1812–1814
Causes of Growing Disagreement between Alexander and
Napoleon—Intervention of Castlereagh and Bernadotte—The
Attitude and Internal Policy of Prussia—Invasion of Russia
by Napoleon—Battle of Borodino—Retreat of the French
from Russia—Campaign of 1812 in the Peninsula—Battle of
Salamanca—Policy of Bernadotte—Prussia declares War—First
Campaign of 1813 in Saxony—Armistice of Pleswitz—Convention
of Reichenbach—Congress of Prague—Austria declares War—Second
Campaign of 1813 in Saxony—Battle of Dresden—Treaty of
Töplitz—Battle of Leipzig—General Insurrection of Germany
against Napoleon—Campaign of 1813 in the Peninsula—Battle
of Vittoria—Wellington’s Invasion of France—Negotiations
for Peace—Proposals of Frankfort—The Allies invade
France—Napoleon’s first Defensive Campaign of 1814—Other
Movements against Napoleon—Bernadotte—Holland—Battle of
Orthez—Italy—Congress of Châtillon—Attitude of France towards
Napoleon—Treaty of Chaumont—Napoleon’s Second Defensive
Campaign of 1814—Occupation of Paris by the Allies—The
Policy of Talleyrand—The Provisional Government—Alexander’s
Speech to the French Senate—Napoleon declared to be no
longer Emperor—Abdication of Napoleon—Provisional Treaty of
Paris—Battle of Toulouse—Arrival of Louis XVIII., and his
Assumption of the Throne of France—First Treaty of Paris.
[Sidenote: Gradual disagreement between Alexander and Napoleon.]
The causes of the disagreement between Napoleon and the Emperor
Alexander dated back to the Treaty of Tilsit. At that time, though
personally full of enthusiasm for the French conqueror, Alexander
looked with suspicion on the formation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
as a possible first step towards the restoration of Poland. Napoleon
pointed out to him that he could obtain compensation in the direction
of Sweden and of Turkey—a suggestion which led to the conquest of
Finland and eventually of Bessarabia. Though Alexander carried out
the projects proposed to him, he continued to resent the creation of
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and still more the maintenance of French
troops in that quarter. At the Congress of Erfurt Napoleon to some
degree allayed the suspicions of his ally, but on his return to Russia
there can be no doubt that Alexander looked upon himself as duped and
badly treated. The war of 1809 widened the breach. Napoleon complained
that the Russian troops promised for his assistance had not acted with
vigour, and Alexander regarded with open discontent the cession of part
of Austrian Galicia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The dethronement of
the Duke of Oldenburg, who had married Alexander’s favourite sister,
the Grand Duchess Catherine, and the absorption of his Duchy into
the French Empire, in 1810, was another and more personal cause of
disagreement. The delay in granting a Russian grand duchess to him
in marriage was looked on by Napoleon as a personal slight, and his
interference in Spain appeared to the Russian Emperor a sign that
Napoleon could maltreat even his most faithful ally. The carrying
out of the Continental Blockade embittered the situation. Napoleon
complained that the Russians did not adhere loyally to the arrangement
for the exclusion of English commerce. Alexander on his side complained
that his country was being ruined by the blockade, while the French
Emperor granted many licences to Frenchmen to trade with England.
To these political reasons must be added the personal characters of
the two emperors. Napoleon, though he had spoken at Tilsit of dividing
Europe between France and Russia, began, as his power increased, to
devise schemes for securing the Empire of Europe for himself and the
exclusion of Russia from any share. Instead of restoring the Empires
of the East and West, Napoleon arrogated to himself the position of
ruler of Europe, and spoke of thrusting Russia back into Asia. In these
views he was encouraged by many of those surrounding him. His marshals,
finding no profits to be got from Spain, looked forward to enriching
themselves in Russia. His statesmen, either from motives of their own
or to please his personal wishes, declared that France could not be
safe until Russia was crushed. Alexander on his side was surrounded by
bitter enemies of Napoleon. His ministers never wearied of emphasizing
the ruin caused to Russia by the Continental Blockade. The King of
Prussia, whom he had made his personal friend, pleaded for the complete
restoration of his dominions. His family, and especially his mother,
regarded Napoleon as the enemy of the human race; English agents were
perpetually inciting the Russians to declare for commercial freedom;
and three of the most accomplished and most able statesmen in Europe
constantly urged him to war with France, namely, Stein, whom Napoleon
had ordered the King of Prussia to dismiss; Pozzo di Borgo, a Corsican,
who had known Napoleon in his youth, and who hated him as a personal
enemy; and Nesselrode, a skilled diplomatist and an intimate friend of
Metternich.
