women, the principal suffrage questions in Great Britain to-day are
those pertaining to the conferring of the voting privilege upon adult
males who are still debarred, the abolition of the plural vote, and a
general simplification and unification of franchise arrangements. The
problem of the plural vote is an old one. Under existing law an
elector may not vote more than once in a single constituency, nor in
more than one division of the same borough; but aside from this, and
except in so far as is not prohibited by residence requirements, he is
entitled to vote in every constituency in which he possesses a
qualification. In the United States and in the majority of European
countries a man is possessed of but one vote, and any arrangement
other than this would seem to contravene the principle of civic
equality which lies at the root of popular government. In England
there have been repeated attempts to bring about the establishment of
an unvarying rule of "one man, one vote," but never as yet with
success. The number of plural voters--some 525,000--is relatively
small, but when it is remembered that a single voter may cast during a
parliamentary election as many as fifteen or twenty votes it will be
observed that the number quite suffices to turn the scale in many
closely contested constituencies. An overwhelming proportion of the
plural voters are identified with the Conservative party, whence it
arises that the Liberals are, and long have been, hostile to the
privilege. Following the Liberal triumph at the elections of 1906 (p. 090)
a Plural Voting Bill was introduced requiring that every elector
possessed of more than one vote should be registered in the
constituency of his choice and in no other one. The measure passed the
Commons, by a vote of 333 to 104, but the Conservative majority in the
Lords compassed its defeat, alleging that while it was willing to
consider a complete scheme of electoral reform the proposed bill was
not of such character.[126]
[Footnote 126: May and Holland, Constitutional
History of England, III., 48-49. It may be noted
that an able royal commission, appointed in
December, 1908, to study foreign electoral systems
and to recommend modifications of the English
system, reported in 1910 adversely to the early
adoption of any form of proportional
representation.]
*94. The Franchise Bill of 1912.*--Soon after the final enactment, in
August, 1911, of the Parliament Bill whereby the complete ascendancy
of the Commons was secured in both finance and legislation[127] the
Liberal government of Mr. Asquith made known its intention to bring
forward at an early date a comprehensive measure of franchise reform.
During the winter of 1911-1912 the project was formulated, and in the
early summer of 1912 the bill was introduced. The adoption of the
measure in its essentials is not improbable, although at the date of
writing[128] it is by no means assured. In the main, the bill makes
provision for three reforms. In the first place, it substitutes for
the present complicated and illogical network of suffrages a simple
residential or occupational qualification, thereby extending the
voting privilege to practically all adult males. In the second place,
it simplifies the process of registration and, in effect, enfranchises
large numbers of men who in the past have been unable to vote because
of change of residence or of the difficulties of the registration
process. Finally, it abolishes absolutely both the plural vote and the
separate representation of the universities. The effect of the first
two of these provisions, it is estimated, would be to enlarge the
electorate by 2,500,000 votes, that of the third, to reduce it by
upwards of 600,000;[129] so that the net result of the three would be
to raise an existing electorate of eight millions to one of ten
millions. A total of twenty-eight franchise statutes are totally, and
forty-four others are partially, repealed by the bill. The ground upon
which the measure, in its earlier stages, was attacked principally was
its lack of provision for a redistribution of seats. The defense of
the Government has been that, while the imperative need of
redistribution is recognized, such redistribution can be effected only
after it shall be known precisely what the franchise arrangements (p. 091)
of the kingdom are to be.[130]
[Footnote 127: See pp. 110-113.]
[Footnote 128: October, 1912.]
[Footnote 129: The number of plural voters is
placed at 525,000; that of graduates who elect the
university representatives, at 49,614.]
[Footnote 130: A timely volume is J. King and F. W.
Raffety, Our Electoral System; the Demand for
Reform (London, 1912).]
*95. The Question of Woman's Suffrage.*--It will be observed that the
Franchise Bill restricts the franchise to adult males. The measure was
shaped deliberately, however, to permit the incorporation of an
amendment providing for the enfranchisement of women. It is a fact not
familiarly known that English women of requisite qualifications were
at one time in possession of the suffrage at national elections. They
were not themselves allowed to vote, but a woman was privileged to
pass on her qualifications temporarily to any man, and, prior to the
seventeenth century, the privilege was occasionally exercised. It was
not indeed, until the Reform Act of 1832 that the law of elections, by
introducing the phrase "male persons," in effect vested the
parliamentary franchise exclusively in men.[131] The first notable
attempt made in Parliament to restore and extend the female franchise
was that of John Stuart Mill in 1867. His proposed amendment to the
reform bill of that year was defeated by a vote of 196 to 73. In 1870
a woman's suffrage measure drafted by Dr. Pankhurst and introduced in
the Commons by John Bright passed its second reading by a majority of
thirty-three, but was subsequently rejected. During the seventies and
early eighties a vigorous propaganda was maintained and almost every
session produced its crop of woman's suffrage bills. A determined
attempt was made to secure the inclusion of a woman's suffrage clause
in the Reform Bill of 1884. The proposed amendment was supported very
generally by the press, but in consequence of a threat by Gladstone to
the effect that if the amendment were carried the entire measure would
be withdrawn the project was abandoned. The next chapter of importance
in the history of the movement was inaugurated by the organization, in
1903, of the Women's Social and Political Union. In 1904 a suffrage
bill was introduced but failed to become law. Within the past decade,
however, the cause has made substantial headway, and by the
spectacular character which it has assumed it has attracted wide
attention. In March, 1912, a Woman's Enfranchisement measure was
rejected in the House of Commons by the narrow margin of 222 to 208
votes. Premier Asquith is opposed to female enfranchisement, but his
colleagues in the ministry are almost evenly divided upon the issue,
and it is not inconceivable that a woman's suffrage measure may be
carried through in the guise of an amendment to the pending Franchise
Bill. If it were to be, and the qualifications should be made (p. 092)
identical with those of men, the number of women voters would be
approximately 10,500,000.[132]
[Footnote 131: May and Holland, Constitutional
History of England, III., 61.]
[Footnote 132: K. Schirmacher, The Modern Woman's
Rights Movement, trans. by C. C. Eckhardt (New
York, 1912), 58-96; B. Mason, The Story of the
Woman's Suffrage Movement (London, 1911); E. S.
Pankhurst, The Suffragette; the History of the
Woman's Militant Suffrage Movement, 1905-1910
(London, 1911). The subject is surveyed briefly in
May and Holland, Constitutional History, III.,
59-66.]
*96. Qualifications for Election.*--The regulations governing the
qualifications essential for election to Parliament are to-day, on the
whole, simple and liberal. The qualification of residence was replaced
in the eighteenth century by a property qualification; but, as has
been pointed out, in 1858 this likewise was swept away. Oaths of
allegiance and oaths imposing religious tests once operated to debar
many, but all that is now required of a member is a very simple oath
or affirmation of allegiance, in a form compatible with any shade of
religious belief or unbelief. Any male British subject who is of age
is qualified for election, unless he belongs to one of a few small
groups--notably peers (except Irish); clergy of the Roman Catholic
Church, the Church of England, and the Church of Scotland; certain
office-holders; bankrupts; and persons convicted of treason, felony,
or corrupt practices. A member is not required to be a resident of the
electoral district which he represents. Once elected, a man properly
qualified cannot escape membership by resignation. He may be expelled,
but the only means by which he can retire from the House voluntarily
is the acceptance of some public post whose occupant is _ipso facto_
disqualified. To serve this end two or three sinecures are maintained,
the best known being the stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds. The
member who desires to give up his seat accomplishes his purpose by
applying for one of these offices, receiving it, and after having
disqualified himself, resigning it.
IV. ELECTORAL PROCEDURE AND REGULATIONS
*97. Writs and Election Days.*--When a parliament is dissolved the royal
proclamation wherein the dissolution is declared expresses the desire
of the crown to have the advice of the people and announces the
sovereign's will and pleasure to call a new parliament. With this
proclamation as a warrant, the chancellors of Great Britain and
Ireland forthwith issue writs of election, addressed to the returning
officers of the counties and boroughs, i.e., in all Scotch and Irish
constituencies and in the English counties the sheriffs, or their
deputies, and in the English boroughs the mayors. The form of these
writs, as well as the nature of the electoral procedure generally, is
prescribed in the Parliamentary and Municipal Elections Act, commonly
known as the Ballot Act, of 1872.[133] Upon receipt of the proper (p. 093)
writ the returning officer gives notice of the day and place of the
election, and of the poll if it is known that the election will be
contested. In the counties the election must take place within nine
days, in the boroughs within four days, after receipt of the writ, but
within these limits the date is fixed in each constituency by the
returning officer. What actually happens on election day is: (1) all
candidates for seats are placed formally in nomination; (2) if within
an hour of the time fixed for the election the number of nominated
candidates does not exceed the number of places to be filled, the
election of these candidates is forthwith declared; and (3) if there
is a contest the election is postponed to a polling day, to be fixed
by the returning officer, in the counties from two to six, and in the
boroughs not more than three, days distant.
[Footnote 133: For the form of the writ see Anson,
Law and Custom of the Constitution, I., 57.]
*98. The Polling.*--Prior to 1872 candidates were nominated _viva voce_
at the "hustings," an outdoor platform erected for the purpose; but
nowadays nominations are made in writing. It is required that a
candidate shall be proposed by a registered elector of the
constituency and that his nomination shall be assented to formally by
nine other electors. The number of uncontested elections is invariably
large (especially in Ireland, where, in many instances, it is useless
to oppose a candidate to the Nationalists), the proportion reaching
sometimes one-fourth, and even one-third. Polling is completed within
an individual constituency during the course of a single day, the
hours being from eight o'clock in the morning until eight o'clock in
the evening, but under the arrangements that have been described it
falls out that a national election is extended invariably through a
period of more than two weeks. The system operates, of course, to the
advantage of the plural voter, who is enabled to present himself at
the polls from day to day in widely separated constituencies. For the
convenience of voters constituencies are divided regularly into
districts, or precincts. When the properly qualified and registered
elector appears at the polls a ballot paper is presented to him
containing the names of the candidates. He takes this to a screened
compartment and places a cross-mark opposite the name or names of
those for whom he desires to vote, after which the paper is deposited
in a box. At the conclusion of the polling, the boxes are transmitted
to the returning officer of the constituency, the votes are counted,
and the result is declared. The writ which served as the returning
officer's authority is indorsed with a certificate of the election and
returned to the clerk of the Crown in Chancery. It is to be observed,
however, that in the universities the Ballot Act does not apply. In
these constituencies an elector may deliver his vote orally, or (p. 094)
he may transmit it by proxy from his place of residence.[134]
[Footnote 134: On electoral procedure see Lowell,
Government of England, I., Chap. 10; M. MacDonaugh,
The Book of Parliament (London, 1897), 24-50; H. J.
Bushby, Manual of the Practice of Elections for the
United Kingdom (4th ed., London, 1874); W.
Woodings, The Conduct and Management of
Parliamentary Elections (4th ed., London, 1900); E.
T. Powell, The Essentials of Self-Government,
England and Wales (London, 1909); P. J. Blair, A
Handbook of Parliamentary Elections (Edinburgh,
1909); and H. Fraser, The Law of Parliamentary
Elections and Election Petitions (2d ed., London,
1910). A volume filled with interesting information
is J. Grego, History of Parliamentary Elections and
Electioneering from the Stuarts to Queen Victoria
(new ed., London, 1892). The monumental work upon
the entire subject is M. Powell (ed.), Rogers on
Elections, 3 vols. (16th ed., London, 1897).]
*99. Frequency of Elections: the Campaign.*--General elections do not
take place in Great Britain with periodic regularity. The only
positive requirement in the matter is that an election must be ordered
when a parliament has attained the maximum lifetime allowed it by law.
Prior to 1694 there was no stipulation upon this subject and the king
could keep a parliament in existence as long as he liked. Charles II.
retained for seventeen years the parliament called at his accession.
