PUBLIC POLICY IN RESPECT TO MONOPOLY
§ 1. Moral judgments of competition and monopoly. § 2. Public character
of private trade. § 3. Evil economic effects of monopolistic price.
§ 4. Common law on restraint of trade. § 5. Growing disapproval of
combination. § 6. Competition sometimes favored regardless of results.
§ 7. Increasing regard for results of competition. § 8. Common law remedy
for monopoly ineffective. § 9. First federal legislation against
monopoly. § 10. Policy of the Sherman anti-trust law. § 11. Policy of
monopoly-accepted-and-regulated. § 12. Field of its application. § 13.
Industrial trusts,--a natural evolution? § 14. Artificial versus natural
growth. § 15. Kinds of unfair practices. § 16. Growing conception of
fair competition. § 17. The trust issues in 1912. § 18. Anti-trust
legislation in 1914.
§ 1. #Moral judgments of competition and monopoly.# What should be the
attitude of society toward monopoly? Is it good or bad as compared
with competition? Some very strong ethical judgments bearing on
practical problems are found in the popular mind connected with the
ideas of competition and monopoly. Competition usually is pronounced
bad when viewed from the standpoint of the competitors who are losing
by it, and as good when viewed from the standpoint of the traders on
the other side of the market who gain by that competition. Competition
among buyers thus appears to sellers to be a good thing; that among
sellers appears to themselves to be a bad thing (and _vice versa_).
Many persons are moved by sympathy to pronounce competition among
low-paid and underfed workers to be bad, and each worker is convinced
that it is so in his own trade. Yet nearly all men are of one mind
that competition is a good thing in most industries, those that are
thought of as supplying "the general public." Monopoly is believed by
the public to be wrong in such cases, and competition to be the normal
and right condition of trade. Yet there are some men interested in
"large business" who look upon competition as bad, and upon monopoly
as having essentially the nature of friendly coöperation. The roots
of these opinions, or prejudices, are easily discoverable in the
theoretical study of the nature of monopoly.[1] Yet often different
men or groups of men feel so strongly on this matter, viewing it from
their own standpoints, that they are quite unable to understand
how any one else can feel otherwise. There is thus a great deal of
controversy to no purpose.
§ 2. #Public character of private trade.# Any such general judgment as
that of the public, tho it may be mistaken in some details, is likely
to be a resultant of broad experience. There is in competitive trade a
public, a social character, which monopoly destroys. Even in a simple
auction, when the bidding is really competitive, price depends far
less on shrewd bargaining, on bluff, or on stubbornness, than is the
case in isolated trade. Each bidder is compelled by self-interest to
outbid his less eager competitors, and thus the limits within which
the price must fall are narrowly fixed. The auction-sale is less a
purely personal matter, takes on a more public aspect, has a more
socialized character than isolated trade, depends more on forces
outside the control of any one man, and results in a price fixed with
greater definiteness. The price in a more developed market results
from the play of impersonal forces, or at least from the play of
personal forces which have come under the rules of the market.[2] This
price men are ready to accept as fair. It has a democratic character,
whereas the gains of monopoly price arouse resentment as being the
work of personal, and felt to be despotic, power. Monopoly price is a
bad price to the one who pays it, not only because it is a high price
but because it bears the character of personal extortion.
The medieval notion of _justum pretium_, the just price, may have
been often misapplied, and it was often criticized and ridiculed by
economists in the period of idealized competition (from Adam Smith
to John Stuart Mill). But at the heart of the notion was the judgment
that general uniform prices fixed in the open market are the proper
norms for prices when one of the traders is caught at an exceptional
disadvantage. The modern world has been compelled to reëxamine the
conception of the just price.
§ 3. #Evil economic effects of monopolistic price.# Theoretical
analysis confirms this view. Any exercise of monopolistic power over
price keeps some, the weaker bidders, from getting any of the desired
goods, or limits them to their most urgently desired units. What
may be called "the theoretically correct price"[3] with two-sided
competition is the one that permits the maximum number of trades
with a margin of gain to each trader. In narrowing the possibility of
substitution of goods by trade, the sum of values of goods for most
men is diminished. All citizens thus that are the victims of an
artificially created scarcity look upon monopoly as "bad," just
as they do upon the evils of nature--drought, locusts, fires, and
pestilence. A monopoly has an indirect and more distant effect upon
the spirit of all those trading with it. If they are producers selling
at prices depressed by monopoly, their money incomes are reduced; if
they are consumers buying at monopoly prices, their real-incomes are
reduced; in either case their psychic incomes, the motives of all
industry, are diminished, and their industrial energies are relaxed.