[Sidenote: Policy of Castlereagh.]
These various causes, both political and personal, might not then
have led to war had it not been for the direct intervention of the
English by means of the new Prince Royal of Sweden, Bernadotte. Lord
Castlereagh, in January 1812, returned to office. He advocated the
carrying on of the war against Napoleon, not only by reinforcing
Wellington in the Peninsula, but by subsidizing the monarchs of the
Continent. He therefore despatched three diplomatists to the three
chief courts of the Continent, to endeavour to form a fresh coalition
against Napoleon. These were his brother, Sir Charles Stewart,
ambassador to Berlin, Lord Aberdeen to Vienna, and Lord Cathcart to
St. Petersburg. Lord Cathcart was a distinguished military officer,
and strenuously urged Alexander to declare war, and he brought with
him several English officers to assist in reorganizing the Russian
army, of whom the best known is Sir Robert Wilson. But it was rather
through Sweden than directly that Castlereagh influenced the Emperor
Alexander. Bernadotte, on being elected Prince Royal, had applied to
Sweden the Continental Blockade against England, but he soon perceived
how ruinous that policy was to his new country, and inclined to make
some arrangement with England. Being unable to break with Napoleon
by himself, Bernadotte acted as the intermediary between England and
Russia, and in April 1812 signed a secret treaty with Alexander at
Abo, by which Sweden renounced all claims on Finland on condition that
Russia should promise Norway in its stead. Both England and Russia
approved of this scheme. Frederick VI. of Denmark, who had succeeded
his father, Christian VII., in 1808, had, after the capture of the
Danish fleet in 1807, formed a most intimate alliance with Napoleon,
and Alexander at Abo held out to Bernadotte, not only a hope that he
might have the whole of Denmark as a result of successful war against
the French, but even an expectation that he might eventually receive
the throne of France as a reward for his services. Not less important
than the English intervention in Sweden was the effect of English
influence in Turkey; for it was through English mediation that the
Treaty of Bucharest was signed in May 1812, which allowed the Emperor
of Russia to concentrate all his military power against Napoleon.
[Sidenote: Prussia. The Ministry of Hardenberg.]
Between France and Russia there remained, however, Austria, Poland, and
Prussia. Though Napoleon’s direct domain extended to Lübeck along the
coast, he had not ventured to annex Germany proper, which lies between
the Elbe and the Rhine, or to accept the title of German Emperor, in
addition to that of the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, as
had been suggested by the Prince Primate, Dalberg. Yet Germany proper,
owing to his creation of the Confederation of the Rhine and the Kingdom
of Westphalia, was so thoroughly under his influence that, from a
military point of view, it might be regarded as part of his Empire.
Austria, Poland, and Prussia were, however, more independent, and his
first effort, when he decided to attack Russia, was to secure their
active co-operation. The Emperor Francis, since the campaign of Wagram,
had abandoned the idea of resistance. He feared and disliked the
Russians; Napoleon was his son-in-law, and he did not intend to oppose
his wishes. He therefore promised willingly enough that an Austrian
army should invade Russia to the south of the direct French invasion.
In the Grand Duchy of Warsaw the Poles cared little for their Grand
Duke, the King of Saxony; they looked to Napoleon for the restoration
of their complete independence, and delighted in the thought of
striking a blow at their old foes, the Russians. In Prussia the
position was more complicated. Reduced as the kingdom was, the reforms
of Stein and Scharnhorst had created a national feeling, which could
not as yet be utilised in attacks on the French soldiers who occupied
the Prussian fortresses. Stein himself had been driven from Prussia by
Napoleon’s orders, but a successor, Hardenberg, completed his work. It
is significant that when Hardenberg was reappointed State Chancellor in
1810, he did not undertake the Foreign Office, as he had done in 1806,
but the ministries of the Finance and the Interior. It was Hardenberg
who in 1810 made the nobles subject to taxation, and brought Stein’s
promised Representative Assemblies into partial use; who, on 23rd
January 1811, suppressed the Teutonic Order, and made its possessions
part of the national domain; and who, on 11th September 1811, achieved
the logical result of Stein’s edict abolishing serfdom by granting
the peasants power to become absolute proprietors of two-thirds of
their holdings on surrendering the other third to the lords in full
recognition of all feudal dues and servitudes.
