proceedings of this convention to the convention of the County of
Worcester.
23d. Voted, That the chairman of the convention be desired to transmit
a copy of the proceedings of this convention to the county of Berkshire.
24th. Voted, That the chairman of this convention be directed to notify
a county convention, upon any motion made to him for that purpose, if
he judge the reasons offered be sufficient, giving such notice together
with the reasons therefor, in the publick papers of this county.
25th. Voted, That a copy of the proceedings of this convention be sent
to the press in Springfield for publication.
_b. Washington's Alarm_
(1) _George Washington to Henry Lee._
Washington's _Writings_ (Ford edition), XI, 76-78. Lee was a
Virginia delegate in the Continental Congress. Washington's letter
is in reply to one received from Lee.
MOUNT VERNON, October 31, 1786.
... The picture which you have exhibited ... of the commotions and
temper of numerous bodies in the eastern States, are equally to be
lamented and deprecated. They exhibit a melancholy proof of what our
transatlantic foe has predicted; and of another thing perhaps, which
is still more to be regretted, and is yet more unaccountable, =that
mankind, when left to themselves, are unfit for their own government=.
I am mortified beyond expression when I view the clouds that have
spread over the brightest morn that ever dawned upon any country.
In a word, I am lost in amazement when I behold what intrigue, the
interested views of desperate characters, ignorance, and jealously of
the minor part, are capable of effecting, as a scourge on the major
part of our fellow citizens of the Union; for it is hardly to be
supposed, that the great body of the people, though they will not act,
can be so shortsighted or enveloped in darkness, as not to see rays of
a distant sun through all this mist of intoxication and folly.
You talk, my good Sir, of employing influence to appease the present
tumults in Massachusetts. I know not where that influence is to be
found, or, if attainable, that it would be a proper remedy for the
disorders. _Influence_ is no _government_. Let us have one by which
our lives, liberties, and properties will be secured, or let us know
the worst at once. Under these impressions, my humble opinion is,
that there is a call for decision. Know precisely what the insurgents
aim at. If they have _real_ grievances, redress them if possible;
or acknowledge the justice of them, and your inability to do it in
the present moment. If they have not, employ the force of government
against them at once. If this is inadequate, _all_ will be convinced,
that the superstructure is bad, or wants support. To be more exposed in
the eyes of the world, and more contemptible than we already are, is
hardly possible. To delay one or the other of these, is to
exasperate ... or to give confidence, and will add to their numbers;
for, like snow-balls, such bodies increase by every moment unless there
is something in the way to obstruct and crumble them before the weight
is too great and irresistible....
(2) _George Washington, to James Madison._
_Writings_ (Ford edition), XI, 80, 81. Note especially the extracts
quoted from General Lincoln, in command against the rebels.
November 5, 1786.
I thank you for the communications in your letter of the 1st instant.
... Fain would I hope that the great and most important of all
subjects, the _federal government_, may be considered with ... calm
and deliberate attention. ... No morn ever dawned more favorably than
ours did; and no day was ever more clouded than the present. Wisdom
and good examples are necessary at this time to rescue the political
machine from the impending storm. Virginia has now an opportunity to
set the latter, and has enough of the former, I hope, to take the lead
in promoting this great and arduous work. Without an alteration in
our political creed, the superstructure we have been seven years in
raising, at the expense of so much treasure and blood, must fall. We
are fast verging to anarchy and confusion.
... a letter which I have received from General Knox, who had just
returned from Massachusetts, whither he had been sent by Congress
consequent of the commotions in that State, is replete with melancholy
accounts of the temper and designs of a considerable part of that
people. Among other things he says:
"Their creed is, that the property of the United States has been
protected from the confiscation of Britain by the joint exertions
of _all_; and therefore ought to be the _common property of all_;
and he that attempts opposition to this creed, is an enemy to
equity and justice, and ought to be swept from off the face of the
earth." Again: "They are determined to annihilate all debts, public
and private, and have agrarian laws, which are easily effected by
the means of unfunded paper money, which shall be a tender in all
cases whatever." He adds: "The number of these people amount in
Massachusetts to about one fifth part of several populous counties,
and to them may be collected people of similar sentiments from the
States of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, so as to
constitute a body of about twelve or fifteen thousand desperate and
unprincipled men. They are chiefly of the young and active part of
the community."
How melancholy is the reflection, that in so short a space we should
have made such large strides towards fulfilling the predictions of our
transatlantic foes! "Leave them to themselves, and their government
will soon dissolve." Will not the wise and good strive hard to avert
this evil? Or will their supineness suffer ignorance, and the arts of
self interested, designing, disaffected, and desperate characters, to
involve this great country in wretchedness and contempt? What stronger
evidence can be given of the want of energy in our government, than
these disorders? If there is not power in it to check them, what
security has a man for life, liberty, or property? To you I am sure
I need not add aught on this subject. The consequences of a lax or
inefficient government are too obvious to be dwelt upon. Thirteen
sovereignties pulling against each other, and all tugging at the
federal head, will soon bring ruin on the whole; whereas a liberal and
energetic constitution, well guarded and closely watched to prevent
encroachments, might restore us to that degree of respectability and
consequence to which we had a fair claim....
152. A Shrewd Foreign Observer's View of the Social Conflict over the
Adoption of a New Constitution
_Louis Guillaume Otto to Vergennes_[149]
George Bancroft's _History of the Constitution_ (1882), II,
Appendix, 399 ff.
PHILADELPHIA, October 10, 1786.
[The letter first describes the failure of the Annapolis Convention.]
The people are not ignorant that the natural consequences of an
increase of power in the government would be a regular collection of
taxes, a strict administration of justice, extraordinary duties on
imports, =_rigorous executions against debtors_=--in short, =_a marked
preponderance of rich men and of large proprietors_=.
It is, however, for the interest of the people to guard as much as
possible the absolute freedom granted them in a time when no other law
was known but necessity, and when an English army, as it were, laid the
foundations of the political constitution.
In those stormy times =_it was necessary_= to agree that all power
ought to emanate only from the people; that everything was subject to
its supreme will, and that the magistrates were only its servants.
Although there are no nobles in America, there is a class of men
denominated "gentlemen," who, by reason of their wealth, their talents,
their education, their families, or the offices they hold, =_aspire to
a pre-eminence which the people refuse to grant them_=; and, although
many of these men have betrayed the interests of their order to gain
popularity, =_there reigns among them a connection so much the more
intimate as they almost all of them dread the efforts of the people to
despoil them of their possessions, and, moreover, they are creditors_=,
and therefore interested in strengthening the government, and watching
over the execution of the laws....
The majority of them being merchants, it is for their interest to
establish the credit of the United States in Europe on a solid
foundation by the exact payment of debts, and to grant to congress
powers extensive enough to compel the people to contribute for this
purpose. The attempt, my lord, has been vain, by pamphlets and
other publications, to spread notions of justice and integrity, and
to deprive the people of a freedom which they have so misused. By
proposing a new organization of the federal government all minds
would have been revolted; circumstances ruinous to the commerce of
America have happily arisen to furnish the reformers with a pretext for
introducing innovations.
They represented to the people that the American name had become
opprobrious among all the nations of Europe; that the flag of the
United States was everywhere exposed to insults and annoyance....
[Otto continues at length to represent that the gentry sought to
secure a stronger government by inflaming the common people against
foreign powers. He then declares that it was never intended that
the Annapolis convention should do anything; that it was only one
step in a "plot" to secure a more unfettered convention.]
The measures were so well taken that at the end of September no more
than five states were represented at Annapolis, and the commissioners
from the northern states tarried several days at New York, in order to
retard their arrival.
The states which assembled, after having waited nearly three weeks,
separated under the pretext that they were not in sufficient numbers to
enter on business, and, to justify this dissolution, they addressed to
the different legislatures and to congress a report, the translation of
which I have the honor to enclose to you [i.e., the paper reproduced in
No. 153].
In this paper the commissioners employ an infinity of circumlocutions
and ambiguous phrases to show to their constituents the impossibility
of taking into consideration a general plan of commerce and the powers
pertaining thereto, without at the same time touching upon other
objects closely connected with the prosperity and national importance
of the United States.
Without enumerating these objects, the commissioners enlarge upon
the present crisis of public affairs, upon the dangers to which the
confederation is exposed, upon the want of credit of the United States
abroad, and upon the necessity of uniting, under a single point of
view, the interests of all the states.
They close by proposing, for the month of May next, a new assembly of
commissioners, instructed to deliberate not only upon a general plan
of commerce, but upon other matters which may concern the harmony and
welfare of the states, and upon the means of rendering the federal
government adequate to the exigencies of the union.
In spite of the obscurity of this document, you will perceive, my lord,
that the commissioners were unwilling to take into consideration the
grievances of commerce, which are of exceeding interest for the people,
without at the same time perfecting the fundamental constitution of
congress.
FOOTNOTES:
[148] Which was so constituted as to represent wealth rather than men,
cf. _American History and Government_, # 154 and note.
[149] Otto was the French minister to the United States; Vergennes was
the French minister in charge of foreign affairs at Paris.
XXVII. MAKING THE CONSTITUTION
153. Call issued by the Annapolis Convention
_Documentary History of the Constitution_, I, 1-6. For a narrative
of the circumstances, cf. _American History and Government_, # 199.
