PLOTS AND PREPAREDNESS
The Government of the German Empire was inspired by a spirit that was at
once modern and medieval, and this contradictory spirit manifested itself
in the ways and means employed to win the sympathy of the United States
and to prevent it, as a neutral power, from assisting the Entente.
Germany worked on the one hand by means of open propaganda, which is the
method of modern commercial advertisement translated into the political
field, and on the other by secret intrigue reminiscent of the days of
Louis XI. Her propaganda took the form of organized campaigns to
influence opinion through speeches, pamphlets, and books, which were
designed to convince the country of the justice of Germany's cause and
the dangers of becoming the catspaw of the Entente. Her plans of intrigue
were directed towards the use of German-Americans or German spies to
assist in the return of German officers from this country, to hinder the
transport of Canadian troops, to destroy communications, and to hamper
the output of munitions for the Entente by strikes, incendiary fires, and
explosions.
During the first weeks of the war a German press bureau was established
in New York for the distribution of pro-German literature and the support
of the German-American press. Its activities were chiefly directed by Dr.
Bernhard Dernburg, who defended Germany from the charge of responsibility
for the war and expatiated upon her efficiency and the beneficence of her
culture in the same breath that he attacked the commercial greed of Great
Britain, the cruel autocracy of Russia, and the imperialistic designs of
Japan in the Pacific. Its pamphlets went so far as to excoriate allied
methods of warfare and to level accusations of inhumanity against the
Belgians. It distributed broadcast throughout the country an appeal
signed by ninety-three German professors and intellectuals, and
countersigned by a few notable Americans, which besought the American
people not to be deceived by the "lies and calumnies" of the enemies of
Germany.
This propaganda left all cold except those who already sympathized with
Germany. Indeed it reacted unfavorably against the German cause, as soon
as the well-authenticated reports came of German atrocities in Belgium,
of the burning of the Louvain library, and of the shelling of Rheims
cathedral. The efforts of German agents then shifted, concentrating in an
attack upon the United States Government for its alleged unneutral
attitude in permitting the export of munitions to the Entente. In some
sections of the country they were able to arouse an opinion favorable to
the establishment of an embargo. In the Senate, on December 10, 1914, a
bill was offered by John D. Works of California providing for the
prohibition of the sale of war supplies to any belligerent nation and a
similar bill was fathered in the House by Charles L. Bartlett of Georgia.
These efforts were warmly supported by various associations, some of
which were admittedly German-American societies, although the majority
attempted to conceal their partisan feeling under such titles as
_American Independence Union_ and _American Neutrality League_. The
latter effectively displayed its interest in America and in neutrality by
tumultuous singing of _Deutschland über Alles_ and _Die Wacht am Rhein_.
Of sincerely pacifist organizations there were not a few, among which
should not be forgotten the fantastic effort of Henry Ford in December,
1915, to end the war by sending a "Peace Ship" to Europe, designed to
arouse such public opinion abroad in favor of peace that "the boys would
be out of the trenches by Christmas." The ship sailed, but the
expedition, which was characterized by equal amounts of honesty and
foolishness, broke up shortly in dissension. For the most part pacifism
and pro-Germanism went hand in hand--a tragic alliance of good and evil
which was to hamper later efforts to evolve an international organization
for the preservation of peace.
The attempts of German propagandists to influence the policy of the
Government met, as we have seen, the stubborn resolve of the President
not to favor one camp of the belligerents by a departure from
international custom and law during the progress of the war. Their
efforts, however, were not entirely relaxed. Appeals were made to workmen
to stop the war by refusing to manufacture munitions; vigorous campaigns
were conducted to discredit the Administration by creating the belief
that it was discriminating in favor of the British. But more and more
Germany took to secret intrigue, the strings of which were pulled by the
military and naval attachés, von Papen and Boy-Ed. The German Ambassador,
von Bernstorff, also took a lively interest in the plans to control
public opinion and later to hamper munitions production. With his
approval, German manufacturing companies were organized at Bridgeport and
elsewhere to buy up the machinery and supplies essential to the
production of powder, shrapnel, and surplus benzol; arrangements were
made with the Bosch Magneto Company to enter into contracts with the
Entente for fuses and at the last moment to refuse to complete the
contract. Von Bernstorff was careful to avoid active participation in
plots for the destruction of property; but his interest and complicity,
together with that of Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, Financial Adviser of the
German Embassy, are evidenced by the checks drawn on their joint account
and paid to convicted criminals.
