand men,
marched on Bayamo. He received a severe check at Saladillo, but
eventually succeeded in crossing the Cauto. The Cubans saw the
hopelessness of defending the place against such superior numbers, and,
rather than have it fall into the hands of the enemy, burned the city.
In December, General Quesada, who afterward played a most prominent part
in the war, landed a cargo of arms and took command of the army at
Camarguey.
Before the close of the year, Spain, realizing how desperate was to be
the struggle, had under arms nearly forty thousand troops which had been
sent from Europe, besides twelve thousand guerillas recruited on the
island and some forty thousand volunteers organized for the defense of
the cities. These latter were in many respects analogous to the National
Guard of the United States. They were raised from Spanish immigrants,
between whom and the native Cubans have always existed a bitter enmity
and jealousy.
In the spring of 1869, the revolutionists drew up a constitution, which
provided for a republican form of government, an elective president and
vice-president, a cabinet and a single legislative chamber. It also made
a declaration in favor of the immediate abolition of slavery. Cespedes
was elected president and Francisco Aquilero vice-president.
It is said that at the beginning of the war, before being driven to
reprisals, the Cubans behaved with all humanity. They took many Spanish
prisoners of war, but paroled them. On the other hand, the Cuban
prisoners were treated with the utmost treachery and cruelty. In all
parts of the island, no Cuban taken a prisoner of war was spared; to a
man they were shot on the spot as so many dogs.
Valmaseda, the Spanish general, in April, 1869, issued the following
proclamation, which speaks for itself:
"Inhabitants of the country! The re-enforcements of troops that I have
been waiting for have arrived; with them I shall give protection to the
good, and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion against
the government of the metropolis.
"You know that I have pardoned those that have fought us with arms; that
your wives, mothers and sisters have found in me the unexpected
protection that you have refused them. You know, also, that many of
those I have pardoned have turned against us again.
"Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it is not possible for me to be
the man I have been; there is no longer a place for a falsified
neutrality; he that is not for me is against me, and that my soldiers
may know how to distinguish, you hear, the orders they carry:
1st. Every man, from the age of fifteen years, upward, found away from
his habitation and not proving a justified motive therefor, will be
shot.
2d. Every unoccupied habitation will be burned by the troops.
3d. Every habitation from which does not float a white flag, as a
signal that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes.
"Women that are not living at their own homes, or at the house of their
relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguana or Bayamo, where
maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will
be conducted forcibly."
The second paragraph was flagrantly untrue. Those who had fought against
the Spaniards had not been pardoned. On the contrary, they had been put
to death. Fearful atrocities had been committed in Havana and elsewhere.
To cite only a few instances: The shooting of men, women and children at
the Villanuesa Theatre, at the Louvre, and at the sack of Aldama's
house.
Valmaseda's proclamation raised a storm of protest from all civilized
nations, and the Spaniards, stiff and unbending, never wavered, but the
policy embodied in Valmaseda's proclamation remained their tactics until
the end of the war.
The United States was especially roused and disgusted. Secretary Fish,
in a letter to Mr. Hale, then Minister to Spain, protested "against the
infamous proclamation of general, the Count of Valmaseda."
Even a Havanese paper is quoted as declaring that,
"Said proclamation does not even reach what is required by the
necessities of war in the most civilized nations."
The revolutionists were victorious in almost every engagement for the
first two years, although their losses were by no means inconsiderable.
It has even been acknowledged recently by a representative of Spain to
the United States that the greater and better part of the Cubans were in
sympathy with the insurrection. This opinion appeared in a statement
made by Senor De Lome (whose reputation among Americans is now somewhat
unsavory) in the New York Herald of February 23, 1896.
The Cubans were recognized as belligerents by Chili, Bolivia, Guatemala,
Peru, Columbia and Mexico.
There were two important expeditions of assistance sent to the Cubans in
the early part of the war. One was under the command of Rafael Quesada,
and, in addition to men, brought arms and ammunition, of which the
insurgents were sadly in need. The other was under General Thomas
Jordan, a West Point graduate and an ex-officer in the Confederate
service. By the way, the South, with its well-known chivalry, has always
evinced warm sympathy for the unfortunate Cubans. To their glory be it
spoken and remembered!
Quesada managed to reach the interior without resistance. But Jordan,
with only one hundred and seventy-five men, but carrying arms and
ammunition for two thousand six hundred men, besides several pieces of
artillery, was attacked at Camalito and again at El Ramon; he succeeded
in repulsing the enemy and reaching his destination.
Soon after, as General Quesada demanded extraordinary powers, he was
deposed by the Cuban congress, and General Jordan was appointed
commander-in-chief in his stead.
In August, 1870, the United States government offered to Spain their
good offices for a settlement of the strife. Mr. Fish, who was then
secretary of State, proposed terms for the cession of the island to the
Cubans, but the offer was declined. This is only one of the many times
when Spain, in her suicidal policy, has refused to listen to reason.
About this time the volunteers expelled General Dulce, and General de
Rodas was sent from Spain to replace him with a re-enforcement of thirty
thousand men.