Hardenberg’s most ardent coadjutor was William von Humboldt. As Stein
and Hardenberg had done the work of the French Revolution in Prussia
by abolishing feudalism and securing equality before the law, so
William von Humboldt established a national system of education in
many respects similar to Napoleon’s creation in France, and reformed
the whole department of public instruction. At the head of the system
was founded the University of Berlin. Prussia had deeply felt the loss
of the University of Halle when that city was separated from Prussia
by the Treaty of Tilsit. Königsberg, though made famous by Kant, was
too distant from the centre of the reduced kingdom to fill its place,
and the new national spirit was concentrated in the new University of
Berlin. Learned men came from all parts of Germany. Savigny, Fichte,
Wolf, Buttmann, Boeckh, Schleiermacher, and Niebuhr all enrolled
themselves as professors; and Germany, not merely Prussia, found a
worthy representative in the world of thought.
In the resurrection of Prussia King Frederick William III. merely
acquiesced in the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg. But his former
leaning to neutrality had given place to a desire for revenge on the
French. In July 1810 he lost his patriotic wife, Queen Louise, and
her death only exasperated his feelings. Nevertheless, he refused to
declare himself on the side of Russia in 1812. The Emperor Alexander
announced his policy of allowing the French to invade, and his
intention of thus drawing Napoleon far from his base, and Frederick
William felt that he was not strong enough to openly oppose the French
Emperor. He was even constrained by the occupation of his fortresses
to go further, and, on 24th February 1812, he signed an offensive and
defensive alliance with Napoleon. By this treaty Prussia was not only
to feed the French armies passing through her dominions to invade
Russia, but to send an army of 30,000 men to act with them. Alexander
was not displeased by this behaviour. He knew that Prussia could not
help itself; he felt a sincere friendship for the hapless king; he
understood that beneath the surface, not only Prussia, but all Germany
was boiling with indignation against the French; and in 1812, when war
was at hand, he summoned the inspirer of German national feeling, the
great Prussian minister, Stein, from his exile in Austria to become his
adviser and coadjutor in his German policy.
[Sidenote: The Invasion of Russia. May 1812.]
Without any actual declaration of war, Russia entered into negotiations
with England, and Napoleon assembled a vast army on the banks of the
Vistula. In May 1812 he entered Germany to take the command, and at
Dresden had interviews with the King of Prussia and the Emperor of
Austria. Of the 325,000 men with whom he crossed the river Niémen and
invaded Russia only 155,000 were French; the remainder were foreign
contingents. He detached to his left Marshal Macdonald, with the
Prussian contingent and some Westphalians and Poles, to attack Riga and
advance on St. Petersburg, with the hope of joining Bernadotte and the
Swedes; he was supported on his right by the Austrian subsidiary force,
and with the centre of his army he advanced in person into Lithuania.
That province being occupied, Napoleon crossed the Dnieper, and on the
18th of August he took Smolensk, in spite of the efforts of a Russian
army of 80,000 men to cover the city. On his extreme right the Austrian
army, under Prince Schwartzenberg, was checked by the arrival of the
Russian army, set free by the Peace of Bucharest. The Russian generals,
Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, in the centre, steadily retreated.
[Sidenote: Battle of Borodino. 7th Sept. 1812.]
This military policy soon reduced the efficiency and numbers of the
French army; for it was drawn further from its base into a barren
country, in which it was harassed by peasants and guerillas, and it
was necessary to leave large divisions to protect the communications.
The Emperor Alexander had approved of this policy, and as the Russian
army retired the people abandoned their villages, as the Portuguese had
done during the invasion of Masséna in 1810. But the Russian soldiers
grumbled at this politic retreat, and the Emperor Alexander resolved
to strike one blow for his capital. Barclay de Tolly was replaced by
Kutuzov, and the Russian army suddenly halted on the banks of the
Mosková. On the 7th of September a most terrible battle was fought
there, which is known as the battle of Borodino. The Russians are said
to have lost 50,000 men, including General Bagration, and it is certain
that the French lost more than 30,000. Nevertheless, the French loss
was proportionately the most; for Napoleon was far away from any
reinforcements, whereas the Russians were fighting in their fatherland.