One of the first of the plots was the attempted blowing up of the
international bridge at Vanceboro, Maine, on December 31, 1914. The
materials for this explosion were collected and the fuse set by a German
reservist lieutenant, Werner Horn, who admitted that he acted under the
orders of von Papen. Another plan of the German agents was the
destruction of the Welland Canal, which was entrusted to a brilliant and
erratic adventurer, von der Goltz, who later confessed that he was under
the supervision of von Papen and had secured his materials from Captain
Hans Tauscher, the agent in New York of the Hamburg-American Line. This
company was involved in securing false manifests for vessels that carried
coal and supplies to German cruisers, thus defrauding the United States,
and in obtaining false passports for German reservists and agents; it
acted, in fact, as an American branch of the German Admiralty. More
serious yet was an attempt of the naval attaché, Boy-Ed, to involve the
United States and Mexico in a dispute by a plot to bring back Huerta.
This unhappy Mexican leader was arrested on the Mexican border in June,
1915, and shortly afterwards died.
For some months the existence of such activities on the part of German
agents had been suspected by the public. A series of disclosures
followed. In July, 1915, Dr. Albert, while riding on a New York elevated
train, was so careless as to set his portfolio on the seat for a few
moments; it was speedily picked up by a fellow passenger who made a hasty
exit. Soon afterwards the chief contents of the portfolio were published.
They indicated the complicity of the German Embassy in different
attempts to control the American press and to influence public opinion,
and proved the energy of less notable agents in illegal undertakings.
Towards the end of August, the Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Constantin Dumba,
made use of an American correspondent, James F. J. Archibald by name, to
carry dispatches to the Central Empires. He was arrested by the British
authorities at Falmouth, and his effects proved Dumba's interest in plans
to organize strikes in American munitions plants. "It is my impression,"
wrote the Austrian Ambassador, "that we can disorganize and hold up for
months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in
Bethlehem and the Middle West, which in the opinion of the German
military attaché, is of great importance and amply outweighs the
expenditure of money involved." Archibald also carried a letter from von
Papen to his wife in which he wrote: "I always say to these idiotic
Yankees that they had better hold their tongues." Its publication did not
serve to allay the warmth of American feeling.
It was with great satisfaction, therefore, that the public learned in
September that President Wilson had requested the recall of Ambassador
Dumba in the following words: "By reason of the admitted purpose and
intent of Ambassador Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries
of the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate
trade, and by reason of the flagrant diplomatic impropriety in employing
an American citizen protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer
of official despatches through the lines of the enemy of
Austria-Hungary.... Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government
of the United States." The two German attachés were given a longer
shrift, but on the 30th of November von Bernstorff was told that they
were no longer acceptable; von Papen sailed on the 22d of December and
was followed a week later by Boy-Ed.
During the two preceding months there had been a constant series of
strikes and explosions in munitions plants and industrial works, and
public opinion was now thoroughly aroused. The feeling that Germany and
Austria were thus through their agents virtually carrying on warfare in
the United States was intensified by the revelations of Dr. Joseph
Gori[)c]ar, formerly an Austrian consul, but a Jugoslav who sympathized
with the Entente; according to his statement every Austrian consul in
the country was "a center of intrigue of the most criminal character."
His charges came at the moment when Americans were reading that the
number of strikes in munitions plants was unparalleled, no less than one
hundred and two in a few months, of which fifty were in Bridgeport,
which was known to be a center of German activities. Explosions and
fires at the plants of the Bethlehem Steel Company and the Baldwin
Locomotive Works, and at the Roebling wire-rope shop in Trenton were of
mysterious origin.
