We see many animals in possession of laws and constitutions answering

to our own in all but one particular, namely, that theirs appear to be

fixed while ours are continually changing. But most likely we overrate

both the fixed character of theirs, and the instability of our own.

Changes in the politics of an oyster may easily escape the notice of

a man in the midst of some vast revolution (as he thinks it) of human

affairs, some vast revolution which proves in the end to be nothing

more than a change of names. For mankind the acquisition of language

has indefinitely quickened the movement of ideas, but where language is

without the aids of writing and printing, as among savage tribes, and

where the language itself is an imperfect instrument of thought, the

same routine seems to prevail from generation to generation. Fashion in

dress changes but slowly when the dress itself is nothing but a girdle;

and the fashions of the mind change with as little facility when ideas

and wants, and the means of expressing the one and gratifying the

other, are all alike few and extremely simple.

So simple are the wants and ideas of the savage, so little above those

of the elephant and the ape, that Mr. Wallace finds himself driven

to the conclusion that the savage ‘in his large and well-developed

brain possesses an organ quite disproportionate to his actual

requirements--an organ that seems prepared in advance, only to be

fully utilized as he progresses in civilization.’ But anything _quite

disproportionate_ to its actual place in nature cannot have been

produced according to the theory of development. This theory therefore

Mr. Wallace deems and declares inapplicable to the brain and mind of

man. In support of his view he adduces several circumstances both of

man’s bodily and mental constitution, which he considers this theory

incapable of explaining. He maintains that natural selection will not

account for those rudiments of logical, moral, and æsthetic faculties

which are to be found in uncivilized man; for the nakedness of the

human skin, though hair upon the back would be of essential service to

the unclad savage; for the absence of prehensile power from the human

foot, a power which he thinks would be useful, or for those perfections

of hand and voice which he thinks would be useless, to uncultivated

human beings. The inference he draws ‘from this class of phenomena is,

that a superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a

definite direction and for a special purpose, just as man guides the

development of many animal and vegetable forms.’

In this illustration he overlooks the circumstance that man’s selection

is after all nothing more nor less than part and parcel of natural

selection. In his argument from the various uses and powers of the hand

and brain, which could have been of no service to men in a wild state,

he neglects the consideration that what is selected through being

useful in one direction may incidentally become useful in another.

Had he employed his usual ingenuity on the question of man’s hairless

skin, he might have seen the possibility of its ‘selection’ through its

superior beauty or the health attaching to superior cleanliness. At

any rate it is surprising that he should picture to himself a superior

intelligence plucking the hair from the backs of savage men, (to whom

according to his own account it would have been useful and beneficial)

in order that the descendants of the poor shorn wretches might, after

many deaths from cold and damp, in the course of many generations take

to tailoring and dabbling in bricks and mortar. In regard to the voice

he makes an assertion which is surely impossible for himself or any one

else to prove, namely, that ‘savages certainly never choose their wives

for fine voices.’ But upon this assertion the whole of his argument

about the voice depends. And as for the stress which he lays upon the

rudimentary moral and æsthetic faculties of savages, we have shown that

numbers of other animals likewise have rudimentary moral faculties,

while Mr. Wallace himself makes it probable that many have a taste for

colour[40], and that ‘their powers of vision and their faculties of

perception and emotion must be essentially of the same nature as our

own[41].’

Truly in one sense every variation is prepared in advance, only to be

fully utilized in the future progress of the creature that varies.

Every variation, I doubt not, is so prepared in advance by a superior

intelligence, but under the general laws which that intelligence

has ordained, and not by a special interference. The real progress

of each creature, within the spheres at least of consciousness and

intelligence, would seem to consist in its growing capacity for

perceiving and understanding, for entering into fellowship with, beings

superior to itself. In mental powers the dog and the horse become more

and more like man, the closer and the more continuous the intercourse.

Could they learn our language or we theirs, the progress might be

indefinitely hastened. In the general progress onwards and upwards,

man, it may be believed, then first became the indisputable lord and

chief over his fellow animals, when his reason had so far advanced

that he could comprehend the idea of God, when his reason had grown

into a capacity of hearing the divine voice, which since then, not by

interference with physical conditions, but by intercourse of mind with

mind, has led him forward step by step from darkness into twilight,

from the twilight is still leading him forward, as his eyes become able

to bear it, towards the beauty of the rosy-fingered dawn; and just as

those of the lower animals are considered the most intelligent which

make the most successful efforts at intercourse with man and at serving

him, so, by a true analogy, may the philosopher deem those men and

those races of men to be furthest on the path of enlightenment who know

most of God and serve Him best.

