THE UPPER AND NETHER MILLSTONES.
From the earliest moment General Grant assumed command in the West, the
old idea of bisecting the Confederacy seems to have monopolized his
mind. The oft-tried theory of "drilling the heart of the Rebellion"--by
cutting through to the Atlantic seaboard--had never been lost sight of,
but in Grant's hands it was to be given practical power and direction.
To effect that object, it was essential to make North Georgia the
objective point; and North Georgia--now as ever--offered a stubborn and
well-nigh insurmountable barrier. But the northern War Department was
now fully impressed with the importance of crushing the spine of the
Confederacy; and the fact was as clearly realized in the North, as in
the South, that the vital cord of Confederate being ran from Atlanta to
Richmond! Therefore, every facility of men and material was furnished
the commander, who at that moment stood out--in reflected lights from
Vicksburg and Missionary Ridge--as the military oracle of the North;
and he was urged to press this design of the campaign to a vigorous and
speedy issue.
During the winter of 1863-64, General Grant incubated his grand scheme,
and with the month of February brought forth a quadruple brood of
ridiculous mice.
His plan--in itself a good and sound one--was to secure a permanent
base nearer than the Mississippi. To accomplish this he must first
secure Mobile, as a water base, and connect that with some defensible
point inland. At the same time that this attempt was made--and while
the troops guarding the passway into Georgia might be diverted--Thomas,
commanding the Chattanooga lines, was to advance against that point.
The plan was undoubtedly sound, but the general's want of balance
caused him to overweight it, until its own ponderousness was its
destruction. On the 1st of February, Sherman, with a splendidly-appointed
force of 35,000 infantry, and corresponding cavalry and artillery,
marched out of Vicksburg; to penetrate to Mobile, or some other point
more accessible, on the line of the proposed new base. Simultaneously a
heavy force approached the city from New Orleans; Smith and Grierson,
with a strong body of cavalry, penetrated Northern Mississippi; and
Thomas made his demonstration referred to.
Any candid critic will see that four converging columns, to be
effective, should never have operated so far away from their point of
convergence, and so far separated from each other. The enterprise was
gigantic; but its awkwardness equaled its strength, and its own weight
broke its back.
Sherman, harassed by cavalry and skirmishers--advanced in solid column;
while Polk, with his merely nominal force, was unable to meet him. But
the latter fell back in good order; secured his supplies, and so
retarded his stronger adversary, that he saved all the rolling-stock of
the railroads. When he evacuated Meridian, that lately busy railroad
center was left a worthless prize to the captor.
Meantime Forrest had harassed the cavalry force of Smith and Grierson,
with not one-fourth their numbers; badly provided and badly mounted.
Yet he managed to inflict heavy loss and retard the enemy's march; but
finally--unable to wait the junction of S. D. Lee, to give the battle
he felt essential--Forrest, on the 20th February, faced the Federal
squadrons. Confident of an easy victory over the ragged handful of
dismounted skirmishers, the picked cavalry dashed gaily on. Charge
after charge was received only to be broken--and Forrest was soon in
full pursuit of the whipped and demoralized columns. Only once they
turned, were heavily repulsed, and then continued their way to Memphis.
This check of his co-operating column and the utter fruitlessness of
his own march, induced a sudden change of Sherman's intent. He fell
rapidly back to Vicksburg; his army perhaps more worn, broken and
demoralized by the desultory attentions of ours, than it would have
been by a regular defeat.
Meantime the New Orleans-Pensacola expedition had danced on and off
Mobile without result. Thomas had been so heavily repulsed on the 25th,
that he hastily withdrew to his lines at Chickamauga--and the great
campaign of General Grant had resulted in as insignificant a fizz as
any costly piece of fireworks the war produced.
On the contrary, history will give just meed to Forrest, Lee and Polk
for their efficient use of the handfuls of ill-provided men, with whom
alone they could oppose separate and organized armies. They saved
Alabama and Georgia--and so, for the time, saved the Confederacy. There
could be no doubt that the sole safety of the invading columns was
their numerical weakness. General Grant's practice of a perfectly sound
theory was clearly a gross blunder; and had Polk been in command of two
divisions more--had Lee been able to swoop where he only hovered--or
had Forrest's ragged boys been only doubled in number--the story told
in Vicksburg would have been even less flattering to the strategic
ability of the commander.
