ARISTOTLE'S CLASSIFICATION OF POLITIES.
I have now described, in a roughly chronological order, the different
kinds of government which successively appeared in the Greek states
from their infancy to their overthrow by Macedonia. I proceed to give
clearer ideas both of the principles on which those governments were
constructed and of the full meaning of certain terms employed in the
foregoing descriptions of them, by stating the classification of
polities which Aristotle gives us in his treatise on Politics. The time
at which this work was written cannot be precisely determined, but part
of it was certainly composed after, and other parts probably before,
the battle of Chæroneia[225].
[225] The latest event referred to in the treatise is the murder of
king Philip in 336 B.C. Aristotle died in 322 B.C.
Aristotle observed all the governments that he knew, and as the
result of his observation divided polities (that is to say, forms of
government, or principles on which governments were constructed or
might be constructed) into two classes, the right or normal polities in
which government was carried on for the good of the whole community,
and the perverted or abnormal polities in which it was conducted by the
governors for their own private interest. Further, since he observed
that in all the polities power was lodged in the hands either of one
person, or of a few, or of the citizens in general, he subdivided each
of his two classes into three species according as power belonged to
one person, or to few, or to many. Among the normal polities the first
species was characterized by the rule of one man for the good of all,
and was known as βασιλεία or kingship: in the second the few best men
ruled for the good of all, and it was known as ἀριστοκρατία or the rule
of the best: the third, where a large number of citizens ruled for the
good of all, deserved in a special and honourable sense the name of
πολιτεία (Polity, or the rule of πολῖται--a Commonwealth), which was
more loosely applied to all constitutions. Among the perverted polities
the first species was tyranny, or the rule of one man for his private
interest; the second oligarchy, or the selfish rule of the few (who in
practice were always identical with the rich); and the third democracy,
the rule of the many (or rather of the poor, since the poor are always
the most numerous) for the selfish interest of their class[226].
[226] The classification is set forth in the _Politics_ III. 6, 7.
Welldon, pp. 116-120. In III. 6. 1 Aristotle defines a polity as "an
ordering or arrangement of a state in respect of its offices generally
and especially of the supreme office."
The character of the several species of polity is better understood
from the observation of concrete instances than from mere definition.
(1) Kingship, the rule of one for the good of all, is best exemplified
in the monarchies of the heroic age of Greece, in which the kings ruled
over willing subjects, came to the throne by inheritance and not by
violence, and governed within the limits imposed by custom[227]. Other
instances of kingship occurred in the early history of Lacedæmonia,
in Macedonia, and among the Molossians: for in all these cases the
kings owed their power to the gratitude of their subjects for good
services which they had rendered in founding the state or in acquiring
new territory[228]. Even the Persian monarchy of Cyrus and Darius,
although despotic, was an example of kingship and belonged to the
normal polities: for the power of the king was controlled by custom
and acquired not by violence but by inheritance, and its despotic
nature was merely an accident due to the slavish character of the
Asiatics[229]. Beside the heroic monarchies of the Greeks we may set
the governments of such kings as Cerdic of Wessex, Ethelbert of Kent,
Edwin of Northumbria, and Alfred the Great: with the conquering kings
of Macedonia we may compare Alaric the Visigoth or Clovis the Frank:
and for the monarchy of the Persians we may find a parallel in the
Ottoman sultanate of the fifteenth century.
[227] Aristotle, _Politics_ III. 14. 2. Welldon, transl. p. 146.
[228] Aristotle, _Politics_ V. 10. 8. Welldon, p. 382.
[229] Aristotle, _Politics_ III. 14. 6. Welldon, p. 145.
(2) Aristocracy is constituted on the principle that power belongs
to those few best men who are best qualified to use it for the good
of the community[230]. The principle that power is based upon merit
belongs to the best kind of monarchy, as we have just seen, and the
only difference between aristocracy and this best kingship is that
aristocracy gives the power to more than one and kingship to one only.
[230] Aristotle, _Politics_ V. 10. 7. Bekker. Welldon, transl. p. 382.
"Kingship corresponds in principle to aristocracy as it is based upon
merit."
There is no instance in Greek history of an aristocracy pure and
simple. The most aristocratic governments in Greece were those of the
tribes in the heroic age and the government of Sparta before 500 B.C.:
but all these were instances of aristocracy combined with kingship.
