THE HOME FRONT
On May 18, 1917, President Wilson issued a proclamation in which are to
be found the following significant sentences:
In the sense in which we have been wont to think of armies there are
no armies in this struggle, there are entire nations armed. Thus,
the men who remain to till the soil and man the factories are no
less a part of the army that is in France than the men beneath the
battle flags. It must be so with us. It is not an army that we must
shape and train for war--it is a Nation. To this end our people must
draw close in one compact front against a common foe. But this
cannot be if each man pursues a private purpose. All must pursue one
purpose. The Nation needs all men, but it needs each man, not in the
field that will most pleasure him, but in the endeavor that will
best serve the common good. Thus, though a sharpshooter pleases to
operate a trip-hammer for the forging of great guns, and an expert
machinist desires to march with the flag, the Nation is being served
only when the sharpshooter marches and the machinist remains at his
levers. The whole Nation must be a team, in which each man shall
play the part for which he is best fitted.
If President Wilson deserves severe criticism for his failure to endorse
adequate plans of preparation for war while his country was at peace, he
should be given due credit for his appreciation that the home front must
be organized if the fighting front was to be victorious. He perceived
clearly that it was necessary to carry into the industrial life of the
nation that centralizing process which characterized his military policy.
That the nation at home was made to feel itself part of the fighting
forces and coöperated enthusiastically and effectively in the organization
of the national resources was not the least of the triumphs of the United
States. Such organization demanded great sacrifice, not merely of luxuries
or comforts, but of settled habits, which are difficult to break. It must
necessarily be of an emergency character, for the United States possessed
no bureaucratic system like that which obtains on the continent of Europe
for the centralization of trade, manufactures, food production, and the
thousand activities that form part of economic life. But the event proved
that both the spirit and the brains of the American people were equal to
the crisis.
The problem of coördinating the national industries for the supply of the
army was complicated by the military decentralization described in the
preceding chapter, which President Wilson was not able to remedy before
the final months of the war. The army did not form or state its
requirements as one body but through five supply bureaus, which acted
independently and in competition with each other. Bids for materials from
the different bureaus conflicted with each other, with those of the navy,
and of the Allies. Not merely was it essential that such demands should
be coördinated, but that some central committee should be able to say how
large was the total supply of any sort of materials, how soon they could
be produced, and to prevent the waste of such materials in unessential
production. If the army was decentralized, American industry as a whole
was in a state of complete chaos, so far as any central organization was
concerned. On the side of business every firm in every line of production
was competing in the manufacture of essential and unessential articles,
in transportation, and in bidding for and holding the necessary labor.
Mr. Wilson set himself the task of evolving order out of this chaos.
The President, as in the purely military problem where he utilized the
General Staff as his instrument, prepared to adapt existing machinery,
rather than to create a completely new organization. For a time he seems
to have believed that his Cabinet might serve the function. But it was
ill-adapted to handle the sort of problems that must be solved. It was
composed of men chosen largely for political reasons, and despite much
public complaint it had not been strengthened after Wilson's reëlection.
Franklin K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior, was generally recognized
as a man of excellent business judgment, willing to listen to experts, and
capable of coöperating effectively with the economic leaders of the
country. His influence with the President, however, seemed to be
overshadowed by that of Newton D. Baker and William G. McAdoo, Secretaries
of War and of the Treasury, who had inspired the distrust of most business
men. McAdoo in particular alienated financial circles because of his
apparent suspicion of banking interest, and both, by their appeals to
laboring men, laid themselves open to the charge of demagogic tactics.
Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, had won recognition as an expert
international lawyer of long experience, but he could not be expected to
exercise great influence, inasmuch as the President obviously intended to
remain his own foreign secretary. Albert S. Burleson, Postmaster-General,
was a politician, expert in the minor tactics of party, whose conduct of
the postal and telegraphic systems was destined to bring a storm of
protest upon the entire Administration. Thomas W. Gregory, the
Attorney-General, had gained entrance into the Cabinet by means of a
railroad suit which had roused the ire of the transportation interests.
The other members were, at that time, little known or spoken of. Wilson
spent much time and effort in defending his Cabinet members from attacks,
and yet it was believed that he rarely appealed to them for advice in the
formulation of policies. Thus the Cabinet as a whole lacked the very
qualities essential to a successful organizing committee: ability to
secure the coöperation and respect of the industrial leaders of the
country.
Titular functions of an organizing character, nevertheless, had been
conferred upon six members of the Cabinet in August, 1916, through the
creation of a "Council of National Defense"; they were charged with the
"coördination of industries and resources for the national security and
welfare." The actual labor of coördination, however, was to be exercised
by an advisory commission of seven, which included Howard E. Coffin, in
charge of munitions, Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, in charge of transportation, Julius Rosenwald, president of the
Sears-Roebuck Company, in charge of supplies including clothing, Bernard
M. Baruch, a versatile financial trader, in charge of metals, minerals,
and raw materials, Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation
of Labor, in charge of labor and the welfare of workers, Hollis Godfrey
in charge of engineering and education, and Franklin H. Martin in charge
of medicine. The commission at once prepared to lay down its programme,
to create sub-committees and technical boards, and to secure the
assistance of business leaders, without whose coöperation their task
could not be fulfilled.