§ 4. #Common law on restraint of trade.# The first recorded case in
English law, wherein the courts sought to prevent the limiting of
competition by agreement, runs back to the year 1415, in the reign
of Henry V. This was a very simple case of a contract in restraint of
trade, whereby a dyer agreed not to practise his craft within the town
for half a year. The court declared the contract illegal (and hence
unenforceable in a court) and administered a severe reproof to the
craftsman who made it. Thus was set forth the doctrine of the moral
and legal obligation of each economic agent to compete fully, freely,
and without restraint upon his action, even restraint imposed upon
himself by a contract voluntarily entered into for his own advantage.
Not until the eighteenth century was this rigid doctrine somewhat
relaxed so as to permit the sale of the "good will" of a business
under limited conditions, and some "reasonable" contracts in restraint
of trade. Later the emphasis was somewhat further shifted, by judicial
interpretations, from the notion of free competition to that of "fair"
competition, so as to permit contracts involving moderate restraint of
trade, if the essential element of competition was retained. Thus
it was said that a piano manufacturer might by contract grant an
exclusive agency to a dealer in a certain territory, there being many
other competing makes of pianos, and such a contract "does not operate
to suppress competition nor to regulate the production or sale of any
commodity."[4] But with such moderate limitations the courts in cases
under the common law have steadily disapproved contracts in restraint
of trade that would appear to be to the disadvantage of third parties,
whether producers or consumers.
§ 5. #Growing disapproval of combination.# The attitude of the courts
became in one respect stricter. Some earlier cases involved the
doctrine that what is lawful for an individual to do alone is lawful
if done in combination with others. Indeed, a comparatively recent
case[5] declared regarding a group of dealers, agreeing not to deal
with another, that "desire to free themselves from competition was a
sufficient excuse" for such action. But the general trend has been
to the doctrine that a combination of men "has hurtful powers
and influences not possessed by the individual." Hence threats of
associations of traders (retailers or wholesalers) not to deal with
another if he continued to deal with some third party have been
declared acts in restraint of trade.[6] Yet in the case cited the
court seemed to have been more concerned with protecting "the
individual against encroachment upon his rights by a greater power,"
"one of the most sacred duties of the courts," than with rights and
interests of the general public, endangered by such restraint of
trade.
§ 6. #Competition sometimes favored regardless of results.# In another
respect the courts have wavered in their attitude toward competition,
the general doctrine being that competition, particularly the cutting
of prices, is absolutely justifiable, regardless of circumstances. In
the leading English case[7] the facts were that the larger steamship
companies sent to Hankow additional ships, now called, figuratively,
"fighting ships," to "smash" freights in order to ruin tramp steamship
owners and drive them out of the field. The court held that this
constituted no legal wrong to the tramp steamship owners, and scouted
the idea of the court's looking at the motives in price cutting,
or taking into consideration in any way what the court called "some
imaginary normal standard of freights and prices." And of this case
the lawyer is forced to say: "Undoubtedly the excellent opinion just
quoted represents the law everywhere," even tho there are other cases
difficult to harmonize with it.[8]
To the economist, not bound in like manner by legal precedent, such
a verdict was from the first impossible. The court appears to have
considered that only the rights of the private litigants, the tramp
steamship owners, were involved, not the rights and interests of the
shipping public; it considered the immediate and not the ultimate
effects of the "smashing" of rates; it allowed itself to be deceived
by the appearance of acts that in outer form were competition,
but that had as their purpose the strengthening and maintenance of
monopoly. These acts are forms of the "unfair" practices that will be
mentioned later.[9]
§ 7. #Increasing regard for results of competition.# Despite the
binding precedents, the courts in some later decisions have refused
to look upon competition as good regardless of its motives and of its
consequences. In a federal case[10] the judge, in a brief and acute
dictum, recognized the evil of a rate war that would result from
threats of definite cuts. They impair "the usefulness of the railroads
themselves, and cause great public and private loss." The court's
opinion was no doubt largely influenced by the fact that railroad
rates were already subject to regulation: "Every precaution has been
taken by state legislatures and by the congress to keep them just and
reasonable,--just and reasonable for the public and for the carriers."
