before, and I rejoice to see what this gentleman says. He is talking
of officials, and I always felt from the beginning that if we did not
succeed in carrying with us the goodwill of that powerful service,
there would be reason for suspecting that we were wrong upon the
merits, and even if we were not wrong on the merits, there would
be reason for apprehending formidable difficulties. I have myself
complete confidence in them. I see in some journals of my own party
suspicions thrown upon the loyalty of that service to his Majesty's
Government of the day. It is absurd to think anything of the kind. If
our policy and our proposals receive the approval of Parliament and
the approval of officials, such as those spoken of in _The Times_ the
other day, I am perfectly sure there will be no more want of goodwill
and zeal on the part of the Indian Civil Service, than there would
be in the officers of his Majesty's Fleet, or his Majesty's Army. It
would be just the same. I should like to read another passage from
_The Times_ letter:--"It would probably be incorrect to say that
the bulk of the Civil Service in the Bombay Presidency are gravely
apprehensive. Most of them are not unnaturally anxious"--I agree;
it is perfectly natural that they should be anxious--"but the main
officials in whose judgment most confidence can be placed, regard the
future with the buoyant hopefulness without which an Englishman in
India is lost indeed." All that is reassuring, and no sign nor whisper
reaches me that any responsible man or any responsible section or
creed, either in India or here, has any desire whatever to wreck our
scheme. And let me go further. Statesmen abroad showing themselves
capable of reflection, are watching us with interest and wishing us
well. Take the remarkable utterance of President Roosevelt the other
day at Washington. And if we turn from Washington to Eastern Europe, I
know very well that any injustice, any suspicion that we were capable
of being unjust, to Mahomedans in India, would certainly provoke a
severe and injurious reaction in Constantinople. I am alive to all
these things. Mr. Ameer Ali said he was sure the Secretary of State
would mete out just and equitable treatment to all interests, if their
views were fairly laid before him. He did me no more than justice.
The Government are entirely zealous and in earnest, acting in thorough
good faith, in the desire to press forward these proposals. I may tell
you that our Bill is now quite ready. I shall introduce it at the
first minute after the Address is over, and, when it reaches the
Commons, it will be pressed forward with all the force and resolution
that Parliamentary conditions permit. These are not mere pious
opinions or academic reforms; they are proposals that are to take
Parliamentary shape at the earliest possible moment; and after taking
Parliamentary shape, no time will, I know, be lost in India in
bringing them as rapidly as possible into practical operation.
Now the first point Mr. Ameer Ali made was upon the unfairness to the
members of the Mahomedan community, caused by reckoning in the Hindu
census a large multitude of men who are not entitled to be there. I
submit that it is not very easy--and I have gone into the question
very carefully--to divide these lower castes and to classify them.
Statisticians would be charged with putting too many into either one
or the other division, wherever you choose to draw the line. I know
the force of the argument, and am willing to attach to it whatever
weight it deserves. I wish some of my friends in this country would
study the figures of what are called the lower castes, because they
would then see the enormous difficulty and absurdity of applying to
India the same principles that are excellent guides to us Westerns who
have been bred on the pure milk of the Benthamite word--one man one
vote and every man a vote. That dream, by the way, is not quite
realised even in this country; but the idea of insisting on a
principle of that sort is irrational to anybody who reflects on this
multiplicity and variety of race and castes.
Then there is the question of the joint electorate--what is called the
mixed electoral college. I was very glad to read this paragraph in the
paper that you were good enough to send to me. You recognise the very
principle that was at the back of our minds, when we came to the
conclusion about mixed electoral college. You say:--"In common with
other well-wishers of India, the Committee look forward to a time when
the development of a true spirit of compromise, or the fusion of
the races, may make principles indicated by his Lordship capable of
practical application without sacrificing the interests of any of
the nationalities, or giving political ascendency to one to the
disadvantage of the others. But the Committee venture to think that,
however ready the country may be for constitutional reforms, the
interests of the two great communities of India must be considered
and dealt with separately." Therefore, to begin with, the difference
between us in principle about the joint electorate is only this: we
are guilty of nothing worse than that we were premature, in the views
of these gentlemen--we were impatient idealists. You say to me, "It is
very fine; we hope it will all come true; but you are premature;
we must wait." Still, though premature, I observe that your own
suggestion in one of those papers adopts and accepts the principle of
the scheme outlined in our despatch. It is quite true to say, "Oh,
but you are vague in your despatch." Yes, a despatch is not a Bill.