Following plans developed by the Council of National Defense, experts in
every business likely to prove of importance were called upon to
coördinate and stimulate war necessities, to control their distribution,
to provide for the settlement of disputes between employers and
wage-earners, to fix prices, to conserve resources. Scientific and
technical experts were directed in their researches. The General Medical
Board and the Committee on Engineering and Education were supervised in
their mobilization of doctors and surgeons, engineers, physicists and
chemists, professors and graduate students in the university laboratories.
Everywhere and in all lines experience and brains were sought and
utilized. State Councils of Defense were created to oversee the work of
smaller units and to establish an effective means of communication between
the individual and the national Government. Naturally much
over-organization resulted and some waste of time and energy; but the
universal spirit of voluntary coöperation evoked by the Councils
overbalanced this loss and aided greatly in putting the country on an
effective war basis. As Wilson said, "beyond all question the highest and
best form of efficiency is the spontaneous coöperation of a free people."
In return for their efforts the people received an education in public
spirit and civic consciousness such as could have come in no other way.
Of the committees of the Council, that on munitions developed along the
most elaborate lines, becoming of such importance that on July 28, 1917,
it was reorganized as the War Industries Board. As such it gradually
absorbed most of the functions of the Council which were not transferred
to other agencies of the Government. During the autumn of 1917 the
activities of the Board underwent rapid extension, but it lacked the
power to enforce its decisions. As in the case of the General Staff, it
was important that it should have authority not merely to plan but also
to supervise and execute. Such a development was foreshadowed in the
reorganization of the Board in March, 1918, under the chairmanship of
Bernard M. Baruch, and when the President received the blanket authority
conferred by the Overman Act, he immediately invested the War Industries
Board with the centralizing power which seemed so necessary. Henceforth
it exercised an increasingly strict control over all the industries of
the country.
The purpose of the Board was, generally speaking, to secure for the
Government and the Allies the goods essential for making war
successfully, and to protect the civil needs of the country. The supply
of raw materials to the manufacturer as well as the delivery of finished
products was closely regulated by a system of priorities. The power of
the Board in its later development was dictatorial, inasmuch as it might
discipline any refractory producer or manufacturer by the withdrawal of
the assignments he expected. The leaders of each of the more important
industries were called into council, in order to determine resources and
needs, and the degree of preference to which each industry was entitled.
Some were especially favored, in order to stimulate production in a line
that was of particular importance or was failing to meet the exigencies
of the military situation; shipments to others of a less essential
character were deferred. Committees of the Board studied industrial
conditions and recommended the price that should be fixed for various
commodities; stability was thus artificially secured and profiteering
lessened. The Conservation Division worked out and enforced methods of
standardizing patterns in order to economize materials and labor. The
Steel Division coöperated with the manufacturers for the speeding-up of
production; and the Chemical Division, among other duties, stimulated the
vitally important supply of potash, dyes, and nitrates. Altogether it has
been roughly estimated that the industrial capacity of the country was
increased by twenty per cent through the organizing labors and authority
of the War Industries Board.
The success of this Board would have been impossible without the building
up of an extraordinary _esprit de corps_ among the men who were brought
face to face with these difficult problems of industry and commerce.
Their chairman relied, of course, upon the coöperation of the leaders of
"big business," who now, in the hour of the country's need, sank their
prejudice against governmental interference and gave freely of their
experience, brains, and administrative power. Men whose incomes were
measured in the hundreds of thousands forgot their own business and
worked at Washington on a salary of a dollar a year.
The same spirit of coöperation was evoked when it came to the conservation
and the production of food. If steel was to win the war, its burden could
not be supported without wheat, and for some months in 1917 and 1918
victory seemed to depend largely upon whether the Allies could find enough
to eat. Even in normal times Great Britain and France import large
quantities of foodstuffs; under war conditions they were necessarily
dependent upon foreign grain-producing countries. The surplus grain of the
Argentine and Australia was not available because of the length of the
voyage and the scarcity of shipping; the Russian wheat supply was cut off
by enemy control of the Dardanelles even before it was dissipated by
corrupt officials or reckless revolutionaries. The Allies, on the verge of
starvation, therefore looked to North America. Yet the stock of cereals
when the United States entered the war was at a lower level than it had
been for years and the number of food animals had also been reduced.
To meet the crisis President Wilson called upon one of the most
interesting and commanding personalities of modern times. Herbert Clark
Hoover was a Californian mining engineer, of broad experience in
Australia, China, and England, who in 1914 had been given control of
Allied Relief abroad. The following year he undertook the difficult and
delicate task of organizing food relief for Belgium. He was able to
arouse the enthusiastic sympathy of Americans, win financial support on a
large scale, procure the much-needed food, and provide for its effective
distribution among the suffering Belgians, in spite of the suspicions of
the Germans and the hindrances thrown in his path. A master organizer,
with keen flair for efficient subordinates, of broad vision never muddied
by details, with sound knowledge of business economics, and a gift for
dramatic appeal, Hoover was ideally fitted to conduct the greatest
experiment in economic organization the world had seen. Unsentimental
himself, he knew how to arouse emotion--a necessary quality, since the
food problem demanded heavy personal sacrifices which would touch every
individual; brusque in manner, he avoided giving the offense which
naturally follows any interference with the people's dinner and which
would destroy the essential spirit of voluntary coöperation.