To what extent explosions in munitions plants were the result of German
incendiarism and not of an accidental nature, it is difficult to
determine. But the Department of Justice was so thoroughly convinced of
the far-reaching character of German plots that President Wilson, in his
annual message of December, 1915, frankly denounced the "hyphenates" who
lent their aid to such intrigues. "I am sorry to say that the gravest
threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within
our own borders. There are citizens of the United States ... who have
poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national
life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our
Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought
it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to
debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue." His attack drew
forth the bitter resentment of the foreign language press, but was hailed
with delight in the East, where German intrigues aroused as great
excitement against the Fatherland as the submarine campaign. Nor was it
calmed by the continuance of fires and explosions and the evident
complicity of German officials. During the spring of 1916 a German agent,
von Igel, who occupied the former offices of von Papen, was arrested, and
the activities of Franz von Rintelen, who had placed incendiary bombs on
vessels leaving New York with food and supplies for the Allies, were
published. Taken in conjunction with the sinking of the _Sussex_, German
plots were now stimulating the American people to a keen sense of their
interest in the war, and preparing them effectively for a new attitude
toward foreign affairs in general.
It was inevitable that such revelations should have created a widespread
demand for increased military efficiency. The nation was approaching the
point where force might become necessary, and yet it was in no way
prepared for warfare, either on land or sea. During the first months of
the war the helplessness of the United States had been laid bare by
General Leonard Wood, who declared that we had never fought a really
first-class nation and "were pitifully unprepared, should such a calamity
be thrust upon us." The regular army "available to face such a crisis"
would be "just about equal to the police forces of Boston, New York, and
Philadelphia." The "preparedness movement" thus inaugurated was
crystallized by the formation of the National Security League, designed
to organize citizens in such a way "as may make practical an intelligent
expression of public opinion and may ensure for the nation an adequate
system of national defense." Pacifists and pro-Germans immediately
organized in opposition; and the movement was hampered by President
Wilson's unwillingness to coöperate in any way. He was flatly opposed, in
the autumn of 1914 and the spring of the following year, to compulsory
military service: "We will not ask our young men to spend the best years
of their lives making soldiers of themselves." He insisted that the
American people had always been able to defend themselves and should be
able to continue to do so without altering their military traditions. It
must not be forgotten that at this time Wilson still believed in absolute
isolation and refused to consider force as an element in our foreign
policy. His attitude was sufficient to render fruitless various
resolutions presented by Congressman Augustus P. Gardner and Senator
George E. Chamberlain, who proposed improvements in the military system.
Congress was pacifically-minded. This was the time when many Congressmen
were advocating an embargo on arms, and so far from desiring to learn how
to make and use munitions of war they concentrated their efforts on
methods of preventing their export to the Allies.
The preparedness movement, none the less, spread through the country and
the influence of the National Security League did much to inform the
public. In the summer of 1915 there was organized at Plattsburg, New
York, under the authority of General Wood, a civilian camp designed to
give some experience in the rudiments of military science. It was not
encouraged by the Administration, but at the end of the year the
President himself confessed that he had been converted. He was about to
abandon his policy of isolation for his new ideal of international
service, and he realized the logical necessity of supporting it by at
least a show of force. Mere negative "neutrality" no longer sufficed. His
fear that greater military strength might lead to an aggressive spirit in
the country had been obliterated by the attacks of submarines and by the
German plots. He admitted frankly that he had changed his mind. "I would
be ashamed," he said, "if I had not learned something in fourteen
months." To the surprise of many who had counted upon his pacific
tendencies to the end, he did what he had not heretofore done for any of
his policies; he left his desk in Washington and took to the platform.
During January and February, 1916, President Wilson delivered a
succession of speeches in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Louis, and other places in the upper Mississippi Valley, emphasizing his
conversion to preparedness. Aware that his transformation would be
regarded as anti-German and tending to draw the United States into the
conflict, he apparently sought out pro-German and pacifist centers, and
for the first time utilized something of the traditional "patriotic"
style to rouse those citizens who, as yet, failed to appreciate the
significance of the international situation. "I know that you are
depending upon me to keep the nation out of war. So far I have done so,
and I pledge you my word that, God helping me, I will--if it is possible.
You have laid another duty upon me. You have bidden me see that nothing
stains or impairs the honor of the United States. And that is a matter
not within my control. That depends upon what others do, not upon what
the Government of the United States does, and therefore there may be at
any moment a time when I cannot both preserve the honor and the peace of
the United States. Do not exact of me an impossible and contradictory
thing, but stand ready and insist that everybody that represents you
should stand ready to provide the means for maintaining the honor of the
United States." And later: "America cannot be an ostrich with its head in
the sand. America cannot shut itself out from the rest of the world....