As it was, he had simply made a bad failure, and given the South two
months' respite from the crushing pressure he was yet to apply. For the
pet scheme of the North was but foiled--not ruined; and her whole power
sang but the one refrain--_Delenda est Atlanta!_
And those two months could not be utilized to much effect by the South.
Worn in resources, supplies--in everything but patient endurance, she
still came forth from the dark doubts the winter had raised, hopeful,
if not confident; calm, if conscious of the portentous clouds lowering
upon her horizon.
Meanwhile, Grant, elevated to a lieutenant-generalcy, had been
transferred to the Potomac frontier; and men, money, supplies--without
stint or limit--had been placed at his disposal.
On the 1st February, Mr. Lincoln had called for 500,000 men; and on the
14th March for 200,000 more!
General Grant, himself, testified to the absolute control given him, in
a letter to Mr. Lincoln, under date of 1st May, '64--from Culpeper C.
H., which concludes: "I have been astonished at the readiness with
which everything asked for has been granted without any explanation
being asked. Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the
least I can say is, that the fault is not with you."
With these unlimited resources, he was given almost unlimited power;
and the jubilant North crowed as loudly as it had before Manassas, the
Seven Days, or Fredericksburg.
In Richmond all was quiet. The Government had done all it could, and
the people had responded with a generous unanimity that ignored all
points of variance between it and them. All the supplies that could be
collected and forwarded, under the very imperfect systems, were sent to
the armies; all the arms that could be made, altered or repaired, were
got ready; and every man not absolutely needed elsewhere--with the rare
exceptions of influence and favoritism openly defying the law--was
already at the front.
And seeing that all was done as well as might be, the Capital
waited--not with the buoyant hopefulness of the past--but with patient
and purposeful resolve.
And the ceaseless clang of preparation, cut by the ceaseless yell of
anticipated triumph, still echoed over the Potomac--ever nearer and
ever louder. Then, by way of interlude, on the 28th March, came the
notorious Dahlgren raid. Though Kilpatrick was demoralized and driven
back by the reserves in the gunless works; though Custar's men retired
before the furloughed artillerists and home guards; and though
Dahlgren's picked cavalry were whipped in the open field by one-fourth
their number of Richmond clerks and artisans!--boys and old men who had
never before been under fire--still the object of that raid remains a
blot even upon the page of this uncivilized warfare. It were useless to
enter into details of facts so well and clearly proved. That the orders
of Dahlgren's men were to release the prisoners, burn, destroy and
murder, the papers found on his dead body showed in plainest terms.
No wonder, then, that many in Richmond drew comfort from soothing
belief in special Providence, when three trained columns of picked
cavalry were turned back in disgraceful flight, by a handful of
invalids, old men and boys!
The feeling in Richmond against the raiders was bitter and universal.
Little vindictive, in general, the people clamored that arson and
murder--as set forth in Dahlgren's orders--merited more serious
punishment than temporary detention and highflown denunciation. The
action of the Government in refusing summary vengeance on the
cavalrymen captured, was indubitably just and proper. Whatever their
object, and whatever their orders, they were captured in arms and were
but prisoners of war; and, besides, they had not really intended more
than dozens of other raiders had actually accomplished on a smaller
scale.
But the people would not see this. They murmured loudly against the
weakness of not making these men an example. And more than one of the
papers used this as the handle for violent abuse of the Government and
of its chief.
At last all preparations were complete; and the northern army--as
perfect in equipment, drill and discipline as if it had never been
defeated--came down to the Rapidan.
Grant divided his army into three corps, under Hancock, Warren and
Sedgwick; and on the 5th May, his advance crossed the river, only to
find Lee quietly seated in his path. Then commenced that series of
battles, unparalleled for bloody sacrifice of men and obstinacy of
leader--a series of battles that should have written General Grant the
poorest strategist who had yet inscribed his name on the long roll of
reverses. And yet, by a strange fatality, they resulted in making him a
hero to the unthinking masses of his countrymen.
Lee's right rested on the Orange road; and an attempt, after the
crossing, to turn it, was obstinately repulsed during the entire day,
by Heth and Wilcox. During the night Hancock's corps crossed the river,
and next morning received a fierce assault along his whole line. The
fighting was fierce and obstinate on both sides; beating back the right
and left of Hancock's line, while sharply repulsed on the center
(Warren's). Still his loss was far heavier than ours, and the result of
the battles of the Wilderness was to put some 23,000 of Grant's men
_hors de combat_; to check him and to force a change of plan at the
very threshold of his "open door to Richmond." For next day (7th May)
he moved toward Fredericksburg railroad, in a blind groping to flank
Lee.