Five days after the declaration of war, President Wilson, through the
Council of National Defense, named a committee on food supply, with Hoover
at its head, and shortly thereafter named him food commissioner. Hoover
began his work of educating the people to realize the necessity of economy
and extra-production; but he lacked the administrative powers which were
essential if his work was to prove effective, and it was not until August
that Congress passed the Lever Act which provided for strict control of
food under an administrator. This measure encountered strong opposition in
the Senate and from the farmers, who feared lest the provisions against
hoarding of food would prevent them from holding their products for high
prices. Wilson exerted his personal influence vigorously for the bill in
the face of congressional opposition, which demanded that large powers of
control should be given to a Senate committee of ten, and he was finally
successful in his appeal. He thereupon appointed Hoover Food Administrator
with practically unlimited powers, legalizing the work already begun on
his own initiative.
Hoover at once made arrangements to prevent the storage of wheat in large
quantities and to eliminate speculative dealings in wheat on the grain
exchanges. He then offered to buy the entire wheat crop at a fair price
and agreed with the millers to take flour at a fair advance on the price
of wheat. Fearful lest the farmers should be discouraged from planting the
following year, 1918, he offered to buy all the wheat that could be raised
at two dollars a bushel. If peace came before the crop was disposed of,
the Government might be compelled to take over the wheat at a higher price
than the market, but the offer was a necessary inducement to extensive
planting. In the meantime Hoover appealed to the country to utilize every
scrap of ground for the growing of food products. Every one of whatever
age and class turned gardener. The spacious and perfectly trimmed lawns of
the wealthy, as well as the weed-infested back yards of the poor, were dug
up and planted with potatoes or corn. Community gardens flourished in the
villages and outside of the larger towns, where men, women, and children
came out in the evening, after their regular work, to labor with rake and
hoe. There were perhaps two million "war gardens" over and beyond the
already established gardens, which unquestionably enabled many a citizen
to reduce his daily demands on the grocer, and stimulated his interest in
the problem of food conservation. As a result of Hoover's dealing with the
farmers, during the year 1917 the planted wheat acreage exceeded the
average of the preceding five years by thirty-five million acres, or by
about twelve per cent, and another additional five million acres were
planted in 1918. The result was the largest wheat crop in American history
except that of 1915, despite the killing cold of the winter of 1917 and
the withering drought of the summer of 1918. An increase in the number of
live stock was also secured and the production of milk, meat, and wool
showed a notable development.
Hoover achieved equal success in the problem of conserving food. He
realized that he must bring home to the individual housewife the need of
the closest economy, and he organized a nation-wide movement to secure
voluntary pledges that the rules and requests of the Food Administration
would be observed. People were asked to use other flours than wheat
whenever possible, to be sparing of sugar and meat, to utilize
substitutes, and rigidly to avoid waste. On every billboard and in all
the newspapers were to be seen appeals to save food. Housewives were
enrolled as "members of the Food Administration" and were given placards
to post in their windows announcing their membership and the willingness
of the family to abide by its requests. Certain days of the week were
designated as "wheatless" or "meatless" when voluntary demi-fasts were to
be observed, the nonobservance of which spelled social ostracism. To
"Hooverize" became a national habit, and children were denied a spoonful
of sugar on their cereal, "because Mr. Hoover would not like it." Hoover,
with his broad forehead, round face, compelling eyes, and underhung jaw,
became the benevolent bogey of the nation. It was a movement of general
renunciation such as no country had undergone except at the pinch of
biting necessity.[7] In the meantime prices were prevented from rapid
increase by a system of licenses, which tended to prevent hoarding or
speculation. Attempts to capitalize the need of the world for private
gain, or in common parlance, to "profiteer," were comparatively rare and
were adequately punished by revocation of license or by forced sale of
hoardings.
[Footnote 7: Restaurants and hotels coöperated; during a period of only
two months they were reported as having saved nine thousand tons of meat,
four thousand tons of flour, and a thousand tons of sugar. City garbage
plants announced a decrease in the amount of garbage collected ranging
from ten to thirteen per cent.]
As a result of the organization of food supply, the stimulation of
production, and the prevention of waste, America was able to save the
Entente nations, and, later, much of central and southeastern Europe from
starvation, without herself enduring anything worse than discomfort. The
Government was able at the same time to provide the troops in France with
food which, to the _poilus_ at least, seemed luxurious. When the United
States entered the war the country was prepared to export 20,000,000
bushels of wheat; instead it sent over 141,000,000. In four months, in
the summer of 1918, the American people saved out of their regular
consumption and sent abroad half a million tons of sugar. The autumn of
1918 saw an increase of nearly a million tons of pork products over what
was available the previous year. Altogether, during the crop year of
1918, America doubled the average amount of food sent to Europe
immediately before the war, notwithstanding unfavorable weather
conditions and the congestion of freight that resulted from other war
necessities. The total contribution in foodstuffs exported to Europe
that year amounted to a value of about two billion dollars. This was done
without food cards and with a minimum of edicts. It was the work of
education and conscience.