The elders who formed the Spartan council were selected for merit and
the councils were aristocratic: but the kingly power was important as
well as the power of the council, and the Spartan government is to be
classed as a monarchy with a large element of aristocracy.
The principle that power and merit should go together was very
sparingly applied in the other Greek states, and the usual method
of appointing to offices was by drawing lots among the candidates:
exceptional instances of the use of voting in elections are found at
Athens in the cases of the archons for a few years after 508 B.C.[231],
and of the ten generals throughout the period of the democracy.
[231] See p. 76.
The constitution of Rome in the third century B.C. and especially
after the battle of Cannæ, when magistrates were selected for merit
without regard to their patrician or plebeian order, and the senate,
the supreme power in the government, was filled entirely with men who
had served as magistrates or been named senators for high character
and ability, is an example of almost unmixed aristocracy. The small
non-aristocratic elements in that constitution were democratic or
oligarchic.
It may be remarked that it is according to Aristotle an aristocratic
feature in a government if officers are appointed by election and not
by lot, because if officers are elected power and merit tend to go
together[232]. Hence it may be regarded as an aristocratic feature in
modern states that members of Parliament are elected, provided they are
elected for merit: if they are elected for their willingness to give
pledges, they are no longer elected for merit, and they will use their
power not for the good of all but to comply with the wishes of their
constituents, and the real rulers will be the constituents.
[232] Aristotle, _Politics_ II. 11. 7, II. 12. 2. Welldon, pp. 91, 94.
The appointment of the Premier and the Cabinet must be made according
to merit and is aristocratic. The English method of selecting officers
for the army and for the civil service by competitive examination is in
principle aristocratic, being adopted because merit is shown by success
in examination.
(3) Of Polity, the rule of many for the good of all, there are many
species. Aristotle describes some of them in general terms, but does
not name a definite example of any.
The first species was a form of government adopted by some Greek
peoples after the fall of the heroic monarchies. In that age
distinctions of class depended on military efficiency, and military
efficiency on wealth. The only effective warriors were those who fought
on horseback or from a chariot (we do not know whether chariots were
still used in fighting, and Aristotle's words are ambiguous): those men
who possessed horses, whether they served in war themselves or placed
their horses at the disposal of other warriors, helped to furnish the
effective part of the army; and, because they rendered this service
to the community, they became the ruling class. In the Polity thus
constituted the ruling class was not a large one, though larger than
the ruling class in a mere oligarchy: and this species of Polity,
though it was not oligarchy, had a somewhat oligarchical character.
The second species of Polity was constructed on much the same lines as
the first, but in a later age, when the effective warriors included not
only the horsemen but also a much larger force of heavy armed infantry
or hoplites. In this case, as in the other, military efficiency was
dependent on property: the panoply, or complete suit of armour and set
of weapons which a hoplite required, had to be skilfully wrought, and
was a possession beyond the means of the poor, though it cost far less
than the breeding and keep of a horse. The ruling class included every
man who furnished, either for his own use or for use by another, either
a war-horse or the equipment of a hoplite: and the ruling class was so
large that the Polities of the second species were known in the times
when they existed, though not in Aristotle's time, as democracies[233].
There were also many other varieties of Polities. In all of them,
political power was shared by a class or classes which included a large
part of the free men, and therefore the classes that were neither very
rich nor very poor were of great political importance. The importance
of the upper and middle classes might be secured by various methods: by
conceding political rights only to those who had a certain amount of
property, the amount being so fixed that those who had political rights
were slightly more numerous than those who had them not; by giving
political rights to all free men but compelling those who had property
to be regular, under pain of a fine, in attendance at the assembly; or
by other like devices.
[233] Aristotle, IV. 13. 10, 11. Bekker. Welldon, pages 291, 292.
The one feature common to all Polities was that they were made by a
fusion of oligarchy and democracy. They were in one way democratic
because they conceded political rights to a large body of free men: but
in another sense they had a trace of oligarchy in their composition,
because they gave more power to a man with property than to one who was
very poor[234].
[234] The account here given of Polity is derived from Aristotle's
discussion of it in the _Politics_, book IV. chapters 8-13 (in
Bekker's edition): Welldon, pages 274-292. Nothing has been added
except a few necessary explanations.