From 1694 to 1716, however, the maximum term of a parliament was three
years; from 1716 to 1911 it was seven years; to-day it is five
years.[135] In point of fact, parliaments never last through the
maximum period, and an average interval of three or four years between
elections has been the rule. In most instances an election is
precipitated more or less unexpectedly on an appeal to the country by
a defeated ministry, and it not infrequently happens that an election
turns all but completely upon a single issue and thus assumes the
character of a national referendum upon the subject in hand. This was
pre-eminently true of the last general election, that of December,
1910, at which the country was asked to sustain the Asquith government
in its purpose to curb the independent authority of the House of
Lords. In any event, the campaign by which the election is preceded is
brief, although it continues throughout the electoral period, and, if
the outcome is doubtful, tends to increase rather than to diminish in
intensity. Appeals to the voters are made principally through public
speaking, the controversial and illustrated press, the circulation of
pamphlets and handbills, parades and mass-meetings, and the generous
use of placards, cartoons, and other devices designed to attract and
focus attention. Plans are laid, arguments are formulated, and (p. 095)
leadership in public appeal is assumed by the members of the
Government, led by the premier, and, on the other side, by the men who
are the recognized leaders of the parliamentary Opposition.[136]
[Footnote 135: The Representation of the People Act
of 1867 made the duration of a parliament
independent of a demise of the crown. The text of
the Septennial Act and that of the Lords' Protest
against the measure are printed in Robertson,
Statutes, Cases, and Documents, 117-119.]
[Footnote 136: M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the
Organization of Political Parties, trans. by F.
Clarke, 2 vols. (London, 1902), I., 442-501;
MacDonaugh, The Book of Parliament, 1-23. Among
numerous articles descriptive of English
parliamentary elections mention may be made of H.
W. Lucy, The Methods of a British General Election,
in _Forum_, Oct., 1900; S. Brooks, English and
American Elections, in _Fortnightly Review_, Feb.,
1910; W. T. Stead, The General Election in Great
Britain, in _American Review of Reviews_, Feb.,
1910; and d'Haussonville, Dix jours en Angleterre
pendant les élections, in _Revue des Deux Mondes_,
Feb. 1, 1910.]
*100. The Regulation of Electoral Expenditure.*--Time was, and within
the memory of men still living, when an English parliamentary election
was attended by corrupt practices so universal and so shameless as to
appear almost more ludicrous than culpable. Voters as a matter of
course accepted the bribes that were tendered them and ate and drank
and smoked and rollicked at the candidate's expense throughout the
electoral period and were considered men of conscience indeed if they
did not end by going over to the opposition. The notorious Northampton
election of 1768, in the course of which a body of voters numbering
under a thousand were the recipients of hospitalities from the backers
of three candidates which aggregated upwards of a million pounds, was,
of course, exceptional; but the history of countless other cases
differed from it only in the amounts laid out. To-day an altogether
different state of things obtains. From having been one of the most
corrupt, Great Britain has become one of the most exemplary of nations
in all that pertains to the proprieties of electoral procedure. The
Ballot Act of 1872 contained provisions calculated to strengthen
pre-existing corrupt practices acts, but the real turning point was
the adoption of the comprehensive Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of
1883. By this measure bribery (in seven enumerated forms) and treating
were made punishable by imprisonment or fine and, under varying
conditions, political disqualification. The number and functions of
the persons who may be employed by the candidate to assist in a
campaign were prescribed, every candidate being required to have a
single authorized agent charged with the disbursement of all moneys
(save certain specified "personal" expenditures) in the candidate's
behalf and with the duty of submitting to the returning officer within
thirty-five days after the election a sworn statement covering all
receipts and expenditures. And, finally, the act fixed, upon a sliding
scale in proportion to the size of the constituencies, the maximum
amounts which candidates may legitimately expend. In boroughs
containing not more than 2,000 registered voters the amount is (p. 096)
£350, with an additional £30 for every thousand voters above the
number mentioned. In rural constituencies, where proper outlays will
normally be larger, the sum of £650 is allowed when the number of
registered electors falls under 2,000, with £60 for each additional
thousand. Beyond these sums the candidate is allowed an outlay of £100
for expenses of a purely personal character.
The range of expenditure which is thus permitted by law is, of course,
considerable, and the records of election cases brought into the
courts demonstrate that not infrequently in practice its limits are
exceeded. None the less, the effect of the law has been undeniably to
restrain the outpouring of money by candidates, to purify politics,
and at the same time to enable men of moderate means to stand for
election who otherwise would be at grave disadvantage as against their
wealthier and more lavish competitors. It is of interest to observe
that by reason of the non-participation of the state in electoral
costs there fall upon candidates certain charges which are unknown in
the United States and other countries. The bills submitted by the
returning officer must be paid by the candidates within the
constituency, and these bills cover the publishing of notices of the
election, the preparing and supplying of nomination papers, the cost
of dies, ballot-paper, polling-stations, and printing, the fees of
clerks, and, finally, the travelling expenses and fee of the returning
officer himself. The candidate's share of this outlay may be as small
as £25, but it is likely to be from £200 to £300 and may rise to as
much as £600.[137]
[Footnote 137: On the adoption of the Corrupt and
Illegal Practices Act of 1883 see May and Holland,
Constitutional History of England, III., 31-33. The
actual operation of the system established may be
illustrated by citing a specific case. At the
election of 1906 the maximum expenditure legally
possible for Mr. Lloyd-George in his sparsely
populated Carnarvon constituency was £470. His
authorized agent, after the election, reported an
outlay of £50 on agents, £27 on clerks and
messengers, £189 on printing, postage, etc., £30 on
public meetings, £25 on committee rooms, and £40 on
miscellaneous matters--a total of £361. The
candidate's personal expenditure amounted to £92,
so that the total outlay of £462 fell short by a
scant £8 of the sum that might legally have been
laid out. Divided among the 3,221 votes that Mr.
Lloyd-George received, his outlay per vote was 2s.,
10d. At the same election Mr. Asquith's expenditure
was £727; Mr. Winston Churchill's, £844; Mr. John
Morley's, £479; Mr. Keir Hardie's, £623; Mr. James
Bryce's, £480. In non-contested constituencies
expenditures are small. In 1906 Mr. Redmond's was
reported to be £25 and Mr. William O'Brien's, £20.
In 1900 a total of 1,103 candidates for 670 seats
expended £777,429 in getting 3,579,345 votes; in
1906, 1,273 candidates for the same 670 seats
expended £1,166,858 in getting 5,645,104 votes; in
January, 1910, 1,311 candidates laid out £1,296,382
in getting 6,667,394 votes. A well-informed article
is E. Porritt, Political Corruption in England, in
_North American Review_, Nov. 16, 1906.]
CHAPTER V (p. 097)
PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF LORDS
I. COMPOSITION
*101. Origins.*--With the possible exception of the Hungarian Table of
Magnates, the British House of Lords is the most ancient second
chamber among parliamentary bodies. It is, furthermore, among second
chambers the largest and the most purely hereditary. Its descent can
be traced directly from the Great Council of the Plantagenet period
and, in the opinion of some scholars, from the witenagemot of
Anglo-Saxon times.[138] To the Council belonged originally the
nobility, and the clergy, greater and lesser. Practically, the body
was composed of the more influential churchmen and the more powerful
tenants-in-chief of the crown. In the course of time the lesser clergy
found it convenient to confine their attention to the proceedings of
the ecclesiastical assemblage known as Convocation; while the lesser
nobles, i.e., the poorer and more uninfluential ones, found it to
their interest to cast in their lot, not as formerly with the great
barons and earls, but with the well-to-do though non-noble knights of
the shire. From the elements that remained--the higher clergy and the
greater nobles--developed directly the House of Lords. The lesser
barons, the knights of the shire, and the burgesses, on the other
hand, combined to form the House of Commons.
[Footnote 138: "The House of Lords not only springs
out of, it actually is, the ancient Witenagemot. I
can see no break between the two." Freeman, Growth
of the English Constitution, 62. Professor Freeman,
it must be remembered, was prone to glorify
Anglo-Saxon institutions and to under-estimate the
changes that were introduced in England through the
agency of the Norman Conquest. For the most recent
statement of the opposing view see Adams, Origin of
the English Constitution, Chaps. 1-4.]
*102. Princes of the Blood and Hereditary Peers.*--In respect to its
fundamental constitution the House of Lords has undergone but slight
modification during the many centuries of its existence. In respect,
however, to the composition and size of the body changes have been
numerous and important. There are in the chamber to-day at least six
distinct groups of members, sitting by various rights and possessing
a status which is by no means identical. The first comprises (p. 098)
princes of the royal blood who are of age. The number of these is
variable, but of course never large. They take precedence of the other
nobility, but in point of fact seldom participate in the proceedings
of the Chamber. The second group is the most important of all. It
comprises the peers with hereditary seats and is itself divided
properly into three groups: the peers of England created before the
union with Scotland in 1707, the peers of Great Britain created
between the date mentioned and the union with Ireland in 1801, and the
peers of the United Kingdom created since that date. Technically,
peers are created by the crown; but in practice their creation is
controlled largely by the premier; and the act may be performed for
the purpose of honoring men of distinction in law, letters, science,
or business, or for the more practical purpose of altering the
political complexion of the upper chamber.[139] The power to create
peerages is unlimited[140] and, this being the only means by which the
membership of the body can be increased at discretion, the power is
one which is not infrequently exercised. Originally the right to sit
as a peer was conferred simply by an individual writ of summons, or by
the fact that such a writ had been issued to one's ancestor, but this
method has long since been replaced by a formal grant of letters
patent, accompanied by bestowal of the requisite writ. With exceptions
to be noted, peerages are hereditary, and the heir assumes his
parliamentary seat at the age of twenty-one. Peers are of five
ranks--dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, and barons. The complicated
rules governing the precedence of these classes are of large social,
but of minor political, interest.
[Footnote 139: The first peerage bestowed purely in
recognition of literary distinction was that of
Lord Tennyson in 1884, the peerages bestowed upon
Macaulay and Bulwer Lytton having been determined
upon in part under the influence of political
considerations. The first professional artist to be
honored with a peerage was Lord Leighton, in 1896.
Lord Kelvin and Lord Lister are among well-known
men of science who have been so honored. Lord
Goschen's viscountcy was conferred, with universal
approval, as the fitting reward of a great business
career. The earldom of General Roberts and the
viscountcies of Generals Wolseley and Kitchener
were bestowed in recognition of military
distinction. With some aptness the House of Lords
has been denominated "the Westminster Abbey of
living celebrities."]
[Footnote 140: Except that, under existing law, the
crown cannot (1) create a peer of Scotland, (2)
create a peer of Ireland otherwise than as allowed
by the Act of Union with Ireland, and (3) direct
the devolution of a dignity otherwise than in
accordance with limitations applying in the case of
grants of real estate.]
*103. Representative Peers of Scotland and of Ireland.*--A third group
of members comprises the representative peers of Scotland. Under
provision of the Act of Union of 1707, when a new parliament is
summoned the whole body of Scottish peers elects sixteen of their
number to sit as their representatives at Westminster. By custom (p. 099)
the election takes place at Holyrood Palace in the city of
Edinburgh.[141] The act of 1707 made no provision for the creation of
Scottish peers, with the consequence that, through the extinction of
noble families and the occasional conferring of a peerage of the
United Kingdom upon a Scottish peer, the total number of Scottish
peerages has been reduced from 165 to 33.[142] The tenure of a
Scottish representative peer at Westminster expires with the
termination of a parliament. A fourth group of members is the Irish.
By the Act of Union of 1800 it was provided that not all of the peers
of Ireland should be accorded seats in the House of Lords, but only
twenty-eight of them, to be elected for life by the whole number of
Irish peers. The number of Irish peerages was put in the course of
gradual reduction and it is now under the prescribed maximum of one
hundred.[143] Unlike the English and Scottish peers, Irish peers, if
not elected to the House of Lords, may stand for election to the House
of Commons, though they may not represent Irish constituencies.[144]
While members of the Commons, however, they may not be elected to the
Lords, nor may they participate in the choice of representative peers.
[Footnote 141: For a statement of the process of
election see Anson, Law and Custom of the
Constitution (4th ed.), I., 219-229.]
[Footnote 142: In 1909. Lowell, Government of
England, I., 395.]
[Footnote 143: The crown was authorized to create
one Irish peerage only for every three such
peerages that should become extinct. During the
thirty years preceding the conferring of an Irish
peerage upon Mr. Curzon, in 1898, the creation of
Irish peerages was entirely suspended.]
[Footnote 144: Lord Palmerston, for example, was an
Irish peer, but sat in the House of Commons.]