In a state case[11] the facts were that a man of wealth started a
barber shop and employed a barber to injure the plaintiff and drive
him out of business. The court recognized that while, as a general
proposition, "competition in trade and business is desirable," it
may in certain cases result in "grievous and manifold wrongs to
individuals"; and in this case the "malevolent" man of wealth was
declared to be "guilty of a wanton wrong and an actionable tort."
The economists can but pronounce this judgment admirable so far as it
goes, but it is remarkably confined to a consideration of the private
legal rights of the injured competitor, and gives hardly a hint of
a higher criterion for judging competitive acts, that of the general
welfare.
§ 8. #Common law remedy for monopoly ineffective.# The common law
contained prohibitions enough, both broad and specific, against
contracts and acts in restraint of trade. The common law contained
likewise a closely related body of doctrine by which the railroads,
as common carriers, ought to have given equitable and undiscriminating
rates to all shippers. There was a strong body of influential opinion
that long maintained that the case was sufficiently covered, that the
only thing needed was to enforce the common law. Even now, after all
that has elapsed, there are some in railroad and business circles
who still appear to hold that opinion. But the evils of railroad
discrimination and of other monopolistic practices continued, and for
some cause the common law was not enforced, excepting occasionally,
disconnectedly, and without important results.
Why? The answer may be ventured that in the common law the whole
question of restraint of trade was treated primarily as one of private
rights and only incidentally as one involving general public policy.
Cases came before the courts only on complaint of some individual
that felt injured. Now the injury of higher prices due to contracts in
restraint of trade is usually diffused among many customers, and
the loss of any one is less than the expense of bringing suit.
Consequently, it rarely happened that cases were brought before the
courts except by one of the two equally guilty parties to a contract
in restraint of trade, when the other party had failed in some way to
do his part. When such an illegal contract in restraint of trade was
proved before a court by a defendant in a civil suit the contract was
declared unenforceable, and the only penalty in practice was that the
plaintiff could not collect his debt or secure performance from the
defendant.[12] A very similar situation existed in the case of the
individual's grievances against railroad charges and services.
§ 9. #Federal legislation against monopoly.# The passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887[13] prohibiting discrimination and
railway pooling, and that of the Act of 1890 "to protect trade and
commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," popularly known
as the "Sherman Anti-trust Law," were part of one public movement to
remedy monopoly. From one point of view it seems true, as has often
been said, that in essence these statutes were simply enactments
of long established principles of the common law. Section 1 of the
Sherman law declared illegal "every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations." Section 2
made it a misdemeanor "to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize."
But from another point of view, these new laws showed a marked change
both in the conception of the interests involved and in the means of
preventing the evils. The evil was at last conceived of as a general
public evil; the laws are not merely to protect individuals,[14]
but "to regulate commerce," "to protect trade and commerce."
More important still, it was made the duty of public officers
(district-attorneys of the United States) to institute proceedings in
equity "to prevent and restrain" violation of the Sherman Act, and a
special Commission was instituted to deal with railroad cases. It was
this undertaking of the initiative by the government, the treatment of
the problem as one of the general welfare, that marked a new epoch
in this field. The methods and agencies provided might be at first
inadequate and ineffective, but time and experience could remedy those
defects.
§ 10. #Policy of the Sherman anti-trust law.# But in important
respects opinion and policies were not yet clear and consistent. They
wavered from one to another conception of the method for dealing with
the problem. It was clear only that _laissez-faire_ had been laid
aside. There are three other possible policies reflecting as
many different conceptions of the problem of monopoly: (1)
monopoly-prosecuted, (2) monopoly-accepted-and-regulated,
(3) competition-maintained-and-regulated. The policy of
monopoly-prosecuted is merely negative. This is the policy of
the Sherman law. It opposed no positive action to the making of
monopolistic contracts and to the formation of combinations, but
declared them to be illegal and provided for their prosecution and
punishment after the mischief had been done. The great epoch of the
formation of combinations[15] followed the enactment of this law.
True, lack of experience by the department of justice, and lack of
vigorous effort to enforce the law, and the slow action of the courts
were largely to blame for this result. The law has proved to be more
effective to prevent new combinations since it has been successfully
enforced in a few notable cases. But once large combinations have
been formed and complex individual financial interests have become
involved, the courts have proved to be incapable of undoing the deeds.
In practice the most sweeping remedy attempted under the law has been
the dissolution of enormous combinations formed years after the law
went into effect. This has been called the job of unscrambling the
eggs. The most notable cases were those of the Standard Oil Company
and of the Tobacco Company, decided in 1911, the results being
absurdly futile.