Fuel like food was a war necessity and there was equal need of
stimulating production by assuring a fair profit and of eliminating all
possible waste. Without the steam power provided by coal, raw materials
could not be transformed into the manufactured articles demanded by
military necessity, nor distributed by the railroads and steamships. Soon
after the declaration of war, a committee of coal operators, meeting
under the authorization of the Council of National Defense, drew up a
plan for the stimulation of coal production and its more economical
distribution. This committee voluntarily set a price for coal lower than
the current market price, in order to prevent a rise in manufacturing
costs; it was approved by the Secretary of the Interior, who warmly
praised the spirit of sacrifice displayed by the operators. Unfortunately
the Secretary of War, as chairman of the Council of National Defense,
repudiated the arrangement, on the ground that the price agreed upon was
too high. The operators were discouraged, because of the difficulty of
stimulating production under the lower price which Secretary Baker
insisted upon; they were further disappointed at the postponement of
plans for a zone system and an elimination of long cross hauls, designed
to relieve the load that would be thrown upon railroad transportation in
the coming winter.
In August, Wilson was empowered by the Lever Act to appoint a Fuel
Administrator and chose Harry A. Garfield, President of Williams College.
Conditions, however, became more confused. The fuel problem was one of
transportation quite as much as of production; the railroads were unable
to furnish the needed coal-cars, and because of an expensive and possibly
unfair system of car allotment, coal distribution was hampered. Add to
this the fact that numerous orders for coal shipments had been deferred
until autumn, in the belief that the Administration, which in the person
of Baker was not believed to look on the coal operators with favor, would
enforce low prices. Hence during the last three months of the year an
unprecedented amount of coal had to be shipped, and the congestion on the
competing railroads was such that the country faced a real coal famine.
In December, the Government recognized the obvious fact that the railroad
must be placed under one management, if the confusion in the whole
industrial situation were to be eliminated. President Wilson accordingly
announced that the Federal Government would take over the railroads for
the period of the war.
This measure came too late to save the country from the evil effects of
the fuel shortage. The penalty for the delays of the preceding summer had
to be paid, and it was the heavier because of the severity of the winter.
Overloaded trains were stalled and harbors froze over, imprisoning the
coal barges. Thirty-seven ships laden with essential military supplies
were held up in New York harbor for lack of fuel, and long strings of
empties blocked the sidings, while the shippers all over the country cried
for cars. To meet the crisis Garfield decreed that all manufacturing
plants east of the Mississippi should be shut down for five days and for a
series of Mondays, until the 25th of March. The order applied also to
places of amusement, private offices, and most stores, which were not
allowed to furnish heat. Munitions plants and essential industries, as
well as Government offices were naturally excepted. "Heatless Mondays"
caused great inconvenience and bitter criticism, for they came at the
moment when it was most important that the economic life of the nation
should be functioning at its greatest efficiency. But the embargo helped
to tide over the crisis. As in the case of food, the public, once it
appreciated the necessity of the situation, accepted it cheerfully.
Domestic economy was also widely preached and applied, to the slogan,
"Save a shovelful of coal a day." The elimination of electric
advertisements and the diminution of street lighting, served to lessen the
non-essential demand for coal; and the crisis also forced the introduction
of "daylight saving," the advancement of the clock by an hour, during the
months extending from March to October, thus saving artificial light.
In the meantime the Fuel Administration, the operators, and the miners
were coöperating to increase coal production. The enthusiasm of the mine
workers was stimulated by making them realize that they were indeed part
of the fighting forces. A competitive spirit was aroused and mining
conditions were bettered to keep them satisfied. Labor responded to the
call. Holidays were omitted and emulation between different shifts became
keen.[8] Increased production was paralleled by more efficient
distribution. A zone system, finally put into operation, eliminated
approximately 160,000,000 car miles. Local fuel administrators kept in
constant touch with the need of the localities under their jurisdiction,
studied methods of abolishing unnecessary manufacturing use of coal and
refused coal to non-essential industries.
[Footnote 8: In 1918 the average number of days worked by each miner in
the bituminous fields was greater by twelve than that of 1917, and by
twenty-five than that of 1916. During the half-year period from April to
September, 1918, bituminous production was twelve per cent greater than
in the corresponding period of the previous year, which had itself
established a record, despite the decrease in the number of mine
workers.]
Similar increase in the production and saving of oil was accomplished.