*104. The Lords of Appeal.*--A fifth group of members comprises the
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, who differ from other peers created by
the crown in that their seats are not hereditary. One of the functions
of the House of Lords is to serve as the highest national court of
appeal. It is but logical that there should be included within the
membership of the body a certain number of the most eminent jurists of
the realm, and, further, that the judicial business of the chamber
should be transacted largely by this corps of experts. In 1876 an
Appellate Jurisdiction Act was passed authorizing the appointment of
two (subsequently increased to four) "law lords" with the title of
baron, and by legislation of 1887 the tenure of these members,
hitherto conditioned upon the continued exercise of judicial
functions, was made perpetual for life. At the present day these four
justices, presided over by the Lord Chancellor, comprise in reality
the supreme tribunal of the kingdom. Three of them are sufficient to
constitute a quorum for the transaction of judicial business, and (p. 100)
although other legal-minded members of the chamber may participate,
and technically every member has a right to do so, in most instances
this inner circle discharges the judicial function quite alone.[145]
[Footnote 145: The recognized advisability of
strengthening the judicial element in the Lords
precipitated at one time a serious issue respecting
the power of the crown to create life peerages. In
1856, upon the advice of her ministers, Queen
Victoria conferred upon a distinguished judge, Sir
James Parke, a patent as Baron Wensleydale for
life. The purpose was to introduce into the chamber
desirable legal talent without further augmenting
the peerage. For the creation of life peerages
there was some precedent, but none later than the
reign of Henry VI., and the House of Lords,
maintaining that the right had lapsed and that the
peerage had become entirely hereditary, refused to
admit Baron Wensleydale until his patent was so
modified that his peerage was made hereditary.]
*105. The Lords Spiritual.*--Finally, there are the ecclesiastical
members--not peers, but "lords spiritual." In the fifteenth century
the lords spiritual outnumbered the lords temporal; but upon the
dissolution of the monasteries in the reign of Henry VIII., resulting
in the dropping out of the abbots, the spiritual contingent fell
permanently into the minority. At the present day the quota of
ecclesiastical members is restricted, under statutory regulation, to
26. Scotland, whose established church is the Presbyterian, has none.
Between 1801 and 1869 Ireland had four, but since the disestablishment
of the Irish church in 1869 there have been none. In England five
ecclesiastics, by statute, are entitled invariably to seats, i.e.,
the archbishops of Canterbury and York and the bishops of London,
Durham, and Winchester. Among the remaining bishops the law allows
seats to twenty-one, in the order of seniority. There are always,
therefore, some English bishops--in 1909, ten--who are not members of
the chamber.[146] All ecclesiastical members retain their seats during
tenure of their several sees, but do not, of course, transmit their
rights to their heirs, nor, necessarily, save in the case of the five
mentioned, to their successors in office. Bishops and archbishops are
elected, nominally, by the dean and chapter of the diocese; but when a
vacancy arises the sovereign transmits a _congé d'élire_ containing
the name of the person to be elected, so that, practically,
appointment is made by the crown, acting under the advice of the prime
minister. Bishoprics are created by act of Parliament.[147]
[Footnote 146: The Bishop of Sodor and Man is
entitled to a seat, but not to take part in the
chamber's proceedings. His status has been compared
to that of a territorial delegate in the United
States. Moran, The English Government, 170.]
[Footnote 147: On the composition of the House of
Lords see Lowell, Government of England, I., Chap.
21; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, I.,
Chap. 5; May and Holland, Constitutional History of
England, I., Chap. 5; Moran, English Government,
Chap. 10; Low, Governance of England, Chap. 12;
Courtney, Working Constitution of the United
Kingdom, Chap. 11; Macy, English Constitution,
Chap. 4; Marriott, English Political Institutions,
Chaps. 6-7; and Walpole, The Electorate and the
Legislature, Chap. 2. The subject is treated in
greater detail in Pike, Constitutional History of
the House of Lords, especially Chap. 15.]
*106. Qualifications and Number of Members.*--A peer may be (p. 101)
prevented from occupying a seat in the chamber by any one of several
disqualifications. He must have attained the age of twenty-one; he
must not be an alien; he must not be a bankrupt; he must not be under
sentence for felony. On the other hand, a man who inherits a peerage
cannot renounce the inheritance. Upon more than one occasion this rule
has been a matter of political consequence, for its operation has
sometimes meant that an able and ambitious commoner has been compelled
to surrender his seat in the more important chamber and to assume a
wholly undesired place in the upper house. In 1895 Mr. William W.
Palmer, later Lord Selbourne, inheriting a peerage but desiring to
continue for a time in the Commons, put this rule to a definite test
by neglecting to apply for a writ of summons as a peer. The decision
of the Commons, however, was that he was obligated to accept
membership in the upper chamber, and hence to yield the place which he
occupied in the lower.
The House of Lords numbers to-day 620 members. In earlier periods of
its history it was a very much smaller body, and, indeed, its most
notable growth has taken place within the past one hundred and fifty
years. During the reign of Henry VII. there were never more than
eighty members, the majority of whom were ecclesiastics. To the first
parliament of Charles II. there were summoned 139 persons. At the
death of William III. the roll of the upper chamber comprised 192
names. At the death of Queen Anne the number was 209: at that of
George I. it was 216; at that of George II., 229; at that of George
III., 339; at that of George IV., 396; at that of William IV., 456.
Between 1830 and 1898 there were conferred 364 peerages--222 under
Liberal ministries (covering, in the aggregate, forty years) and 142
under the Conservatives (covering twenty-seven years). More than
one-half of the peerages of to-day have been created within the past
fifty years, and of the remainder only an insignificant proportion can
be termed ancient.
II. THE REFORM OF THE LORDS: THE QUESTION PRIOR TO 1909
*107. The Status of the Chamber.*--As a law-making body the House of
Lords antedates the House of Commons. At the beginning of the
fourteenth century the theory was that the magnates assented to
legislation while the Commons merely petitioned for it. In a statute
of 1322, however, the legislative character of Parliament as a (p. 102)
whole was effectively recognized, and at the same time the legislative
parity of the commons with the magnates. Thenceforth, until very
nearly the present day, the two chambers were legally co-ordinate and
every act of legislation required the assent of both. It is true that
during the course of the nineteenth century there was a remarkable
growth of legislative preponderance on the part of the House of
Commons, until, indeed, the point was reached where all important
measures were first presented in that chamber and the Lords were very
certain not to thwart the ultimate adoption of any project of which
the nation as represented in the popular branch unmistakably approved.
Yet upon numerous occasions bills, and sometimes--as in the case of
Gladstone's Home Rule Bill in 1893--highly important ones, were
defeated outright; and at all times the chamber imposed a check upon
the lower house and exercised a powerful influence upon the actual
course of legislative business. Under the provisions of the act of
1911, however, the status and the legislative functions of the House
of Lords have been profoundly altered, and an adequate understanding
of the workings of the British parliament to-day requires some review
of the changes wrought by that remarkable piece of legislation.
Throughout upwards of a century the "mending or ending" of the Lords
has been among the most widely discussed of public issues in the
United Kingdom. The question has been principally one of "mending,"
for the number of persons who have advocated seriously the total
abolition of the chamber has been small and their influence has been
slight. The utility of a second chamber, in a democratic no less than
in an illiberal constitutional system, is very generally
admitted,[148] and no one supposes that the House of Lords will ever
be swept completely out of existence to make room for the
establishment of a new and entirely different parliamentary body. If
it were to devolve upon the people of Great Britain to-day to adopt
for themselves _de novo_ a complete governmental system, they might
well not incorporate in that system an institution of the nature of
the present House of Lords; but since the chamber exists and is rooted
in centuries of national usage and tradition, the perpetuation of it,
in some form, may be taken to be assured.
[Footnote 148: There are, of course, Englishmen who
concur in the dictum of Sieyès that "if a second
chamber dissents from the first, it is mischievous;
if it agrees, it is superfluous." An able exponent
of this doctrine, within recent years, is Sir
Charles Dilke.]
*108. The Breach Between the Lords and the Nation.*--The indictments
which have been brought against the House of Lords have been sweeping
and varied. They have been based upon the all but exclusively
hereditary character of the membership, upon the meagerness of (p. 103)
attendance at the sittings and the small interest displayed by a
majority of the members, and upon the hurried and frequently
perfunctory nature of the consideration which is accorded public
measures. Fundamentally, however, the tremendous attack which has been
levelled against the Lords has had as its impetus the conviction of
large masses of people that the chamber as constituted stands
persistently and deliberately for interests which are not those of the
nation at large. Prior to the parliamentary reforms of the nineteenth
century the House of Commons was hardly more representative of the
people than was the upper chamber. Both were controlled by the landed
aristocracy, and between the two there was as a rule substantial
accord. After 1832, however, the territorial interests, while yet
powerful, were not dominant in the Commons, and a cleavage between the
Lords, on the one hand, and the Commons, increasingly representative
of the mass of the nation, on the other, became a serious factor in
the politics and government of the realm. The reform measures of 1867
and 1884, establishing in substance a system of manhood suffrage in
parliamentary elections, converted the House of Commons into an organ
of thoroughgoing democracy. The development of the cabinet system
brought the working executive, likewise, within the power of the
people to control. But the House of Lords underwent no corresponding
transformation. It remained, and still is, an inherently and
necessarily conservative body, representative, in the main, of the
interests of landed property, adverse to changes which seem to menace
property and established order, and identified with all the forces
that tend to perpetuate the nobility and the Anglican Church as
pillars of the state. By simply standing still while the remaining
departments of the governmental system were undergoing democratization
the second chamber became, in effect, a political anomaly.[149]
[Footnote 149: Dickinson, Development of Parliament
during the Nineteenth Century, Chap. 3.]
*109. Earlier Projects of Reform.*--Projects for the reform of the Lords
were not unknown before 1832, but it has been since that date, and,
more particularly during the past half-century, that the reform
question has been agitated most vigorously. Some of the notable
proposals that have been made relate to the composition of the
chamber, others to the powers and functions of it, and still others to
both of these things. In respect to the composition of the body, the
suggestions that have been brought forward have contemplated most
commonly the reduction of the chamber's size, the dropping out of the
ecclesiastical members, and the substitution, wholly or in part, of
specially designated members in the stead of the members who at present
sit by hereditary right. As early as 1834 it was advocated that (p. 104)
the archbishops and bishops of the Established Church should "be
relieved from their legislative and judicial duties," and this demand,
arising principally from the Non-conformists, has been voiced
repeatedly in later years. In 1835 the opposition of the peers to
measures passed by the Commons incited a storm of popular disapproval
of such proportions that more than one of the members of the chamber
gloomily predicted the early demolition of the body, and throughout
succeeding decades the idea took increasing hold, within the
membership as well as without, that change was inevitable. In 1869 a
bill of Lord Russell providing for the gradual infiltration of life
peers was defeated on the third reading, and in the same year a
project of Earl Grey, and in 1874 proposals of Lord Rosebery and Lord
Inchiquin, came to naught. The rejection by the Lords of measures
supported by Gladstone's government in 1881-1883 brought the chamber
afresh into popular disfavor, and in 1884 Lord Rosebery introduced a
motion "that a select committee be appointed to consider the best
means of promoting the efficiency of this House," with the thought
that there might be brought into the chamber representatives of the
nation at large, and even of the laboring classes. The motion was
rejected overwhelmingly, but in 1888 it was renewed, and in that year
the Salisbury government introduced two reform bills, one providing
for the gradual creation of fifty life peerages, to be conferred upon
men of attainment in law, diplomacy, and administrative service, and
the other (popularly known as the "Black Sheep Bill") providing for
the discontinuance of writs of summons to undesirable members of the
peerage. The bills, however, were withdrawn after their second reading
and an attempt on the part of Lord Carnarvon, in 1889, to revive the
second of them failed.
*110. The Lords and the Liberal Government, 1906-1907.*--Thence-forward
until 1907 the issue was largely quiescent. During a considerable
portion of this period the Unionist party was in power, and between
the upper chamber, four-fifths of whose members were Unionists, and
the Unionist majority in the Commons substantial harmony was easily
maintained. During the Liberal administration of 1893-1894 the Lords
rejected Gladstone's second Home Rule Bill and mutilated and defeated
other measures; but, although the Liberal leaders urged that the will
of the people had been frustrated, the appeal for second chamber
reform failed utterly to strike fire. With the establishment of the
Campbell-Bannerman ministry, in December, 1905, the Liberals entered
upon what has proved a prolonged tenure of power and the issue of the
Lords was brought again inevitably into the forefront of public
controversy. In consequence of the Lords' insistence upon an amendment
of the fundamentals of the Government's Education Bill, late in (p. 105)
1906, and the openly manifested disposition of the Unionist upper chamber
to obstruct the Liberal programme in a variety of directions,[150] the
warfare between the houses once more assumed threatening proportions.