HUMAN NATURE AND BRUTE NATURE.[42]

A poor slave, named Androcles, escaped from his master into a sandy

desert. While there a lion came suddenly upon him, and by signs made

him understand that it was in an agony of pain. This the slave was

able to relieve by extracting a large thorn from its paw and by gentle

treatment of the wound. From this time the lion shared its prey with

the man, till Androcles, pining for human society, and facing even

death to regain it, at length gave himself up to his master. It so

happened that the slave was sent to Rome to be exposed to wild beasts

at the same time that the very lion which he had befriended was

sent thither, among many others, to supply the cruel sports of the

amphitheatre. The moment came when Androcles was to be torn in pieces.

A huge famished lion rushed forth in fury upon him; then paused, crept

gently towards him, and ended by fawning upon him with caressing

movements. It was the lion he had known in the desert.

This is no fable, but a piece of well-known history; and the sequel is

equally well-known, that the applause and admiration of all beholders

at this wonderful instance of fraternity between man and beast, at this

marvellous exemplification of the powers of memory and gratitude in a

wild animal, secured the lives both of slave and lion.

Had this been recorded in the Hebrew Scriptures, in that noble and

reverent phraseology which so often leaves out of sight all secondary

causes as by comparison insignificant, and ascribes all that is good

and wonderful directly to God, there can be little doubt that it would

have borne a striking resemblance to the miracles wrought in favour of

Elijah and Daniel; when for the one God commanded the ravens to feed

him, and the ravens brought him bread and flesh in the morning and

bread and flesh in the evening; and for the other God sent his angel

and stopped the mouths of the lions even in their den, and they did him

no hurt. Explain these miracles as you will, and the kindred one quoted

by St. Peter, or accept them all without explanation as occurrences

out of the course of nature and beyond our comprehension, it still

follows from the language of the sacred writers that they at least

supposed these brute creatures capable of intelligence, an intelligence

sufficient to receive the divine commands and to avoid, so far as they

might, opposition to God’s will. For how else could there be any moral

teaching in the circumstance that ‘the dumb ass speaking with man’s

voice forbad the madness of the prophet?’ How else can the miracle seem

anything else or anything better than a piece of puerile conjuring?

But this faculty, which the sacred writers therefore attribute to the

brutes, the faculty of hearing and obeying the voice of God, is the

basis of the highest intelligence, the basis of all true morality and

religion.

That which we are now concerned to prove is, that human reason is an

outgrowth and development of a faculty common to the whole animal

creation; that we are the heirs of the past in fact, as we are

inheritors of the future in hope; that an incalculable multitude of

small advantages acquired in successive generations has brought man to

his present vantage-ground of superiority; and that this very footing

of advantage has now become in its turn simply the starting-point for

future improvement to an estate indefinitely higher and better. It may

well be impossible in a few minutes’ discourse to do more than indicate

the bare outline of the proof; and even this might seem inappropriate

to the time and place, did we not hope to show further that these

opinions, startling or even dangerous as they may seem to some, give

support to high principles of humanity, and are in accordance with the

course and progress of God’s revelation of Himself to mankind.

It is well established that the human body in all its parts corresponds

to the structure of certain of the lower animals. When first discovered

this was extremely shocking to the sentiments of mankind, shocking

to their pride, but shocking also to their religious sentiment,

because they had been accustomed to speak of the ‘human form divine,’

to represent the supreme God, ‘Jehovah, Jove, or Lord,’ as wearing

the form and acting with the members of a man, and because in the

writings sacred alike to the Jew and to the Christian, they found it

written that God created man in His own image; in the image of God

created He him.’ They did not stop to enquire what sort of creation

was intended or what sort of likeness. They failed to observe that

the vague indefinite notion they entertained of a bodily likeness was

inconsistent with the Christian’s cardinal doctrine of the Incarnation,

according to which it is not man that wears the form of God, but God

that took upon him the form of man.

It will now for a time perhaps seem equally shocking that the mind

of man, which alone is left him for the divine resemblance, should

notwithstanding have been developed from the mind of a brute creature,

or if not developed, at any rate framed upon the same type and pattern.

A broad line has till lately been drawn between reason and instinct,

instinct appearing in a large number of instances to do or even to

surpass the work of reason, but within an exceedingly limited sphere,

and according to a fixed invariable course. Ingenious and thoughtful

men, however, taking their opinions not from hearsay and tradition, but

founding them on careful observation of the works and ways of God in

nature itself, have now shown the baselessness of this ancient estimate.