A Minister writing a despatch does not put in all the clauses and
sections and subsections and schedules. It is the business of a
Minister composing a despatch like mine of November 27, 1908, to
indicate only general lines--general enough to make the substance and
body of the scheme intelligible, but still general. I should like to
say a word about the despatch. It is constantly assumed that in the
despatch we prescribed and ordered the introduction of the joint
electoral college. If any of you will be good enough to look at the
words, you will find that no language of that sort--no law of the
Medes and Persians--is to be found in it. If you refer to paragraph 12
you will see that our language is this:--
"I suggest for your consideration that the object in view might be
better secured, at any rate in the more advanced provinces in India,
by a modification of the system of popular electorate founded on the
principle of electoral colleges."
You see it was merely a suggestion thrown out for the Government of
India, not a direction of the Mede and Persian stamp. You say, "That
for the purpose of electing members to the Provincial Councils,
electoral colleges should be constituted on lines suggested by his
Lordship, composed exclusively of Mahomedans whose numbers and mode of
grouping should be fixed by executive authority." This comes within
the principle of my despatch, and we shall see--I hope very
speedily--whether the Government of India discover objections to its
practicability. Mark, electoral colleges "composed exclusively of
Mahomedans whose members and mode of grouping should be fixed by
executive authority"--that is a proposition which is not outside the
despatch. Whether practicable or not, it is a matter for discussion
between us here and the Government in India.
The aim of the Government and yours is identical--that there shall
be (to quote Mr. Ameer Ali's words) "adequate, real, and genuine
Mahomedan representation." Now, where is the difference between us?
The machinery we commended, you do not think possible. As I have
told you, the language of the despatch does not insist upon a mixed
electoral college. It would be no departure in substance from the
purpose of our suggestion, that there should be a separate Mahomedan
electorate--an electorate exclusively Mahomedan; and in view of
the wide and remote distances, and difficulties of organisation in
consequence of those distances in the area constituting a large
province, I am not sure that this is not one of those cases where
election by two stages would not be convenient, and so there might be
a separate electoral college exclusively Mahomedan. That is, I take
it, in accordance with your own proposal. There are various methods by
which it could be done. In the first place, an election exclusively
Mahomedan might be direct into the legislative council. To this it
may be said that it would be impossible by reason of distance. In the
second place, you could have an election by separate communities to a
local board, and the local board should be the electoral college, the
Mahomedans separating themselves from the other members of the board
for that purpose. Thirdly, the members of the local board, the
communities being separate in the same way, could return a member for
the electoral college. Fourthly, you might have a direct election to
an electoral college by the community, and this electoral college
would return a representative to the legislative council. These, you
see, are four different expedients which well deserve consideration
for attaining our end.
I go to the next point, the apprehensions lest if we based our system
on numerical strength alone, a great injustice would be done to
your community. Of course we all considered that, from the Viceroy
downwards. Whether your apprehensions are well founded or not, it is
the business of those who call themselves statesmen to take those
apprehensions into account, and to do the best we can in setting up
a working system to allay and meet such apprehensions. If you take
numerical strength as your basis, in the Punjab and Eastern Bengal
Mahomedans are in a decisive majority. In the Punjab the Moslem
population is 53 per cent. to 38 per cent. Hindu. In Eastern Bengal 58
per cent. are Moslem and 37 per cent. are Hindu. Therefore, in those
two provinces, on the numerical basis alone, the Mahomedans will
secure sufficient representation. In Madras, on the other hand,
the Hindus are 89 per cent. against 6 per cent. of Moslems, and,
therefore, numbers would give no adequate representation to Moslem
opinion. In Bombay the Moslems are in the ratio of 3-3/4 to 14
millions--20 per cent. to 77 per cent. The conditions are very complex
in Bombay, and I need not labour the details of this complexity. I am
inclined to agree with those who think that it might be left to
the local Government to take other elements into view required or
suggested by local conditions. Coming to the United Provinces, there
the Moslems are 6-3/4 millions to 40-3/4 Hindus--14 per cent. to 85
per cent. This ratio of numerical strength no more represents the
proportion in the elements of weight and importance, than in Eastern
Bengal does the Hindu ratio of 37 per cent. to 58 per cent. of
Moslems. You may set off each of those two cases against the other.