It is curious to note the different feeling in Washington and Richmond
on receipt of the news. In the North--where the actual truth did not
reach--there was wild exultation. The battles of the Wilderness were
accounted a great victory; Lee was demoralized and would be swept from
the path of the conquering hero; Grant had at last really found the
"open door!" In Richmond there was a calm and thankful feeling that the
first clinch of the deadly tug had resulted in advantage. Waning
confidence in the valor of men, and discretion of the general, was
strengthened, and a somewhat hopeful spirit began to be infused into
the people. Still they felt there would be a deadlier strain this time
than ever before, and that the fresh and increasing thousands of the
North could be met but by a steadily diminishing few--dauntless,
tireless and true--but still how weak! Yet there was no _give_ to
the southern spirit, and--as ever in times of deadliest strain and
peril--it seemed to rise more buoyant from the pressure.
Next came the news of those fearful fights at Spottsylvania, on the 8th
and 9th--in which the enemy lost three to our one--preceding the great
battle of the 12th May. By a rapid and combined attack the enemy broke
Lee's line, captured a salient with Generals Ed Johnson and George H.
Stewart and part of their commands, and threatened, for the time, to
cut his army in two. But Longstreet and Hill sent in division after
division from the right and left, and the fight became general and
desperate along the broken salient. The Yankees fought with obstinacy
and furious pluck. Charge after charge was broken and hurled back. On
they came again--ever to the shambles! Night fell on a field piled
thick with bodies of the attacking force; in front of the broken
salient was a perfect charnel-house!
By his own confession, Grant drove into the jaws of death at Spottsylvania
_over 27,000 men_! But his object was, for the second time, utterly
frustrated; and again he turned to the left--still dogged and
obstinate--still seeking to flank Lee.
On the 14th, Grant was again repulsed so sharply that his advance
withdrew; and then the "greatest strategist since Napoleon" struck out
still for his cherished left; and, leaving "the open door," passed down
the Valley of the Rappahannock.
Lee's calm sagacity foresaw the enemy's course, and on the 23d Grant
met him face to face, in a strong position near the North Anna.
Blundering upon Lee's lines, throwing his men blindly against works
that were proved invincible, he was heavily repulsed in two
attacks--with aggregate loss amounting to a bloody battle. Failing in
the second attack (on the 25th) Grant swung off--still to the left--and
crossing the Pamunkey two days later, took up strong position near Cold
Harbor on the last day of May.
Lee also moved down to face Grant, throwing his works up on a slight
curve extending from Atlee's, on the Central Railroad, across the old
Cold Harbor field--averaging some nine miles from Richmond. Our general
was satisfied with the results of the campaign thus far; the army was
buoyant and confident, and the people were more reliant than they had
been since Grant had crossed the Rapidan. They felt that the nearness
of his army to Richmond in no sense argued its entrance into her
coveted defenses; and memories of Seven Pines, and of that other Cold
Harbor, arose to comfort them.
In the North, great was the jubilee. It was asserted that Grant could
now crush Lee and capture his stronghold at a single blow; that the
present position was only the result of his splendid strategy and
matchless daring; and the vapid boast, "I will fight it out on this
line if it takes all summer"--actually uttered while he was blindly
groping his way, by the left, to the Pamunkey!--was swallowed whole by
the credulous masses of the North. They actually believed that Grant's
position was one of choice, not of necessity; and that Lee's movement
to cover Richmond from his erratic advance--though it ever presented an
unbroken front to him, and frequently drove him back with heavy
loss--was still a retreat!
Both sides can look now calmly and critically at this campaign--seemingly
without a fixed plan, and really so hideously costly in blood. When
Grant crossed the Rapidan, he could have had no other intention than to
sweep Lee from his front; and either by a crushing victory, or a forced
retreat, drive him toward Richmond. Failing signally at the Wilderness,
he abandoned this original plan and took up the Fredericksburg line.
Here again the disastrous days of Spottsylvania foiled him completely;
and he struck for the Tappahannock and Fort Royal line. Lee's emphatic
repulse of his movement on the North Anna again sent Grant across the
Pamunkey; and _into the very tracks of McClellan two years
before_!
But there was one vast difference. McClellan had reached this base with
no loss. Grant, with all McClellan's experience to teach him, had not
reached this point at a cost of less than 70,000 men!