A resolution introduced by the premier June 24, 1907, was adopted in
the Commons after a three days' debate by a vote of 385 to 100, as
follows: "That, in order to give effect to the will of the people as
expressed by elected representatives it is necessary that the power of
the other House to alter or reject bills passed by this House shall be
so restricted by law as to secure that within the limits of a single
parliament the final decision of the Commons shall prevail." It was
announced that a bill carrying into effect the substance of this
declaration would be introduced, and it was understood that the
Government's plan contemplated a reduction of the maximum life of a
parliament from seven years to five and the institution of a system of
conference committees whereby agreement might be effected upon
occasion between the two houses, reserving the eventual right of the
Commons, after a third rejection by the Lords, to enact a measure into
law alone. Preoccupied, however, with projects of general legislation,
the Government postponed and eventually abandoned the introduction of
its bill.
[Footnote 150: Notably in respect to legislation
abolishing the plural vote and regulating the
liquor traffic. The Lords rejected a Plural Voting
Bill and an Aliens Bill in 1906, a Land Values Bill
in 1907, and a Licensing Bill in 1908. In the
interest of accuracy it should be observed that
during the first session of 1906 a total of 121
bills became law, that only four (including the
Education Bill) passed by the Commons were rejected
by the Lords, and that fifteen passed by the Lords
were rejected in the Commons. The proportions at
most sessions during the period under review were
substantially similar. But, of course, measures
rejected by the Lords were likely to be those in
which the interest of the Liberal government was
chiefly centered.]
In the upper chamber a measure introduced by Lord Newton, providing
for (1) a reduction of the hereditary element by requiring that a peer
by descent alone should have a right to sit only if he were elected
(for a single parliament) as a representative peer or possessed other
stipulated qualifications and (2) the appointment by the crown of a
maximum of one hundred life peers, was discussed at some length. The
bill was withdrawn, but it was decided to create a Select Committee on
the House of Lords, under the chairmanship of Lord Rosebery, and in
December, 1908, this committee reported a scheme of reform in
accordance with which (1) a peerage alone should not entitle the
holder to a seat in the chamber; (2) the hereditary peers, including
those of Scotland and Ireland, should elect two hundred representatives
to sit in the upper house for each parliament; (3) hereditary peers
who had occupied certain posts of eminence in the government and the
army and navy should be entitled to sit without election; (4) the (p. 106)
bishops should elect eight representatives, while the archbishops
should sit as of right; and (5) the crown should be empowered to
summon four life peers annually, so long as the total did not exceed
forty. This series of proposals failed utterly to meet the Liberal
demand and no action was taken upon it. But it is to be noted that the
Lords' Reconstruction Bill of 1911, to be described presently, was
based in no small measure upon information and recommendations
forthcoming from the Rosebery committee.[151]
[Footnote 151: May and Holland, Constitutional
History of England, III., 343-349. For references
on the general subject of the reform of the Lords
see pp. 115-116.]
III. THE QUESTION OF THE LORDS, 1909-1911
*111. The Lords and Money Bills.*--In November, 1909, the issue was
reopened in an unexpected manner by the Lords' rejection of the
Government's Finance Bill, in which were included far-reaching
proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd-George,
respecting the readjustment of national taxation. This act of the
upper chamber, while not contrary to positive law, contravened in so
serious a manner long established custom that it was declared by those
who opposed it to be in effect revolutionary. Certainly the result was
to precipitate an alteration of first-rate importance in the
constitution of the kingdom. The priority of the Commons within the
domain of finance was established at an early period of parliamentary
history; and priority, in time, was converted into thoroughgoing
dominance. As early as 1407 Henry IV. recognized the principle that
money grants should be initiated in the Commons, assented to by the
Lords, and subsequently reported to the crown. This procedure was not
always observed, but after the resumption by the two houses of their
normal functions following the Restoration in 1660 the right of the
commoners to take precedence in fiscal business was forcefully and
continuously asserted. In 1671 the Commons resolved "that in all aids
given to the king by the Commons, the rate or tax ought not to be
altered by the Lords," and a resolution of 1678 reaffirmed that all
bills granting supplies "ought to begin with the Commons." At no time
did the Lords admit formally the validity of these principles; but, by
refusing to consider fiscal measures originated in the upper chamber
and to accept financial amendments there proposed, the Commons
successfully enforced observance of them.
The rules in this connection upon which the Commons insisted have been
summarized as follows: (1) The Lords ought not to initiate any (p. 107)
legislative proposal embodied in a public bill and imposing a charge
on the people, whether by taxes, rates, or otherwise, or regulating
the administration or application of money raised by such a charge,
and (2) the Lords ought not to amend any such legislative proposal by
altering the amount of a charge, or its incidence, duration, mode of
assessment, levy or collection, or the administration or application
of money raised by such a charge.[152] These rules, although not
embodied in any law or standing order, were through centuries so
generally observed in the usage of the two houses that they became for
all practical purposes, a part of the constitutional system--conventional,
it is true, but none the less binding. From their observance it
resulted (1) that the upper chamber was never consulted about the
annual estimates, about the amounts of money to be raised, or about
the purposes to which those amounts should be appropriated; (2) that
proposals of taxation came before it only in matured form and under
circumstances which discouraged criticism; and (3) that, since the
policy of the executive is controlled largely through the medium of
the power of the purse, the upper house lost entirely the means of
exercising such control. In 1860 the Lords, as has been mentioned,
made bold to reject a bill for the repeal of the duties on paper; but
the occasion was seized by the Commons to pass a resolution
reaffirming vigorously the subordination of the second chamber in
finance, and the next year the repeal of the paper duties was
incorporated in the annual budget and forced through. Thereafter it
became the invariable practice to give place to all proposals of
taxation in the one grand Finance Bill of the year, with the effect,
of course, of depriving the Lords of the opportunity to defeat a
proposal of the kind save by rejecting the whole of the measure of
which it formed a part.[153]
[Footnote 152: Ilbert, Parliament, 205.]
[Footnote 153: It was in pursuance of this policy
that Sir William Vernon-Harcourt incorporated in
the Finance Bill of 1894, extensive changes in the
death duties and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in 1899,
included proposals for altering the permanent
provisions made for the reduction of the national
debt.]
*112. The Finance Bill of 1909 and the Asquith Resolutions.*--The
rejection of the Finance Bill in 1909,[154] following as it did the
rejection of other important measures which the Liberal majority in
the Commons had approved, raised in an acute form the question of the
power of the Lords over money bills and precipitated a crisis in (p. 108)
the relations between the two houses. On the one hand the House of
Commons adopted, by a vote of 349 to 134, a memorable resolution to
the effect that "the action of the House of Lords in refusing to pass
into law the provision made by the House of Commons for the finances
of the year is a breach of the constitution, and a usurpation of the
privileges of the House of Commons"; and, on the other, the Asquith
ministry came instantly to the decision that the situation demanded an
appeal to the country. In January, 1910, a general election took
place, with the result that the Government was continued in power,
though with a reduced majority; and at the convening of the new
parliament, in February, the Speech from the Throne promised that
proposals should speedily be submitted "to define the relations
between the houses of Parliament, so as to secure the undivided
authority of the House of Commons over finance, and its predominance
in legislation." The Finance Bill of the year was reintroduced and
this time successfully carried through; but in advance of its
reappearance the premier laid before the House of Commons a series of
resolutions to the following effect:[155] (1) that the House of Lords
should be disabled by law from rejecting or amending a money bill; (2)
that the power of the chamber to veto other bills should be restricted
by law; and (3) that the duration of a parliament should be limited to
a maximum period of five years. During the course of the debate upon
these resolutions it was made clear that the Government did not desire
the abolition of the Lords, but wished merely to have the legislative
competence of the house confined to consultation, revision, and,
subject to proper safeguards, delay. April 14, 1910, the resolutions
were adopted in the Commons by substantial majorities,[156] and with
them as a basis the Government proceeded with the framing of its bill
upon the subject.
[Footnote 154: Strictly, the Lords declined to
assent to the Budget until it should have been
submitted to the judgment of the people. On the
nature of the Government's finance proposals see
May and Holland, Constitutional History of England,
III., 350-355; G. L. Fox, The British Budget of
1909, in _Yale Review_, Feb., 1910; and D.
Lloyd-George, The People's Budget (London, 1909),
containing extracts from the Chancellor's speeches
on the subject.]
[Footnote 155: The Finance Bill passed its third
reading in the House of Commons April 27, was
passed in the Lords April 28, without division, and
received the royal assent April 29.]
[Footnote 156: The votes on the three resolutions
were, respectively, 339 to 237, 351 to 246, and 334
to 236.]
Meanwhile, March 14, there had been introduced in the House of Lords
by Lord Rosebery an independent series of resolutions, as follows: (1)
that a strong and efficient second chamber is not merely a part of the
British constitution but is necessary to the well-being of the state
and the balance of Parliament; (2) that such a chamber may best be
obtained by the reform and reconstitution of the House of Lords; and
(3) that a necessary preliminary to such a reform and reconstitution
is the acceptance of the principle that the possession of a peerage
should no longer of itself involve the right to sit and vote in (p. 109)
the House. The first two of these resolutions were agreed to without
division; the third, although vigorously opposed, was carried
eventually by a vote of 175 to 17.
*113. The Unionists and the Referendum.*--The death of the king, May 6,
halted consideration of the subject, and through the succeeding summer
hope was centered in a "constitutional conference" participated in by
eight representatives of the two houses and of the two principal
parties. A total of twenty-one meetings were held, but all effort to
reach an agreement proved futile and at the reassembling of
Parliament, November 15, the problem was thrown back for solution upon
the houses and the country. November 17 there was carried in the
Lords, without division, a new resolution introduced by Lord Rosebery
to the effect that in future the House of Lords should consist of
Lords of Parliament in part chosen by the whole body of hereditary
peers from among themselves and by nomination of the crown, in part
sitting by virtue of offices held and qualifications possessed, and in
part designated from outside the ranks of the peerage. A few days
subsequently, the Government's Parliament Bill having been presented
in the second chamber (November 21), Lord Lansdowne, leader of the
Opposition in that chamber, came forward with a fresh series of
resolutions designed to clarify the Unionist position in anticipation
of the elections which were announced for the ensuing month. With
respect to money bills it was declared that the Lords were "prepared
to forego their constitutional right to reject or amend money bills
which are purely financial in character," provided that adequate
provision should be made against tacking, that questions as to whether
a bill or any provision thereof were purely financial should be
referred to a joint committee of the two houses (the Speaker of the
Commons presiding and possessing a casting vote), and that a bill
decided by such a committee to be not purely financial should be dealt
with in a joint sitting of the two houses. With respect to all
measures other than those thus provided for the resolutions declared
that "if a difference arises between the two houses with regard to any
bill other than a money bill in two successive sessions, and with an
interval of not less than one year, and such difference cannot be
adjusted by any other means, it shall be settled in a joint sitting
composed of members of the two houses; provided that if the difference
relates to a matter which is of great gravity, and has not been
adequately submitted for the judgment of the people, it shall not be
referred to the joint sitting, but shall be submitted for decision to
the electors by referendum." It will be observed that these resolutions
were hardly less drastic than were those carried through the (p. 110)
Commons by the ministry. Their adoption involved the abolition of the
absolute veto of the second chamber and might well involve the
intrusting of interests which the peers held dear to the hazards of a
nation-wide referendum.[157] None the less, the resolutions were
agreed to without division, and, both parties having in effect
pronounced the existing legislative system unsatisfactory, the
electorate was asked to choose between the two elaborate substitutes
thus proposed.
[Footnote 157: For the growth of the idea of the
referendum see H. W. Horwill, The Referendum in
Great Britain, in _Political Science Quarterly_,
Sept., 1911.]
*114. The Enactment of the Parliament Bill, 1911.*--The appeal to the
country, in December, yielded results all but exactly identical with
those of the elections of the previous January. The Government secured
a majority of 127, and in the new parliament, which met February 6,
the Parliament Bill was reintroduced without alteration. On the ground
that the measure had been submitted specifically to the people and had
been approved by them, the ministry demanded its early enactment by
the two houses. May 15 the bill passed its third reading in the
Commons by a vote of 362 to 241. During the committee stage upwards of
one thousand amendments were suggested. But the Government stood firm
for the instrument as originally drawn and, while it accepted a few
incidental changes, in the end it got essentially its own way.