From what has been said it is clear that the second species of Polity
is well exemplified in the system of government which existed in most
of the German tribes in the time of Cæsar or Tacitus: a system in
which the assembly of the warriors, including both horsemen and foot
soldiers, determined the action of the community. The name Polity may
also be applied to the government established at Athens by Solon, in
which the power granted to the common people was only just so much as
to prevent them from being disaffected[235]: and to the constitution
of Cleisthenes, in which the assembly of the citizens was supreme,
but did not hold its meetings very frequently, and showed no undue
favour toward the poorer citizens. And, finally, all modern governments
with popular representative institutions, though they differ from
Aristotle's Polity in many important features, yet have more in common
with that kind of government than with any other that Aristotle
recognises.
[235] Aristotle, _Politics_ II. 12. 5. Welldon, p. 95.
(4) We turn to the three perverted forms of government. Democracy, the
rule of the many (or rather of the poor, since the poor are always the
most numerous) for the selfish interest of their own class, will be
considered first, because it is the least strongly contrasted with the
right polities which have been already examined. The word democracy,
as has been noticed above, did not always denote an extreme democracy,
for there was a time when it was applied to those moderate governments
which Aristotle calls Polities: and Aristotle himself is not perfectly
constant in his use of the word, since there is a passage[236] in
which he makes it comprehend both moderate and extreme popular rule.
The democracy however which we now have to consider is the extreme or
thoroughgoing democracy.
[236] _Politics_, IV. 6. 1-4. Welldon, pages 269, 270.
From many passages in the Politics we learn what Aristotle regarded as
the distinctive features and tendencies of complete democracy.
Democracy was a form of government which arose in cities with a large
population and a large revenue: the whole of the citizens not only
were theoretically admitted to a share in the work of governing, but
actively and habitually exercised their powers, and those citizens
who could not otherwise afford the time to attend assemblies were
enabled to do so by receiving remuneration out of the state treasury.
And indeed such a population had more leisure than any other for
attendance at the assemblies and for serving on juries: for, as their
private property was small, their time was not used up in attending
to the management of it. The consequence was that under this form of
government the ultimate authority in the state was not any established
constitution but the mass of the poor citizens[237].
[237] Aristotle, _Politics_, Bekker IV. 6. 5, 6. Welldon, pages 270,
271.
Again in another striking passage Aristotle says that there are
democracies in which the ultimate authority is not the established
constitution but the mass of the people and the resolutions which
the people chooses to make.... In these democracies the common folk
becomes a monarch, a monarch composed of many men, a multitude reigning
collectively.... The common folk, being a monarch, determines to rule
as a monarch owing no obedience to the constitution, so that, becoming
a despot, it esteems most highly those men who flatter it the most: and
this kind of democracy holds the same place among popular governments
as tyranny among kingly governments. The same temper and character
is found in this democracy as in tyranny: both of them are arbitrary
rulers of the better citizens, only the one rules by resolutions, the
other by decrees, and the one is influenced by demagogues, the other by
personal adulators[238].
[238] Aristotle, _Politics_, Bekker IV. 4. 25-28. Welldon, pp.
265-267. In translating, I have taken liberties with the words but I
hope not with the sense of any sentence.
In yet other passages we are told that democratically governed cities
are beyond all others anxious to ensure equality among their citizens,
and that the use of ostracism for the expulsion of any man, who from
wealth or personal popularity or from any other cause has unusual
political influence, is a result of this anxiety[239]: and when we
find that the practice of appointing to offices by drawing lots is
democratic[240], we may observe (though Aristotle does not say so) that
this also is a striking exemplification of the same guiding principle.
When we read that the principle of democracy is freedom[241] we must,
considering the tenor of two passages which have been already quoted,
understand that the freedom that is meant is not the freedom of the
individual but the freedom of the assembly to do whatever it pleases.
[239] Aristotle, _Politics_ III. 13. 15. Welldon, pages 140, 141.
[240] Aristotle, _Politics_ II. 11. 5-8. Welldon, pages 90, 91.
[241] _Ibid._ IV. 4. 23, IV. 8. 7. Bekker. Welldon, pages 265, 275.
The marks then of a pure democracy as conceived by Aristotle are these:
(1) All the citizens, and more especially the poor citizens, actively
and habitually control the business of government, and come together
in frequent general assemblies for that purpose: (2) The assembly of
citizens is free to do whatever it pleases, not being bound to conform
to any law, precedent, or established constitution: (3) Every citizen
has, as far as the nature of things permits, an equal share with every
other citizen of political power and the enjoyment of office.