Sundry of the States having in Consequence of a Resolution and
Circular Letter from the State of Virginia appointed Commissioners
to meet at such time and Place as should be agreed upon by them the
said Commissioners, to take into Consideration the Trade and Commerce
of the United States etc:--the Commissioners of Virginia, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York, met at the City of Annapolis
on the 11th of September 1786, but did not think it advisable to
proceed on the Business of their Mission. They therefore broke up after
making a Report to the States by which they had been appointed and
transmitting to Congress a Copy thereof which is as follows.
To the Honorable the Legislatures of Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey and New York.
The Commissioners from the said States respectively Assembled at the
City of Annapolis, humbly beg leave to Report:
That, pursuant to their several Appointments, they met at Annapolis in
the State of Maryland, on the eleventh day of September Instant, and,
having proceeded to a communication of their Powers, they found that
the States of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia had, in substance,
and nearly in the same terms, authorized their respective Commissioners
"to meet such Commissioners as were or might be appointed by the other
States in the Union, at such time and Place as should be agreed upon
by the said Commissioners, to take into Consideration the trade and
Commerce of the United States, to consider how far an uniform System
in their commercial intercourse and regulations might be necessary
to their common interest and permanent harmony, and _to report, to
the several States_, such an Act relative to this great Object, _as
when unanimously ratified by them_, would enable the United States in
Congress Assembled effectually to provide for the same."
That the State of Delaware had given similar Powers to their
Commissioners, with this difference only, that the Act to be framed
in virtue of those Powers, is required to be reported "to the United
States in Congress Assembled to be agreed to by them and Confirmed by
the Legislatures of every State."
That the State of New Jersey has enlarged the Object of their
Appointment, empowering their Commissioners, "to consider how far an
uniform System in their Commercial Regulations, and _other important
matters_, might be necessary to the common interest and permanent
harmony of the several States;" and to "report such an Act on the
Subject, as when ratified by them" would "enable the United States in
Congress Assembled effectually to provide _for the exigencies of the
Union_."
That appointments of Commissioners have also been made by the States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and North Carolina, none of
whom have however attended, but that no information has been received
by your Commissioners of any Appointment having been made by the States
of Connecticut, Maryland, South-Carolina or Georgia.
That the express terms of the Powers to your Commissioners supposing a
Deputation from _all_ the States, and having for Object _the trade and
Commerce of the United States_, your Commissioners did not conceive
it advisable to proceed on the business of their Mission, under the
Circumstance of so partial and defective a Representation.
Deeply impressed however with the magnitude and importance of the
Object confided to them on this Occasion, your Commissioners cannot
forbear to indulge an expression of their earnest and unanimous wish
that speedy measures may be taken to effect a general meeting of the
States in a future Convention, for the same, and such other Purposes,
as the situation of Public Affairs may be found to require.
If in expressing this wish, or in intimating any other Sentiment,
your Commissioners should seem to exceed the strict bounds of their
Appointment, they entertain a full Confidence that a Conduct dictated
by an anxiety for the welfare of the United States, will not fail to
receive an indulgent Construction.
In this persuasion, your Commissioners submit an Opinion, that the Idea
of extending the Powers of their Deputies to other Objects than those
of Commerce, which has been adopted by the State of New Jersey, was an
improvement on the original Plan, and will deserve to be incorporated
into that of a future Convention. They are the more naturally led to
which Conclusion, as in the course of the Reflections on the Subject,
they have been induced to think, that the Power of regulating Trade, is
of such comprehensive extent, and will enter so far into the General
System of the F[oe]deral Government, that to give it efficacy, and to
obviate questions and doubts concerning its precise nature and limits,
may require a corresponding adjustment of other Parts of the F[oe]deral
System.
That there are important defects in the System of the F[oe]deral
Government, is acknowledged by the Acts of those States which have
concurred in the present Meeting. That the defects, upon a closer
examination may be found greater and more numerous than even these
Acts imply, is at least so far probable from the embarrassments which
characterize the present state of our National Affairs, foreign and
domestic, as may reasonably be supposed to merit a deliberate and
candid discussion, in some mode, which will unite the Sentiments
and Councils of all the States. In the choice of the mode, your
Commissioners are of Opinion that a Convention of Deputies from the
different States, for the special and sole purpose of entering into
this investigation and digesting a Plan for supplying such defects as
may be discovered to exist, will be entitled to a preference, from
Considerations which will occur without being particularized.
Your Commissioners decline an enumeration of those National
Circumstances on which their Opinion respecting the Propriety of a
future Convention with more enlarged Powers is founded; as it would be
an useless intrusion of facts and Observations, most of which have been
frequently the Subject of Public Discussion, and none of which can have
escaped the penetration of those to whom they would in this instance
be addressed. They are however of a nature so serious as, in the View
of your Commissioners, to render the situation of the United States
delicate and critical, calling for an exertion of the united Virtue and
Wisdom of all the Members of the Confederacy.
Under this Impression Your Commissioners, with the most respectful
deference, beg leave to suggest =_their unanimous conviction that
it may essentially tend to advance the interests of the Union, if
the States by whom they have been respectively delegated would
themselves concur, and use their endeavours to procure the concurrence
of the other States, in the Appointment of Commissioners to meet
at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take into
Consideration the situation of the United States, to devise such
further Provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the
Constitution of the F[oe]deral Government adequate to the exigencies
of the Union; and to report such an Act for that purpose to the United
States in Congress Assembled, as when "agreed to by them and afterwards
confirmed by the Legislatures of every State" will effectually provide
for the same_=.
Though your Commissioners could not with propriety address these
Observations and Sentiments to any but the States they have the honor
to Represent, they have nevertheless concluded, from motives of
respect, to transmit Copies of this Report, to the United States in
Congress Assembled, and to the Executives of the other States.
By Order of the Commissioners
John Dickinson, Chairman
Dated at Annapolis
September 14th 1786.
154. Appointment of Delegates: Credentials (Georgia)
_Records of the Federal Convention_ (Farrand), III, 576-577.
Georgia is here selected for illustration, because of the emphasis
upon the sovereignty of the State in the forms used.
GEORGIA
By the Honorable GEORGE MATHEWS Esquire, Captain General, Governor
and Commander in Chief, in and over the said State aforesaid.
To all to whom these Presents shall come Greeting.
KNOW YE that JOHN MILTON Esquire, who hath certified the annexed
Copy of an Ordinance intituled "An Ordinance for the appointment of
Deputies from this State for the purpose of revising the F[oe]deral
Constitution"--is Secretary of the said State in whose Office the
Archives of the same are deposited. Therefore all due faith, Credit and
Authority are and ought to be had and given the same.
IN TESTIMONY whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great
Seal of the said State to be put and affixed at _Augusta_, this Twenty
fourth day of April in the Year of our Lord One thousand seven hundred
and eighty seven and of _our_ Sovereignty and Independence the Eleventh.
GEO. (Seal) MATHEWS.
By his Honor's Command
J. MILTON Secy
AN ORDINANCE for the appointment of Deputies from this State for the
purpose of revising the F[oe]deral Constitution.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Representatives of the Freemen of the State of
Georgia in General Assembly met and by the Authority of the same, that
WILLIAM FEW, ABRAHAM BALDWIN, WILLIAM PIERCE, GEORGE WALTON, WILLIAM
HOUSTOUN and NATHANIEL PENDLETON ESQUIRES, Be, and they are hereby
appointed Commissioners, who, =_or any two or more of them_= are hereby
authorized as Deputies from this State to meet such deputies as maybe
appointed and authorized by other States to assemble in Convention at
Philadelphia and to join with them in devising and discussing all such
Alterations and farther Provisions as may be necessary to render the
Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union, and in
reporting such an Act for that purpose to the United States in Congress
Assembled as _when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several
States_ will effectually provide for the same. In case of the death of
any of the said Deputies, or of their declining their appointments, the
Executive are hereby authorized to supply such Vacancies.
By Order of the House
(signed) WM GIBBONS Speaker.
Augusta the 10th February 1787.
Georgia.
Secretary's Office
The above is a true Copy from the Original Ordinance deposited in my
Office.
Augusta }
24 April 1787. } J. MILTON, Secretary.
_The State of Georgia by the grace of God free, Sovereign and
Independent_
To the Honorable WILLIAM PIERCE, Esquire.
WHEREAS you, the said William Pierce, are in and by an Ordinance of the
General Assembly of our said State Nominated and Appointed a Deputy to
represent the same in a Convention of the United States to be assembled
at Philadelphia, for the Purposes of devising and discussing such
Alterations and farther Provisions as may be necessary to render the
F[oe]deral Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union.
You are therefore hereby Commissioned to proceed on the duties required
of you in virtue of the said Ordinance
Witness our trusty and well beloved _George Mathews_ Esquire, our[150]
Captain General, Governor, and Commander in Chief, under his hand and
our Great Seal at Augusta this Seventeenth day of April in the Year
of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and of our
Sovereignty and Independence the Eleventh.[151]
GEO: MATHEWS (Seal)
By His Honor's Command.
J. Milton. Secy.
[Like commissions for the other delegates.]
155. George Mason on the Preliminaries at Philadelphia
_George Mason to George Mason, Jr._
_Records of the Federal Convention_ (Farrand), III, 22-24.