Then there is the great province of Bengal, where the Moslems are
one-quarter of the Hindus--9 millions to 39 millions--18 per cent. to
77 per cent.
We all see, then, that the problem presents extraordinary difficulty.
How are you going in a case like the United Provinces, for example, to
secure that adequate and substantial representation, which it is the
interest and the desire of the Government for its own sake to secure.
No fair-minded Moslem would deny in Eastern Bengal, any more than a
fair-minded non-Moslem would deny it in the United Provinces, that
there is no easy solution. You see, gentlemen, I do not despair
of finding a fair-minded man in a controversy of this kind. From
information that reaches me I do not at all despair of meeting
fair-minded critics of both communities, in spite of the sharp
antagonism that exists on many matters between them. But, whatever may
be the case with Mahomedans and Hindus, there is one body of men
who are bound to keep a fair mind, and that is the Government. The
Government are bound, whatever you may do among yourselves, strictly,
and I will even say sternly, to insist on overcoming all obstacles
in a spirit of absolute equity. Now, what is the object of the
Government? It is that the Legislative Councils should represent truly
and effectively, with a reasonable approach to the balance of real
social forces, the wishes and needs of the communities themselves.
That is the object of the Government, and in face of a great problem
of that kind, algebra, arithmetic, geometry, logic--none of these
things will do your business for you. You have to look at it widely
and away from those sciences, excellent in their place, but not of
much service when you are solving awkward political riddles. I think
if you allow some method of leaving to a local authority the power of
adding to the number of representatives from the Mahomedan community,
or the Hindu community, as the case may be, that might be a possible
and prudent way of getting through this embarrassment. Let us all be
clear of one thing, namely--and I thought of this when I heard one
or two observations that fell from Mr. Ameer Ali--that no general
proposition can be wisely based on the possession by either community,
either of superior civil qualities or superior personal claims. If you
begin to introduce that element, you perceive the perils to that peace
and mutual goodwill which we hope to emerge by-and-by, though it may
take longer than some think. I repeat that I see no harm from the
point of view of a practical working compromise, in the principle
that population, or numerical strength, should be the main factor in
determining how many representatives should sit for this or the other
community; but modifying influences may be both wisely and equitably
taken into account in allotting the numbers of such representatives.
As regards Indian members on the Executive Council, if you will allow
me to say so, I think it was dubious tactics in you to bring that
question forward. We were told by those who object, for instance,
to my recommending to the Crown an Indian member of the Viceroy's
Executive--that it will never do; that if you choose a man of one
community, the other will demand a second. The Executive Council in
all--this will not be in the Bill--consists of six members. Suppose
there were to be two vacancies, and I were to recommend to the Crown
the appointment of one Mahomedan and one Hindu, the effect would be
that of the six gentlemen one-third would be non-English. You may
think that all right, but it would be a decidedly serious step.
Suppose you say you will bring in a Bill, then, for the purpose of
appointing an extra member always to be an Indian. That is much more
easily said than done. I am talking perfectly plainly. You would not
get such a Bill. I want to talk even more plainly. I want to say
that reference to the Hindu community or the Mahomedan community, in
respect to the position of the Viceroy's Executive, is entirely wide
of the mark in the view, I know, both of the Viceroy and of myself.