It is certain that Aristotle regarded the Athenian constitution as an
example of the genuine or extreme species of democracy, since that
constitution cannot be brought under any of the other species which he
defines: moreover he says explicitly that it is only in the extreme
form of democracy that demagogues are to be found[242], and we know
from history that demagogues were plentiful and powerful at Athens.
But much of what he says about extreme democracy cannot be taken as
referring to Athenian democracy: at any rate it does not accurately
depict the democracy under which the Athenians lived. In support
of these statements, I may adduce two facts. Firstly, the Athenian
assembly was not in practice free to do whatever it liked, and was not
above the law and the constitution. It could indeed decide in favour
of an unconstitutional measure whenever it chose, and its decision
was carried into effect: but the proposer of the measure acted at his
peril. In case the people after accepting his proposal continued for
a whole year to think it good and useful, he was safe: but if within
the year his measure became unpopular, he was certain to be condemned
under a Graphê Paranomôn, and to suffer heavy penalties. And secondly,
the passage, in which Aristotle denounces extreme democracy for turning
the common folk into an arbitrary ruler who defies law and precedent
and oppresses the wealthier citizens, can only refer to cases in which
the poorer classes take pleasure in reckless changes and in robbery of
the rich: at Athens the assembly, though the poor citizens predominated
in it, disliked changes and was considerate towards the wealthy
citizens[243].
[242] Aristotle, _Politics_ IV. 4. 24-26, Bekker. Welldon, pages 265,
266.
[243] For example, till 340 B.C., the richest citizens were allowed to
contribute far less than their just share towards the trierarchies,
which defrayed a large part of the cost of maintaining the navy; and
the change to a fairer system was effected with difficulty: Grote,
Part II. chapter XC.
The strong conservative tendency, which prevailed among the Athenians
under their democratic constitution, was, I believe, first noticed by
Mr W. Warde Fowler. There is a striking passage on the matter in his
_City-state of the Greeks and Romans_ (pages 170, 171).
The mischiefs which Aristotle regarded as attendant on democracies
have certainly been found in some governments which have borne that
name. Aristotle could not have denounced them as he does unless he had
seen them exemplified in some Greek democracies: in the governments
(nominally at least democratic), which ruled in Paris during the
French Revolution, all and more than all the evils that he describes
were to be found. Athens was practically exempt from them, and we may
seek causes for its immunity. One cause, the long training that the
Athenians went through under the constitution of Cleisthenes, has
been already noticed: the other was that at Athens the principles
on which Greek democracy was founded were actually followed out in
the daily life of the community, the citizens gave their time and
attention to the work of government, and the people was far more truly
a self-governing people than any other that has ever existed.
From what has just been said it will be seen that I regard Athens as
the sole historical example of a true democracy in the Greek sense of
the term. The Florentine Republic after 1324 A.D. is often compared
with the Athenian democracy: but, out of the three characteristics of
Greek democracy, the Florentine constitution had only the two least
important: the citizens had indeed, as far as possible, equal shares
in the enjoyment of office, and the assembly was free to do as it
liked: but the assembly was rarely convoked, and the true governors
were not the assembled citizens, but some fifty citizens selected
by drawing lots every two months or every four months to fill the
various magistracies and boards which ruled the city[244]. In modern
Switzerland some faint traces of actual self-government by the citizens
can be detected in the yearly assemblies held in four of the smaller
cantons, and in the cantonal and federal Referenda, or popular votes on
new laws: but they are no more than traces, and do not make the Swiss
government at all like the Athenian: and, beside this, Switzerland is
a federal state while Athens was a city, and for that reason the two
states are so unlike that it is useless to compare them.
[244] Hallam, _Middle Ages_, chapter III.: in the cabinet edition,
vol. I. pages 421-423.
(5) Oligarchy, or the rule of the few rich for the advantage of their
own class, admits of several degrees and varieties. There is something
of oligarchy wherever the enjoyment of public office is limited to
those who have a certain amount of property: there is a larger element
of oligarchy if the qualifying amount is fixed extremely high, or if
the body of rulers fill up vacancies in their own number, or if offices
descend from father to son: and the state is completely oligarchic if,
besides all this, the law does not control the rulers but the rulers
control the law[245]. We may detect a minute trace of oligarchy in
Solon's constitution which excluded the poorest citizens from the
archonship. Perfect oligarchies are exemplified in the Bacchiadæ of
Corinth whose power was hereditary and set them above the law, so that
they could order Labda's child to be killed, and in the Eupatridæ or
hereditary nobles of Athens, whose oppressive rule necessitated Solon's
reforms. Other instances of oligarchy are found in the exclusive
rule of the patricians at Rome from 510 B.C. to 367 B.C., and in the
monopoly of office which was enjoyed by the wealthiest class of the
Romans between 150 B.C. and the time of Julius Cæsar. The most complete
example of an oligarchy is found at Venice between 1310 and the fall of
the republic in 1797.