On the 14th of September the French army occupied Moscow. On the
16th, either by accident or on purpose, fire broke out in the Russian
capital. It raged for three days and three nights, and more than
three-fifths of the city was utterly destroyed. The Emperor Alexander
then entered into negotiations with Napoleon, and, whether he intended
it or not, he kept the French Emperor from moving until too late for
his safety. It was not until the 15th of October that Napoleon saw that
negotiating was waste of time, and started from Moscow. The winter was
an early one. Snow fell heavily. When Smolensk was reached, it was
found that all the provisions stored there had been destroyed. The
retreating army, now in a state of disorganisation, was hunted through
the country, not only by the Russian soldiers, but by the peasantry
returning to their homes. Marshal Ney covered the retreat, and won
on this occasion his title of ‘the bravest of the brave.’ Napoleon,
on being informed that a conspiracy against him, headed by General
Malet, had been discovered in Paris, left the retreating army early in
December. After his departure the cold increased. The retreat became
a rout; Murat, who succeeded to the command, could not keep the army
together; and but very few of the 155,000 Frenchmen who had invaded
Russia recrossed the river Niémen.
[Sidenote: Campaign in the Peninsula. 1812.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Salamanca. 22d July 1812.]
While Napoleon was wrecking one army in Russia, Wellington was
defeating another French army in Spain. Marmont, who had succeeded
Masséna, failed to prevent the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo in January,
or that of Badajoz in April, and after a long course of intricate
manœuvres, gave Wellington the opportunity to attack and defeat him
at the battle of Salamanca, July 22, 1812. The victory was complete.
Joseph Bonaparte evacuated Madrid, and withdrawing all his troops from
Andalusia fell back behind the Ebro. Wellington occupied Madrid on
August 12, and then with his main army advanced on Burgos. Burgos,
however, resisted all his assaults. The Anglo-Portuguese army had to
retire once more into Portugal, and Joseph Bonaparte for the last
time returned to his capital. While this campaign was being fought
Lord William Bentinck, who commanded the English garrison in Sicily,
was requested to send troops to the eastern coast of Spain to effect
a diversion. But the operations were badly combined; Sir John Murray
was driven from before Tarragona; and at a subsequent date Lord
William Bentinck himself failed to make an impression on Suchet’s army
at Alicante. The victory of Salamanca was a proof of the insecure
foundation on which the throne of Joseph Bonaparte rested. Owing to it
alone he had to leave Madrid, and evacuate the whole of southern Spain;
the military policy of the English ministers was justified; and though
Salamanca cannot be compared with the disasters in Russia, it yet had
its effect in showing the increasing weakness of the French military
power.
[Sidenote: Prussia declares war. 16th March 1813.]
The retreat of the French and their passage of the Niémen enabled
Prussia to throw off the mask of alliance with France. The Prussian
contingent, amounting to 18,000 men, had been placed under the command
of Marshal Macdonald, and was occupied in the siege of Riga. Napoleon
had hoped that this detached army upon his left would be joined by
Bernadotte at the head of the Swedes. But Bernadotte, as has been seen,
had forgotten his French nationality in accepting the position of heir
to the Swedish throne. His first idea was to make himself popular in
Sweden by securing the conquest of Norway to take the place of Finland,
and behind it lay the hope of possibly succeeding Napoleon himself.
In his original communications with the Emperor Alexander, he had
demanded the assistance of a Russian army for the conquest of Norway
as the price of his adhesion to the coalition against Napoleon. When
Alexander would not make a definite promise, Bernadotte applied to his
former sovereign in June 1812, and promised to assist in the French
invasion of Russia, if Napoleon would guarantee to him the possession
of Norway. But the French Emperor would make no compact with his former
marshal, and hoped that he would lend his assistance to the occupation
of St. Petersburg in return for vague promises. Bernadotte therefore
remained neutral, and Macdonald, without the expected help from Sweden,
could get no further than Riga. The retreat of the main French army
from Moscow made it necessary for Macdonald likewise to fall back, and
in the course of his retreat the Prussian contingent, under the command
of General York, deserted, and that general signed the Convention of
Tauroggen, on 30th December 1812, by which he abandoned France without
definitely declaring himself upon the side of Russia. Macdonald, with
his Westphalians and Poles, managed to leave Russia in safety, and
to join the remnants of the main army. But the desertion of York was
a symptom of what was to follow. Stein summoned the Estates of East
Prussia at Königsberg; the Prussians rose _en masse_, and the French
army, pursued by the Russian troops and these new enemies, retreated
behind the Vistula.