Do you want the situation to be such that all the President can do is to
write messages, to utter words of protest? If these breaches of
international law which are in daily danger of occurring should touch the
very vital interests and honor of the United States, do you wish to do
nothing about it? Do you wish to have all the world say that the flag of
the United States, which we all love, can be stained with impunity?" What
a transformation from those days of December, 1914, when he believed that
military preparation would prove that the American people had been thrown
off their balance by a war with which they had nothing to do! And what a
revelation of the wounds inflicted by the barbed taunts cast against the
President for his patience in the writing of diplomatic notes!
Had the President carried his enthusiasm into actual accomplishment and
provided for effective military and naval preparation, his claim to the
title of great statesman would be more clear. Unfortunately when it came
to forcing Congress to take the necessary steps, he failed. The inertia
and reluctance of pacifist or partisan representatives would have been
broken by Roosevelt. But Wilson did mere lip-service to the principle of
military efficiency. The bills introduced in Congress were denounced by
military experts as half-measures likely to produce no efficient result,
and the President, who in most matters was determined to dominate, in
this permitted congressional committees to have their way. The protests
of the Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison, led to his resignation; and
(most curious development) the President replaced him by a man, Newton D.
Baker, who, whatever his capacity, was generally known as a pacifist.
Wilson's intelligence told him that military preparation was necessary,
if his policy of international service was to be anything more than
academic; but his pacific instincts prevented him from securing real
military efficiency.
An example of the unreadiness of the United States was furnished in the
late spring and summer of 1916, when relations with Mexico became strained
almost to the breaking point. President Wilson's handling of the knotty
Mexican problem had been characteristic. He had temporized in the hope
that anything like a break might be avoided and was resolutely opposed to
formal armed intervention. But after refusing to recognize Huerta, who had
gained his position of provisional president of Mexico through the murder
of Madero, in which he was evidently implicated, the President had ordered
the occupation of Vera Cruz by United States troops in retaliation for the
arrest of an American landing party and Huerta's refusal to fire an
apologetic salute. Huerta was forced to give up his position and fled, but
the crisis continued and American-Mexican relations were not improved. The
country was left in the hands of three rival presidents, of whom Carranza
proved the strongest, and, after an attempt at mediation in which the
three chief South American powers participated, President Wilson decided
to recognize him. But Mexican conditions remained chaotic and American
interests in Mexico were either threatened or destroyed. In the spring of
1916 an attack on American territory led by a bandit, Francisco Villa,
again roused Wilson to action. He dispatched General John J. Pershing
across the border to pursue and catch Villa. The expedition was difficult,
but well-conducted; it extended far south of the frontier and provoked the
protests of Carranza. At the moment when Pershing's advance guard seemed
to have its hands on the bandit, orders were given to cease the pursuit.
The opponents of the Administration had some excuse for laughing at the
"inglorious and ineffectual war" thus waged. It had failed to result in
the capture of Villa and it gave rise to serious danger of an open break
with Mexico. On the 21st of June an attack at Carrizal by Carranza's
troops resulted in the capture of some United States cavalrymen and the
mobilization of the national guard troops for the protection of the
border. But President Wilson was not to be drawn into intervention. He
might be compelled to exercise force in carrying out his ideals of
international service against an international criminal like Germany; he
would not use it against a weaker neighbor and particularly at the moment
when the United States must be free to face European complications. But
the Mexican crisis proved definitely the weakness of the military system.
Though the regulars who accompanied Pershing proved their worth, the
clumsy inefficient mobilization of the National Guard, on the other hand,
indicated as plainly as possible the lack of trained troops and officers.