If, as I have already said I expect, it may be my duty by-and-by to
recommend to the Crown the name of an Indian member, it will not be
solely for the sake of placing on the Viceroy's Executive Council an
Indian member simply as either a Hindu or a Mahomedan. Decidedly we
are of opinion that the Governor-General in Council will be all the
more likely to transact business wisely, if he has a responsible
Indian adviser at his elbow. But the principle in making such
a recommendation to the Crown, would be to remove the apparent
disability in practice--for there is no disability in law--of an
Indian holding a certain appointment because he is an Indian. That is
a principle we do not accept; and the principle I should go upon--and
I know Lord Minto would say exactly the same--is the desirability
of demonstrating that we hold to the famous promise made in the
proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1858, that if a man is fully
qualified in proved ability and character to fill a certain post, he
shall not be shut out by race or religious faith. There is a very
great deal more to be said on this most important subject; but to-day
I need only tell you--which I do with all respect, without complaining
of what you have said, and without denying that in practical
usage some day there may be means of alternation for meeting your
difficulty--I see no chance whatever of our being able to comply with
your present request.
I have endeavoured to meet you as fairly as I possibly could. I assure
you again we are acting in earnest, with zeal and entire good faith;
and any suggestion that any member of the Government, either in this
office or the Government of India, has any prejudice whatever against
Mahomedans, for the purposes of political administration in India, is
one of the idlest and most wicked misapprehensions that could possibly
enter into the political mind. I am greatly encouraged by having met
you. I am sure that you speak in the name of important bodies of your
own countrymen and of your own community. I am sure that you are going
to look at our proposals in a fair and reasonable spirit, and give
us credit for a desire to do the best that we possibly can in the
interests of all the communities in India, including also the
interests of the British Government. I can only tell you further, that
if this action of ours fails, miscarries, and is wrecked, it will be
a considerable time before another opportunity occurs. You will never
again--I do not care whether the time be long or be short--you will
never again have the combination of a Secretary of State and a
Viceroy, who are more thoroughly in earnest in their desire to improve
Indian government, and to do full justice to every element of the
Indian population.
VII
SECOND READING OF INDIAN COUNCILS BILL
(HOUSE OF LORDS, FEBRUARY 23, 1909)
MY LORDS. I invite the House to take to-day the first definite and
operative step in carrying out the policy that I had the honour of
describing to your Lordships just before Christmas, and that has
occupied the active consideration both of the Home Government and of
the Government of India for very nearly three years. The statement was
awaited in India with an expectancy that with time became impatience,
and it was received in India--and that, after all, is the point to
which I looked with the most anxiety--with intense interest and
attention and various degrees of approval, from warm enthusiasm to
cool assent and acquiescence.
A few days after the arrival of my despatch, a deputation waited upon
the Viceroy unique in its comprehensive character. Both Hindus and
Mahomedans were represented; and they waited upon the Viceroy to offer
warm expressions of gratitude for the scheme that was unfolded
before them. A few days later at Madras the Congress met; they, too,
expressed their thanks to the Home Government and to the Government
of India. The Moslem League met at Amritsar; they were warm in their
approval of the policy which they took to be foreshadowed in the
despatch, though they found fault with the defects they thought they
had discovered in the scheme, and implored the Government, both in
India and here, to remedy those defects. So far as I know--and I do
beg your Lordships to note these details of the reception of our
policy in India--there has been no sign in any quarter, save in the
irreconcilable camp, of anything like organised hostile opinion among
either Indians or Anglo-Indians.
The Indian Civil Service I will speak of very shortly. I will pass
them by for the moment. Lord Lansdowne said truly the other night that
when I spoke at the end of December, I used the words "formidable and
obscure" as describing the situation, and he desired to know whether
I thought the situation was still obscure and formidable. I will not
abandon the words, but I think the situation is less formidable and
less obscure. Neither repression on the one hand, nor reform on the
other, could possibly be expected to cut the roots of anarchical crime
in a few weeks. But with unfaltering repression on the one hand, and
vigour and good faith in reform on the other, we see solid reason to
hope that we shall weaken, even if we cannot destroy, those baleful
forces.
There are, I take it, three classes of people that we have to consider
in dealing with a scheme of this kind. There are the extremists, who
nurse fantastic dreams that some day they will drive us out of India.