The oil-burning vessels of the allied navies and merchant marines, the
motor transport service of the armies, all made this necessary. In 1918
the production of oil in the United States was fourteen per cent greater
than in 1914. In response to an urgent cable from Marshal Foch, which
ran: "If you don't keep up your petrol supply we shall lose the war," a
series of "gasless Sundays" was suggested. For nearly two months, merely
at the request of the Fuel Administration and without any compulsion
except that arising from public opinion, Sunday motoring was practically
abandoned. That most crowded of motor thoroughfares, the Boston Post
Road from New York to Stamford, might have served as playground for a
kindergarten. The estimated saving of gasoline amounted to a million
barrels: about four per cent of the gasoline sent abroad in 1918 was
provided by the gasless Sundays.
Credit must be given the Fuel Administration for the large measure of
success which it finally secured. It was slow in its early organization
and at first failed to make full use of the volunteer committees of coal
operators and labor representatives who offered their assistance and
whose experience qualified them to give invaluable advice. But Garfield
showed his capacity for learning the basic facts of the situation, and
ultimately chose strong advisers. When he entered upon his duties he
found the crisis so far advanced that it could not be immediately solved.
Furthermore, in a situation which demanded the closest coöperation
between the Fuel and the Railroad Administration, he did not always
receive the assistance from the latter which he had a right to expect.
As a war measure, the temporary nationalization of the railroads was
probably necessary. Whatever the ultimate advantages of private ownership
and the system of competition, during the period of military necessity
perfect coördination was essential. Railroad facilities could not be
improved because new equipment, so far as it could be manufactured, had
to be sent abroad; the only solution of the problem of congestion seemed
to be an improvement of service. During the first nine months after the
declaration of war a notable increase in the amount of freight carried
was effected; nevertheless, as winter approached, it became obvious that
the roads were not operating as a unit and could not carry the load
demanded of them. Hence resulted the appointment of McAdoo in December,
1917, as Director-General, with power to operate all the railroads as a
single line.
During the spring of 1918 the Administration gradually overcame the worst
of the transportation problems. To the presidents and management of the
various railroads must go the chief share of credit for the successful
accomplishment of this titanic task. Despite their distrust of McAdoo and
their objections to his methods, they coöperated loyally with the
Railroad Administration in putting through the necessary measures of
coördination and in the elimination of the worst features of the former
competitive system. They adopted a permit system which prevented the
loading of freight unless it could be unloaded at its destination; they
insisted upon more rapid unloading of cars; they consolidated terminals
to facilitate the handling of cars; they curtailed circuitous routing of
freight; they reduced the use of Pullman cars for passenger service. As a
result, after May, 1918, congestion was diminished and during the summer
was no longer acute. This was accomplished despite the number of troops
moved, amounting during the first ten months of 1918 to six and a half
millions. In addition the railroads carried large quantities of food,
munitions, building materials for cantonments, and other supplies, most
of which converged upon eastern cities and ports. The increase in the
number of grain-carrying cars alone, from July to November, was 135,000
over the same period of the previous year.
Unquestionably the Government's administration of the railroads has a
darker side. Complaints were frequent that the Railroad Administration
sacrificed other interests for its own advantage. The future of the roads
was said not to be carefully safeguarded, and equipment and rolling stock
mishandled and allowed to deteriorate. Above all, at the moment when it
was quite as essential to preserve the morale of labor on the home front
as that of the troops in France, McAdoo made concessions to labor that
were more apt to destroy discipline and _esprit de corps_ than to
maintain them. The authority given for the unionization of railroad
employees, the stopping of piecework, the creation of shop committees,
weakened the control of the foremen and led to a loss of shop efficiency
which has been estimated at thirty per cent. Government control was
necessary, but in the form in which it came it proved costly.
During the months when manufacturing plants were built and their output
speeded up, when fuel and food were being produced in growing amounts,
when the stalled freight trains were being disentangled, there was
unceasing call for ocean-going tonnage. Food and war materials would be
of little use unless the United States had the ships in which to
transport them across the Atlantic. The Allies sorely needed American
help to replace the tonnage sunk by German submarines; during some
months, Allied shipping was being destroyed at the rate of six million
tons a year. Furthermore if an effective military force were to be
transported to France, according to the plans that germinated in the
summer of 1917, there would be need of every possible cubic inch of
tonnage. The entire military situation hinged upon the shipping problem.
Yet when the United States joined in war on Germany there was not a
shipyard in the country which would accept a new order; every inch of
available space was taken by the navy or private business.
In September, 1916, the United States Shipping Board had been organized
to operate the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which had been set up
primarily to develop trade with South America. This body now prepared a
gigantic programme of shipbuilding, which expanded as the need for
tonnage became more evident. By November 15, 1917, the Board planned for
1200 ships with dead weight tonnage of seven and a half millions. The
difficulties of building new yards, of collecting trained workmen and
technicians were undoubtedly great, but they might have been overcome
more easily had not unfortunate differences developed between William
Denman, the chairman of the Board, who advocated wooden ships, and
General George W. Goethals, the head of the Emergency Fleet Corporation,
who depended upon steel construction. The differences led to the
resignation of both and continued disorganization hampered the rapid
fulfillment of the programme Edward N. Hurley became chairman of the
Shipping Board, but it was not until the spring of 1918, when Charles M.
Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel Company was put in charge of the Emergency
Fleet Corporation as Director General of shipbuilding, that public
confidence in ultimate success seemed justified.
Much of the work accomplished during the latter days of the war was
spectacular. Waste lands along the Delaware overgrown with weeds were
transformed within a year into a shipyard with twenty-eight ways, a ship
under construction on each one, with a record of fourteen ships already
launched. The spirit of the workmen was voiced by the placard that hung
above the bulletin board announcing daily progress, which proclaimed,
"Three ships a week or bust." The Hog Island yards near Philadelphia and
the Fore River yards in Massachusetts became great cities with docks,
sidings, shops, offices, and huge stacks of building materials. Existing
yards, such as those on the Great Lakes, were enlarged so that in
fourteen months they sent to the ocean a fleet of 181 steel vessels. The
new ships were standardized and built on the "fabricated" system, which
provided for the manufacture of the various parts in different factories
and their assembling at the shipyards. In a single day, July 4, 1918,
there were launched in American shipyards ninety-five vessels, with a
dead weight tonnage of 474,464. In one of the Great Lakes yards a 5500
ton steel freighter was launched seventeen days after the keel was laid,
and seventeen days later was delivered to the Shipping Board, complete
and ready for service.
This work was not accomplished without tremendous expenditure and much
waste. The Shipping Board was careless in its financial management and
unwise in many of its methods. By introducing the cost plus system in the
letting of contracts it fostered extravagance and waste and increased and
intensified the industrial evils that had resulted from its operation in
the building of army cantonments. The contractors received the cost of
construction plus a percentage commission; obviously they had no incentive
to economize; the greater the expense the larger their commission. Hence
they willingly paid exorbitant prices for materials and agreed to "fancy"
wages. Not merely was the expense of securing the necessary tonnage
multiplied, but the cost of materials and labor in all other industries
was seriously enhanced. The high wages paid tended to destroy the
patriotic spirit of the shipworkers, who were enticed by greed rather
than by the glory of service. The effect on drafted soldiers was bound to
be unfortunate, for they could not but realize the injustice of a system
which gave them low pay for risking their lives, while their friends in
the shipyards received fabulous wages. Such aspects of the early days of
the Shipping Board were ruthlessly reformed by Schwab when he took
control of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. Appealing to the patriotism of
the workers he reduced costs and increased efficiency, according to some
critics, by thirty per cent, according to others, by no less than one
hundred and ten per cent.
By September, 1918, the Shipping Board had brought under its jurisdiction
2600 vessels with a total dead weight tonnage of more than ten millions.
Of this fleet, sixteen per cent had been built by the Emergency Fleet
Corporation. The remainder was represented by ships which the Board had
requisitioned when America entered the war, by the ships of Allied and
neutral countries which had been purchased and chartered, and by interned
enemy ships which had been seized. The last-named were damaged by their
crews at the time of the declaration of war, but were fitted for service
with little delay by a new process of electric welding. Such German boats
as the _Vaterland_, rechristened the _Leviathan_, and the _George
Washington_, together with smaller ships, furnished half a million tons
of German cargo-space. The ships which transported American soldiers were
not chiefly provided by the Shipping Board, more than fifty per cent
being represented by boats borrowed from Great Britain.[9]
[Footnote 9: In the last six months of the war over 1,500,000 men were
carried abroad as follows:
44 per cent in United States ships
51 per cent in British ships
3 per cent in Italian ships
2 per cent in French ships
The United States transports included 450,000 tons of German origin;
300,000 tons supplied by commandeered Dutch boats; and 718,000 tons
provided by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.]
More effective use of shipping was fostered by the War Trade Board, which
had been created six months after the declaration of war by the Trading
with the Enemy Act (October 6, 1917), and which, in conjunction with the
activities of the Alien Property Custodian, possessed full powers to
curtail enemy trade. It thereby obtained practical control of the foreign
commerce of this country, and was able both to conserve essential products
for American use and to secure and economize tonnage.
Such control was assured through a system of licenses for exports and
imports. No goods could be shipped into or out of the country without a
license, which was granted by the War Trade Board only after investigation
of the character of the shipment and its destination or source. The
earlier export of goods which had found their way to Germany through
neutral countries was thus curtailed and the blockade on Germany became
strangling. Products necessary to military effectiveness were secured from
neutral states in return for permission to buy essentials here. Two
millions of tonnage were obtained from neutral states for the use of the
United States and Great Britain. Trade in non-essentials with the Orient
and South America was limited, extra bottoms were thus acquired, and the
production of non-essentials at home discouraged. Altogether, the War
Trade Board exercised tremendous powers which, however necessary, might
have provoked intense resentment in business circles; but these powers
were enforced with a tact and discretion characteristic of the head of the
Board, Vance McCormick, who was able successfully to avoid the irritation
that might have been expected from such governmental interference with
freedom of commerce.