§ 11. #Policy of monopoly-accepted-and-regulated.# A second policy may
be called that of monopoly-accepted-and-regulated. This is represented
by the Interstate Commerce Act (at first weakly, and more vigorously
after its amendment), and by the great mass of state legislation
putting the local and interurban public utilities under the control
of regulative commissions. For some decades after these industries
developed, the public faith was in competition as the effective
regulator. If monopolistic prices were too high, another company was
chartered to build a parallel railroad or another horse-car line on
the next street, or to lay down another set of gas pipes in the same
block. Almost from the first some students of the subject saw the
wastefulness and futility of this kind of competition, and nearly a
half century later the public reluctantly came to this view. Still,
sad to relate, the same history had to be repeated in regard to the
telegraph and telephone industry, and in some quarters the ultimate
outcome is not yet recognized. The Interstate Commerce Act itself,
with odd inconsistency, contains an anti-pooling provision (section
5) the purpose of which seems to have been to compel competition as to
rates which is now practically impossible under the other provisions
of the law. The policy of "monopoly-accepted" was seen to involve as
a necessary feature, public regulation of rates, to the point, if
necessary, of absolutely fixing them. The principle has come to be
accepted that wherever competition ends there public regulation of
prices and service begins. Monopolistic enterprises are _ipso facto_
quasi-public institutions.
§ 12. #Field of its application#. This policy, gradually extending
in practice, came to be applied to the class of industries which,
for lack of a better name, are called local utilities. The one
characteristic that they all have in common is that the service,
or product, which is sold requires for its delivery an expensive,
permanent, physical plant, and some special use of public highways.
Thus gas pipes, water pipes, poles and wires for telegraph, telephones
and electric light, street railways, regular steam railroads and some
other minor industries all answer to this test.[16]
Beginning about the year 1900 one state after another enlarged the
powers of its state railroad commission or created a new corporation
commission to regulate these "local" or "public utilities."[17] They
have accomplished much, but the development of this kind of regulation
has not proceeded in many cases beyond the adjustment of relative
rates and the abolition of discrimination among the different
individuals and classes of customers. Experience has shown the great
difficulty of determining what is a fair absolute level of charges.
A new science of accounting has been developing to assist in the
solution of a problem, the complexity of which transcends the agencies
at hand to deal with it. With this policy applied to the local utility
(and railroad) phase of monopoly, there remains still the problem of
the industrial trusts in the manufacturing enterprises.
§ 13. #The industrial trust,--a natural evolution?# The policy that
one is inclined to favor regarding industrial trusts depends very
much on one's answer to the question: Are or are not industrial trusts
natural growths? In this bare form the question is somewhat vague, but
the thought of those who answer it in the affirmative is positive if
not always entirely clear. They (at least the extreme representatives
of this view) declare that trusts have been, are, and will continue
to be, the results of a "natural evolution" of business conditions, as
inevitable as the great changes in the physical world. If this is so
man and society must recognize the facts, must waste no efforts vainly
in fighting against fate, but should accept the trusts and realize
their possibilities for good. And these are declared to be great, for
it is assumed that without the trusts all of the economies of large
production must be sacrificed. Irresistible economic forces, it is
said, are creating larger and larger units of business; friendly
coöperation and unified action must take the place of competition in
business.
The outcome must be monopoly in every important line of manufacturing
industry and perhaps of commerce. In view of public opinion toward
monopoly, its acceptance necessitates its regulation. This argument
is supported by appeal to the experience in the field of railroads
and other local utilities, where public opinion has, after long
hesitation, recognized competition to be impracticable and the
acceptance of monopoly as inevitable. As extremes often meet, the view
of the industrial trust as a natural evolution is most favored on the
one hand by men of "big business," already interested financially
in trusts, and on the other hand by the most radical communists (or
socialists) whose ideal is the complete monopolization of industry
under the government.
§ 14. #Artificial versus natural growth.# Opposed to this view is a
deep and widespread popular opinion or prejudice, against the trust
and in favor of competition. General opinion in this case (as not
always) finds much support in special economic studies of the methods
by which the existing industrial trusts came into being. First the
question properly is raised; just what is meant by "natural"? In a
sense everything has been the natural outcome of evolution,--the steam
engine, the submarine, the boycott, militarism. In an equally good,
if not better sense, every mechanical invention and every method of
industrial organization is artificial, has been the result of man's
choice and effort. In any case men may choose as good or reject as
unsuitable or bad, any particular mechanical device, and society
may decide to adopt any particular policy toward a certain form of
business organization and certain business practices (unless, indeed,
our philosophy be that of automatism, crude determination or fatalism,
regarding all human affairs).