General de Rodas, however, remained in command only about six months, he
in his turn being replaced by Valmaseda, again at the dictation of the
volunteers.
Speaking of these volunteers, who it will be remembered were recruited
from Spanish immigrants and who were peculiarly obnoxious to Cubans of
all classes, it will not be out of place to relate here an act of wanton
cruelty upon their part.
This took place in the autumn of 1871. One of the volunteers had died,
and his body had been placed in a public tomb in Havana. Later it was
discovered that the tomb had been defaced, by some inscription placed
upon it, no more, no less. Suspicion fell upon the students of the
university. The volunteers made a complaint and forty-three of the young
students were arrested and tried for the misdemeanor. An officer of the
regular Spanish army volunteered to defend them, and through his
efforts, they were acquitted.
This verdict did not satisfy the volunteers, however. They demanded and
obtained from the captain-general, who was a man of weak character, the
convening of another court-martial two-thirds of which was to be
composed of volunteers. Was there ever such a burlesque of justice? The
accusers and the judges were one and the same persons. Of course, there
could be but one result. All the prisoners were found guilty and
condemned, eight to be shot, and the others to imprisonment and hard
labor.
The day after the court-martial (?) fifteen hundred volunteers turned
out under arms and executed the eight boys.
This incident filled the whole of the United States with horror and
indignation. The action was censured by the Spanish Cortes, but the
matter ended there. No attempt whatever was made to punish the
offenders.
The insurgents waged an active warfare until the spring of 1871. They
had at that time a force of about fifty thousand men, but they were
badly armed and poorly supplied with necessities of all sorts. The
resources of the Spaniards were infinitely greater. About this time the
Cuban soldiers who had been fighting in the district of Camaguey
signified a desire to surrender and cease the conflict, provided their
lives were spared. The proposition was accepted. Their commander,
General Agramonte refused to yield, and he was left with only about
thirty-five men who remained loyal to him. He formed a body of cavalry,
and continued fighting for some two years longer, when he was killed on
the field of battle.
In January, 1873, the Edinburg Review contained a very strong article on
the condition of affairs in Cuba, in the course of which it said:
"It is well known that Spain governs Cuba with an iron and blood-stained
hand. The former holds the latter deprived of political, civil and
religious liberty. Hence the unfortunate Cubans being illegally
prosecuted and sent into exile, or executed by military commissions in
time of peace; hence their being kept from public meeting, and forbidden
to speak or write on affairs of State; hence their remonstrances against
the evils that afflict them being looked on as the proceedings of
rebels, from the fact that they are bound to keep silence and obey;
hence the never-ending plague of hungry officials from Spain, to devour
the product of their industry and labor; hence their exclusion from
public stations, and want of opportunity to fit themselves for the art
of government; hence the restrictions to which public instruction with
them is subjected, in order to keep them so ignorant as not to be able
to know and enforce their rights in any shape or form whatever; hence
the navy and the standing army, which are kept in their country at an
enormous expenditure from their own wealth, to make them bend their
knees and submit their necks to the iron yoke that disgraces them; hence
the grinding taxation under which they labor, and which would make them
all perish in misery but for the marvelous fertility of their soil."
In July, 1873, Pieltain, then captain-general, sent an envoy to
President Cespedes to offer peace on condition that Cuba should remain
a state of the Spanish republic, but this offer was declined.
In December of the same year, Cespedes was deposed by the Cuban
Congress, and Salvador Cisneros elected in his place. The latter was a
scion of the old Spanish nobility who renounced his titles and had his
estates confiscated when he joined the revolution. He was and is
distinguished for his patriotism, intelligence and nobility of
character. It was his daughter, Evangelina Cisneros, who was rescued
from the horrors of a Spanish dungeon by Americans, and brought to the
United States.
After his retirement, Cespedes was found by the Spaniards, and put to
death, according to their usual policy: "Slay and spare not."
The war dragged on, being more a guerrilla warfare than anything else.
The losses were heavy on both sides. There is no data from which to
obtain the losses of the Cubans, but the records in the War Office at
Madrid show the total deaths in the Spanish land forces for the ten
years to have been over eighty thousand. Spain had sent to Cuba one
hundred and forty-five thousand men, and her best generals, but while
they kept the insurgents in check they were unable to subdue them. The
condition of the island was deplorable, her trade had greatly decreased
and her crops were ruined.
For years there had been a constant waste of men and money, with no
perceptible gain on either side.
By 1878, both parties were heartily weary of the struggle and ready to
compromise.
General Martinez de Campos was then in command of the Spanish forces,
and he opened negotiations with the Cuban leader, Maximo Gomez, the same
who was destined later to attain even more prominence. Gomez listened to
what was proposed, and after certain deliberations, terms of peace were
concluded in February, 1878, by the treaty of El Zanjon.
This treaty guaranteed Cuba representation in the Spanish Cortes,
granted a free pardon to all who had taken part directly or indirectly,
in the revolution, and permitted all those who wished to do so to leave
the island.
At first glance these terms seem fair. But, as we shall see later, Spain
in this case as in all others was true to herself, that is, false to
every promise she made.