IT IS a miserable state of mind, to have few things to desire, and many
things to fear; and yet that commonly is the case of kings; who, being
at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more
languishing; and have many representations of perils and shadows, which
makes their minds the less clear. And this is one reason also, of
that effect which the Scripture speaketh of, That the king's heart is
inscrutable. For multitude of jealousies, and lack of some predominant
desire, that should marshal and put in order all the rest, maketh
any man's heart, hard to find or sound. Hence it comes likewise, that
princes many times make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon
toys; sometimes upon a building; sometimes upon erecting of an order;
sometimes upon the advancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining
excellency in some art, or feat of the hand; as Nero for playing on the
harp, Domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for
playing at fence, Caracalla for driving chariots, and the like. This
seemeth incredible, unto those that know not the principle, that the
mind of man, is more cheered and refreshed by profiting in small things,
than by standing at a stay, in great. We see also that kings that have
been fortunate conquerors, in their first years, it being not possible
for them to go forward infinitely, but that they must have some
check, or arrest in their fortunes, turn in their latter years to be
superstitious, and melancholy; as did Alexander the Great; Diocletian;
and in our memory, Charles the Fifth; and others: for he that is used to
go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favor, and is not
the thing he was.
To speak now of the true temper of empire, it is a thing rare and hard
to keep; for both temper, and distemper, consist of contraries. But it
is one thing, to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. The
answer of Apollonius to Vespasian, is full of excellent instruction.
Vespasian asked him, What was Nero's overthrow? He answered, Nero could
touch and tune the harp well; but in government, sometimes he used to
wind the pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low. And certain
it is, that nothing destroyeth authority so much, as the unequal and
untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much.
This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter times, in princes'
affairs, is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and
mischiefs, when they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep
them aloof. But this is but to try masteries with fortune. And let men
beware, how they neglect and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared;
for no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come. The
difficulties in princes' business are many and great; but the greatest
difficulty, is often in their own mind. For it is common with princes
(saith Tacitus) to will contradictories, Sunt plerumque regum voluntates
vehementes, et inter se contrariae. For it is the solecism of power, to
think to command the end, and yet not to endure the mean.
Kings have to deal with their neighbors, their wives, their children,
their prelates or clergy, their nobles, their second-nobles or
gentlemen, their merchants, their commons, and their men of war; and
from all these arise dangers, if care and circumspection be not used.
First for their neighbors; there can no general rule be given (for
occasions are so variable), save one, which ever holdeth, which is, that
princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do ever grow
so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or
the like), as they become more able to annoy them, than they were.
And this is generally the work of standing counsels, to foresee and to
hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry the Eighth
of England, Francis the First King of France, and Charles the Fifth
Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a
palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either
by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and would not in any wise
take up peace at interest. And the like was done by that league (which
Guicciardini saith was the security of Italy) made between Ferdinando
King of Naples, Lorenzius Medici, and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the
one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the opinion of some of
the Schoolmen, to be received, that a war cannot justly be made, but
upon a precedent injury or provocation. For there is no question, but
a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a
lawful cause of a war.
For their wives; there are cruel examples of them. Livia is infamed,
for the poisoning of her husband; Roxalana, Solyman's wife, was the
destruction of that renowned prince, Sultan Mustapha, and otherwise
troubled his house and succession; Edward the Second of England, his
queen, had the principal hand in the deposing and murder of her husband.
This kind of danger, is then to be feared chiefly, when the wives have
plots, for the raising of their own children; or else that they be
advoutresses.
For their children; the tragedies likewise of dangers from them, have
been many. And generally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of
their children, hath been ever unfortunate. The destruction of Mustapha
(that we named before) was so fatal to Solyman's line, as the succession
of the Turks, from Solyman until this day, is suspected to be untrue,
and of strange blood; for that Selymus the Second, was thought to
be suppositious. The destruction of Crispus, a young prince of rare
towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his father, was in like manner
fatal to his house; for both Constantinus and Constance, his sons, died
violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did little better; who
died indeed of sickness, but after that Julianus had taken arms against
him. The destruction of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second of Macedon,
turned upon the father, who died of repentance. And many like examples
there are; but few or none, where the fathers had good by such distrust;
except it were, where the sons were up in open arms against them; as
was Selymus the First against Bajazet; and the three sons of Henry the
Second, King of England.
For their prelates; when they are proud and great, there is also danger
from them; as it was in the times of Anselmus, and Thomas Becket,
Archbishops of Canterbury; who, with their croziers, did almost try it
with the king's sword; and yet they had to deal with stout and haughty
kings, William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The danger
is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence of foreign
authority; or where the churchmen come in and are elected, not by the
collation of the king, or particular patrons, but by the people.
For their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is not amiss; but to
depress them, may make a king more absolute, but less safe; and less
able to perform, any thing that he desires. I have noted it, in
my History of King Henry the Seventh of England, who depressed his
nobility; whereupon it came to pass, that his times were full of
difficulties and troubles; for the nobility, though they continued loyal
unto him, yet did they not co-operate with him in his business. So that
in effect, he was fain to do all things himself.
For their second-nobles; there is not much danger from them, being a
body dispersed. They may sometimes discourse high, but that doth little
hurt; besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility, that they
grow not too potent; and, lastly, being the most immediate in authority,
with the common people, they do best temper popular commotions.
For their merchants; they are vena porta; and if they flourish not,
a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish
little. Taxes and imposts upon them, do seldom good to the king's
revenue; for that that he wins in the hundred, he leeseth in the shire;
the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading,
rather decreased.
For their commons; there is little danger from them, except it be, where
they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle with the point of
religion, or their customs, or means of life.
For their men of war; it is a dangerous state, where they live and
remain in a body, and are used to donatives; whereof we see examples in
the janizaries, and pretorian bands of Rome; but trainings of men, and
arming them in several places, and under several commanders, and without
donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.
Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times; and
which have much veneration, but no rest. All precepts concerning kings,
are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances: memento quod es
homo; and memento quod es Deus, or vice Dei; the one bridleth their
power, and the other their will.