Now when one examines the methods which the notable trusts actually
did employ, and apparently had to employ, even when they were already
powerful single enterprises, in order to destroy their competitors and
to attain their monopolistic power, the word "natural" seems hardly to
describe the process. The evidence is not a matter of hearsay but is
embodied in a long line of judicial decisions, and in numerous special
inquiries by governmental commissions and officials.[18]
§ 15. #Kinds of unfair practices#. This evidence is a startling
array of "unfair practices" and "unfair" forms of competition, which,
however novel in appearance, are essentially of the kind that has been
illegal under the common law for the past five hundred years. Many of
these practices were baldly dishonest, many of them were contemptibly
mean. The manifold varieties of unfair competition may be roughly
grouped under three headings according as they are connected with (1)
Illegal favors received from public or quasi-public officials; (2)
Discrimination against, or control of, customers; (3) Foul tactics
against competitors.
(1) Among the practices in the first group are discriminatory rates
and rebates from railroads, favoritism in matters of taxation, undue
influence in legislatures, special manipulation of tariff rates
through powerful lobbies, or paid agents, undue influence in the
courts through the employment of lawyers of the highest talent, who
often later became judges.
(2) Among the unfair practices toward customers are discriminations
among them by the various forms of price cutting, grants of credit,
and kinds of service. The liberty of retail dealers is limited in
a variety of ways, such as fixing resale prices, requirement of
exclusive dealing, and full-line forcing.
(3) All the methods just mentioned as employed in dealings with
customers are likewise unfair toward competitors. Many other methods
are used to the same end, such as: enticing away their employees,
or corrupting and bribing them to act as spies, paying secret
commissions, false advertising, misrepresenting competitors, imitating
their patterns in goods of defective workmanship, shutting off their
credit or their supplies of materials, acquiring stock in competing
companies, malicious suits, infringement of patents, intimidation by
threats of business injury or of scandalous exposures, operation of
bogus independent companies.
§ 16. #Growing conception of fair competition.# Any industrial trust
that was able to gain domination and monopoly power only by the use of
such practices, or any part of them, can hardly be deemed the result
of a "natural evolution." If "artificial" means the use of artifices
surely this development deserves the adjective. Yet even if not
natural, this development may be thought to be "inevitable," human
nature being as it is. But the bald fact is that while the great trust
movement was in progress no effort worthy of the name was being made
to enforce even the then existing laws and to oppose this artificial
development. The same allegation of inevitableness was once commonly
made of discriminatory railroad rates and rebates, evils which have
been in large part remedied only since the period 1903-1906, when at
last intelligent action was taken.
To those that came to see the problem in this light, acceptance
of industrial monopoly with its complex task of fixing by public
commission the prices on innumerable kinds and qualities of goods
seemed at least premature. Rather, the first step toward a solution
seemed to be the vigorous prevention of unfair practices, and the
next step a positive regularizing of "fair competition."[19] The
fundamental idea in this is the enforcement of a common market price
(plus freights) at any one time to all the customers of an enterprise.
By this plan potential competition would become actual, and small
enterprises that were efficient might compete successfully within
their own fields with large enterprises that maintained prices above
a true competitive level. Even general lowering of prices by a large
enterprise with evident purpose of killing off smaller competitors is
unfair competition under this conception. It was for years recognized
that the realization of this policy required legislation regarding
uniform prices and the creation of a commission for the administration
of the law.
§ 17. #The trust issues in 1912#. The campaign of 1912 presented in an
interesting manner the three policies above outlined. The
Republican party led by President Taft stood for the policy of
monopoly-prosecuted; its program was the vigorous enforcement of the
Sherman law. The Progressive party, led by Mr. Roosevelt, stood in the
main for the policy of "monopoly-accepted-and-regulated"; its program
called for minimizing prosecution and for developing a system of
regulation of trust-prices. The Democratic party, led by Mr. Wilson,
stood for the policy of competition-maintained-and-regulated, and the
problem was to find means to strengthen and regularize the forces of
competition.