Frederick William of Prussia at last threw off the mask, and, on the
7th of February 1813, he called out the reserve which had been formed
by the skilful military policy of Scharnhorst, and ordered the Landwehr
and the Landsturm to join the colours; on 27th February he signed the
Treaty of Kalisch with Russia, promising alliance; on 16th March he
declared war against France; and he joined the headquarters of his
friend Alexander, and lived in his company until the termination of the
war. Prussian enthusiasm grew to its height; the reserves fell in from
every city and district, and the broken French army, which was now left
under the command of Eugène de Beauharnais, retreated first behind the
Oder and then behind the Elbe, leaving powerful garrisons in Dantzic,
Stettin, and the chief Prussian fortresses. The Russians of the army
of the right pursued vigorously, and after driving the French from
Berlin, the Russian generals, Chernishev and Tetterborn, took Hamburg.
The resurrection of Prussia and the rapid retreat of the French caused
Bernadotte to declare himself openly on the side of the allies, and he
crossed the Baltic and entered Germany at the head of a Swedish army of
12,000 men. The King of Prussia’s declaration of war with France was
received with enthusiasm. Two separate Prussian armies were formed,
the first under Bülow to act with the Swedes, and the Russian army of
the right, and to defend Berlin, the other under Blücher in Silesia to
co-operate with the second invading army of the left from Russia. The
command in chief of this latter army was, after the death of Kutuzov in
May, conferred on Barclay de Tolly, while Wittgenstein commanded the
Russian contingent.
[Sidenote: First Campaign of 1813.]
[Sidenote: Armistice of Pleswitz. 3d June 1813.]
In the spring of 1813 Napoleon started for Germany to face the new
coalition. His Westphalian, Bavarian, and Saxon allies were still true
to him and increased their contingents. He called to his assistance the
old soldiers who were employed in the garrisons of Holland and Northern
Germany, and he raised a large number of fresh conscripts, who, in
spite of their youth and inexperience, were at once directed upon
Germany. At the head of 250,000 men, eventually increased to 300,000,
he invaded Saxony. He defeated Wittgenstein at Lutzen or Gross Görschen
on the 2d of May, at which battle his friend, Marshal Bessières was
killed, and Scharnhorst was mortally wounded, and reoccupied Saxony. He
defeated the whole of the allied army of Silesia at Bautzen on the 20th
of May, and established his headquarters at Dresden. Meanwhile Vandamme
had recaptured Hamburg, and, after placing it in a state of defence,
joined the Emperor in Saxony. After these vigorous blows both sides
desired a rest, and on the 3d of June the Armistice of Pleswitz was
signed, and it was agreed that a congress should be held at Prague to
consider if terms of peace could not be arranged. The important point
to be decided at Prague was the position to be adopted by Austria; and
both sides prepared to offer a high price for her active assistance,
for her intervention would probably settle the result of the war.
Napoleon trusted that his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, would
not abandon him, and counted upon the assistance of an Austrian army.
He relied also upon the hereditary hatred of Austria for Prussia, and
promised his father-in-law, as the price of his active assistance,
not only the restoration of the Illyrian provinces, but of the whole
of Silesia, which Frederick the Great had torn from Maria Theresa.
Napoleon was even sanguine enough to count upon the former friendship
which the Emperor Alexander had felt for him, and he hoped that the
invasion of Russia would be forgiven if he guaranteed the possession
of the whole of Poland. The country which would be sacrificed by these
arrangements was Prussia. Napoleon projected the entire extinction of
the Prussian kingdom, and suggested that the kingdom of Westphalia
should be extended to the Oder. That he should venture to offer such
terms showed how entirely Napoleon misunderstood his position. The
Emperor Francis, although his daughter was Napoleon’s wife, could not
forget the humiliations that Austria had undergone, and allowed his
feelings as an Austrian to outweigh his sentiments as a father. The
Emperor Alexander had been entirely cured by the invasion of Russia of
his former infatuation, and now distrusted the French Emperor as much
as he had formerly believed in him; he had struck up an intimacy with
the King of Prussia, and had promised him his restoration to the whole
of his dominions.