[245] Aristotle, _Politics_. Bekker IV. 5. 1-2 and IV. 6. 7-11.
Welldon, pages 266-267, pages 271-272.
(6) Tyranny, the rule of one man for his private interest, has been
exemplified in the stories of the despots of Corinth and Athens. For
other instances we must go to the great storehouse of illustrations of
tyranny, the mediæval history of Italy where, besides the well known
despots Eccelin da Romano, the Visconti, the Medici, and Cesar Borgia,
there is such a host of minor tyrants that pages might be filled with a
mere enumeration of their names.
We are now in a position to make some general remarks on Aristotle's
classification of polities--to see in some measure what it was, and
what it was not.
Aristotle defined a polity as "an ordering or arrangement of a state
in respect of its offices generally and especially of the supreme
office[246]": and from this definition, as well as from his use of
the word πολιτεία, it is clear that he regarded a polity as the form
on which a whole government and not merely a part of a government
was constructed. But nevertheless he recognised that a government
consisting wholly of kingship or wholly of aristocracy was, at least
among the Greeks, merely an ideal or perhaps an imaginary government,
and was not within the range of practical politics[247]. And herein
Greek history shows that he was right: for we never find in it a whole
government composed solely of kingship or wholly of aristocracy. On the
other hand we find that not only kingship and aristocracy, but also
oligarchy and democracy, constantly occur as forms or principles on
which a part of a government was constructed: for example the ancient
Spartan constitution was in one part kingly, in another aristocratic,
in another democratic; Solon's constitution contained elements both
of democracy and of oligarchy; and even the mature Athenian democracy
contained a trace of aristocracy in the selection of the ten generals
for merit and not by chance. Hence it is clear that, while kingship,
aristocracy, polity, democracy, oligarchy and tyranny were polities,
and each of them was a form on which a whole government either real or
ideal could be erected, four of them at least, kingship, aristocracy,
democracy and oligarchy, were also forms on which a part of a
government could be constructed, and which entered in very various
combinations into the making of actual governments.
[246] _Politics_ III. 6. 1. Welldon, p. 116.
[247] In the _Politics_ (IV. 2. Bekker. Welldon, pp. 253, 254)
Aristotle says that "speculation about the ideally best polity is
nothing else than a discussion of kingship and aristocracy": and
that "kingship must be a mere name and not a reality, unless it
is justified by a vast superiority of the reigning king over his
subjects":--a condition that can rarely if ever be fulfilled. See also
Sidgwick, _Elements of Politics_, p. 579.
From what has been said it will be seen that Aristotle's classification
of polities was based much more on philosophic theory than on history
and that, in some part at least of its extent, it is not a direct
classification of actual and concrete governments.
The only actual governments which it directly and straightforwardly
classifies are those which were constructed wholly on the lines of
any single one of the six polities, and these were tyrannies, pure
oligarchies and Polities. As to the rest of the governments which
Aristotle knew, it enabled him to describe them admirably, but did
not help him to assign to them brief, distinctive and convenient
class-names: for instance, it enabled him to describe the Spartan
government as containing elements of kingship, of aristocracy and of
democracy, and the constitution of the Phœnician city of Carthage as
containing elements of kingship, aristocracy, oligarchy and democracy;
but it did not furnish him with any class-name for either of those
governments other than the single word normal or the descriptions of
them which have just been mentioned[248].
[248] The descriptions of the Spartan and the Carthaginian governments
are given in the _Politics_ II. 9 and II. 11.
It has been necessary for me in speaking of the Greek governments to
employ some class-names, and the names that I have used are tribal
governments and city governments. The mere fact of using these names
implied an assumption that the governments of the Greek tribes and
the governments of the Greek cities formed in some way two distinct
classes. With the aid of the Aristotelian polities and our historical
examination of Greek governments we may now make some observations
which will help us to see whether the assumption was justified by facts.