The bird building its nest does not follow an invariable rule,

but accommodates itself to circumstances, to the materials of the

locality, to the requirements of defence, as man does with his own

habitations. There is no proof that the bird builds untaught by its

elders, or that it does not improve by practice. Since wasps have been

known to construct their nest out of paper, itself a fabric of human

invention, it is impossible they can have chosen their material by an

original instinct. The cells which various bees construct attain to

various degrees of perfection, and imperfections may be found in the

most perfect. It has indeed been a curious fancy for men so long to

entertain, that though they were created in the image of God to have

dominion over the lower creatures, yet those creatures without reason,

without teaching, without the God-likeness, should be able to surpass

them, by a miracle or a mystery, in the accuracy or perfection of their

works.

The pursuit which man in a low state of civilization has ever thought

most noble is that of war. The essence of war lies in the combination

of forces and the choice of opportunity. Of both these the lower

animals are known to be capable. Their armies resemble human armies in

following leaders, in posting sentinels, in carrying off captives, in

making slaves. Creatures that are very weak combine not unfrequently

to repel or to destroy an antagonist immensely too strong for their

individual efforts. That rooks and other animals try, and execute

justice upon, offenders against the laws and customs of their society

is probable, if it cannot be absolutely proved.

The objection is sure to be urged that if the dumb animals have the

progressive plastic intelligence which is thus claimed for them,

it ought, in the innumerable generations which have existed, to

have attained to something far higher than there is any pretence

for thinking it to have done. But this objection leaves important

considerations out of sight. It is true here, as in so many cases,

that to him that hath shall more be given. The intelligence of man

reached a point not all at once but by degrees, at which it was able

to invent helps and appliances for its own benefit and improvement,

and thenceforward its strides were more rapid and its distinction from

lower intelligences more marked. Cancel the art of printing, cancel

the signs of the alphabet, cancel the forms of articulate language,

and with each one of these steps you will thrust back and degrade, not

perhaps every single human intellect, but certainly the whole mass

and average of human intelligence. There is no need to ask or answer

the question whether thought without language is possible: without

language thought cannot move, it has no grasp upon the world; it may

flicker for a moment in the mind that kindles it, as a light under a

bushel, but it cannot shine before men that they may see its goodness

and glorify their Father in heaven. We see the proof of this in races

of men that have no printed books, no symbols for writing, and but

feeble imperfect languages. Civilization is wanting to them; their

worship is degraded; in their habits and general morality they rise but

little above the brute creation. Moreover, century after century they

continue without making any apparent improvement or advance. Contrast

or compare with these the lower animal creation, and it will be found,

if not in its separate members, still in the whole group, not to fall

so infinitely below humanity as human beings have long been pleased to

imagine: for the lower animals can be taught to recognize man as their

superior and friend, though his mind is beyond their comprehension,

and a similar recognition is exactly what we men have to attain to in

regard to God; they can be taught by pleasure and pain, motives by

which we ourselves both in childhood and in age are taught, motives by

which God Himself declares that He teaches us, if we are to believe His

word.

That they are capable of our virtues has been shown in a notable

instance; that they are capable of our follies is clear in the

conspicuous vanity of the peacock; and no weakness cleaves more

pertinaciously to the human mind than this of vanity, which is often

found combined even with the noblest intellect. That they are

influenced by feelings like ours may be learned from the gay plumage

of the bird of Paradise, acquired under the same influence of the

preference and admiration of others, for which fair women wear fair

raiment, and for which the soldier, at extra risk to his life, is clad

in scarlet.

According to a principle now well known, the earlier the period of life

the greater the resemblance is likely to be between creatures akin to

one another. Hence we may explain the phenomenon that some children,

throughout their childhood prone to causeless mischief and stubborn

resistance, become at length reasonable and self-controlled men. As

for the child, so for the brute, a future of enlightened reason and

self-control may be in store. The largest and most generous minds are

now beginning to contemplate the possibility of an immortal destiny

for all animals whatsoever. To my own mind, as doubtless to many of

yours, such a conception has often seemed fanciful and ridiculous,

as the greatest and best notions often do to minds that are narrow

or unexpanded by a wisdom higher than their own. So it was that the

gossips and philosophers of Athens mocked when they heard of the

resurrection of the dead, though St. Paul was preaching only the

resurrection of human beings. To extend this belief in the resurrection

to all the animate creation is to extend our conception of the power

and the goodness of God, to make easy many things that otherwise seem

appallingly difficult in regard to His justice and His mercy. Does

it seem a thing impossible with you that God should raise the dead?