In this group there are academic extremists and physical force
extremists, and I have seen it stated on a certain authority--it
cannot be more than a guess--that they do not number, whether academic
or physical force extremists, more than one-tenth, or even three per
cent. of what are called the educated class in India. The second
group nourish no hopes of this sort; they hope for autonomy or
self-government of the colonial species and pattern. The third
section in this classification ask for no more than to be admitted to
co-operation in our administration, and to find a free and effective
voice in expressing the interests and needs of their people. I believe
the effect of the reforms has been, is being, and will be, to draw the
second class, who hope for colonial autonomy, into the ranks of the
third class, who will be content with admission to a fair and workable
co-operation. A correspondent wrote to me the other day and said:--
"We seem to have caught many discontented people on the rebound,
and to have given them an excuse for a loyalty which they have
badly wanted."
In spite of all this, it is a difficult and critical situation. Still,
by almost universal admission it has lost the tension that strained
India two or three months ago, and public feeling is tranquillised,
certainly beyond any expectation that either I or the Viceroy ventured
to entertain.
The atmosphere has changed from dark and sullen to hopeful, and I am
sure your Lordships will allow me to be equally confident that nothing
will be done at Westminster to overcloud that promising sky. The noble
Marquess the other day said--and I was delighted to hear it--that
he, at all events, would give us, with all the reservations that
examination of the scheme might demand from him, a whole-hearted
support here, and his best encouragement to the men in India. I
accept that, and I lean upon it, because if anything were done at
Westminster, either by delay or otherwise, to show a breach in what
ought to be the substantial unity of Parliamentary opinion in face of
the Indian situation, it would be a marked disaster. I would venture
on the point of delay to say this. Your Lordships will not suspect me
of having any desire to hurry the Bill, but I remember that when Lord
Cross brought in the Bill of 1892 Lord Kimberley, so well known and so
popular in this House, used language which I venture to borrow from
him, and to press upon your Lordships to-day--
"I think it almost dangerous to leave a subject of this kind hung
up to be perpetually discussed by all manner of persons, and,
having once allowed that, at all events, some amendment is
necessary in regard to the mode of constituting the Legislative
Councils, it is incumbent upon the Government and Parliament
to pass the Bill which they may think expedient as speedily as
possible into law."
Considerations of social order and social urgency in India make that
just as useful to be remembered to-day, as it was useful then.
The noble Marquess the other day, in a very courteous manner,
administered to me an exhortation and an admonition--I had almost said
a lecture--as to the propriety of deferring to the man on the spot,
and the danger of quarrelling with the man on the spot. I listened
with becoming meekness and humility, but then it occurred to me that
the language of the noble Marquess was not original. Those noble Lords
who share the Bench with him, gave deep murmurs of approval to the
homily that was administered to me. They forgot that they once had a
man on the spot, the man then being that eminent and distinguished
personage whom I may be allowed to congratulate upon his restoration
to health and to his place in this Assembly. He said this, which
the noble Marquess will see is a fair original for his own little
discourse; it was said after the noble Lord had thrown up the reins--
"What I wish to say to high officers of State and members of
Government is this, as far as you can trust the man on the spot.
Do not weary or fret or nag him with your superior wisdom. They
claim no immunity from errors of opinion or judgment, but their
errors are nothing compared with yours."
The remonstrance, therefore, of Lord Curzon, addressed to the noble
Lords sitting near him, is identical with the warning which I have
laid to heart from the noble Marquess.
The House will pardon me if for a moment I dwell upon what by
application is an innuendo conveyed in the admonition of the noble
Marquess. I have a suspicion that he considered his advice was needed;
he expressed the hope that all who were responsible for administration
in India would have all the power for which they had a right to ask.
Upon that I can--though I am half reluctant to do it--completely
clear my character. In December last, shortly before I addressed your
Lordships, Lord Minto, having observed there was some talk of my
interference with him and his Council, telegraphed these words, and
desired that I should make use of them whenever I thought fit--
"I hope you will say from me in as strong language as you may
choose to use, that in all our dealings with sedition I could not
be more strongly supported than I have been by you. The question
of the control of Indian administration by the Secretary of State,
mixed up as it is with the old difficulties of centralisation, we
may very possibly look at from different points of view. But that
has nothing to do with the support the Secretary of State gives
to the Viceroy, and which you have given to me in a time of great
difficulty, and for which I shall always be warmly grateful."