In practice these programs doubtless would be less divergent than they
appear. All alike proposed the retention of the Sherman law. The
two proposals to go further were presented as mutually exclusive
alternatives, whereas they necessarily must supplement each other in
some degree. The Progressives did not expect all industries to become
monopolies, and the Democrats tacitly conceded to monopoly-accepted
the large field of transportation and local utilities it already had
occupied. But there was a real difference in the angle of approach and
a real difference in emphasis. The Democratic program (the somewhat
unclearly) showed greater distrust of monopoly and greater faith in
the possibilities of creating fair conditions of competition (which
never had fully prevailed) in which efficiency would be able to prove
its merits and monopoly would work its own undoing. It was the more
logical for the country to give this policy at least a trial before
adopting irrevocably the policy of general industrial monopoly.
In either case competition actual or potential is the fundamental
principle by which prices have to be regulated. Where competition is
enforced it is by applying some general rules that create a general
market price instead of discriminatory prices, but the fixing of the
price is left to the competitors. Where monopoly is accepted prices
must be fixed with reference to an estimated competitive standard,
that which under hypothetically free conditions would just suffice to
attract and retain private enterprise and capital.
§ 18. #Anti-trust legislation of 1914#. The anti-trust legislation
of 1914, passed by the Democratic party to carry out its program, is
embodied in two acts: the Clayton Act, laying down new rules; and
the Federal Trade Commission Act, mainly to provide an agency with
administrative and quasi-judicial functions to deal with unfair
practices. This displaced the Bureau of Corporations, established in
1903. The Clayton Act forbids discrimination where the effect may be
to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly. Due allowance may
be made for difference in the cost of selling or transportation, but
a difference is not required in such cases. It forbids contracts
to prevent dealers from handling other brands. It forbids corporate
ownership of stock in a competing corporation, forbids interlocking
directorates in large banks and in other competing corporations,
with capital, surplus and undivided profits aggregating more than
$1,000,000. The Trade Commission Act in addition to its administrative
provisions for investigation, reports, and readjustment of the
business of companies upon request of the courts, declares that
"unfair methods of competition in commerce" are unlawful, and both
empowers and directs the Commission to prevent their use (banks and
common carriers subject to other acts being excepted).
These acts are too new to have been given a fair test. They have,
however, given evidence of exercising at once an influence upon
the situation. They are imperfect in some details that will require
amendment; but they mark the beginning of a new policy toward
industrial monopoly, the results of which will be watched with the
deepest interest.
[Footnote 1: See Vol. I, especially pp. 74 and 75.]
[Footnote 2: See Vol. I, pp 59, 68, 70-71]
[Footnote 3: See Vol. I, pp. 66, 67.]
[Footnote 4: 77 Miss., 476. Cited by Bruce Wyman, "Control of the
Market," p. 137.]
[Footnote 5: 19 R.I., 255.]
[Footnote 6: 115 Ga., 429.]
[Footnote 7: Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor (L.R. 23 Q.B.D.
598).]
[Footnote 8: Bruce Wyman, "Control of the Market," p. 22. In 1914 (216
Fed. 971), a federal court granted an injunction restraining the use
of fighting ships by a combination, and in 1915 (220 Fed 235),
the court indicated a willingness to grant a similar injunction if
necessary. Similarly "fighting brands" of goods have been recently
prohibited.]
[Footnote 9: See below, sec. 15.]
[Footnote 10: Averrill v. Southern Railway (75 Fed. Rep. 736).]
[Footnote 11: 107 Minn. 145.]
[Footnote 12: Arnott v. Pittston and Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558
(1877).]
[Footnote 13: See ch. 27, sec. 16.]
[Footnote 14: At the same time the rights of injured individuals
are better safeguarded by sec. 7 of the Sherman law, permitting the
recovery of threefold damages and attorney's fees.]
[Footnote 15: See ch. 28, sec. 9.]
[Footnote 16: See further, ch. 30, secs. 5-9.]
[Footnote 17: See ch. 27, sec. 15, on state commissions.]
[Footnote 18: A few among the most important sources are the Report
of the Industrial Commission, 1898-1901, 19 volumes; reports of the
Bureau of Corporations on the petroleum and tobacco industries; U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, e.g., the Addystone Pipe case (175 U.S. 211),
given in Ripley, Trusts, Pools, and Corporations, p. 86; the Standard
Oil case (221 U.S. 1), and the Tobacco Trust case (221 U.S. 106); and
the very comprehensive volume on "Trust Laws and Unfair Competition,"
by Joseph E. Davies, Commissioner of Corporations, Washington, 1916.]
[Footnote 19: John B. Clark, the distinguished professor of economics
in Columbia University, has been the foremost and clearest exponent of
this idea, in his "The Control of Trusts," 1901, 2d ed., 1912, and in
other works.]