SHEPHERDS of people, had need know the calendars of tempests in state;
which are commonly greatest, when things grow to equality; as natural
tempests are greatest about the Equinoctia. And as there are certain
hollow blasts of wind, and secret swellings of seas before a tempest, so
are there in states:
--Ille etiam caecos instare tumultus
Saepe monet, fraudesque et operta tunescere bella.
Libels and licentious discourses against the state, when they are
frequent and open; and in like sort, false news often running up and
down, to the disadvantage of the state, and hastily embraced; are
amongst the signs of troubles. Virgil, giving the pedigree of Fame,
saith, she was sister to the Giants:
Illam Terra parens, irra irritata deorum, Extremam (ut perhibent) Coeo
Enceladoque sororem Progenuit.
As if fames were the relics of seditions past; but they are no less,
indeed, the preludes of seditions to come. Howsoever he noteth it right,
that seditious tumults, and seditious fames, differ no more but as
brother and sister, masculine and feminine; especially if it come to
that, that the best actions of a state, and the most plausible, and
which ought to give greatest contentment, are taken in ill sense, and
traduced: for that shows the envy great, as Tacitus saith; conflata
magna invidia, seu bene seu male gesta premunt. Neither doth it follow,
that because these fames are a sign of troubles, that the suppressing
of them with too much severity, should be a remedy of troubles. For the
despising of them, many times checks them best; and the going about
to stop them, doth but make a wonder long-lived. Also that kind of
obedience, which Tacitus speaketh of, is to be held suspected: Erant
in officio, sed tamen qui mallent mandata imperantium interpretari quam
exequi; disputing, excusing, cavilling upon mandates and directions, is
a kind of shaking off the yoke, and assay of disobedience; especially if
in those disputings, they which are for the direction, speak fearfully
and tenderly, and those that are against it, audaciously.
Also, as Machiavel noteth well, when princes, that ought to be common
parents, make themselves as a party, and lean to a side, it is as a
boat, that is overthrown by uneven weight on the one side; as was well
seen, in the time of Henry the Third of France; for first, himself
entered league for the extirpation of the Protestants; and presently
after, the same league was turned upon himself. For when the authority
of princes, is made but an accessory to a cause, and that there be other
bands, that tie faster than the band of sovereignty, kings begin to be
put almost out of possession.
Also, when discords, and quarrels, and factions are carried openly and
audaciously, it is a sign the reverence of government is lost. For the
motions of the greatest persons in a government, ought to be as the
motions of the planets under primum mobile; according to the old
opinion: which is, that every of them, is carried swiftly by the highest
motion, and softly in their own motion. And therefore, when great
ones in their own particular motion, move violently, and, as Tacitus
expresseth it well, liberius quam ut imperantium meminissent; it is a
sign the orbs are out of frame. For reverence is that, wherewith princes
are girt from God; who threateneth the dissolving thereof; Solvam
cingula regum.
So when any of the four pillars of government, are mainly shaken, or
weakened (which are religion, justice, counsel, and treasure), men
had need to pray for fair weather. But let us pass from this part of
predictions (concerning which, nevertheless, more light may be taken
from that which followeth); and let us speak first, of the materials of
seditions; then of the motives of them; and thirdly of the remedies.
Concerning the materials of seditions. It is a thing well to be
considered; for the surest way to prevent seditions (if the times
do bear it) is to take away the matter of them. For if there be fuel
prepared, it is hard to tell, whence the spark shall come, that shall
set it on fire. The matter of seditions is of two kinds: much poverty,
and much discontentment. It is certain, so many overthrown estates, so
many votes for troubles. Lucan noteth well the state of Rome before the
Civil War,
Hinc usura vorax, rapidumque in tempore foenus,
Hinc concussa fides, et multis utile bellum.
This same multis utile bellum, is an assured and infallible sign, of a
state disposed to seditions and troubles. And if this poverty and broken
estate in the better sort, be joined with a want and necessity in the
mean people, the danger is imminent and great. For the rebellions of the
belly are the worst. As for discontentments, they are, in the politic
body, like to humors in the natural, which are apt to gather a
preternatural heat, and to inflame. And let no prince measure the
danger of them by this, whether they be just or unjust: for that were
to imagine people, to be too reasonable; who do often spurn at their
own good: nor yet by this, whether the griefs whereupon they rise, be
in fact great or small: for they are the most dangerous discontentments,
where the fear is greater than the feeling. Dolendi modus, timendi non
item. Besides, in great oppressions, the same things that provoke the
patience, do withal mate the courage; but in fears it is not so. Neither
let any prince, or state, be secure concerning discontentments, because
they have been often, or have been long, and yet no peril hath ensued:
for as it is true, that every vapor or fume doth not turn into a storm;
so it is nevertheless true, that storms, though they blow over divers
times, yet may fall at last; and, as the Spanish proverb noteth well,
The cord breaketh at the last by the weakest pull.
The causes and motives of seditions are, innovation in religion;
taxes; alteration of laws and customs; breaking of privileges; general
oppression; advancement of unworthy persons; strangers; dearths;
disbanded soldiers; factions grown desperate; and what soever, in
offending people, joineth and knitteth them in a common cause.
For the remedies; there may be some general preservatives, whereof
we will speak: as for the just cure, it must answer to the particular
disease; and so be left to counsel, rather than rule.