[Sidenote: Convention of Reichenbach. 17th June 1813.]
Meanwhile the rulers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia signed a treaty at
Reichenbach on 17th June 1813, by which Austria assumed the position
of a mediator and promised to declare war against France, if the
conditions of peace, which she should offer, were rejected. In return
for this attitude, Austria was given a free hand to negotiate with
the South German States, and the idea of rousing a national German
feeling against France, which was strongly advocated by Stein, was
abandoned. Metternich had no liking for the national idea; it seemed
to him to bear the imprint of the spirit of the French Revolution,
and could only end in disaster to Austria. The rising of Prussia had
indeed been a success, but if it spread through Germany, it might
end in a united Germany with Prussia at its head, and the consequent
depreciation of the Austrian power. The example of Spain, which Stein
and patriotic Germans pointed to, seemed to cut in two ways; if, on
the one hand, it had raised a people in arms against Napoleon, on the
other it had encouraged revolutionary ideas. Both the Emperor Alexander
and King Frederick William felt the weight of these arguments, and the
conception of the war changed from a national uprising to a coalition
of the usual type. Under these circumstances, Napoleon’s propositions
were ignored, and proposals were made to him on the other hand that he
should be content with the natural limits of France, namely, the Rhine
and the Alps; that he should restore the Bourbons to Spain and the
independence of Holland; that he should abandon his position as head of
the Confederation of the Rhine and allow the Pope to return to Rome.
Murat was to remain at Naples, and Jerome on the throne of Westphalia,
and the terms offered were by no means unfavourable to France, though
perhaps hardly justified by the military position of the allies.
Metternich, who perceived that Austria held the key to the position,
brought these terms to Napoleon’s headquarters at Dresden, and informed
the Emperor that if they were not accepted, Austria would join the
coalition against him.
[Sidenote: Austria declares war.]
Napoleon refused with scorn; Castlereagh, through the English
ambassador, Lord Aberdeen, promised large subsidies to Austria; and
on the 1st of August 1813, the Emperor of Austria promised definitely
to join the allies with 200,000 men if Napoleon refused to accept the
terms offered to him. The Congress met at Prague. Caulaincourt, the
French plenipotentiary, stated that he had no power to accept the terms
offered by Francis, and Austria, on the 12th of August, declared war
against France. On the 14th of August, when it was too late, Napoleon
declared his acceptance of the terms, and received the answer that the
whole matter must be referred to the allied monarchs. War in fact was
inevitable, and the Armistice of Pleswitz was at an end.
[Sidenote: Second Campaign of 1813 in Germany.]
The intervention of Austria not only deprived Napoleon of an expected
ally, but endangered his military position in Saxony, as a strong
Austrian army was being concentrated in Bohemia under the command of
Prince Charles von Schwartzenberg. Nevertheless the French Emperor
refused to retire, and prepared at the head of 300,000 men to make face
against the allies in spite of their great superiority in number. The
plan of campaign of the allies was drawn up by Moreau, who had been
induced to leave America and give the advantage of his advice to the
Czar of Russia. There was also upon the staff of the Russian army one
of the ablest strategists in Europe who, like Moreau, had formerly
been an officer in the French army, General Jomini. The plan was to
direct an army from the north, of Prussians, Russians and Swedes, under
Bülow, Chernishev, and Bernadotte, an army from the east of Russians,
called the Army of Poland, which was being formed under Benningsen,
an army from Silesia, of Prussians under Blücher, and Russians under
Wittgenstein, and finally an army of Austrians under Schwartzenberg,
assisted by the Russian main army of Barclay de Tolly, and the Russian
Imperial Guard under the Grand Duke Constantine, upon Dresden. But
Napoleon with his accustomed rapidity of action determined to strike
first, and he detached three corps under Oudinot, Macdonald and
Vandamme, against Bernadotte, Blücher, and Schwartzenberg; Benningsen
was too far in the rear to be dangerous. Oudinot and Macdonald were
defeated by Bernadotte and Blücher at Gross-Beeren and the Katzbach
respectively, on the 23d and 25th of August, and Schwartzenberg,
instead of waiting for the other armies, attacked the French centre at
Dresden. On the 26th and 27th of August a terrible battle was fought,
