THE CRITERION OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
225. Having established the worth of the principles of consciousness,
of evidence, and of contradiction, in relation to the dignity of
fundamental, we will now examine the intrinsic value of the different
criteria. And here the doctrine of the preceding chapters, of which the
following are the development and complement, furnishes much light. We
will begin with consciousness, or the internal sense.
The testimony of consciousness includes all phenomena, either actively
or passively, realized in our soul. It is by its nature purely
subjective; so that in itself considered, apart from the intellectual
instinct and the light of evidence, it testifies nothing with respect
to objects. By it we know what we experience, not what is; we perceive
the phenomenon, not the reality; what authorizes us to say: such a
thing appears to me; but not, such a thing is.
The transition from subject to object, from the idea representing to
the thing represented, from the impression to the cause impressing,
belongs to other criteria: consciousness is limited to the interior,
or rather, to itself, which is nothing but an act of our soul.
226. We must distinguish between direct and reflex consciousness: the
former accompanies every internal phenomenon; the latter does not: the
former is natural; the latter philosophical: the former abstracts the
act of reason; the latter is one of these acts.
Direct consciousness is the presence of the phenomenon to the mind,
whether that phenomenon be a sensation or an idea, an act or an
impression, in the intellectual or the moral order.
This distinction shows that direct consciousness accompanies every
exercise, whether active or passive, of the faculties of our soul. It
is a contradiction to say that these phenomena exist in the soul, and
are not present to it.
These phenomena are not modifications like those which occur in
insensible things; we here treat of living modifications, so to speak,
in a living being; in the idea of these modifications is contained
their presence to the mind.
It is impossible for us to have a sensation without experiencing
it; for whoever says he has a sensation, says that he experiences a
sensation: this experience is its presence; an experienced sensation is
a present sensation.
Thought is by its essence, a representation that can neither exist nor
be conceived without presence; the name itself shows this, and the idea
which we join with it confirms the meaning of the word. When we speak
of representation, we understand that there is some real or imaginary
object, which mediately or immediately offers itself to the subject.
There is then presence in every representation, and consequently in
every thought.
If, from what is passive, like sensations and representations, we
pass to the active, that is, to the phenomena when the soul freely
evolves its force in the intellectual or moral order, _in combining or
willing_, this presence is, if possible, yet more evident. The being
that thus acts, does not obey a natural impulse, but motives which it
proposes to itself, and to which it may or may not attend. To make
intellectual combinations and to exercise acts of the will, without
either being present to the soul, are contradictory assertions.
227. Reflex consciousness, called by the French _aperception_, from
the verb _s'apercevoir_, and denoting perception of the perception,
is the act whereby the mind explicitly knows any phenomenon which is
realized in it. Thus, I hear a noise: the simple sensation, present
to and affecting my mind, constitutes what we have called direct
consciousness; but if besides hearing, I also _aperceive_, to use a
Gallicism, that I hear; then I not only hear, but also think that I
hear: this we call reflex consciousness.
228. It is clear from this example, that direct and reflex
consciousness are not only distinct but separable. I may hear without
thinking that I hear; and this is very often the case.
229. Most men have little reflex consciousness, and the greatest
intellectual force operates directly. This ideological fact is
connected with moral truths of the utmost importance. The human mind
was not born to contemplate itself, to think that it thinks: its
affections were not given as an object of reflection, but as impulses
which elevate it to what it is called to: the principal object of its
intelligence and love is, in this life as in the other, the infinite
being. The worship of itself is an aberration of pride; its punishment
is darkness.
230. All great scientific discoveries lie in the objective, not in
the subjective order. The exact sciences, natural as well as moral,
have emanated not from reflexion of the subject upon itself, but from
knowledge of objects and their relations. Even the metaphysical
sciences, in all that is most solid in them, ontology, cosmology,
and theology, are purely objective: ideology and psychology which
consider the subject, are full of the obscurity inherent in all that is
subjective; ideology scarcely does more than merely observe internal
phenomena,--an observation, we may remark, generally very defective,
poorly made, and bewildered with vain cavils; and what has psychology
itself, truly demonstrated, except the simplicity of the soul, the
necessary consequence of the unity of consciousness? In all else it
resembles ideology, and to a certain point, is confounded with it; it
observes phenomena, and afterwards defines and classifies them better
or worse, but fails to explain their mysterious nature.
231. Consciousness is the foundation of the other criteria, not as
a proposition which serves as their basis, but as a fact which is a
necessary condition of them all.