The first remedy or prevention is to remove, by all means possible, that
material cause of sedition whereof we spake; which is, want and poverty
in the estate. To which purpose serveth the opening, and well-balancing
of trade; the cherishing of manufactures; the banishing of idleness; the
repressing of waste, and excess, by sumptuary laws; the improvement and
husbanding of the soil; the regulating of prices of things vendible; the
moderating of taxes and tributes; and the like. Generally, it is to be
foreseen that the population of a kingdom (especially if it be not
mown down by wars) do not exceed the stock of the kingdom, which should
maintain them. Neither is the population to be reckoned only by number;
for a smaller number, that spend more and earn less, do wear out an
estate sooner, than a greater number that live lower, and gather more.
Therefore the multiplying of nobility, and other degrees of quality, in
an over proportion to the common people, doth speedily bring a state
to necessity; and so doth likewise an overgrown clergy; for they bring
nothing to the stock; and in like manner, when more are bred scholars,
than preferments can take off.
It is likewise to be remembered, that forasmuch as the increase of any
estate must be upon the foreigner (for whatsoever is somewhere gotten,
is somewhere lost), there be but three things, which one nation selleth
unto another; the commodity as nature yieldeth it; the manufacture; and
the vecture, or carriage. So that if these three wheels go, wealth
will flow as in a spring tide. And it cometh many times to pass, that
materiam superabit opus; that the work and carriage is more worth than
the material, and enricheth a state more; as is notably seen in the
Low-Countrymen, who have the best mines above ground, in the world.
Above all things, good policy is to be used, that the treasure and
moneys, in a state, be not gathered into few hands. For otherwise a
state may have a great stock, and yet starve. And money is like muck,
not good except it be spread. This is done, chiefly by suppressing,
or at least keeping a strait hand, upon the devouring trades of usury,
ingrossing great pasturages, and the like.
For removing discontentments, or at least the danger of them; there is
in every state (as we know) two portions of subjects; the noblesse
and the commonalty. When one of these is discontent, the danger is not
great; for common people are of slow motion, if they be not excited by
the greater sort; and the greater sort are of small strength, except the
multitude be apt, and ready to move of themselves. Then is the danger,
when the greater sort, do but wait for the troubling of the waters
amongst the meaner, that then they may declare themselves. The poets
feign, that the rest of the gods would have bound Jupiter; which he
hearing of, by the counsel of Pallas, sent for Briareus, with his
hundred hands, to come in to his aid. An emblem, no doubt, to show how
safe it is for monarchs, to make sure of the good will of common people.
To give moderate liberty for griefs and discontentments to evaporate
(so it be without too great insolency or bravery), is a safe way. For
he that turneth the humors back, and maketh the wound bleed inwards,
endangereth malign ulcers, and pernicious imposthumations.
The part of Epimetheus mought well become Prometheus, in the case of
discontentments: for there is not a better provision against them.
Epimetheus, when griefs and evils flew abroad, at last shut the lid,
and kept hope in the bottom of the vessel. Certainly, the politic and
artificial nourishing, and entertaining of hopes, and carrying men
from hopes to hopes, is one of the best antidotes against the poison
of discontentments. And it is a certain sign of a wise government and
proceeding, when it can hold men's hearts by hopes, when it cannot by
satisfaction; and when it can handle things, in such manner, as no evil
shall appear so peremptory, but that it hath some outlet of hope; which
is the less hard to do, because both particular persons and factions,
are apt enough to flatter themselves, or at least to brave that, which
they believe not.
Also the foresight and prevention, that there be no likely or fit head,
whereunto discontented persons may resort, and under whom they may join,
is a known, but an excellent point of caution. I understand a fit head,
to be one that hath greatness and reputation; that hath confidence with
the discontented party, and upon whom they turn their eyes; and that is
thought discontented, in his own particular: which kind of persons, are
either to be won, and reconciled to the state, and that in a fast and
true manner; or to be fronted with some other, of the same party, that
may oppose them, and so divide the reputation. Generally, the dividing
and breaking, of all factions and combinations that are adverse to
the state, and setting them at distance, or at least distrust, amongst
themselves, is not one of the worst remedies. For it is a desperate
case, if those that hold with the proceeding of the state, be full
of discord and faction, and those that are against it, be entire and
united.
I have noted, that some witty and sharp speeches, which have fallen from
princes, have given fire to seditions. Caesar did himself infinite hurt
in that speech, Sylla nescivit literas, non potuit dictare; for it did
utterly cut off that hope, which men had entertained, that he would at
one time or other give over his dictatorship. Galba undid himself by
that speech, legi a se militem, non emi; for it put the soldiers out of
hope of the donative. Probus likewise, by that speech, Si vixero, non
opus erit amplius Romano imperio militibus; a speech of great despair
for the soldiers. And many the like. Surely princes had need, in tender
matters and ticklish times, to beware what they say; especially in these
short speeches, which fly abroad like darts, and are thought to be shot
out of their secret intentions. For as for large discourses, they are
flat things, and not so much noted.
Lastly, let princes, against all events, not be without some great
person, one or rather more, of military valor, near unto them, for the
repressing of seditions in their beginnings. For without that, there
useth to be more trepidation in court upon the first breaking out of
troubles, than were fit. And the state runneth the danger of that which
Tacitus saith; Atque is habitus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus
auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur. But let such military
persons be assured, and well reputed of, rather than factious and
popular; holding also good correspondence with the other great men in
the state; or else the remedy, is worse than the disease.