The problem of labor was obviously one that must be faced by each of the
war boards or administrations, and nearly all of them were compelled to
establish some sort of labor division or tribunal within each separate
field. The demands made upon the labor market by war industry were heavy,
for the withdrawal of labor into the army created an inevitable scarcity
at the moment when production must be increased, and the different
industries naturally were brought to bid against each other; the value of
any wage scale was constantly affected by the rising prices, while the
introduction of inexperienced workmen and women affected the conditions
of piecework, so that the question of wages and conditions of labor gave
rise to numerous discussions. The Labor Committee of the Council of
National Defense had undertaken to meet such problems as early as
February, 1917, but it was not until the beginning of the next year that
the Department of Labor underwent a notable reorganization with the
purpose of effecting the coördination necessary to complete success.
Unlike the food, fuel, and transportation problems, which were solved
through new administrations not connected with the Department of
Agriculture, the Bureau of Mines, or the Interstate Commerce Commission
respectively, that of labor was met by new bureaus and boards which were
organic parts of the existing Department of Labor. In January, 1918, that
Department undertook the formulation and administration of a national war
labor policy. Shortly afterwards delegates of the National Industrial
Conference Board and of the American Federation of Labor, representing
capital and labor, worked out a unanimous report upon the principles to
be followed in labor adjustment. To enforce these recommendations the
President, on April 9, 1918, appointed a National War Labor Board, which
until November sat as a court of final appeal in labor disputes. An index
of the importance of the Board was given by the choice of ex-President
Taft as one of its chairmen. A month later, a War Labor Policies Board
was added to the system to lay down general rules for the use of the War
Labor Board in the rendering of its judgments.
Not merely enthusiasm and brains enabled America to make the
extraordinary efforts demanded by the exigencies of war. Behind every
line of activity lay the need of money: and the raising of money in
amounts so large that they passed the comprehension of the average
citizen, forms one of the most romantic stories of the war. It is the
story of the enthusiastic coöperation of rich and poor: Wall Street and
the humblest foreign immigrants gave of their utmost in the attempt to
provide the all-important funds for America and her associates in the
war. Citizens accepted the weight of income and excess profit taxes far
heavier than any American had previously dreamed of. They were asked in
addition to buy government bonds to a total of fourteen billions, and
they responded by oversubscribing this amount by nearly five billions. Of
the funds needed for financing the war, the Government planned to raise
about a third by taxation, and the remainder by the sale of bonds and
certificates maturing in from five to thirty years. It would have proved
the financial statesmanship of McAdoo had he dared to raise a larger
proportion by taxation; for thus much of the inflation which inevitably
resulted from the bond issues might have been avoided. But the Government
feared alike for its popularity and for the immediate effect upon
business, which could not safely be discouraged. As it was, the excess
profit taxes aroused great complaint. The amount raised in direct
taxation represented a larger proportion of the war budget than any
foreign nation had been able to secure from tax revenues.
In seeking to sell its bonds the Government, rather against its will, was
compelled to rely largely upon the capitalists. The large popular
subscriptions would have been impossible but for the assistance and
enthusiasm shown by the banks in the selling campaign. Wall Street and
the bankers of the country were well prepared and responded with all
their strength, a response which deserves the greater credit when we
remember the lack of sympathy which had existed between financial circles
and President Wilson's Administration. Largely under banking auspices the
greatest selling campaign on record was inaugurated. Bonds were placed on
sale at street corners, in theaters, and restaurants; disposed of by
eminent operatic stars, moving-picture favorites, and wounded heroes from
the front. Steeple jacks attracted crowds by their perilous antics, in
order to start the bidding for subscriptions. Villages and isolated
farmhouses were canvassed. The banks used their entire machinery to
induce subscriptions, offering to advance the subscription price. When
during the first loan campaign the rather unwise optimism of the Treasury
cooled enthusiasm for a moment, by making it appear that the loan could
be floated without effort, Wall Street took up the load. The first loan
was oversubscribed by a billion. The success of the three loans that
followed was equally great; the fourth, coming in October, 1918, was set
for six billion dollars, the largest amount that had ever been asked of
any people, and after a three weeks' campaign, seven billions were
subscribed. Quite as notable as the amount raised was the progressive
increase in the number of subscribers, which ranged from four million
individuals in the first loan to more than twenty-one millions in the
fourth. Equally notable, as indicating the educative effect of the war
and of the sale of these Liberty Bonds, was the successful effort to
encourage thrift. War Savings societies were instituted and children
saved their pennies and nickels to buy twenty-five cent "thrift stamps"
which might be accumulated to secure interest-bearing savings
certificates. Down to November 1, 1918, the sale of such stamps totalled
$834,253,000, with a maturity value of more than a billion dollars.