PHILADELPHIA, May 20th, 1787.
... Upon our arrival here on Thursday evening, seventeenth May, I
found only the States of Virginia and Pennsylvania fully represented;
and there are at this time only five--New York, the two Carolinas,
and the two before mentioned. All the States, Rhode Island excepted,
have made their appointments; but the members drop in slowly; some of
the deputies from the Eastern States are here, but none of them have
yet a sufficient representation, and it will probably be several days
before the Convention will be authorized to proceed to business. The
expectations and hopes of all the Union centre in this Convention. God
grant that we may be able to concert effectual means of preserving our
country from the evils which threaten us.
The Virginia deputies (who are all here) meet and confer together two
or three hours every day, in order to form a proper correspondence of
sentiments; and for form's sake, to see what new deputies are arrived,
and to grow into some acquaintance with each other, we regularly meet
every day at three o'clock. These and some occasional conversations
with the deputies of different States and with some of the general
officers of the late army (who are here upon a general meeting of the
Cincinnati), are the only opportunities I have hitherto had of forming
any opinion upon the great subject of our mission, and, consequently,
a very imperfect and indecisive one. Yet, upon the great principles
of it, I have reason to hope there will be greater unanimity and
less opposition, except from the little States, than was at first
apprehended. The most prevalent idea in the principal States seems to
be a total alteration of the present federal system, and substituting
a great national council or parliament, consisting of two branches of
the legislature, founded upon the principles of equal proportionate
representation, with full legislative powers upon all the subjects of
the Union; and an executive: and to make the several State legislatures
subordinate to the national, by giving the latter the power of a
negative upon all such laws as they shall judge contrary to the
interest of the federal Union ... and what is a very extraordinary
phenomenon, we are likely to find the republicans, on this occasion,
issue from the Southern and Middle States, and the anti-republicans
from the Eastern; however extraordinary this may at first seem, it may,
I think be accounted for from a very common and natural impulse of the
human mind. Men disappointed in expectations too hastily and sanguinely
formed, tired and disgusted with the unexpected evils they have
experienced, and anxious to remove them as far as possible, are very
apt to run into the opposite extreme; and the people of the Eastern
States, setting out with more republican principles, have consequently
been more disappointed than we have been....
156. The Virginia Plan
_Records of the Federal Convention_ (Farrand), I, 20-22, for May
29. For history of the plan, cf. _American History and Government_,
# 202. On the opening day of the Philadelphia Convention for
business Mr. Randolph, after a brilliant speech, introduced the
following resolutions in behalf of the Virginia delegation.
1. Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so
corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their
institution; namely, "common defence, security of liberty and general
welfare."
2. Resd. therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National
Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or
to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may
seem best in different cases.
3. Resd. that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States
every ---- for the term of ----; to be of the age of ---- years at
least; to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for
the devotion of their time to public service; to be ineligible to any
office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the
United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of
the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of ----
after its expiration; to be incapable of re-election for the space
of ---- after the expiration of their term of service, and to be
subject to recall.
5. Resd. that the members of the second branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper
number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be
of the age of ---- years at least; to hold their offices for a term
sufficient to ensure their independency; to receive liberal stipends,
by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to
public service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a
particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except
those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch,
during the term of service, and for the space of ---- after the
expiration thereof.
6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating
Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation and moreover
to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are incompetent,
or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the
several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature
the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union against
any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles
thereof.
7. Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the
National Legislature for the term of ---- years, to receive punctually
at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in
which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the
Magistracy existing at the time of increase or diminution, and to be
ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority to
execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation.
8. Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National
Judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision with authority to
examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate,
and every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon
shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount
to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again
passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by ----
of the members of each branch.
9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or
more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the
National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour;
and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their
services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to
affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or
diminution that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to
hear and determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal
to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies
of the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners
or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdiction may be
interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue;
impeachments of any National officers, and questions which may involve
the national peace and harmony.
10. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the admission of States
lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a
voluntary junction of Government and Territory or otherwise, with the
consent of a number of voices in the National legislature less than the
whole.
11. Resd. that a Republican Government and the territory of each State,
except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government and
territory, ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each State.
12. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after
the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the
completion of all their engagements.
13. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary; and that the
assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.
14. Resd. that the Legislative Executive and Judiciary powers within
the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of
Union.
15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the
Confederation by the Convention, ought at a proper time, or times,
after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or
assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures
to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.
157. George Mason on the Convention and its Aristocratic Tendencies
(June, 1787)
_George Mason to George Mason, Jr._
Records of the Federal Convention (Farrand), III, 32-33
PHILADELPHIA, June 1, 1787.
... Virginia has had the honor of presenting the outlines of the plan
upon which the convention is proceeding; but so slowly that it is
impossible to judge when the business will be finished, most probably
not before August--_festina lente_ may very well be called our motto.
=_When I first came here, judging from casual conversations with
gentlemen from the different States, I was very apprehensive that,
soured and disgusted with the unexpected evils we had experienced from
the democratic principles of our governments, we should be apt to run
into the opposite extreme and in endeavoring to steer too far from
Scylla, we might be drawn into the vortex of Charybdis, of which I
still think there is some danger_=,[152] though I have the pleasure to
find in the convention, many men of fine republican principles. America
has certainly, upon this occasion, drawn forth her first characters;
there are upon this Convention many gentlemen of the most respectable
abilities, and so far as I can discover, of the purest intentions. The
eyes of the United States are turned upon this assembly, and their
expectations raised to a very anxious degree....
All communications of the proceedings are forbidden during the sitting
of the Convention; this I think was a necessary precaution to prevent
misrepresentations or mistakes; there being a material difference
between the appearance of a subject in its first crude and undigested
shape, and after it shall have been properly matured and arranged.
158. The New Jersey Plan
_Records of the Federal Convention_ (Farrand), I, 242-245 (for June
15). The Convention, in committee of the whole, in two weeks of
debate, had adopted nineteen resolutions based upon the fifteen in
the Virginia Plan above. Action upon this report of the committee
of the whole was then interrupted by the presentation of the
following plan on which the "Small States" had now agreed.
Mr. _Patterson_ [New Jersey] laid before the Convention the plan which
he said several of the deputations wished to be substituted in place
of that proposed by Mr. Randolph. After some little discussion of the
most proper mode of giving it a fair deliberation it was agreed that it
should be referred to a Committee of the Whole, and that in order to
place the two plans in due comparison, the other should be recommitted.
At the earnest desire of Mr. Lansing [New Jersey], and some other
gentlemen, it was also agreed that the Convention should not go into
Committee of the Whole on the subject till tomorrow, by which delay the
friends of the plan proposed by Mr. Patterson wd. be better prepared
to explain and support it, and all would have an opportunity of taking
copies.--
The propositions from N. Jersey moved by Mr. Patterson were in the
words following.
1. Resd. that the articles of Confederation ought to be so revised,
corrected and enlarged as to render the federal Constitution adequate
to the exigencies of Government, and the preservation of the Union.
2. Resd. that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in
Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation, they be
authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or
duties on all goods and merchandizes of foreign growth or manufacture,
imported into any part of the U. States, by Stamps on paper, vellum or
parchment, and by a postage on all letters or packages passing through
the general post-Office, to be applied to such federal purposes as
they shall deem proper and expedient; to make rules and regulations
for the collection thereof; and the same from time to time to alter
and amend in such manner as they shall think proper: to pass Acts
for the regulation of trade and commerce as well with foreign nations
as with each other: provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures
and penalties, to be incurred for contravening such acts rules and
regulations shall be adjudged by the Common law judiciaries of the
State in which any offence contrary to the true intent and meaning
of such Acts rules and regulations shall have been committed or
perpetrated, with liberty of commencing in the first instance all suits
and prosecutions for that purpose in the superior Common law Judiciary
in such State, subject nevertheless, for the correction of all errors,
both in law and fact in rendering judgment, to an appeal to the
Judiciary to the U. States.
3. Resd. that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead
of the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of
Confederation, the United States in Congs. be authorized to make such
requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white and other free
citizens and inhabitants of every age sex and condition including those
bound to servitude for a term of years and three fifths of all other
persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians
not paying taxes; that if such requisitions be not complied with, in
the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the
non complying States and for that purpose to devise and pass acts
directing and authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers
hereby vested in the U. States in Congs. shall be exercised without the
consent of at least ---- States, and in that proportion, if the number
of Confederated States should hereafter be increased or diminished.
4. Resd. that the U. States in Congs. be authorized to elect a federal
Executive to consist of ---- persons, to continue in office for the
term of ---- years, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed
compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution,
shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the Executive at
the time of such increase or diminution, to be paid out of the federal
treasury; to be incapable of holding any other office or appointment
during their time of service and for ---- years thereafter; to be
ineligible a second time, and removeable by Congs. on application by a
majority of the Executives of the several States; that the Executives
besides their general authority to execute the federal acts ought to
appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, and to direct
all military operations; provided that none of the persons composing
the federal Executive shall on any occasion take command of any troops,
so as personally to conduct any enterprise as General, or in other
capacity.