Meanwhile, early in May, Lord Lansdowne introduced in the upper
chamber a comprehensive bill which put in form for legislation the
programme of reconstruction to which the more moderate elements in
that chamber were ready, under the circumstances, to subscribe. The
Lansdowne Reconstruction Bill proposed, at the outset, a reduction of
the membership of the chamber to 350. Princes of the blood and the two
archbishops should retain membership, but the number of bishops entitled
to sit should be reduced to five, these to be chosen triennially by
the whole body of higher prelates upon the principle of proportional
representation. The remainder of the membership should comprise lords
of parliament, as follows: (1) 100 elected from the peers possessing
carefully stipulated qualifications, for a term of twelve years, on
the principle of proportional representation, by the whole body of
hereditary peers (including the Scotch and Irish), one-fourth of the
number retiring triennially; (2) 120 members chosen by electoral colleges
composed of members of the House of Commons divided for the purpose
into local groups, each returning from three to twelve, under conditions
of tenure similar to those prevailing in the first class; and (3) 100
appointed, from the peerage or outside, by the crown on nomination by
the premier, with regard to the strength of parties in the House (p. 111)
of Commons, and under the before-mentioned conditions of tenure. It
was stipulated, further, that peers not sitting in the House of Lords
should be eligible for election to the House of Commons, and that,
except in event of the "indispensable" elevation of a cabinet minister
or ex-minister to the peerage, it should be unlawful for the crown to
confer the dignity of an hereditary peerage upon more than five
persons during the course of any single year.
This body of proposals, it will be observed, related exclusively to
the _composition_ of the upper chamber. The Liberal leaders preferred
to approach the problem from the other side and to assure the
preponderance of the Commons by the imposition of positive
restrictions upon the _powers_ which the Lords, under given
conditions, might exercise. Lord Lansdowne's bill--sadly characterized
by its author as the "deathblow to the House of Lords, as many of us
have known it for so long"--came too late, and the chamber, after
allowing it to be read a second time without division, was constrained
to drop it for the Government's measure. July 20 the Parliament Bill,
amended in such a manner as to exclude from its operation legislation
affecting the constitution and other matters of "great gravity," was
adopted without division. The proposed amendments were highly
objectionable to the Liberals and, relying upon an understanding
entered into with the king during the previous November relative to
the creation of peers favorable to the Government's programme, the
ministry let it be understood that no compromise upon essentials could
be considered.[158] Confronted with the prospect of a wholesale
"swamping,"[159] the Opposition fell back upon the policy of
abstention and, although a considerable number of "last-ditchers" held
out to the end, a group of Unionists adequate to carry the measure
joined the supporters of the Government, August 10, in a vote not to
insist upon the Lords' amendments, which meant, in effect, to approve
the bill as adopted in the lower house.[160] The royal assent was
extended August 18.
[Footnote 158: When, July 24, Premier Asquith rose
in the Commons to reply to the Lords' amendments
there resulted such confusion that for the first
time in generations, save upon one occasion in
1905, the Speaker was obliged to adjourn a sitting
on account of the disorderly conduct of members.]
[Footnote 159: Had the Unionists maintained to the
end their attitude of opposition the number of
peers which would have had to be created to ensure
the enactment of the bill would have been some
400.]
[Footnote 160: The final vote in the Lords was 131
to 114. The Unionist peers who voted with the
Government numbered 37.]
IV. THE PARLIAMENT ACT OF 1911 AND AFTER (p. 112)
*115. Provisions Relating to Money Bills.*--In its preamble the
Parliament Act promises further legislation which will define both the
composition and the powers of a second chamber "constituted on a
popular instead of an hereditary basis"; but the act itself relates
exclusively to the powers of the chamber as it is at present
constituted. The general purport of the measure is to define the
conditions under which, while the normal methods of legislation remain
unchanged, financial bills and proposals of general legislation may
nevertheless be enacted into law without the concurrence of the upper
house. The first signal provision is that a public bill passed by the
House of Commons and certified by the Speaker to be, within the terms
of the act, a "money bill" shall, unless the Commons direct to the
contrary, become an act of Parliament on the royal assent being
signified, notwithstanding that the House of Lords may not have
consented to the bill, within one month after it shall have been sent
up to that house. A money bill is defined as "a public bill which, in
the judgment of the Speaker, contains only provisions dealing with all
or any of the following subjects: the imposition, repeal, remission,
alteration, or regulation of taxation; the imposition for the payment
of debt or other financial purposes of charges on the Consolidated
Fund, or on money provided by Parliament, or the variation or repeal
of any such charges; supply; the appropriation, receipt, custody,
issue or audit of accounts of public money; the raising or guarantee
of any loan or the payment thereof; or subordinate matters incidental
to those subjects or any of them." A certificate of the Speaker given
under this act is made conclusive for all purposes. It may not be
questioned in any court of law.[161]
[Footnote 161: An incidental effect of the act is
to exalt the power and importance of the Speaker,
although it should be observed that the Speaker has
long been accustomed to state at the introduction
of a public bill whether in his judgment the rights
or privileges claimed by the House of Commons in
respect to finance had been infringed. If he were
of the opinion that there had been infringement, it
remained for the House to determine whether it
would insist upon or waive its privilege Ilbert,
Parliament, 207.]
*116. Provisions Relating to Other Public Bills.*--The second
fundamental stipulation is that any other public bill (except one to
confirm a provisional order or one to extend the maximum duration of
Parliament beyond five years) which is passed by the House of Commons
in three successive sessions, whether or not of the same parliament,
and which, having been sent up to the House of Lords at least one (p. 113)
month, in each case, before the end of the session, is rejected by
that chamber in each of those sessions, shall, unless the House of
Commons direct to the contrary, become an act of Parliament on the
royal assent being signified thereto, notwithstanding the fact that
the House of Lords has not consented to the bill. It is required that
at least two years shall have elapsed between the date of the second
reading of such a bill (i.e., the first real opportunity for its
discussion) in the first of these sessions of the House of Commons and
the final passage of the bill in the third of the sessions. To come
within the provisions of this act the measure must be, at its initial
and its final appearances, the "same bill;" that is, it must exhibit
no alterations save such as are rendered necessary by the lapse of
time. And a bill is to be construed to be "rejected" by the Lords if
it is not passed, or if amendments are introduced to which the House
of Commons does not agree, or which the House of Commons does not
suggest to the House of Lords at the second or third passage of the
bill.
*117. Effects of the Act.*--By the provisions which have been enumerated
the co-ordinate and independent position which, in law if not in fact,
the British upper chamber, as a legislative body, has occupied through
the centuries has been effectually subverted. Within the domain of
legislation, it is true, the Lords may yet exercise influence of no
inconsiderable moment. To the chamber must be submitted every project
of finance and of legislation which it is proposed to enact into law,
and there is still nothing save a certain measure of custom to prevent
the introduction of even the most important of non-financial measures
first of all in that house. But a single presentation of any money
bill fulfills the legal requirement and ensures that the measure will
become law. For such a bill will not be presented until it has been
passed by the Commons, and, emanating from the cabinet, it will not be
introduced in that chamber until the assent of the executive is
assured. The upper house is allowed one month in which to approve or
to reject, but, so far as the enactment of the bill is concerned, the
result is the same in any case. Upon ordinary legislation the House of
Lords possesses still a veto--a veto, however, which is no longer
absolute but only suspensive. The conditions which are required for
the enactment of non-fiscal legislation without the concurrence of the
Lords are not easy to bring about, but their realization is not at all
an impossibility. By the repeated rejection of proposed measures the
Lords may influence public sentiment or bring about otherwise a change
of circumstances and thus compass the defeat of the original intent of
the Commons, and this is the more possible since a minimum period of
two years is required to elapse before a non-fiscal measure can be (p. 114)
carried over the Lords' veto. But the continuity of political
alignments and of legislative policy is normally such in Great Britain
that the remarkable legislative precedence which has been accorded the
Commons must mean in effect little less than absolute law-making
authority.
*118. Possible Further Changes and the Difficulties Involved.*--What the
future holds in store for the House of Lords cannot be discerned. The
Parliament Act, as has been pointed out, promises further legislation
which will define both the composition and the powers of a second
chamber constituted on a popular instead of an hereditary basis; but
no steps have as yet (1912) been taken publicly in this direction, nor
has any authoritative announcement of purpose been made.[162] Many
Englishmen to-day are of the opinion that, as John Bright declared, "a
hereditary House of Lords is not and cannot be perpetual in a free
country." None the less, it is recognized that the chamber as it is at
present constituted contains a large number of conscientious, eminent,
and able men, that upon numerous occasions the body has imposed a
wholesome check upon the popular branch, and that sometimes it has
interpreted the will of the nation more correctly than has the popular
branch itself. The most reasonable programme of reform would seem to
be, not a total reconstitution of the chamber upon a non-hereditary
basis, but (1) the adoption of the Rosebery principle that the
possession of a peerage shall not of itself entitle the possessor to
sit, (2) the admission to membership of a considerable number of
persons representative of the whole body of peers, and (3) the
introduction of a goodly quota of life peers, appointed by reason of
legal attainments, governmental experience, and other qualities of
fitness and eminence.[163]
[Footnote 162: The Parliament Act is the handiwork,
of course, of the Liberal party, and only that
party is likely to acknowledge the obligation to
follow up the reform of the Lords which the measure
imposes. But the Unionists may be regarded as
committed by Lord Lansdowne's bill to some measure
of popularization of the chamber.]
[Footnote 163: During the discussions of 1910 an
interesting suggestion was offered (April 25) by
Lord Wemyss to the effect that the representative
character of the chamber should be given emphasis
by the admission of three members designated by
each of some twenty-one commercial, professional,
and educational societies of the kingdom, such as
the Royal Academy of Arts, the Society of
Engineers, the Shipping Federation, and the Royal
Institute of British Architects.]
It is to be observed, however, that neither this programme nor any
other that can be offered, unless it be that of popular election,
affords much ground upon which to hope for harmonious relations
between the upper chamber and a Liberal Government. The House of
Lords--_any_ House of Lords in which members sit for life or in
heredity--is inevitably conservative in its political tendencies (p. 115)
and sympathies, which means, as conditions are to-day, that the
chamber is certain to be dominated by adherents of the Unionist party.
History shows that even men who are appointed to the upper house as
Liberals become adherents almost invariably, in time, of Unionism. The
consequence is that, while a Unionist administration is certain to
have the support of a working majority in both of the houses, a
Liberal government cannot expect ever to find itself in the ascendancy
in the Lords. Its measures will be easy to carry in the lower house
but difficult or impossible to carry in the upper one. This was the
central fact in the situation from which sprang the Parliament Act of
1911. By this piece of legislation the Liberals sought to provide for
themselves a mode of escape from the _impasse_ in which the opposition
of the Lords so frequently has involved them. The extent, however, to
which the arrangements effected will fulfill the purpose for which
they were intended remains to be ascertained.[164] "An upper house in
a true parliamentary system," says Lowell, "cannot be brought into
constant accord with the dominant party of the day without destroying
its independence altogether; and to make the House of Lords a mere
tool in the hands of every cabinet would be well-nigh impossible and
politically absurd."[165] Therein must be adjudged still to lie (p. 116)
the essential dilemma of English politics.
[Footnote 164: The literature of the question of
second chamber reform in England is voluminous and
but a few of the more important titles can be
mentioned here. The subject is discussed briefly in
Lowell, Government of England, I., Chap. 22; Moran,
English Government, Chap. 11; Low, Governance of
England, Chap. 13; and H. W. V. Temperley, Senates
and Upper Chambers (London, 1910), Chap. 5.
Important books include W. C. Macpherson, The
Baronage and the Senate; or the House of Lords in
the Past, the Present, and the Future (London,
1893); T. A. Spalding, The House of Lords: a
Retrospect and a Forecast (London, 1894); J. W.
Wylie, The House of Lords (London, 1908); W. S.