Firstly, it may be noticed that all governments of Greek tribes were
mixed governments containing within them in combination both the rule
of the one and the rule of the few, or both the rule of the few and
the rule of the many: and all governments of Greek city states were
pure or unmixed governments, that is to say pure oligarchy, or pure
tyranny, or pure democracy (in so far as a pure democracy is in the
nature of things possible). In making this general statement about
the governments of city states I do not regard Argolis from the time
of Pheidon to 480 B.C., and Athens in the days of Cleisthenes as city
states in the strictest sense of the term: for in Argolis the central
city of Argos was by no means the sole place of importance, but was
counterbalanced by the two ancient cities of Tiryns and Mycenæ, and
in Attica in the time of Cleisthenes the rural districts were in some
respects as important as the city of Athens.
Secondly, all the governments of the tribes were limited and
constitutional, and all the governments of the city states with
one possible exception, were absolute or unconstitutional. These
propositions might almost be regarded as corollaries to those which
preceded them, since in a mixed government the various elements impose
limitations on the authority of one another, and ensure that each
of them shall be subject to a constitution or general understanding
about the exercise of power, while in an unmixed government the ruling
person or class is likely to be subject to no restrictions: but it is
more satisfactory to establish their truth from history. A moment's
consideration shows that the mixed governments which prevailed in the
tribes of the heroic age and at ancient Sparta, as well as those in
which the military class were the ruling class, were all limited and
constitutional. The unmixed governments of the cities were oligarchies,
or tyrannies, or democracies. It is obvious that oligarchies and
tyrannies were absolute governments, and in a democracy Aristotle
tells us that the ruling class, the whole body of citizens, was above
the law. The one possible exception occurs in the fully developed
Athenian democracy, which was in many respects exceptional among Greek
democracies. It is by no means clear that at Athens the mass of the
citizens was an absolute ruler. The truth seems to be that it was an
absolute ruler in so far that there were no limitations that it could
not throw off at pleasure, but in practice it was very much like a
constitutional ruler because it voluntarily submitted to formalities
which restrained its actions.
Thirdly, in the tribes, government was conducted for the good of the
whole community; in the city states, except perhaps Athens, it was
conducted for the good of the rulers. After all that has been said,
these propositions require no further proving.
We find then that in the tribes governments were mixed, constitutional
and, in Aristotle's sense, normal; in the city states they were
unmixed, and with one possible exception they were absolute and, in
Aristotle's sense, abnormal or perverted.
Now that we have discovered from observation of numerous instances that
the governments of the Greek tribes and the governments of the Greek
cities stood in strong contrast with one another, we may try to find
out the causes to which the contrast was due.
In the case of tribes it is impossible to make out completely why their
governments were mixed, constitutional, and normal, because we know but
little about the tribes and nothing of their history. But at any rate
we may observe that the tribes were militant communities engaged in a
constant struggle for existence with other similar communities, and
that in such communities it is essential to the safety of each and all
of their members that all the classes which contribute to the fighting
strength should be kept contented and zealous in the common cause, and
that therefore it is necessary that none of those classes should be
oppressed and that each should have its fair share in determining their
common action.
In the case of city states the reasons why the governments were
unmixed, absolute, and abnormal are best seen contrasting a city state
with a larger political community: for example, England in the middle
ages. In that large political community it was impossible, owing to the
size of the territory, the importance of the country districts, and
the diverse characters of different districts, for any single person
or class to engross all power and become the sole ruler. The size of
the territory necessitated the existence of local rulers or magnates,
the barons: and diversities of local character made each locality
inclined in case of need to act for itself under its own baron. The
result was that if any person or class attempted to become omnipotent
and oppressive, some of the local districts rose in revolt under their
barons and the attempt ended in failure. In a city state all the
circumstances were different: the country districts had no strength or
importance, the power, whether it was a person or a class, that ruled
in the city, met with no resistance from outside the city, and, owing
to the small size of the territory, had all its enemies within its
reach, and could easily destroy them unless they chose to go into exile.
In my second chapter it was stated tentatively and without proof that
there is an intimate connexion between the form of a political body and
the form of the government by which it is ruled. The connexion between
form of political body and form of government has now been traced in
the case of the Greek tribes and cities, and it has been shown that the
assumption which I made when I divided the Greek governments before the
battle of Chæroneia into tribal governments and city governments was
one for which history affords justification.