Had he embarked his troops in transports and sailed up the river, Grant
might have landed his army at the White House in twenty-four hours; and
that without the firing of a shot. But he had chosen a route that was
to prove him not only the greatest strategist of the age, but the most
successful as well. The difference of the two was simply this: he took
twenty-six days instead of one; he fought nine bloody engagements
instead of none; he made four separate changes in his digested plan of
advance; and he lost 70,000 men to gain a position a condemned general
had occupied two years before without a skirmish!
But the people of the North did not see this. They were only allowed
partial reports of losses and changes of plan; they were given
exaggerated statements of the damage done to Lee and of his dire
strait; and the fact of Grant's proximity to the Rebel Capital was made
the signal for undue and premature rejoicing. He was already
universally declared the captor of Richmond, by a people willing to
accept a fact with no thought of its cost; to accept a result for the
causes that produced it.
But Grant was now in a position when he could not afford to await the
slow course of siege operations. He could not allow time for the hubbub
at the North to die away and reflection to take its place. Blood to him
was no thicker than water; and he must vindicate the boasts of his
blind admirers--cost thousands of lives though it might. Once more he
marshaled his re-enforced ranks, only to hurl them into the jaws of
death. For though worn away by the fearful friction of numbers--melted
slowly in the fiery furnace of battle--the little Confederate force sat
behind its works, grim, defiant--dangerous as ever!
Could Grant crush out that handful by the pure weight of his fresh
thousands--could he literally hurl enough flesh and blood against it to
sweep it before him--then the key of every road to Richmond was in his
hands! So, on the morning of the 3d of June, Hancock's corps rushed to
the assault.
Impetuous and fierce, the charge broke Breckinridge's line. Fresh men
poured in and, for a moment, the works were in the enemy's hands. But
it was only for a moment. They rallied, relief came--the conflict was
fierce and close--but it was short. When the smoke rose, Hancock's line
was broken and retreating. Again and again he rallied it splendidly,
only to be hurled back each time with deadlier slaughter. On the other
points Warren and Burnside had been driven back with terrible loss; and
along the whole southern line the death-dealing volley into the
retreating ranks rang the joyous notes of victory. Grant had played the
great stake of his campaign and lost it!
He had lost it completely, and in an incredibly short time. Near 30,000
men told the horrid story of that ferocious hurling of flesh and blood
against earthworks. Near one-fifth of his whole force had paid for his
last great blunder, while the Confederate loss was less than _one-tenth_
his own!
Even McClellan's line had failed the sledge-hammer strategist, and
nothing was left but to transfer his army to the south side of the
James. Lingering with dogged pertinacity on his slow retreat--turning
at every road leading to the prize he yearned for, only to be beaten
back--Grant finally crossed the river with his whole force on the 13th
of June.
The great campaign was over. It had been utterly foiled at every point;
had been four times turned into a new channel only to be more signally
broken; and had ended in a bloody and decisive defeat that left Grant
no alternative but to give up his entire plan and try a new one on a
totally different line. For the southern arms it had been one unbroken
success from the Rapidan to Cold Harbor; for though sometimes badly
hurt, the Confederates had never once been driven from an important
position; had never once failed to turn the enemy from his chosen line
of advance--and had disabled at the least calculation 120,000 of his
men at the cost of less than 17,000 of their own!
Such was the southern view, at the moment, of this campaign of
invasion; as unparalleled in the history of war, as was that of
Stonewall Jackson in the Valley. Such is the view of southern thinkers,
to-day; and it is backed by the clearest judgment and calmest criticism
of the North.
That success was made the test of merit; that attrition at last wore
away unre-enforced resistance; that highest honors in life, and
national sorrow in death, were rewards of a man--truly great in many
regards, if justly measured; all these are no proof that General Grant
was either a strategist, or a thinker; no denial that his Rapidan
campaign--equally in its planning and its carrying out--was a bald and
needlessly-bloody failure!
And, realizing this at the supreme moment, can it be wondered that the
people of Richmond, as well as the victorious little army, grew hopeful
once more? Is it strange that--mingled with thanksgivings for
deliverance, unremitting care of the precious wounded, and sorrow for
the gallant dead of many a Virginia home--there rose a solemn
joyousness over the result, that crowned the toil, the travail and the
loss?
And so the South, unrefreshed but steadfast, girded her loins for the
new wrestle with the foe, now felt to be implacable!