5. Resd. that a federal judiciary be established to consist of a
supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the Executive,
and to hold their offices during good behaviour, to receive punctually
at stated times a fixed compensation for their services in which no
increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons
actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution; that the
Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear and determine
in the first instance on all impeachments of federal officers, and
_by way of appeal, in the dernier resort, in all cases touching the
rights of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in
all cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas, in all cases in
which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any treaty
or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for regulation of
trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue_: that none of the
Judiciary shall during the time they remain in Office be capable of
receiving or holding any other office or appointment during their time
of service, or for ---- thereafter.
6. =Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by virtue and
in pursuance of the powers hereby and by the articles of confederation
vested in them, and all Treaties made and ratified under the authority
of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the respective States so
far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or
their Citizens, and _that the Judiciary of the several States_ shall
be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws
of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding=; and that if
any State or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent the
carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive
shall be authorized to call forth the power of the Confederated States,
or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an
obedience to such Acts or an Observance of such Treaties.
7. Resd. that provision be made for the admission of new States into
the Union.
8. Resd. the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every
State.
9. Resd. that a Citizen of one State committing an offence in another
State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the sane offence as if it
had been committed by a Citizen of the State in which the Offence was
committed.
Adjourned
159. Hamilton's Plan
On June 18, Hamilton occupied nearly the whole session with an
argument for a government stronger and more centralized even than
the Virginia Plan--to meet the advocates of the New Jersey Plan by
taking high ground. During this address he presented his own Plan
(not what he thought attainable, but desirable). The paper given
below (from Hamilton's _Works_, Federalist edition, I, 401 ff.)
seems to have been prepared to assist the delivery of this address,
as a sort of brief. The address itself is reported by Madison
(_Journal_, for June 18) much more at length, but with many of the
same phrases. The student would do well to compare the two. Copious
extracts from that speech, and from other words of Hamilton in the
Convention, are quoted in _American History and Government_, # 200.
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The
first are the rich and well-born; the other, the mass of the people.
... The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or
determine right. Give therefore to the first class [the few] a distinct
_permanent_ share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness
of the second; and, as they cannot receive any advantage by a change,
they therefore will ever maintain good government. ... Nothing but
a _permanent_ body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their
turbulent and uncontrollable disposition requires checks....
It is admitted that you cannot have a good Executive upon a democratic
plan. See the excellency of the British Executive. He is placed above
temptation. He can have no distinct interests from the public welfare.
=Nothing short of such an executive can be efficient. ... Let one body
of the Legislature be constituted during good behavior or life.= Let
one Executive be appointed who dares execute his powers. It may be
asked: Is this a republican system? It is strictly so, as long as they
remain elective. And let me observe that an Executive is less dangerous
to the liberties of the people when in office during life, than for
seven years. ... =Let electors be appointed in each of the States to
elect the Legislature=, to consist of two branches; and I would give
them [the national legislature] the _unlimited power of passing all
laws, without exception_. The Assembly to be elected for three years
by the people in districts. The Senate to be elected by electors to be
chosen for that purpose by the people, and to remain in office during
life. _The Executive to have the power of negativing all laws_; to make
war and peace, with their [Senate's] advice, but to have sole direction
of all military operations, and to send ambassadors, and appoint all
military officers; and to pardon all offenders, treason excepted,
unless by advice of the Senate ... Supreme judicial officers to be
appointed by the Executive and the Senate.
The Legislature to appoint courts in each State, _so as to make the
State governments unnecessary to it_. All state laws which contravene
the general laws to be absolutely void. _An officer to be appointed in
each State to have a negative on all State laws. ..._
160. Character Sketches of Delegates by William Pierce
_Records of the Federal Convention_, III, 87 ff.
Pierce was a delegate from Georgia. It is not known just when he
composed these sketches.
From New Hampshire.
Mr. Langdon is a man of considerable fortune....
From Massachusetts.
Rufus King, Natl. Gorham, Gerry and Jno. [Caleb] Strong Esquires.
Mr. King is a Man much distinguished for his eloquence and great
parliamentary talents. He was educated in Massachusetts and is said
to have good classical as well as legal knowledge. He has served
for three years in the Congress of the United States with great and
deserved applause, and is at this time high in the confidence and
approbation of his Countrymen. This Gentleman is about thirty three
years of age, about five feet ten Inches high, well formed, an handsome
face, with a strong expressive Eye, and a sweet high toned voice. In
his public speaking there is something peculiarly strong and rich in
his expression, clear, and convincing in his arguments, rapid and
irresistible at times in his eloquence but he is not always equal. His
action is natural, swimming and graceful, but there is a rudeness of
manner sometimes accompanying it. But take him _tout en semble_, he may
with propriety be ranked among the Luminaries of the present Age.
Mr. Gorham is a Merchant in Boston....
Mr. Gerry's character is marked for integrity and perseverance. He
is a hesitating and laborious speaker;--possesses a great degree of
confidence and goes extensively into all subjects that he speaks on,
without respect to elegance or flower of diction. He is connected and
sometimes clear in his arguments, conceives well, and cherishes as his
virtue, a love for his Country. Mr. Gerry is very much of a Gentleman
in his principles and manners;--he has been engaged in the mercantile
line and is a Man of property. He is about 37 years of age.
From Connecticut.
Saml. Johnson, Roger Sherman, and W. [Oliver] Elsworth Esquires.
* * * * *
Mr. Sherman exhibits the oddest shaped character I ever remember to
have met with. He is awkward, un-winning, and unaccountably strange in
his manner. But in his train of thinking there is something regular,
deep and comprehensive; yet the oddity of his address, the vulgarisms
that accompany his public speaking, and that strange New England cant
that runs through his public as well as his private speaking make
everything that is connected with him grotesque and laughable;--and yet
he deserves infinite praise,--no Man has a better Heart or a clearer
Head. If he cannot embellish he can furnish thoughts that are wise and
useful. He is an able politician and extremely artful in accomplishing
any particular object;--and it is remarked that he seldom fails. I am
told he sits on the bench in Connecticut, and is very correct in the
discharge of his Judicial functions. In the early part of his life
he was a Shoe-maker;--but despising the lowness of his condition, he
turned Almanack maker, and so progressed upwards to a Judge. He has
been several years a Member of Congress, and discharged the duties of
his Office with honor and credit to himself, and advantage to the State
he represented. He is about 60.
Mr. Elsworth is a Judge of the Supreme Court in Connecticut;--he is
a Gentleman of a clear, deep, and copious understanding; eloquent,
and connected in public debate; and always attentive to his duty. He
is very happy in a reply, and choice in selecting such parts of his
adversary's arguments as he finds make the strongest impressions,--in
order to take off the force of them, so as to admit the power of his
own. Mr. Elsworth is about 37 years of age, a Man much respected for
his integrity, and venerated for his abilities.
From New York.
Alexander Hamilton, [Robert] Yates, and W. [John] Lansing Esquires.
Colo. Hamilton is deservedly celebrated for his talents. He is a
practitioner of the Law, and reputed to be a finished Scholar. To a
clear and strong judgment he unites the ornaments of fancy, and whilst
he is able, convincing, and engaging in his eloquence the Heart and
Head sympathize in approving him. Yet there is something too feeble in
his voice to be equal to the strains of oratory;--it is my opinion that
he is rather a convincing Speaker, that [than] a blazing Orator. Colo.
Hamilton requires time to think,--he enquires into every part of his
subject with the searchings of philosophy, and when he comes forward
he comes highly charged with interesting matter. There is no skimming
over the surface of a subject with him, he must sink to the bottom to
see what foundation it rests on.--His language is not always equal,
sometimes didactic like Bolingbroke's at others light and tripping
like Stern's. His eloquence is not so diffusive as to trifle with the
senses, but he rambles just enough to strike and keep up the attention.
He is about 33 years old, of small stature, and lean. His manners are
tinctured with stiffness, and sometimes with a degree of vanity that is
highly disagreeable.
Mr. Yates is said to be an able Judge. He is a Man of great legal
abilities, but not distinguished as an Orator. Some of his Enemies say
he is an anti-federal Man, but I discovered no such disposition in him.
He is about 45 years old, and enjoys a great share of health.
Mr. Lansing is a practicing Attorney at Albany, and Mayor of that
Corporation. He has a hesitation in his speech, that will prevent his
being an Orator of any eminence;--his legal knowledge I am told is not
extensive, nor his education a good one. He is however a Man of good
sense, plain in his manners, and sincere in his friendships. He is
about 32 years of age.
From New Jersey.
Wm. Livingston, David Brearly, Wm. Patterson, and Jonn. Dayton,
Esquires.
Governor Livingston is confessedly a Man of the first rate talents,
but he appears to me rather to indulge a sportiveness of wit, than
a strength of thinking. He is however equal to anything, from the
extensiveness of his education and genius. His writings teem with
satyr and a neatness of style. But he is no Orator, and seems little
acquainted with the guiles of policy. He is about 60 years old, and
remarkably healthy.
Mr. Brearly is a man of good, rather than of brilliant parts. He is
a Judge of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and is very much in the
esteem of the people. As an Orator he has little to boast of, but as a
Man he has every virtue to recommend him. Mr. Brearly is about 40 years
of age.
M. Patterson is one of those kind of Men whose powers break in upon
you, and create wonder and astonishment. He is a Man of great modesty,
with looks that bespeak talents of no great extent,--but he is a
Classic, a Lawyer, and an Orator;--and of a disposition so favorable
to his advancement that every one seemed ready to exalt him with their
praises. He is very happy in the choice of time and manner of engaging
in a debate, and never speaks but when he understands his subject well.