232. Consciousness tells us that we see the idea of one thing contained
in the idea of another: thus far there is nothing but appearance;
the formula, to express its testimony would be: _it appears to me_;
which denotes a purely subjective phenomenon. But this phenomenon is
accompanied by an intellectual instinct, an irresistible impulse of
nature, which makes us assent to the truth of the relation, not only
so far as it is in us, but as it is formed without us, in the purely
objective order, whether in the sphere of reality or possibility.
Thus it is explained how evidence is founded on consciousness, not as
identified with it, but as resting upon it as a fact from which it
cannot be abstracted, and as also containing the intellectual instinct
which makes us believe whatever is evident to be true.
233. Sensation, in itself considered, is a fact of pure consciousness,
since it is immanent in us: so far is it from being an act whereby
the mind passes beyond itself, translates itself to the object, that
it ought rather to be regarded as a passion than an action, and this
accords with the common mode of speaking, which ascribes it to a
passive rather than to an active faculty. Nevertheless on this mere
fact of consciousness is in some sense founded what is called the
testimony of the senses, and consequently all knowledge of the external
world, its properties, and relations.
In the sensation whereby we see the sun, there are two things: the
sensation itself, that is, the representation which I experience
in myself, and which I call sight; and the correspondence of this
sensation to the external object which I call the sun. Evidently,
these are two very distinct things, and yet we always unite them.
Consciousness is certainly the first basis of the formation of
judgment; but alone it does not suffice, for it only testifies that
the sensation is, not what it is. How is the judgment completed? By
means of a natural instinct which makes us render sensations objective,
that is, makes us believe in an external object corresponding to
the internal phenomena. Thus the testimony of the senses is in some
manner founded on consciousness; it does not, however, proceed from
consciousness alone, but requires the natural instinct, by means of
which we form our judgments in perfect security.
234. We must here remark that evidence has nothing to do with the
testimony of the senses, even in their intellectual part, wherein we
judge that an external object corresponds to the sensation. The idea
of the existence or possibility of an external object does not enter
into the idea of the sensation as purely subjective, and without
this indispensable condition there can be no evidence. Not only is
this clear of itself, but it is confirmed by daily experience. We
continually have the representation of the external subjectively
considered, as a pure phenomenon in our soul, although no real object
corresponds to it; more or less clear when we are awake, but most
vivid, even so as to produce a perfect illusion, when we are asleep.
235. With this exposition, the value and extent of consciousness may be
exactly determined: this we shall see in the following propositions, in
all of which, we would observe, we treat only of direct consciousness.
FIRST PROPOSITION.
The testimony of consciousness extends to all the phenomena that are
realized in our soul, regarded as an intellectual and sensitive being.
SECOND PROPOSITION.
236. If there exist in our soul phenomena of a different order, that
is to say, if it may in some sense be modified in non-representative
faculties, the testimony of consciousness does not extend to such
phenomena.
We do not advance this proposition without a solid reason. It is
probable, and even very probable, that our soul has active faculties,
of the exercise of which it is not conscious; otherwise how explain
the mysteries of organic life? The soul is united to the body, and is
for it the vital principle, the separation from which causes death,
manifested in complete disorganization and decomposition. This activity
is exercised without consciousness, either of the mode or of the fact
of its existence.
It may be said that there is here a series of those confused
perceptions of which Leibnitz speaks in his _Monadologie_; or that
these perceptions are so slight, so wan, as to leave no trace in the
memory, nor be an object of reflection: but these are only conjectures.
It is hard to persuade one's self that the fœtus in the mother's womb
has any consciousness of the activity exercised for the development of
its organization: it is also hard to persuade one's self that even
in adults there is any consciousness of that same activity producing
circulation of the blood, nutrition, and other phenomena which
constitute life. If these phenomena are produced, as they certainly
are, by the soul, there is in it, an exercise of activity of which it
either has no consciousness, or one so weak and confused that it is as
if it were not.
THIRD PROPOSITION.
237. The testimony of consciousness, in itself considered, is so
limited to the purely internal, that it is _of itself_ worth nothing in
the external order, either for the criterion of evidence or that of the
senses.
FOURTH PROPOSITION.
The testimony of consciousness is the foundation of the other criteria,
inasmuch as it is a fact which they all require, and without which they
are impossible.
FIFTH PROPOSITION.
238. From the combination of consciousness with intellectual instinct
arise all the other criteria.(23)