I approve the recommendations of the General Board for the increase of
the Navy, calling especial attention to the need of additional
destroyers and colliers, and above all, of the four battleships. It is
desirable to complete as soon as possible a squadron of eight
battleships of the best existing type. The North Dakota, Delaware,
Florida, and Utah will form the first division of this squadron. The
four vessels proposed will form the second division. It will be an
improvement on the first, the ships being of the heavy, single caliber,
all big gun type. All the vessels should have the same tactical
qualities--that is, speed and turning circle--and as near as possible
these tactical qualities should be the same as in the four vessels
before named now being built.
I most earnestly recommend that the General Board be by law turned into
a General Staff. There is literally no excuse whatever for continuing
the present bureau organization of the Navy. The Navy should be treated
as a purely military organization, and everything should be
subordinated to the one object of securing military efficiency. Such
military efficiency can only be guaranteed in time of war if there is
the most thorough previous preparation in time of peace--a preparation,
I may add, which will in all probability prevent any need of war. The
Secretary must be supreme, and he should have as his official advisers
a body of line officers who should themselves have the power to pass
upon and coordinate all the work and all the proposals of the several
bureaus. A system of promotion by merit, either by selection or by
exclusion, or by both processes, should be introduced. It is out of the
question, if the present principle of promotion by mere seniority is
kept, to expect to get the best results from the higher officers. Our
men come too old, and stay for too short a time, in the high command
positions.
Two hospital ships should be provided. The actual experience of the
hospital ship with the fleet in the Pacific has shown the invaluable
work which such a ship does, and has also proved that it is well to
have it kept under the command of a medical officer. As was to be
expected, all of the anticipations of trouble from such a command have
proved completely baseless. It is as absurd to put a hospital ship
under a line officer as it would be to put a hospital on shore under
such a command. This ought to have been realized before, and there is
no excuse for failure to realize it now.
Nothing better for the Navy from every standpoint has ever occurred
than the cruise of the battle fleet around the world. The improvement
of the ships in every way has been extraordinary, and they have gained
far more experience in battle tactics than they would have gained if
they had stayed in the Atlantic waters. The American people have cause
for profound gratification, both in view of the excellent condition of
the fleet as shown by this cruise, and in view of the improvement the
cruise has worked in this already high condition. I do not believe that
there is any other service in the world in which the average of
character and efficiency in the enlisted men is as high as is now the
case in our own. I believe that the same statement can be made as to
our officers, taken as a whole; but there must be a reservation made in
regard to those in the highest ranks--as to which I have already
spoken--and in regard to those who have just entered the service;
because we do not now get full benefit from our excellent naval school
at Annapolis. It is absurd not to graduate the midshipmen as ensigns;
to keep them for two years in such an anomalous position as at present
the law requires is detrimental to them and to the service. In the
academy itself, every first classman should be required in turn to
serve as petty officer and officer; his ability to discharge his duties
as such should be a prerequisite to his going into the line, and his
success in commanding should largely determine his standing at
graduation. The Board of Visitors should be appointed in January, and
each member should be required to give at least six days' service, only
from one to three days' to be performed during June week, which is the
least desirable time for the board to be at Annapolis so far as
benefiting the Navy by their observations is concerned.