This Gentleman is about 34 years of age, of a very low stature.
Capt. Dayton is a young Gentleman of talents, with ambition to exert
them. He possesses a good education, and some reading; he speaks
well, and seems desirous of improving himself in Oratory. There is an
impetuosity in his temper that is injurious to him; but there is an
honest rectitude about him that makes him a valuable Member of Society,
and secures to him the esteem of all good Men. He is about 30 years
old, served with me as a Brother Aid to General Sullivan in the Western
expedition of '79.
From Pennsylvania.
Benja. Franklin, Thos. Mifflin, Robt. Morris, Geo. Clymer, Thomas
Fitzsimmons, Jared Ingersol, James Wilson, Governeur Morris.
Dr. Franklin is well known to be the greatest philosopher of the
present age;--all the operations of nature he seems to understand,--the
very heavens obey him, and the Clouds yield up their Lightning to
be imprisoned in his rod. But what claim he has to the politician
posterity must determine. It is certain that he does not shine much in
public Council,--he is no Speaker, nor does he seem to let politics
engage his attention. He is, however, a most extraordinary Man, and
tells a story in a style more engaging that anything I ever heard. Let
his Biographer finish his character. He is 82 years old, and possesses
an activity of mind equal to a youth of 25 years of age.
* * * * *
Robert Morris is a merchant of great eminence and wealth; an able
Financier, and a worthy Patriot. He has an understanding equal to any
public object, and possesses an energy of mind that few Men can boast
of. Although he is not learned, yet he is as great as those who are.
I am told that when he speaks in the Assembly of Pennsylvania, that
he bears down all before him. What could have been his reason for not
Speaking in the Convention I know not,--but he never spoke on any
point. This Gentleman is about 50 years of age....
Mr. Fitzsimmons is a Merchant of considerable talents....
* * * * *
Mr. Ingersol is a very able Attorney, and possesses a clear legal
understanding. He is well educated in the Classics and is a Man of
very extensive reading. Mr. Ingersol speaks well, and comprehends his
subject fully. There is a modesty in his character that keeps him back.
He is about 36 years old.
Mr. Wilson ranks among the foremost in legal and political knowledge.
He has joined to a fine genius all that can set him off and show him
to advantage. He is well acquainted with Man, and understands all the
passions that influence him.
Government seems to have been his peculiar Study, all the political
institutions of the World he knows in detail, and can trace the causes
and effects of every revolution from the earliest stages of the Grecian
commonwealth down to the present time. No man is more clear, copious,
and comprehensive than Mr. Wilson, yet he is no great Orator. He draws
the attention not by the charm of his eloquence, but by the force of
his reasoning. He is about 45 years old.
Mr. Governeur Morris is one of those Genius's in whom every species of
talents combine to render him conspicuous and flourishing in public
debate:--He winds through all the mazes of rhetoric, and throws around
him such a glare that he charms, captivates, and leads away the senses
of all who hear him. With an infinite stretch of fancy he brings to
view things when he is engaged in deep argument, that render all the
labor of reasoning easy and pleasing. But with all these powers he is
fickle and inconstant,--never pursuing one train of thinking,--nor ever
regular. He has gone through a very extensive course of reading, and
is acquainted with all the sciences. No Man has more wit,--nor can any
one engage the attention more than Mr. Morris. He was bred to the Law,
but I am told he disliked the profession, and turned merchant. He is
engaged in some great mercantile matters with his namesake Mr. Robt
Morris. This Gentleman is about 38 years old, he has been unfortunate
in losing one of his Legs, and getting all the flesh taken off his
right arm by a scald, when a youth.
From Delaware.
John Dickinson, Gunning Bedford, Geo: Richd. Bassett, and Jacob Broom
Esquires.
Mr. Dickinson has been famed through all America, for his Farmers
Letters; he is a Scholar, and said to be a Man of very extensive
information. When I saw him in the Convention I was induced to pay the
greatest attention to him whenever he spoke. I had often heard that he
was a great Orator, but I found him an indifferent Speaker. With an
affected air of wisdom he labors to produce a trifle,--his language is
irregular and incorrect,--his flourishes (for he sometimes attempts
them), are like expiring flames, they just shew themselves and go
out;--no traces of them are left on the mind to chear or animate it. He
is, however, a good writer and will ever be considered one of the most
important characters in the United States. He is about 55 years old,
and was bred a Quaker.
Mr. Bedford was educated for the Bar, and in his profession I am told
has merit. He is a bold and nervous Speaker, and has a very commanding
and striking manner;--but he is warm and inpetuous in his temper, and
precipitate in his judgment. [Cf. No. 161.] Mr. Bedford is about 32
years old, and very corpulent.
* * * * *
From Maryland.
Luther Martin, Jas. McHenry, Daniel of St. Thomas, Jenifer, and Daniel
Carrol Esquires.
Mr. Martin was educated for the Bar, and is Attorney general for the
State of Maryland. This Gentleman possesses a good deal of information,
but he has a very bad delivery, and so extremely prolix, that he never
speaks without tiring the patience of all who hear him. He is about 34
years of age.
Mr. Jenifer is a Gentleman of fortune....
Mr. Carroll is a Man of large fortune....
From Virginia.
Genl. Geo. Washington, Geo. Wythe, Geo. Mason, Jas. Maddison Jr. Jno.
Blair, Edmd. Randolph, and James McLurg.
* * * * *
Mr. Mason is a Gentleman of a remarkable strong powers, and possesses a
clear and copious understanding. He is able and convincing in debate,
steady and firm in his principles, and undoubtedly one of the best
politicians in America. Mr. Mason is about 60 years old, with a fine
strong constitution.
Mr. Maddison is a character who has long been in public life; and what
is very remarkable every Person seems to acknowledge his greatness.
He blends together the profound politician, with the Scholar. In the
management of every great question he evidently took the lead in the
Convention, and tho' he cannot be called an Orator, he is a most
agreable, eloquent, and convincing Speaker. From a spirit of industry
and application which he possesses in a most eminent degree, he always
comes forward the best informed Man of any point in debate. The affairs
of the United States, he perhaps, has the most correct knowledge of,
of any Man in the Union. He has been twice a Member of Congress, and
was always thought one of the ablest Members that ever sat in that
Council. Mr. Maddison is about 37 years of age, a Gentleman of great
modesty,--with a remarkable sweet temper. He is easy and unreserved
among his acquaintances, and has a most agreable style of conversation.
Mr. Blair is one of the most respectable Men in Virginia both on
account of his Family as well as his fortune....
Mr. Randolph is Governor of Virginia,--a young Gentleman in whom unite
all the accomplishments of the Scholar, and the States-man. He came
forward with the postulata or first principles, on which the Convention
acted, and he supported them with a force of eloquence and reasoning
that did him great honor. He has a most harmonious voice, a fine person
and striking manners. Mr. Randolph is about 32 years of age.
* * * * *
North Carolina.
Wm. Blount, Richd. Dobbs Spaight, Hugh Williamson, Wm. Davey, and Jno.
[Alexander] Martin Esquires.
Mr. Blount is a character strongly marked for integrity and honor. He
has been twice a Member of Congress, and in that office discharged
his duty with ability and faithfulness. He is no Speaker, nor does he
possess any of those talents that make Men shine;--he is plain, honest,
and sincere. Mr. Blount is about 36 years of age.
Mr. Spaight is a worthy Man, of some abilities, and fortune. Without
possessing a Genius to render him brilliant, he is able to discharge
any public trust that his Country may repose in him. He is about 31
years of age....
South Carolina.
Jno. Rutledge, Chs. Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, and Pierce
Butler Esquires.
Mr. Rutledge is one of those characters who was highly mounted at
the commencement of the late revolution; his reputation in the first
Congress gave him a distinguished rank among the American Worthies.
He was bred to the Law, and now acts as one of the Chancellors of
South Carolina. This Gentleman is much famed in his own State as an
Orator, but in my opinion he is too rapid in his public speaking to be
denominated an agreeable Orator. He is undoubtedly a man of abilities,
and a Gentleman of distinction and fortune. Mr. Rutledge was once
Governor of South Carolina. He is about 48 years of age.
Mr. Chas. Cotesworth Pinckney is a Gentleman of Family and fortune....
Mr. Charles Pinckney is a young Gentleman of most promising talents. He
is, altho only 24 years of age, in possession of a very great variety
of knowledge. Government, Law, History, and Philosophy are his favorite
studies, but he is intimately acquainted with many species of polite
learning....
* * * * *
For Georgia.
Wm. Few, Abraham Baldwin, Wm. Pierce, and Wm. Houstoun Esqrs.
Mr. Few possesses a strong natural Genius, and from application has
acquired some knowledge of legal matters; and he practices at the bar
of Georgia, and speaks tolerably well in the Legislature. He has been
twice a Member of Congress, and served in that capacity with fidelity
to his State, and honor to himself. Mr. Few is about 35 years of age.
Mr. Baldwin is a Gentleman of superior abilities, and joins in a public
debate with great art and eloquence. Having laid the foundation of a
compleat classical education at Harvard College, he pursues every other
study with ease. He is well acquainted with Books and Characters,
and has an accommodating turn of mind, which enables him to gain the
confidence of Men, and to understand them. He is a practicing Attorney
in Georgia, and has been twice a Member of Congress. Mr. Baldwin is
about 38 years of age.