McKechnie, The Reform of the House of Lords
(Glasgow, 1909); W. L. Wilson, The Case for the
House of Lords (London, 1910); and J. H. Morgan,
The House of Lords and the Constitution (London,
1910). Of these, the first constitutes one of the
most forceful defenses and the second one of the
most incisive criticisms of the upper chamber that
have been written. A brief review by an able French
writer is A. Esmein, La Chambre des Lords et la
démocratie (Paris, 1910). Among articles in
periodicals may be mentioned H. W. Horwill, The
Problem of The House of Lords, in _Political
Science Quarterly_, March, 1908; E. Porritt, The
Collapse of the Movement against the Lords, in
_North American Review_, June, 1908; ibid., Recent
and Pending Constitutional Changes in England, in
_American Political Science Review_, May, 1910; J.
L. Garvin, The British Elections and their Meaning,
in _Fortnightly Review_, Feb., 1910; J. A. R.
Marriott, The Constitutional Crisis, in _Nineteenth
Century_, Jan., 1910. A readable sketch is A. L. P.
Dennis, Impressions of British Party Politics,
1909-1911, in _American Political Science Review_,
Nov., 1911; and the best accounts of the Parliament
Act and of its history are: Dennis, The Parliament
Act of 1911, ibid., May and Aug., 1912; May and
Holland, Constitutional History of England, III.,
343-384; Lowell, Government of England (rev. ed.,
New York, 1912), Chap. 23a; _Annual Register_ for
the years 1910 and 1911; M. Sibert, Le vote du
Parliament Act, in _Revue du Droit Public_,
Jan.-March, 1912; and La réforme de la Chambre des
Lords, ibid., July-Sept., 1912. A book of some
value is C. T. King, The Asquith Parliament,
1906-1909; a Popular Sketch of its Men and its
Measures (London, 1910).]
[Footnote 165: Government of England, I., 418-419.]
CHAPTER VI (p. 117)
PARLIAMENT: ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, PROCEDURE
I. THE ASSEMBLING OF THE CHAMBERS
*119. Sessions.*--Parliament is required by statute to meet at least
once in three years;[166] but, by reason of the enormous pressure of
business and, in particular, the custom which forbids the voting of
supplies for a period longer than one year, meetings are, in point of
fact, annual. A session begins ordinarily near the first of February
and continues, with brief adjournments at holiday seasons, until
August or September. It is required that the two houses shall
invariably be summoned together. Either may adjourn without the other,
and the crown can compel an adjournment of neither. A prorogation,
which brings a session to a close, and a dissolution, which brings the
existence of a parliament to an end, must be ordered for the two
houses conjointly. Both take place technically at the command of the
crown, actually upon the decision of the ministry. A prorogation is to
a specified date, and it terminates all pending business; but the
reassembling of the houses may be either postponed or hastened by
royal proclamation.
[Footnote 166: Triennial Act of December 22, 1694.]
*120. The Opening of a Parliament.*--At the beginning of a session the
members of the two houses gather first of all in their respective
chambers. The commoners are summoned thereupon to the chamber of the
Lords, where the letters patent authorizing the session are read and
the Lord Chancellor makes known the desire of the crown that the
Commons proceed with the choosing of a Speaker. The Commons withdraw
to attend to this matter, and on the next day the newly elected
official, accompanied by the members, presents himself at the bar of
the House of Lords, announces his election, and, through the Lord
Chancellor, receives the royal approbation. Having demanded and
received guarantee of the "ancient and undoubted rights and privileges
of the Commons," the Speaker and the members then retire to their own
quarters, where the necessary oaths are administered. If, as is not
unusual, the king meets Parliament in person, he goes in state, (p. 118)
probably the next day, to the House of Lords and takes his seat upon
the throne, and the Lord Chamberlain is instructed to desire the
Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod to _command_ the attendance once more
of the Commons. If the sovereign does not attend, the Lords
Commissioners bid the Usher to _desire_ the Commons' presence. In any
case, the commoners present themselves and the king (or, in his
absence, the Lord Chancellor) reads the Speech from the Throne, in
which is communicated succinctly the nature of the business to which
attention is to be directed. Following the retirement of the
sovereign, the Commons again withdraw, the Throne Speech is reread and
an address in reply voted in each house, and the Government begins the
introduction of fiscal and legislative proposals. In the event that a
session is not the first one of a parliament, the election of a
Speaker and the administration of oaths are omitted.[167]
[Footnote 167: On the ceremonies involved in the
opening, adjournment, prorogation, and dissolution
of a parliament see Anson, Law and Custom of the
Constitution, I., 61-77; J. Redlich, The Procedure
of the House of Commons; a Study of its History and
Present Form, trans. by A. E. Steinthal, 3 vols.
(London, 1908), II., 51-67; T. E. May, Treatise on
the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage of
Parliament (11th ed., London, 1906), Chap. 7; A.
Wright and P. Smith, Parliament, Past and Present,
2 vols. (London, 1902), II., Chap. 25; MacDonaugh,
The Book of Parliament, 96-114, 132-147, 184-203;
and H. Graham, The Mother of Parliaments (Boston,
1911), 135-157.]
*121. The Palace of Westminster.*--From the beginning of parliamentary
history the meeting-place of the houses has been regularly
Westminster, on the left bank of the Thames. The last parliament which
sat at any other spot was the third Oxford Parliament of Charles II.,
in 1681. The Palace of Westminster, in mediæval times outside, though
near, the principal city of the kingdom, was long the most important
of the royal residences, and it was natural that its great halls and
chambers, together with the adjoining abbey, should be utilized
habitually for parliamentary sittings. Of the enormous structure known
as Westminster to-day (still, technically, a royal palace, though not
a royal residence), practically all portions save old Westminster Hall
were constructed after the fire of 1834. The Lords first occupied
their present quarters in 1847 and the Commons theirs in 1850.[168]
[Footnote 168: MacDonaugh, The Book of Parliament,
79-95; Graham, The Mother of Parliaments, 60-80;
Wright and Smith, Parliament, Past and Present, I.,
Chaps. 11-13. The classic history of the old Palace
of Westminster is E. W. Brayley and J. Britton,
History of the Ancient Palace and Late Houses of
Parliament at Westminster (London, 1836).]
*122. The Chambers of the Commons and the Lords.*--From opposite sides
of a central lobby corridors lead to the halls in which the sittings
of the two bodies are held, these halls facing each other in such (p. 119)
a manner that the King's throne at the south end of the House of Lords
is visible from the Speaker's chair at the north end of the House of
Commons. The room occupied by the Commons is not large, being but
seventy-five feet in length by forty-five in breadth. It is bisected
by a broad aisle, at the upper end of which is a large table for the
use of the clerk and his assistants and beyond this the raised and
canopied chair of the Speaker. "Facing the aisle on each side long
rows of high-backed benches, covered with dark green leather, slope
upward tier above tier to the walls of the room; and through them, at
right angles to the aisle, a narrow passage known as the gangway, cuts
across the House. There is also a gallery running all around the room,
the part of it facing the Speaker being given up to visitors, while
the front rows at the opposite end belong to the reporters, and behind
them there stands, before a still higher gallery, a heavy screen, like
those erected in Turkish mosques to conceal the presence of women, and
used here for the same purpose."[169] The rows of benches on the gallery
sides are reserved for members, but they do not afford a very desirable
location and are rarely occupied, save upon occasions of special
interest. In the body of the house there are fewer than 350 seats for
670 members. As a rule, not even all of these are occupied, for there
are no desks and the member who wishes to read, write, or otherwise
occupy himself seeks the library or other rooms adjoining. The front
bench at the upper end of the aisle, at the right of the Speaker, is
known as the Treasury Bench and is reserved for members of the
Government. The corresponding bench at the Speaker's left is reserved
similarly for the leaders of the Opposition. In so far as is possible
in the lack of a definite assignment of seats, members of avowed party
allegiance range themselves behind their leaders, while members of
more independent attitude seek places below the gangway. "The accident
that the House of Commons sits in a narrow room with benches facing
each other, and not, like most continental legislatures, in a (p. 120)
semi-circular space, with seats arranged like those of a theatre,
makes for the two-party system and against groups shading into each
other."[170]
[Footnote 169: Lowell, Government of England, I.,
249. Visitors, technically "strangers," are present
only on sufferance and may be excluded at any time;
but the ladies' gallery is not supposed to be
within the chamber, so that an order of exclusion
does not reach the occupants of it. In the autumn
of 1908, however, the disorderly conduct of persons
in the ladies' and strangers' galleries caused the
Speaker to close these galleries during the
remainder of the session. In 1738 the House
declared the publication of its proceedings "a high
indignity and a notorious breach of privilege,"
and, technically, such publication is still
illegal. In 1771, however, the reporters' gallery
was fitted up, and through a century and a quarter
the proceedings have been reported and printed as a
matter of course. On the status of the public and
the press in the chamber see Ilbert, Parliament,
Chap. 8; Redlich, Procedure of the House of
Commons; II., 28-38; MacDonaugh, The Book of
Parliament, 310-329, 350-365; and H. Graham, The
Mother of Parliaments, 259-287.]
[Footnote 170: Ilbert, Parliament, 124. The chamber
is described fully in Wright and Smith, Parliament,
Past and Present, Chap. 19.]
The hall occupied by the Lords is smaller and more elaborately
decorated than that occupied by the Commons. It contains cross
benches, but in the main the arrangements that have been described are
duplicated in it. For social and ceremonial purposes there exists
among the members a fixed order of precedence.[171] In the chamber,
however, the seating is arranged without regard to this order, save
that the bishops sit in a group. The Government peers occupy the
benches on the right of the woolsack and the Opposition those on the
left, while members who prefer to remain neutral take their places on
the cross benches between the table and the bar.[172]
[Footnote 171: This order runs: Prince of Wales,
other princes of the royal blood, Archbishop of
Canterbury, Lord Chancellor, Archbishop of York,
Lord President of the Council, Lord Privy Seal, the
dukes, the marquises, the earls, the viscounts, the
bishops, and the barons.]
[Footnote 172: For full description, with
illustrations, see Wright and Smith, Parliament,
Past and Present, Chap. 18.]
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
*123. Hours of Sittings.*--In the seventeenth century the sittings of
the Commons began regularly at 8.30 or 9 o'clock in the morning and
terminated with nightfall. In the eighteenth century, and far into the
nineteenth, they were apt to begin as late as 3 or 4 o'clock in the
afternoon and to be prolonged, at least not infrequently, until toward
daybreak. In 1888, however, a standing order fixed midnight as the
hour for the "interrupting" of ordinary business, and in 1906 the hour
was made 11 o'clock. Nowadays the House meets regularly on Mondays,
Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays at 2.45 and continues in session
throughout the evening, the interval formerly allowed for dinner
having been abolished in 1906. On Fridays, set apart, until late in
the session, for the consideration of private members' bills, the hour
of convening is 12 o'clock. At sittings on days other than Friday the
first hour or more is consumed usually with small items of formal
business and with the asking and answering of questions addressed to
the ministers, so that the public business set for the day is reached
at approximately 4 o'clock.[173]
[Footnote 173: Redlich, Procedure of the House of
Commons, II., 68-77.]
*124. Officers.*--The principal officers of the House are the (p. 121)
Speaker, the Clerk and his two assistants, the Sergeant-at-Arms and
his deputies, the Chaplain, and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of
Ways and Means. The Clerk and the Sergeant-at-Arms, together with
their assistants, are appointed for life by the crown, on nomination
of the premier, but the Speaker and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman
of Ways and Means are elected for a single parliament by the House.[174]
All save the Chairman and his deputy are, strictly, non-political
officers. The Clerk signs all orders of the House, indorses bills sent
or returned to the Lords, reads whatever is required to be read during
the sittings, records the proceedings of the chamber, and, with the
concurrence of the Speaker, supervises the preparation of the official
Journal. The Sergeant-at-Arms attends the Speaker, enforces the
House's orders, and presents at the bar of the House persons ordered
or qualified to be so presented. The Chairman of Ways and Means (in
his absence the Deputy Chairman) presides over the deliberations of
the House when the body sits as a committee of the whole[175] and
exercises supervision over private bill legislation. Although a
political official, he preserves, in both capacities, a strictly
non-partisan attitude.
[Footnote 174: In point of fact, the Chairman and
Deputy Chairman retire when the ministry by which
they have been nominated goes out of office.]
[Footnote 175: On this account he is referred to
ordinarily as the Chairman of Committees.]