Is the Lord’s arm shortened that it cannot save, whether it be man,

or the worm that Scripture deems his fitting emblem? Or, as the Jews

were jealous that the Gentiles should be saved, are we jealous that

for creatures which we slaughter, trample on, enslave, and crowd out

of existence, happiness and life should yet be in store as well as for

ourselves?

Be willing to believe that language, reason, spiritual insight, which

is the reason elevated to the capacity of knowing God--be willing to

believe that these have been gradual acquisitions to humanity, and the

whole course of God’s Providence will at once stand out in a clearer,

purer light. Supposing the soul of man thousands of years back to have

been precisely what the soul of man is now, its requirements and its

aptitudes must have been the same then as they are to-day, so that

if the doctrine of the Trinity is essential now, it must have been

essential then, when it had not been revealed. On the same supposition,

too, either the record of God’s will in the earliest portion of the

Bible is incredibly defective, or the record of it in the completed

canon of Scripture must be charged with bewildering superfluity.

But God has not dealt so with His children. He has given them their

heavenly food as they were able to bear it. First by allegory and

parable He unfolds His will, as a father tells his little ones the

stories which they love to hear, minding ever within the stories and by

means of the stories to present the truth, the lessons of the beautiful

and the upright. The earliest revelation of God presents Him in the

simplest form, the easiest for us to understand, as the Great Patriarch

of mankind. Along with this revelation came simple commands and

prohibitions, the requirements of external sacrifice, the promise and

warning of temporal rewards and punishments. The law of retaliation, an

eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, seems brutal now, but it is the

beginning of a noble education. It says indeed, ‘Do to others as they

have done to you,’ but then in regard to injuries it bids you exact

no more than you have suffered, instead of taking a brutal revenge by

repaying the injury tenfold: and in regard to benefits it bids you

never forget to be grateful. From it springs the higher and better law,

of doing to others, not as they have done to you, but as you would

have them do to you. Without these beginnings the human mind could

never have comprehended or received the highest education--that we are

not only to forgive but to love our enemies. The system of material

sacrifices trained men to a capability of understanding and of offering

the sacrifice of the heart; the outward cleansings demanded by the law

led them by degrees to recognize the need of inward purity. By the law

came the knowledge of sin. Not till man knew that sin was sinful could

he either wish for or receive a Saviour. Hence it was that Christ came

not at the beginning, but only in the fulness of time. The gift of the

Holy Ghost was not outpoured till men in part were ready to receive

it. That it is still bestowed with so sparing a hand is not the fault

of God’s liberality, but of our backwardness to believe in God, to

commune with Him, and thereby to grow up into His likeness. We are the

mirror in which the divine image shines, if only the mirror can be made

to receive the requisite brightness.

To know that sin is sinful is to become conscious of the will of God,

to become conscious of a good and perfect will to which our own ought

to be conformed. Not to know this will is to be still brutish; to know

it only by the teaching of others is to be still among the things of

a child; to know it of oneself, which is in other words to know it by

the teaching of the Holy Ghost, who alone can implant the doctrine with

unfailing demonstration and enable us to receive His discipline,--this

at length is to be a man made in the image of God. For the fear of

the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and to depart from evil that

is understanding; and to love God with all the heart and all the

understanding and all the soul and all the strength, is the single aim

as it is the crowning effort of the highest and purest intelligence.

To be able to pray to God is the glory of reason; to do it, is the

safeguard of life.

THE LAPSE OF TIME.

The divergence of opinion between scientific and unscientific persons

is scarcely anywhere more conspicuous than in their measurements of the

age of the world we live in. A popular impression still prevails that

the old beldame earth, as Hotspur calls it, is about six thousand years

of age. A little margin is sometimes allowed. By an exercise of heroic

liberality a period of ten or twelve thousand years is occasionally

conceded for the earth’s existence. Any chronology discontented with

these ample limits comes within the domain of rash and dangerous

speculation. Some, indeed, who would fain conciliate all parties, are

willing to extend the bounds on certain conditions. They will grant a

large extra slice of time, provided that during that period the earth

was a shapeless uninhabited lump, or if inhabited, not inhabited by

men. ‘Come, now,’ says the cheap-jack, ‘I’ll tell you what I’ll do with

you; I’ll throw you in another five thousand years; fifteen thousand

years! and take the lot. What! not do? I’ll make it twenty thousand.

Now, I’ll tell you what I’ll do with you: I’ll make it five-and-twenty

thousand years, and if that won’t satisfy you, you aren’t worth arguing

with.’

What scientific men think of the cheap-jack’s offer it is the object of

this essay to consider.

Essays on Darwinism · 第 5 / 11 段