Mr. Houstoun is an Attorney at Law. ... He is a Gentleman of Family,
and was educated in England. As to his legal or political knowledge,
he has very little to boast of. Nature seems to have done more for his
corporeal than mental powers. His person is striking....
161. One Day in the Philadelphia Convention
Madison's _Journal_. The day chosen was the closing day of debate
on the "Connecticut Compromise" proposition, when the Convention
came near disruption. For the narrative, cf. _American History and
Government_, # 203.
SATURDAY, JUNE 30th
_In Convention,_--Mr. BREARLY [New Jersey][153] moved that the
President write to the Executive of New Hampshire, informing it that
the business depending before the Convention was of such a nature as
to require the immediate attendance of the Deputies of that State.
In support of his motion, he observed that the difficulties of the
subject, and the diversity of opinions called for all the assistance we
could possibly obtain. (It was well understood that the object was to
add New Hampshire to the number of States opposed to the doctrine of
proportional representation, which it was presumed, from her relative
size, she must be adverse to.)
Mr. PATTERSON [New Jersey] seconded the motion.
Mr. RUTLEDGE [South Carolina] could see neither the necessity nor
propriety of such a measure. They are not unapprised of the meeting,
and can attend if they choose.
Rhode Island might as well be urged to appoint and send deputies. Are
we to suspend the business until the Deputies arrive? If we proceed, he
hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could
produce its effect.
Mr. KING [Massachusetts] said he had written more than once as a
private correspondent, and the answer gave him every reason to expect
that State would be represented very shortly, if it should be so at
all. Circumstances of a personal nature had hitherto prevented it. A
letter could have no effect.
Mr. WILSON [Pennsylvania] wished to know, whether it would be
consistent with rule or reason of secrecy, to communicate to New
Hampshire that the business was of such a nature as the motion
described. It would spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted the
propriety of soliciting any State on the subject, the meeting being
merely voluntary.
On motion of Mr. BREARLY.
New York, New Jersey, aye--2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, no--5; Maryland divided; Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Georgia, not on the floor.
The motion of Mr. ELLSWORTH being resumed, for allowing each State an
equal vote in the second branch,--[154]
Mr. WILSON did not expect such a motion after the establishment of
the contrary principle in the first branch; and considering the
reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed
in the first branch. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. ELLSWORTH)
had pronounced, that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all
the States north of Pennsylvania one only would agree to any General
Government. He entertained more favourable hopes of Connecticut and of
the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause,
and that they would not abandon a country to which they were bound
by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event
happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. _If the
minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority
on just and proper principles; if a separation must take place, it
could never happen on better grounds._ The votes of yesterday against
the just principle of representation were as twenty-two to ninety of
the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this
point, and he was sure, if there was any room for change, it could not
be on the side of the majority, the question will be, shall less than
one-fourth of the United States withdraw themselves from the Union, or
shall more than three-fourths renounce the inherent, indisputable and
unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial system of States?
If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would choose to join
it. The gentleman from Connecticut, in supposing that the preponderance
secured to the majority in the first branch had removed the objections
to an equality of votes in the second branch for the security of the
minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will enable
the minority to control, in all cases whatsoever, the sentiments and
interests of the majority. Seven States will control six: seven States,
according to the estimates that had been used, composed twenty-four
ninetieths of the whole people. It would be in the power, then, of
less than one-third to overrule two-thirds, whenever a question should
happen to divide the States in that manner....
Mr. ELLSWORTH. The capital objection of Mr. WILSON, "that the minority
will rule the majority," is not true. =_The power is given to the few
to save them from being destroyed by the many._= If an equality of
votes had been given to them in both branches, the objection might have
weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the
many? Is it not the case in the British Constitution, the wisdom of
which so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House
of Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation, a negative
on the laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights against
the encroachments of the Commons? No instance of a confederacy has
existed in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the
members of it. We are running from one extreme to another. We are
razing the foundations of the building, when we need only repair the
roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want of _a majority of
the States_ to favor it. If security be all that the great States
wish for, the first branch secures them. The danger of combinations
among them is not imaginary. Although no particular abuses could be
foreseen by him the possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm
him. But he could easily conceive cases in which they might result
from such combinations. Suppose, that, in pursuance of some commercial
treaty or arrangement, three or four free ports and no more were to
be established, would not combinations be formed in favor of Boston,
Philadelphia, and some port of the Chesapeake? A like concert might be
formed in the appointment of the great offices. He appealed again to
=_the obligations of the Federal compact_= [Articles of Confederation]
=_in force_=, and which had been entered =_into with so much solemnity;
persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to the
plighted faith under which each State, small as well as great, held an
equal right of suffrage in the general councils_=. His remarks were
not the result of partial or local views. The State he represented
(Connecticut) held a middle rank.
Mr. MADISON did justice to the able and close reasoning of Mr.
ELLSWORTH, but must observe that it did not always accord with itself.
On another occasion, the large States were described by him as the
aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small. Now the small are
the House of Lords, requiring a negative to defend them against the
more numerous Commons. Mr. ELLSWORTH had also erred in saying that no
instance had existed in which confederated states had not retained to
themselves a perfect equality of suffrage. Passing over the German
system, in which the King of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr.
ELLSWORTH of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component members
had votes proportioned to their importance, and which Montesquieu
recommends as the fittest model for that form of government. Had the
fact been as stated by Mr. ELLSWORTH, it would have been of little
avail to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments against
him; the history and fate of the several confederacies, modern as
well as ancient, demonstrating some radical vice in their structure.
In reply to the appeal of Mr. ELLSWORTH to the faith plighted in
the existing federal compact, he remarked, that the party claiming
from others an adherence to a common engagement, ought at least to
be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States, however,
Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the
various omissions to perform the stipulated acts, from which no State
was free, the Legislature of that State had, by a pretty recent vote,
_positively refused_ to pass a law for complying with the requisitions
of Congress, and transmitted a copy of the vote to Congress.[155] It
was urged, he said, continually, that an equality of votes in the
second branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be
perfectly safe to the large ones; whose majority in the first branch
was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence,
the majority of States might still injure the majority of the people.
... He admitted that every peculiar interest, whether in any class of
citizens or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as
possible. Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought to be given
a constitutional power of defence. =But he contended that the States
were divided into different interests, not by their difference of size,
but other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly
from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not
having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division
of interests in the United States. It did not lie between the large and
small States. It lay between the Northern and Southern. ...=
Mr. ELLSWORTH assured the House, that, whatever might be thought of
the Representatives of Connecticut, the State was entirely Federal in
her disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in
supplying both men and money. _The muster-rolls would show she had more
troops in the field than Virginia._[156] If she had been delinquent, it
had been from inability, and not more so than other States.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. MADISON animadverted on the delinquency of the States,
when his object required him to prove that the constitution of Congress
was faulty. Congress is not to blame for the faults of the States.
Their measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has been a
further power in Congress to render them effectual.
Mr. DAVIE [North Carolina] was much embarrassed, and wished for
explanations. The Report of the Committee [of the Whole], allowing the
Legislatures to choose the Senate, and establishing a proportional
representation in it, seemed to be impracticable. There will, according
to this rule, be ninety members in the outset, and the number will
increase as new States are added. It was impossible that so numerous
a body could possess the activity and other qualities required in it.
Were he to vote on the comparative merits of the Report, as it stood,
and the amendment, he should be constrained to prefer the latter....
Under this view of the subject, he could not vote for any plan for the
Senate yet proposed. He thought that, in general, there were extremes
on both sides. _We were partly federal, partly national, in our union_;
and he did not see why the Government might not in some respects
operate on the States, in others on the people.
Mr. WILSON admitted the question concerning the number of Senators to
be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others
in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked
forward to the time when the smallest States will contain a hundred
thousand souls at least. Let there be then one Senator in each, for
every hundred thousand souls, and let the States not having that
number of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing himself to submit
to this temporary concession to the small States; and threw out the
idea as a ground of compromise....
Doctor FRANKLIN. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If
a proportional representation takes place, the small States contend
that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is
to be put in its place, the large States say their money will be in
danger. When a broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do
not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint.
In like manner, here, both sides must part from some of their demands,
in order that they may join in some accommodating proposition. He had
prepared one which he would read, that it might lie on the table for
consideration. The proposition was in the words following:
"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose and send
an equal number of delegates, namely ..., who are to compose the
second branch of the General Legislature.
"That in all cases or questions wherein the sovereignty of
individual States may be affected, or whereby their authority over
their own citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the
General Government within the several States augmented, each State
shall have equal suffrage.
"That in the appointment of all civil officers of the General
Government, in the election of whom the second branch may by the
constitution have part, each State shall have equal suffrage.
"That in fixing the salaries of such officers, and in all
allowances for public services, and generally in all appropriations
and disposition of money to be drawn out of the general Treasury;
and in all laws for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of the
several States shall have suffrage in proportion to the sums which
their respective States do actually contribute to the Treasury."
Where a ship had many owners, this was the rule of deciding on her
expedition. He had been one of the ministers from this country to
France during the joint war, and would have been very glad if allowed
to vote in distributing the money to carry it on.