*125. The Speakership.*--The speakership arose from the need of the
House when it was merely a petitioning body for a recognized
spokesman, and although the known succession of Speakers begins with
Sir Thomas Hungerford, who held the office in the last parliament of
Edward III. (1377), there is every reason to suppose that at even an
earlier date there were men whose functions were substantially
equivalent. The Speaker is elected at the beginning of a parliament by
and from the members of the House, and his tenure of office, unless
terminated by resignation or death, continues through the term of that
parliament. The choice of the House is subject to the approval of the
crown; but, whereas in earlier days the king's will was at this point
very influential, the last occasion upon which a Speaker-elect was
rejected by the crown was in 1679. Though nominally elected, the
Speaker is in fact chosen by the ministry, and he is pretty certain to
be taken, in the first instance, from the party in power. During the
nineteenth century, however, it became customary to re-elect a Speaker
as long as he should be willing to serve, regardless of party
affiliation.
*126. The Speaker's Functions and Powers.*--The functions of the Speaker
are regulated in part by custom, in part by rules of the House, and
in part by general legislation. They are numerous and, in the (p. 122)
aggregate, highly important. The Speaker is, first of all, the
presiding officer of the House. In this capacity he is a strictly
non-partisan moderator whose business it is to maintain decorum in
deliberations, decide points of order, put questions, and announce the
result of divisions. The non-partisan aspect of the English speakership
sets the office off in sharp contrast with its American counterpart.
"It makes little difference to any English party in Parliament," says
Mr. Bryce, "whether the occupant of the chair has come from their own
or from hostile ranks.... A custom as strong as law forbids him to
render help to his own side even by private advice. Whatever
information as to parliamentary law he may feel free to give must be
equally at the disposal of every member."[176] Except in the event of
a tie, the Speaker does not vote, even when, the House being in
committee, he is not occupying the chair. In the second place, the
Speaker is the spokesman and representative of the House, whether in
demanding privileges, communicating resolutions, or issuing warrants.
There was a time when he was hardly less the spokesman of the king
than the spokesman of the Commons, but the growth of independence of
the popular chamber enabled him long ago to cast off this dual and
extremely difficult rôle. The Speaker, furthermore, declares and
interprets, though he in no case makes, the law of the House. "Where,"
says Ilbert, "precedents, rulings, and the orders of the House are
insufficient or uncertain guides, he has to consider what course would
be most consistent with the usages, traditions, and dignity of the
House, and the rights and interests of its members, and on these
points his advice is usually followed, and his decisions are very
rarely questioned.... For many generations the deference habitually
paid to the occupant of the chair has been the theme of admiring
comment by foreign observers."[177] Finally, the fact should be noted
that by the Parliament Act of 1911 the Speaker is given sole power,
when question arises, to determine whether a given measure is or is
not to be considered a money bill.[178] Upon his decision may hinge
the entire policy of the Government respecting a measure, and even the
fate of the measure itself. The Speaker's symbol of authority is the
mace, which is carried before him when he formally enters or leaves
the House and lies on the table before him when he is in the chair. He
has an official residence in Westminster, and he receives a salary of
£5,000 a year which is paid from the Consolidated Fund, being on that
account not subject to change when the annual appropriation bills (p. 123)
are under consideration. At retirement from office a Speaker is likely
to be pensioned and to be elevated to the peerage.[179]
[Footnote 176: American Commonwealth, I., 135.]
[Footnote 177: Parliament, 140-141.]
[Footnote 178: See p. 112.]
[Footnote 179: On the officers of the House of
Commons see Lowell, Government of England, I.,
Chap. 12; on the speakership, Redlich, Procedure of
the House of Commons, II., 131-171; Graham, The
Mother of Parliaments, 119-134; MacDonaugh, The
Book of Parliament, 115-132; Porritt, Unreformed
House of Commons, I., Chaps. 21-22; A. I. Dasent,
The Speakers of the House of Commons from the
Earliest Times to the Present Day (New York, 1911);
and G. Mer, Les speakers: étude de la fonction
présidentielle en Angleterre et aux États-Unis
(Paris, 1910).]
*127. Quorum.*--As fixed by a resolution of 1640, a quorum for the
transaction of business in the Commons is forty. If at any time during
a sitting the attention of the Speaker is directed to the fact that
there are not forty members present, the two-minute sand-glass which
stands upon the Clerk's table is inverted and the members are summoned
from all portions of the building as for a division. At the close of
the allotted two minutes the Speaker counts the members present, and
if there be not forty the House adjourns until the time fixed for the
next regular sitting. Except upon occasions of special interest, the
number of members actually occupying the benches is likely to be less
than two hundred, although most of the remaining members are within
the building or, in any case, not far distant.
*128. Kinds of Committees.*--Like all important and numerous legislative
bodies, the House of Commons expedites the transaction of the business
which devolves upon it through the employment of committees. As early
as the period of Elizabeth the reference of a bill, after its second
reading, to a select committee was an established practice, and in the
reign of Charles I. it became not uncommon to refer measures to
committees of the whole house. The committees of the House to-day may
be grouped in five categories: (1) the Committee of the Whole; (2)
select committees on public bills; (3) sessional committees; (4)
standing committees on public bills; and (5) committees on private
bills. Until 1907 a public bill, after its second reading, went
normally to the Committee of the Whole; since the date mentioned, it
goes there only if the House so determines. The Committee of the Whole
is simply the House of Commons, presided over by the Chairman of
Committees in the place of the Speaker, and acting under rules of
procedure which permit virtually unrestricted discussion and in other
ways lend themselves to the free consideration of the details of a
measure. When the subject in hand relates to the providing of revenue
the body is known, technically, as the Committee of Ways and Means;
when to appropriations, it is styled the Committee of the Whole on
Supply, or simply the Committee of Supply.
*129. Select and Sessional Committees.*--Select committees (p. 124)
consist, as a rule, of fifteen members and are constituted to
investigate and report upon specific subjects or measures. It is
through them that the House collects evidence, examines witnesses, and
otherwise obtains the information required for intelligent
legislation. After a select committee has fulfilled the immediate
purpose for which it was constituted it passes out of existence. Each
such committee chooses its chairman, and each keeps detailed records
of its proceedings, which are included, along with its formal report,
in the published parliamentary papers of the session. The members may
be elected by the House, but in practice the appointment of some or
all is left to the Committee of Selection, which itself consists of
eleven members chosen by the House at the beginning of each session.
This Committee of Selection, which appoints members not only of select
committees but also of standing committees and of committees on
private and local bills, is made up after conference between the
leaders of the Government and of the Opposition; and the committees
whose members it designates are always so constituted that they
contain a majority favorable to the Government. The number of select
committees is, of course, variable, but it is never small. A few are
constituted for an entire year and are known as sessional committees.
Of these, the Committee of Selection is itself an example; others are
the Committee on Public Accounts and the Committee on Public
Petitions.
*130. Standing Committees.*--Beginning in 1882, certain great standing
committees have been created, to the general end that the time of the
House may be further economized. Through a change of the standing
orders of the chamber effected in 1907 the number of such committees
was raised from two to four, and all bills except money bills, private
bills, and bills for confirming provisional orders--that is to say,
all public non-fiscal proposals--are required to be referred to one of
these committees (the Speaker to determine which one) unless the House
otherwise directs. It is expected that measures so referred will be so
fully considered in committee that they will consume but little of the
time of the House. Each of the four committees consists of from sixty
to eighty members, who are named by the Committee of Selection in such
a manner that in personnel they will represent faithfully the
composition of the House as a whole. One of them, consisting of all
the representatives of Scotch constituencies and fifteen other
members, is constituted with a special view to the transaction of
business relating to Scotland. The chairmen of the four are selected
(from its own ranks) by a "chairman's panel" of not more than eight
members designated by the Committee of Selection. The procedure (p. 125)
of the standing committees is closely assimilated to that of the
Committee of the Whole, and, in truth, they serve essentially as
substitutes for the larger body.[180]
[Footnote 180: On committees on private bills see
p. 137. The committees of the House of Commons are
described in Lowell, Government of England, I.,
Chap. 13; Marriott, English Political Institutions,
Chap. 11; Ilbert, Parliament, Chap. 6; Redlich,
Procedure of the House of Commons, II., 180-214;
and May, Treatise on the Law, Privileges,
Proceedings, and Usage of Parliament, Chaps.
13-14.]
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
*131. Sittings and Attendance.*--It is required that the two houses of
Parliament shall be convened invariably together, and one may not be
prorogued without the other. The actual sittings of the Lords are,
however, very much briefer and more leisurely than are those of the
Commons. Normally the upper chamber meets but four times a week--on
Mondays, Thursdays, and Fridays at 4.30 o'clock and on Tuesdays at
5.30. By reason of lack of business or indisposition to consume time
in the consideration of measures whose eventual enactment is assured,
sittings not infrequently are concluded within an hour, although, of
course, there are occasions upon which the chamber deliberates
seriously and at much length. A quorum for the transaction of business
is fixed at the number three; although it is but fair to observe
that if a division occurs upon a bill and it is found that there are
not thirty members present the question is declared not to be
decided. Save upon formal occasions and at times when there is under
consideration a measure in whose fate the members are immediately
interested, attendance is always meager. There are members who after
complying with the formalities incident to the assumption of a seat,
rarely, and in some instances never, reappear among their colleagues.
It thus comes about that despite the fact that nominally the House of
Lords is one of the largest of the world's law-making assemblies, the
chamber exhibits in reality little of the unwieldiness ordinarily
characteristic of deliberative bodies of such magnitude. The
efficiency of the chamber is more likely to be impaired by paucity of
attendance than otherwise.
*132. Officers.*--The officers of the House of Lords are largely
appointive, though in part elective. Except during the trial of a
peer,[181] the presiding official is the Lord Chancellor, appointed by
the crown on the advice of the premier. The duty of presiding in the
Lords, as has been explained, is but one of many that fall to this
remarkable dignitary.[182] If at the time of his appointment an (p. 126)
incumbent is not a peer he is reasonably certain to be created one,
although there is no legal requirement to this effect. The theory is
that the woolsack which comprises the presiding official's seat is not
within the chamber proper[183] and that the official himself, as such,
is not a member of the body. The powers allowed him are not even those
commonly possessed by a moderator. In the event that two or more peers
request the privilege of addressing the chamber, the peers themselves
decide which shall have the floor. Order in debate is enforced, not by
the Chancellor, but by the members, and when they speak they address,
not the chair, but "My Lords." Although, if a peer, the Chancellor may
speak and vote as any other member, he possesses as presiding officer
no power of the casting vote. In short, the position which the Chancellor
occupies in the chamber is all but purely formal. In addition to
"deputy speakers," designated to preside in the Chancellor's absence,
the remaining officials of the Lords who owe their positions to
governmental appointment are the Clerk of Parliament, who keeps the
records; the Sergeant-at-Arms, who attends personally the presiding
officer and acts as custodian of the mace; and the Gentleman Usher of
the Black Rod, a pompous dignitary whose function it is to summon the
Commons when their attendance is required and to play a more or less
useful part upon other ceremonial occasions. The one important
official whom the House itself elects is the Lord Chairman of
Committees, whose duty it is to preside in Committee of the Whole.
[Footnote 181: See p. 127.]
[Footnote 182: See p. 63.]
[Footnote 183: In the days of Elizabeth the
presiding official sat upon a sack actually filled
with wool. He sits now, as a matter of fact, upon
an ottoman, upholstered in red. But the ancient
designation of the seat survives.]
IV. PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSES AND OF MEMBERS
*133. Nature and Extent of Privileges.*--On the basis in part of custom
and in part of statute there exists a body of definitely established
privileges, some of which appertain to the Commons as a chamber, some
similarly to the Lords, and some to the individual members of both
houses. The privileges which at the opening of a parliament the
newly-elected Speaker requests and, as a matter of course, obtains for
the chamber over which he presides include principally those of
freedom from arrest, freedom of speech, access to the sovereign, and a
"favorable construction" upon the proceedings of the House. Freedom
from arrest is enjoyed by members during a session and a period of
forty days before and after it, but it does not protect a member (p. 127)
from the consequences of any indictable offense nor, in civil actions,
from any process save arrest. Freedom of speech, finally guaranteed
effectually in the Bill of Rights, means simply that a member may not
be held to account by legal process outside Parliament for anything he
may have said in the course of the debates or proceedings of the
chamber to which he belongs. The right of access to the sovereign
belongs to the Commons collectively through the Speaker, but to the
Lords individually. With the growth of parliamentary government both
it and the privilege of "favorable construction" have ceased to
possess practical importance. Another privilege which survives is that
of exemption from jury duty, though no longer of refusing to attend
court in the capacity of a witness. Each house enjoys the
privilege--for all practical purposes now the right--of regulating its
own proceedings, of committing persons for contempt, and of deciding
contested elections. The last-mentioned function the House of Commons,
however, has delegated to the courts. A privilege jealously retained
by the Lords is that of trial in all cases of treason or felony by the
upper chamber itself, under the presidency of a Lord High Steward
appointed by the crown. The Lords are exempt from arrest in civil
causes, not merely during and immediately preceding and succeeding
sessions, but at all times, and they enjoy all the rights, privileges,
and distinctions which, through law or custom, have become inherent in
their several dignities.