The President's determination not to intervene in Mexico probably assured
him many votes in the pacifist regions of the Middle West in the
presidential election of 1916. That he would be renominated by the
Democrats was a foregone conclusion. He had alienated the machine leaders
by his strict domination of Congress and the party; if he had permitted
certain political leaders to distribute offices for necessary organization
interests, he had seen to it, none the less, that the Democratic bosses
had no share in the determination of policies. Still they could not hope
to prevent his nomination. Whatever chance the party might have in the
coming election lay in the personal strength of Wilson with the masses. In
the South and the districts west of the Mississippi he was regarded as the
greatest Democrat since Jackson. His patience in dealing with Germany, as
with Carranza, convinced them of his desire for peace; the slogan, "He has
kept us out of war," was a powerful argument in those regions. His
attitude towards labor had been friendly, so that the support of the
unions in the large industrial centers might be expected. Placards were
posted showing a poor man's family with the caption, "He has protected me
and mine," in answer to the Republican posters which showed a widow and
orphans (presumably of a drowned American citizen) and the caption, "He
has neglected me and mine." The remnants of the Progressives, who were not
purely Roosevelt supporters, were attracted by Wilson's legislative
programme and record of accomplishment. He could look to an independent
vote such as no other Democrat could hope for.
Despite this strength, the Republican leaders, if they could succeed in
effecting a reunion of their party, awaited the results of the election
with confidence. They counted chiefly upon the personal unpopularity of
Wilson on the Atlantic seaboard and the normal Republican vote in the
industrial centers of the Middle West. His foreign policy, east of the
Mississippi, was generally looked upon as anæmic and nebulous. He had
permitted, so the Republicans contended, the honor of the country to be
stained and Americans to be destroyed, without effective action. His
early opposition to preparedness and the half-hearted measures of army
reform had proved his weakness, at least to the satisfaction of
Republican stump orators. He had won the hearty dislike of the bankers,
the manufacturers, and the merchants by his attacks on capitalist
interests and by his support of labor unions. The Clayton Act, which
exempted strikes from Federal injunctions, and the Adamson Act, which
granted, under threat, the immediate demands of the striking railroad
employees, were cited as clear proof of his demagogic character.
Furthermore, while he alienated the pro-Entente elements in New England
and the Eastern States, he had drawn upon himself the hatred of the
German-Americans by his attacks upon hyphenates and his refusal to accept
an embargo on American munitions.
Had the Republicans been willing to accept Theodore Roosevelt, victory
would probably have come to them. He alone could have gathered in the
Progressive and independent vote, and that of the Pacific coast, which
ultimately went to Wilson. But the Old Guard of the Republicans refused
to consider Roosevelt; they could not take a man who had broken party
lines four years before; above all they wanted a "safe and sane"
President, who would play the political game according to rule--the rule
of the bosses--and they knew that were Roosevelt elected they could not
hope to share in the spoils. The Republican convention ultimately settled
upon Charles E. Hughes, who certainly was not beloved by the bosses, but
who was regarded as "steadier" than Roosevelt. The latter, in order to
defeat Wilson, refused the offer of the Progressives, practically
disbanded the party he had created, and called upon his friends to return
with him to their first allegiance.
Hughes did not prove a strong candidate. Whereas Wilson had stated his
position on the German-American problem plainly, "I neither seek the
favor nor fear the displeasure of that small alien element among us which
puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States,"
Hughes was ordered by his party managers not to offend foreign-born
voters, and in his attempt to steer a middle course, gave a clear
impression of vacillation. Many of those who had been most thoroughly
disgusted with Wilson turned back to him again, as the weeks passed and
Hughes more and more sought refuge in vague generalizations. In a
campaign in which the issues were largely personal the Republican
candidate's failure to evolve a constructive policy greatly weakened him,
especially as Wilson had the advantage of the maxim that it is best not
to change horses in the middle of the stream. Finally, Hughes did not
prove adept in reconciling the Progressives. Indeed it was said to be a
political _gaucherie_ on his part, or that of his advisers, which
alienated the friends of Governor Hiram Johnson of California and threw
the electoral vote of that State to Wilson.
California turned the scale. When on the evening of the 7th of November
the first returns came in and it was seen that Wilson had lost New York
and Illinois, the election of Hughes was generally conceded. Even the
_New York Times_ and the _World_ admitted Wilson's defeat. But the next
morning, news from the west indicated that the President still had a
chance. Later in the day the chance grew larger; he had won Ohio;
Minnesota and California were doubtful. In both States voting was close;
if Wilson won either the election would be his. It was not until the 11th
of November that the returns from California definitely showed a small
Wilson plurality, and only on the 21st that the Republicans finally
abandoned hope. Wilson had secured 277 electoral votes to 254 for
Hughes. He had been saved by the pacifist Middle and Far West, in
combination with the South. But the victory meant something far different
from peace at any price.