Mr. KING observed, that the simple question was, whether each State
should have an equal vote in the second branch; that it must be
apparent to those gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this
quality, nor the Report as it stood, that the Report was as susceptible
of melioration as the motion; that a reform would be nugatory and
nominal only, if we should make another Congress of the proposed
Senate; that if the adherence to an equality of votes was fixed and
unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on the other side; and
that =_we were in fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut
our eyes against it_=. That he was, however, filled with astonishment,
that, if we were convinced that every _man_ in America was secured
in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial
good to the phantom of _State_ sovereignty. That his feelings were
more harrowed and his fears more agitated for his country than he
could express; that he conceived this to be the last opportunity of
providing for its liberty and happiness: that he could not, therefore,
but repeat his amazement, that when a just government, founded on a
fair representation of the _People_ of America, was within our reach,
we should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal
freedom and importance of _States_. That should this wonderful illusion
continue to prevail, his mind was prepared for any event, rather
than sit down under a Government founded on a vicious principle of
representation, and which must be as short-lived as it would be unjust.
He might prevail on himself to accede to some such expedient as had
been hinted by Mr. WILSON; but =_he never could listen to an equality
of votes, as proposed in the motion_=.
Mr. DAYTON. =_When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted
for argument, he presumed they would have no effect, however eloquently
spoken._= It should have been shown that the evils we have experienced
have proceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the seeds
of dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the General
Government. He considered the system on the table [Virginia Plan] as a
novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would
be received by the people.
Mr. MARTIN [Maryland] =_would never confederate, if it could not be
done on just principles_= [_i.e._, giving small States equal voice in
at least one House].
Mr. MADISON would acquiesce in the concession hinted by Mr. WILSON, on
condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The
plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the
States. The Senate, therefore, is only another edition of Congress. He
knew the faults of that body, and had used a bold language against it.
Still he would preserve the State rights as carefully as the trial by
jury.
Mr. BEDFORD [Delaware] contended, that there was no middle way between
a perfect consolidation, and a mere confederacy of the States. The
first is out of the question; and in the latter they must continue,
if not perfectly, yet _equally_, sovereign. If political societies
possess ambition, avarice, and all the other passions which render
them formidable to each other, ought we not to view them in this light
here? Will not the same motives operate in America as elsewhere? If
any gentleman doubts it, let him look at the votes. Have they not
been dictated by interest, by ambition? =_Are not the large States
evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the
small?_= They think, no doubt, that they have right on their side,
but interest has blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small
State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a
great one. South Carolina is actuated both by present interest, and
future prospects. She hopes, too, to see the other States cut down to
her own dimensions. North Carolina has the same motives of present and
future interest. Virginia follows. Maryland is not on that side of the
question. Pennsylvania has a direct and future interest. Massachusetts
has a decided and palpable interest in the part she takes. ... =_The
three large States have a common interest to bind them together in
commerce._= But whether a combination, as we supposed, shall take place
among them, in either case the small States must be ruined. We must,
like Solon, make such a government as the people will approve. Will the
smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them? It is
not true that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the
present Congress. The language of the people has been, that Congress
ought to have the power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the
States where it may be necessary. On the first point they have been
explicit, and, in a manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must
they not agree to this, and similar measures, if they ever mean to
discharge their engagements? The little States are willing to observe
their engagements, _=but will meet the large ones on no ground but that
of the Confederation. We have been told, with dictatorial air, this is
the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a good government. It will
be the last, indeed, if the propositions reported from the Committee go
forth to the people. He was under no apprehensions. The large States
dare not dissolve the Confederation.= If they do, the small ones will
find some foreign ally, of more honour and good faith, who will take
them by the hand, and do them justice._ He did not mean, by this, to
intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence, which ought to be
avoided by enlarging the Federal powers, not annihilating the Federal
system. This is what the people expect. All agree in the necessity of a
more efficient government, and why not make such an one as they desire?
Mr. ELLSWORTH. Under a National Government, he should participate in
the national security, as remarked by Mr. KING; but that was all. What
he wanted was domestic happiness. The National Government could not
descend to the local objects on which this depended. It could only
embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes, therefore, for
the preservation of his rights, to the State Governments. From these
alone he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life.
His happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new-born infant
on its mother for nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory,
he had nothing to add that could be so.
Mr. KING was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and
as far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by Mr.
ELLSWORTH. He did not think a full answer had been given to those who
apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. ... He
could not sit down without taking some notice of the language of the
honorable gentleman from Delaware (Mr. BEDFORD). It was not he [King]
that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance had marked
the honorable gentleman himself. It was not he [King] who, with a
vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to
turn his hopes from our common country, and court the protection of
some foreign hand. This, too, was the language of the honorable member
himself. He was grieved that such an expression had dropped from his
lips. The gentleman could only excuse it to himself on the score of
passion. For himself, _whatever might be his distress, he would never
court relief from a foreign power_.
Adjourned.
[The vote, taken on the opening of the next session, is recorded as
follows:
"_In Convention_,--On the question for allowing each State one vote
in the second branch, as moved by Mr. ELLSWORTH, it was lost, by
an equal division of votes,--Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, aye--5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, no--5; Georgia, divided (Mr.
Baldwin aye, Mr. Houston, no)."
This was a tie, intentionally made so by the Georgia delegate who
voted last. For this and for the final victory of the "Compromise,"
cf. _American History and Government_, # 203.]
FOOTNOTES:
[150] This was an old royal form, now used by the _State_ instead of by
the King.
[151] Some States dated: "in the year of the Sovereignty and
Independence of the United States the Eleventh." Others were even more
specific than Georgia; as, "in the Eleventh year of the Independence
of the Delaware State"; or, as in New York,--"the Eleventh year of the
Independence of the Said State."
[152] Later, Mason became again convinced there was much such danger.
Cf. No. 161 below.
[153] Observe the motion was a "small-State" move, opposed by the
"large States" in debate as in vote.
[154] This motion had been made the day before. The Convention had
previously agreed that voting in the "first branch" should be in
proportion to population.
[155] This begins the rather unhappy "personalities" of the debate.
[156] Cf. note above.
XXVIII. RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION[157]
162. George Mason's Objections to the Constitution, 1787
Kate Mason Rowland's _Life of George Mason_ (1892), II, 387-390.
Mason had been one of the most enthusiastic of the Philadelphia
Convention in its early stages, writing to his son, after a few
weeks, that he would "bury my bones in Philadelphia" rather than
injure the business by leaving prematurely, though his private
affairs were pressing. But he was more democratic than the
Convention, and, before its close, he came to look upon the results
with suspicion. He refused to sign the completed constitution,
and afterward he opposed its ratification in Virginia. Mason was
the chief author of the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 (No. 136
above). Cf. also No. 163.
_There is no Declaration of Rights_, and, the laws of the general
government being paramount to the laws and constitution of the several
States, the Declaration of Rights in the separate States are no
security. _Nor are the people secured even in the enjoyment of the
benefit of the common law._
In the House of Representatives there is not the substance but
the shadow only of representation; which can never produce proper
information in the legislature, or inspire confidence in the people;
the laws will therefore be generally made by men little concerned in,
and unacquainted with their effects and consequences.
The Senate have the power of altering all money bills, and of
originating appropriations of money, and the salaries of the officers
of their own appointment, in conjunction with the president of the
United States, although they are not the representatives of the people
or amenable to them.
These with their other great powers (viz.: their power in the
appointment of ambassadors and all public officers; in making treaties,
and in trying all impeachments; their influence upon and connection
with the supreme Executive from these causes; their duration of office
and their being a constantly existing body, almost continually sitting;
joined with their being one complete branch of the legislature) will
destroy any balance in the government, and enable them to accomplish
what usurpations they please upon the rights and liberties of the
people.
The Judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as
to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several States; thereby
rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as
unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England, and
enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.
The President of the United States has no Constitutional Council, a
thing unknown in any safe and regular government. He will therefore
be unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally
be directed by minions and favorites; or he will become a tool to
the Senate--or a Council of State will grow out of the principal
officers of the great departments; the worst and most dangerous of
all ingredients for such a Council in a free country. From this fatal
defect has arisen the improper power of the Senate in the appointment
of public officers, and the alarming dependence and connection between
that branch of the legislature and the supreme Executive.
Hence also sprung that unnecessary officer the Vice-President, who
for want of other employment is made president of the Senate, thereby
dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers, besides
always giving to some one of the States an unnecessary and unjust
preeminence over the others.
The President of the United States has the unrestrained power of
granting pardons for treason, which may be sometimes exercised to
screen from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit
the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt.
By declaring all treaties supreme laws of the land, the Executive and
the Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legislation;
which might have been avoided by proper distinctions with respect to
treaties, and requiring the assent of the House of Representatives,
where it could be done with safety.
By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and navigation
laws, the five Southern States, whose produce and circumstances are
totally different from that of the eight Northern and Eastern States,
may be ruined, for such rigid and premature regulations may be made as
will enable the merchants of the Northern and Eastern States not only
to demand an exorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the
commodities at their own price, for many years, to the great injury of
the landed interest, and impoverishment of the people; and the danger
is the greater as the gain on one side will be in proportion to the
loss on the other. Whereas requiring two-thirds of the members present
in both Houses would have produced mutual moderation, promoted the
general interest, and removed an insuperable objection to the adoption
of this government.