*134. Payment of Members of the Commons.*--Until recently the fact that
there was no salary attached to service in Parliament operated to
debar from election to the Commons men who were not of independent
means. Through some years the Labor Party was accustomed to provide
funds wherewith its representatives were enabled to maintain
themselves at the capital,[184] but this arrangement affected only a
small group of members and was of an entirely private and casual
nature. Public and systematic payment of members, to the end that poor
but capable men might not be kept out of the Commons, was demanded by
the Chartists three-quarters of a century ago, and from time to time
after 1870 there was agitation in behalf of such a policy. In 1893,
and again in 1895, a resolution in favor of the payment of members was
adopted in the Commons, and March 7, 1906, a resolution was carried to
the effect that every member should be paid a salary of £300 annually.
But it was not until 1911 that a measure of the kind could be got
through the upper chamber. Fresh impetus was afforded by the Osborne
Judgment, in which, on an appeal from the lower courts, the House of
Lords ruled in December, 1909, that the payment of parliamentary (p. 128)
members as such from the dues collected by labor organizations was
contrary to law. The announcement of the Judgment was followed by
persistent agitation for legislation to reverse the ruling. In
connection with the budget presented to the Commons by the Chancellor
of the Exchequer May 16, 1911, the proposition was made, not to take
action one way or the other upon the Lords' decision, but to provide
for the payment to all non-official members of the House of Commons of
a yearly salary of £400; and with little delay and no great amount of
opposition the proposal was enacted into law. The amount of the salary
provided is not large, but it is ample to render candidacy for seats
possible for numbers of men who formerly could not under any
circumstances have contemplated a public career.[185]
[Footnote 184: The sum provided from the party
funds was ordinarily £200 a year.]
[Footnote 185: On the privileges of the Commons see
Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, I.,
153-189; Lowell, Government of England, I., Chap.
11; Walpole, Electorate and Legislature, Chap. 5;
Redlich, Procedure of the House of Commons, III.,
42-50. A standard work in which the subject is
dealt with at length is May, Treatise on the Law,
Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage of Parliament,
Chaps. 3-6.]
V. THE FUNCTIONS OF PARLIAMENT
When the king summons the two chambers he does so, "being desirous and
resolved as soon as may be to meet his people, and to have their
advice in Parliament." No mention is made of legislative or financial
business, and, technically, Parliament is still essentially what
originally it was exclusively, i.e., a purely deliberative
assemblage. Practically, however, the mere discussion of public
questions and the giving of advice to the crown has become but one of
several distinctive parliamentary functions. The newer functions
which, with the passing of time, have acquired ever increasing
importance are, in effect, three. The first is that of criticism,
involving the habitual scrutiny and control of the measures of the
executive and administrative organs. The second is the exercise, under
limitations to be described, of the power of judicature. The third,
and much the most important, is the function of public and private
legislation and of fiscal control.
*135. Criticism: Ministerial Responsibility.*--Parliament does not
govern and is not intended to govern. Never save when the Long
Parliament undertook the administration of public affairs through
committees of its members has Parliament asserted a disposition to
gather immediately into its own hands those powers of state which are
executive in character. At the same time, the growth of parliamentary
government has meant the establishment of a connection between the
executive and the parliamentary chambers (principally the Commons) (p. 129)
as close as may be so long as separateness of organization is still
maintained. The officials who comprise the working executive are
invariably members of Parliament. They initiate public measures,
introduce them, advocate and defend them, and, in general, guide and
control the conduct of public business both inside and outside the
chambers. But for every act they are responsible directly to the House
of Commons. They may continue in power only so long as they are
supported by a majority in that chamber. And their conduct is subject
continually to review and criticism, through the instrumentality of
questions, formal inquiries, and, if need be, judicial procedure.
It is within the competence of any member to address a question to any
minister of the crown who is also a member, to obtain information.
Except in special cases, notice of questions must be given at least
one day in advance, and a period of approximately three-quarters of an
hour is set apart at four sittings every week for the asking and
answering of such questions. A minister may answer or decline to
answer, but unless a declination can be shown to arise from legitimate
considerations of public interest its effect politically may be
embarrassing. In any event, there is no debate, and in this respect
the English practice differs from the French "interpellation."[186]
The asking of questions is liable to abuse but, as is pointed out by
Ilbert, "there is no more valuable safeguard against maladministration,
no more effective method of bringing the searchlight of criticism to
bear on the action or inaction of the executive government and its
subordinates. A minister has to be constantly asking himself, not
merely whether his proceedings and the proceedings of those for whom
he is responsible are legally or technically defensible, but what kind
of answer he can give if questioned about them in the House, and how
that answer will be received."[187] Any member is privileged to bring
forward a motion censuring the Government or any member or department
thereof, and a motion of this sort, when emanating from the leader of
the Opposition, constitutes a vote of confidence upon whose result may
depend the continued tenure of the ministry. By a call upon the
Government or a given department for information, by the constitution
of parliamentary committees, departmental committees, or royal
commissions, and, in particular by taking advantage of the numberless
opportunities afforded by the enactment of appropriation bills, the
House of Commons may further impose upon the executive the most
thoroughgoing responsibility and control. "A strong executive (p. 130)
government, tempered and controlled by constant, vigilant, and
representative criticism," is the ideal at which the parliamentary
institutions of Great Britain are aimed.[188]
[Footnote 186: See p. 314.]
[Footnote 187: Parliament, 113-114.]
[Footnote 188: Ilbert, Parliament, 119. On the
Commons' control of the Government see Lowell,
Government of England, I., Chap. 17; Moran, English
Government, Chap. 8; Low, The Governance of
England, Chap. 5; Todd, Parliamentary Government,
II., 164-185.]
*136. Judicial Powers: Impeachment and Attainder.*--The functions of a
judicial character which, in the capacity of the High Court of
Parliament, the two chambers fulfill are of secondary importance and
do not call for extended discussion. So far as the law of the subject
goes, they comprise (1) the powers possessed by each of the houses to
deal with the constitution and conduct of its own membership; (2) the
power of the Lords to try their own members when charged with treason
or felony; (3) the jurisdiction of the Lords in the capacity of a
final court of appeal for the United Kingdom; (4) the power of the two
houses, acting jointly, to carry through impeachments of public
officers and to enact bills of attainder; and (5) the effecting of the
removal of certain kinds of public officers through the agency of an
address from both houses to the crown. In days when the king and the
ministers were disposed to defy the law and to evade responsibility
the power of impeachment by the Commons at the bar of the Lords,
originated as early as the reign of Edward III., was of the utmost
importance. When, however, the House of Commons progressed in
competence to the point where it was able to review and control the
conduct of ministers with such thoroughness and continuity as to make
it impossible for them to conduct business without a parliamentary
majority, impeachment lost its value and fell into disuse. The last
occasion upon which impeachment proceedings were instituted was in
1805.[189] Procedure by bill of attainder, arising from the
legislative omnipotence of Parliament and following the ordinary
course of legislation, is also obsolete.
[Footnote 189: Anson, Law and Custom of the
Constitution, I., 362-366; Moran, English
Government, 327-332.]
*137. The House of Lords as a Court.*--Most important among surviving
parliamentary functions of a judicial character is the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction by the House of Lords. The judicial authority
of the Lords is an anomaly, although as it is actually exercised it
does not seriously contravene the principle which forbids the bringing
together of judicial and legislative powers in the same hands.
Historically, it arose from a confusion of the functions of two groups
of men which were long largely identical in personnel, i.e., the
Great Council, on the one hand, and the Lords of Parliament, on (p. 131)
the other. In the reign of Henry IV. the Commons asked specifically to
be relieved from judicial business, and the parliamentary jurisdiction
which survived was recognized thereafter to be vested in the House of
Lords alone. From an early date this jurisdiction was, as it is
to-day, both original and appellate. As a court of first instance the
chamber acquired the right to try peers charged with treason and
felony and, on the accusation of the House of Commons, to bring to
justice, through the process of impeachment, offenders who were not of
the peerage. Nowadays these powers are of no practical consequence.
The position of the Lords as an appellate tribunal, however, is still
a fundamental fact in the judicial system. Starting with control, by
way of appeal, over the courts of common law in England, the chamber
acquired in time a similar control over the English courts of
chancery, and eventually over the courts of both Scotland and Ireland.
Its jurisdiction has stopped short only of the ecclesiastical courts,
and of the courts of the outlying portions of the Empire, appeals from
which are heard in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. By the
Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, whereby the higher tribunals
of the realm were remodelled, the appellate jurisdiction of the Lords
was abolished outright; but in 1876, before the measure had been put
in operation the plan was modified and there was passed the Appellate
Jurisdiction Act whereby the appellate functions of the Lords were
restored and provision was made for the creation at first of two,
later of three, and eventually of four, salaried life peers, to be
selected from men of eminence in the law, and to be known as Lords of
Appeal in Ordinary. In so far as it is controlled by statute at all,
the appellate jurisdiction of the chamber is regulated to-day by this
measure. Nominally, judicial business is transacted by the House as a
whole, and every member has a right not only to be present but to
participate in the rendering of decisions. Actually, such business is
transacted by a little group of law lords (the attendance of but three
being necessary) under the presidency of the Lord Chancellor, and the
unwritten rule which prohibits the presence at judicial sessions of
any persons save the law lords is quite as strictly observed as is any
one of a score of other important conventions of the constitution.[190]
Under the act of 1876 it is within the competence of the law lords to
sit and to pronounce judgments in the name of the House at any time,
regardless of whether Parliament is in session.[191] A sitting of the
Court is, technically, a sitting of the Lords, and all actions (p. 132)
taken are entered in the Journal of the House as a part of its
proceedings.[192]
[Footnote 190: Lowell, Government of England, II.,
465.]
[Footnote 191: When Parliament is in session the
sittings of the law lords are held, as a rule,
prior to the beginning of the regular sitting at
4.30 p.m.]
[Footnote 192: The judicial functions of Parliament
are described at some length in Anson, Law and
Custom of the Constitution, I., Chap. 9. The
principal work on the subject is C. H. McIlwain,
The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy (New
Haven, 1910). On the House of Lords as a court see
MacDonaugh, The Book of Parliament, 300-309; A. T.
Carter, History of English Legal Institutions
(London, 1902), 96-109; and W. S. Holdsworth,
History of English Law, I., 170-193.]
*138. Control of Legislation and Finance.*--The principal and altogether
most indispensable ends which Parliament to-day subserves are those of
legislation and of financial control. Many of the measures, important
and unimportant, under which the affairs of the realm are regulated
are but temporary and require annual re-enactment, and the volume of
fresh legislation which is unceasingly demanded is all but limitless.
Similarly, to employ the words of Anson, the revenues which accrue to
the crown and can be dealt with independently of Parliament would
hardly carry on the business of government for a day,[193] and not
only does Parliament (in effect, the House of Commons) by its
appropriation acts make possible the legal expenditure of virtually
all public moneys; it provides, by its measures of taxation, the funds
from which appropriations are made.
[Footnote 193: Law and Custom of the Constitution,
I., 52.]
VI. GENERAL ASPECTS OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE
By reason of the supreme importance which attaches to the legislative
and fiscal activities of the two chambers it is necessary that
attention be directed at this point to the character of the procedure
which these activities involve. For the purpose in hand it will be
sufficient to speak of only the more important principles of procedure
in relation to the three fundamental phases of legislative work: (1)
the enactment of non-financial public bills, (2) the adoption of money
bills, and (3) the passage of private bills. And within at least the
first two of these domains the preponderance of the Commons is such
that the procedure of that chamber alone need be described. The
procedure of the two chambers upon bills is substantially the same,
although, as is illustrated by the fact that amendments to bills may
be introduced in the Lords at any stage but in the Commons at only
stipulated stages, the methods of conducting business in the upper
house are more elastic than those prevailing in the lower.