The successful organizing of national resources to supply military
demands obviously depended, in the last instance, upon the education of
the people to a desire for service and sacrifice. The Liberty Loan
campaigns, the appeals of Hoover, and the Fuel Administration, all were
of importance in producing such morale. In addition the Council of
National Defense, through the Committee on Public Information, spread
pamphlets emphasizing the issues of the war and the objects for which we
were fighting. At every theater and moving-picture show, in the factories
during the noon hours, volunteer speakers told briefly of the needs of
the Government and appealed for coöperation. These were the so-called
"Four Minute Men." The most noted artists gave their talent to covering
the billboards with patriotic and informative posters. Blue Devils who
had fought at Verdun, captured tanks, and airplanes, were paraded in
order to bring home the realities of the life and death struggle in which
America was engaged. The popular response was inspiring. In the face of
the national enthusiasm the much-vaunted plans of the German Government
for raising civil disturbance fell to the ground. Labor was sometimes
disorganized by German propaganda; destruction of property or war
material was accomplished by German agents; and valuable information
sometimes leaked out to the enemy. But the danger was always kept in
check by the Department of Justice and also by a far-reaching citizen
organization, the American Protective League. Equally surprising was the
lack of opposition to the war on the part of pacifists and socialists. It
was rare to find the "sedition" for which some of them were punished,
perhaps over-promptly, translated from words to actions.
* * * * *
The organization of the industrial resources of the nation was
complicated by the same conditions that affected the purely military
problems--decentralization and the emergency demands that resulted from
the sudden decision to send a large expeditionary force to France. The
various organizing boards were so many individual solutions for
individual problems. At the beginning of the war the Council of National
Defense represented the only attempt at a central business organization,
and as time went on the importance and the influence of the Council
diminished. The effects of decentralization became painfully apparent
during the bitter cold of the winter months, when the fuel,
transportation, and food crises combined to threaten almost complete
paralysis of the economic and military mobilization.
The distrust and discouragement that followed brought forth furious
attacks upon the President's war policies, led not merely by Roosevelt
and Republican enemies of the Administration, but by Democratic Senators.
The root of the whole difficulty, they contended, lay in the fact that
Wilson had no policy. They demanded practically the abdication of the
presidential control of military affairs, either through the creation of
a Ministry of Munitions or of a War Cabinet. In either case Congress
would control the situation through its definition of the powers of the
new organization and the appointment of its personnel.
President Wilson utilized the revolt to secure the complete
centralization toward which he had been aiming. He fought the new
proposals on the ground that they merely introduced new machinery to
complicate the war organization, and he insisted that true policy
demanded rather an increase in the efficiency of existing machinery. If
the General Staff and the War Industries Board were given power to
supervise and execute as well as to plan, the country would have the
machinery at hand capable of forming a central organization, which could
determine in the first place what was wanted and where, and in the second
place how it could be supplied. All that was necessary was to give the
President a free hand to effect any transfer of organization, funds, or
functions in any of the existing departments of government, without being
compelled to apply to Congress in each case.
The struggle between Wilson and his opponents was sharp, but the
President carried the day. He exerted to the full his influence on
Congress and utilized skillfully the argument that at this moment of
crisis a swapping of horses might easily prove fatal. Opposing
Congressmen drew back at the thought of shouldering the responsibility
which they knew the President would throw upon them if he were defeated.
On May 20, 1918, the Overman Act became law, giving to the President the
blanket powers which he demanded and which he immediately used to
centralize the military and industrial organization. Bureau chiefs were
bitter in their disapproval; the National Guard grumbled, even as it
fought its best battles in France; politicians saw their chance of
influencing military affairs disappear; business men complained of the
economic dictatorship thus secured by the President. But Mr. Wilson was
at last in a position to effect that which seemed to him of greatest
importance--the concentration of responsibility and authority.
Upon the shoulders of the President, accordingly, must rest in the last
instance the major portion of the blame and the credit to be distributed
for the mistakes and the achievements of the military and economic
organization. He took no part in the working out of details. Once the
development of any committee of organization had been started, he left
the control of it entirely to those who had been placed in charge. But he
would have been untrue to his nature if he had not at all times been
determined to keep the reins of supreme control in his own hands. His
opponents insisted that the organization was formed in spite of him. It
is probable that he did not himself perceive the crying need for
centralization so clearly in 1917 as he did in 1918; and the protests of
his political opponents doubtless brought the realization of its
necessity more definitely home to him. But there is no evidence to
indicate that the process of centralization was forced upon him against
his will and much to show that he sought always that concentration of
responsibility and power which he insisted upon in politics. The task was
herculean; ironically enough it was facilitated by the revolt against his
war policies which resulted in the Senate investigation and the Overman
Act. His tactics were by no means above reproach, and his entire policy
nearly went on the rocks in the winter of 1917 because of his inability
to treat successfully with the Senate and with Republican Congressmen.
When all is said, however, the organization that was developed during the
last six months of the war transported and maintained in Europe more than
a million and a half American soldiers; at home it maintained two
millions more, ready to sail at the earliest opportunity; and it was
prepared to raise and equip an army of five and a half millions by June
30, 1920. The process had been slow and the results were not apparent for
many months. Furthermore, because of the intensity of the danger and the
absolute need of victory, cherished traditions were sacrificed and steps
taken which were to cost much later on; for the price of these
achievements was inevitable reaction and social unrest. But with all the
mistakes and all the cost, the fact still remains that the most gigantic
transformation of history--the transformation of an unmilitary and
peace-loving nation of ninety million souls into a belligerent power--was
successfully accomplished.