=_Under their own construction of the general clause, at the end of
the enumerated powers_=,[158] the Congress may grant monopolies in
trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and severe
punishments, and extend their powers as far as they shall think proper;
so that the State legislatures have no security for the powers now
presumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights.
_There is no declaration of any kind, for preserving the liberty of the
press, or the trial by jury in civil causes; nor against the danger of
standing armies in time of peace._
The State legislatures are restrained from laying export duties on
their own produce.
Both the general legislature and the State legislature are expressly
prohibited making _ex post facto_ laws; though there never was nor can
be a legislature but must and will make such laws, when necessity and
the public safety require them; which will hereafter be a breach of
all the constitutions in the Union, and afford precedents for other
innovations.
=This government will set out a moderate aristocracy=: it is at present
impossible to foresee whether it will, in its operation, produce a
monarchy, or a corrupt, tyrannical aristocracy; it will most probably
vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the one or
the other.
The general legislature is restrained from prohibiting the further
importation of slaves for twenty odd years; though such importations
render the United States weaker, more vulnerable, and less capable of
defence.
163. Mason's Explanation of the Preparation of his "Objections" (and
Accusation of "Railroading" through the Plan of the Majority)
_George Mason to Thomas Jefferson_ [_in France_]
_Records of the Federal Convention_, III, 304-305.
VIRGINIA, GUNSTON HALL, May 26, 1788.
I make no Doubt that You have long ago received Copies of the new
Constitution. ... Upon the most mature consideration I was capable of,
and from Motives of sincere Patriotism, I was under the Necessity of
refusing my Signature, as one of the Virginia Delegates; and drew up
some general Objections; which I intended to offer, by way of Protest;
but was discouraged from doing so, by the precipitate and intemperate,
not to say indecent, Manner, in which the Business was conducted during
the last week of the Convention, after the Patrons of this New Plan
formed they had a decided Majority in their Favour: which was obtained
by a Compromise between the Eastern and the two Southern States, to
permit the latter to continue the Importation of Slaves for twenty odd
years; a more favorite Object with them than the Liberty and Happiness
of the People.
164. An Unfriendly Account of Hancock's Support of the Constitution in
the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention of 1788
_Writings of Laco_, VII, 23 ff. (a series of "Letters" published by
Stephen Higginson and other Federalists, in 1789, to defeat Hancock
in his candidacy for reëlection to the governorship). Higginson
was a Boston merchant, and a leading Federalist. The "plan" he
refers to as placed in Hancock's hands, favored the adoption of the
Constitution with a list of amendments to be adopted later by the
new government.
There are men in every free society, who have not a common interest
with the community at large; and who rely wholly on the popular
affection in their favour, to give them promotion and support in
publick life. ... Without abilities to make them really useful in
publick life, and devoid of principles or merits that can command
respect, they have no dependence but upon popular attention to bring
them into view; and, having been long attentive to the popular pulse,
and always acquainted with the darling object with the multitude for
the time, they rarely fail to touch the right string, and to make the
people subserve their own selfish and private views. ... There cannot
be found within the compass of our memory, an instance, so strongly
verifying the preceding observation, as that of Mr. H. and his adhering
dependents....
... The course of his conduct from his reassuming the chair, to the
meeting of our State Convention, for considering and adopting the new
form of government for the Union, was nothing more than a renewed
exhibition of the same levities, and a uniform preference of his own
private interest, to that of the public.
A scene now opens upon us, very interesting and important:--The objects
which [were] then presented for our consideration, were so novel,
and of such magnitude, as deservedly engrossed the feelings and the
attention of every man. No one could remain mute and indifferent, while
the question as to the New Constitution was pending; and every one,
who felt no other bias than a regard to the safety and happiness of
our country, ... was most anxiously solicitous for its adoption. But
the popular demagogues, and those [who] were very much embarrassed
in their affairs, united to oppose it with all their might; and they
laboured incessantly, night and day, to alarm the simple and credulous,
by insinuating, that, however specious its appearance, and that of its
advocates, tyranny and vassalage would result from its principles.
The former of those descriptions were conscious, that a stable and
efficient government would deprive them of all future importance, or
support from the publick; and the latter of them knew, that nothing
but weakness and convulsions in government could screen them from
payment of their debts. How far Mr. H. was influenced by either, or
both of those motives, it is not easy to determine; but no one, who
recollects his general habits, who knows his situation and views, and
was acquainted with the open conversation and conduct of his cabinet
counsellors, can have a doubt of his being opposed to it. We all know,
that Mr. Quondam, and Mr. Changeling, as well as the _once venerable
old Patriot_ [Samuel Adams], who, by a notable defection, has lately
thrown himself into the arms of Mr. H. in violation of every principle;
and for the paltry privilege of sharing in his smiles, has, at the eve
of life, cast an indelible stain over his former reputation--it is
well known, I say, that these men do not dare to speak in publick a
language opposite to that of their patron; and it is equally notorious,
that they were open in their opposition to the Constitution--They
even went so far as to vilify its compilers, that they might thence
draw an argument to support their suggestions of its containing the
seeds of latent tyranny and oppression. They endeavoured by every
possible mean in their power, to create a popular clamour against the
Constitution; but they failed in their attempt; and Mr. H. and his
friends were obliged, upon their own principles to grow more cautious
in their opposition. The good sense of the _Mechanicks of Boston_ had
produced some manly and spirited resolutions, which effectually checked
Mr. H. and his followers in their opposition to the Constitution; and
eventually occasioned _four_ votes in its favour, which otherwise would
have been most certainly against it. Had those resolutions not made
their appearance, Mr. H. and three others of our Delegates would have
been in the negative; but it was thought necessary by them, after they
had appeared, to vote in favour of it. Having settled this point, the
next thing was to do it with a good grace, and to profit as much by it
as they could; and Mr. H. accordingly intimated to the advocates for
the adoption, that he would appear in its favour, if they would make
it worth his while. This intimation was given through a common friend,
who assured the friends of the Constitution, that nothing more would
be required on the part of Mr. H. than a promise to support him in the
chair at the next election. This promise, though a bitter pill, was
agreed to be given; for such was the state of things, that they were
very much afraid to decide upon the question, whilst he was opposed to
it. The famous conciliatory proposition of Mr. H. as it was called,
was then prepared by the advocates, and adopted by him; but the truth
is, he never was consulted about it, nor knew its contents, before it
was handed to him to bring forward in Convention. At the appointed
time, Mr. H. with all the parade of an Arbiter of States, came out with
the motion, not only in the words, but the very original paper that
was given him; and, with a confidence astonishing to all who were in
the secret, he called it his own, and said it was the result of his
own reflections on the subject, in the short intervals of ease which
he had enjoyed, during a most painful disorder. In this pompous and
farcical manner did he make that famous proposition, upon which he and
his adherents have arrogated so much; but neither he nor they have any
other merit in the case, than an attempt to deceive both parties can
fairly entitle them. For, at the very time he was buoying up the hopes
of the advocates, he was assuring the opposers of the Constitution,
by his emissaries, that he was really adverse to it; and upon the
strictest scrutiny we cannot find that any one vote was gained by his
being ostensibly in favour of it. The votes of the Old Patriot, and Mr.
Changeling, and Mr. Joyce, jun. we know were determined in its favour
by the resolutions of the Mechanicks; but the votes of many others,
who used implicitly to follow Mr. H. were in the negative, which were
counted upon by the friends of the Constitution, as being certain on
their side. This is a strong confirmation that Mr. H. was then playing
a game, which these people well understood; and indeed they, some of
them, explicitly declared it at the time. His subsequent conduct, in
regard to amendments, is a clear proof also, that by appearing in its
favour in Convention, he did not mean to support it; and that he was
not serious when he declared his proposition to be only conciliatory,
and not to remedy any defects existing in his mind in the constitution
as reported, which he explicitly declared at the time was the case.
165. The Federal Constitution
Recommended by the Philadelphia Convention to the States, September
17, 1787; ratified by the ninth State, June 21, 1788; in effect,
April 30, 1789 (_American History and Government_, ## 210, 212).
The text is that authorized by the Department of State and
printed in the _Revised Statutes_ (1878), except for the footnote
references and the brackets used in a few instances to inclose
portions of the document no longer effective, and for the omission
of numbers for the paragraphs. Interpolated explanatory matter is
in the same type as this paragraph, and is placed within marks of
parenthesis.
We the People[159] of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,[160] and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America.
ARTICLE I
SECTION 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.
SECTION 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.[161]
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the
Age of twenty five-Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State
in which he shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective numbers [which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years], and excluding Indians not taxed, [three fifths of all other
Persons].[162] The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years
after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall
by Law direct.[163] The number of Representatives shall not exceed one
for every thirty Thousand,[164] but each State shall have at Least one
Representative; [and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of
New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York
six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six,
Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia
three].
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
SECTION 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen [by the Legislature thereof],[165] for
six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.
[Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the
first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three
Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated
at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the
Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration
of the sixth Year], so that one third may be chosen every second
Year;[166] and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during
the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may
make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature,
which shall then fill such Vacancies.
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which
he shall be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they[167] be equally divided.