in which Moreau was mortally wounded. Napoleon was successful, but he
suffered severe losses which he was unable to repair. Three days later
he received the news that Vandamme’s army, which had penetrated into
Bohemia to cut off Schwartzenberg’s communications, had been forced to
capitulate at Kulm to the Russians under Barclay de Tolly. The battle
of Dresden proved to the allies that it was impossible for one of their
armies to overthrow Napoleon unassisted, and they therefore recurred to
their original plan. Napoleon once more endeavoured to break from his
defensive position and struck at Berlin; but Marshal Ney was defeated
by Bernadotte and Bülow at Dennewitz, on 6th September, and he had
to wait while the ring formed round him. The Emperor’s losses during
the first part of this campaign had been immense. He had lost over
10,000 men by the capitulation of Kulm; his young soldiers had been
decimated at the Katzbach and Dennewitz; and the troops of the German
contingents deserted _en masse_. In fact when the operations of the
allies were completed and their armies had concentrated around Leipzig,
to which place he had withdrawn, he had not more than 160,000 men,
whose confidence was shaken by repeated defeats, to oppose to more than
double that number.
[Sidenote: Treaty of Töplitz. 19th Sept. 1813.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Leipzig. 16th-19th October 1813.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Hanau.]
After the battle of Dresden, the army of Schwartzenberg retired into
Bohemia, and the allied monarchs determined to define their position
as to the future. The enormous armies they were concentrating made
them feel sure of success, if they held together. On 9th September the
important Treaty of Töplitz was signed. By this treaty it was agreed
that Prussia and Austria should be restored as nearly as possible to
the limits they had held in 1805, that the Confederation of the Rhine
should be dissolved, and that entire independence should be granted
to the states of southern and western Germany. This decision overcame
the lingering hesitation of the south German monarchs, who had feared
retaliation from the allies for their consistent adhesion to Napoleon.
Of these states, Bavaria was the chief, and on 8th October the Treaty
of Ried was signed between Austria and Bavaria, by which Bavaria
promised the aid of 36,000 men in return for complete indemnity and the
recognition of complete sovereignty in her dominions. Then the allies
in their full strength attacked Napoleon. For three days, from the 16th
to the 19th of October, the terrible battle of Leipzig was fought. The
result was a foregone conclusion, and even without the desertion of the
Saxons in the course of the battle, the ruin of the French army was
certain. Napoleon’s forces were not only defeated, they were destroyed,
and in the utmost disorder the routed French divisions fled in a state
of disorganisation across Germany. At this moment Maximilian Joseph
of Bavaria, whom Napoleon had made a king, declared against him as
he had promised, and not only withdrew the Bavarian contingent, but
endeavoured to check the French retreat. At the battle of Hanau on
October the 30th, however, the remnant of the French army broke through
the Bavarians, and it eventually found safety behind the Rhine.
[Sidenote: Insurrection of Germany against Napoleon 1813.]
The battle of Leipzig was followed by a general rising throughout
central Europe against the French. The secret societies which had
been formed to promote the idea of the freedom of Germany acted in
every direction. Many isolated regiments of the French army were
cut off and the French garrisons in the various German cities were
closely besieged. The benefits which had been conferred by French
administration were forgotten and the people thought only of the
humiliation of the French occupation. Nor was this spirit confined
to Germany. The Dutch rose in rebellion, and declared in all the
chief cities of Holland for the Prince of Orange. That prince at once
left England and set himself at the head of the insurgents, and Lord
Castlereagh a few months later sent to his assistance an English
force under the command of Sir Thomas Graham to reduce the few Dutch
fortresses still occupied by French garrisons. In Italy also an almost
universal insurrection broke out against the French domination. Lord
William Bentinck, who commanded the English army which occupied Sicily,
sailed to Genoa with a powerful force and encouraged the insurgents
in that quarter. Meanwhile an Austrian army under General Hiller
invaded Italy from the north-east and defeated Eugène de Beauharnais
at Valsarno on the 26th of October. Against this unanimity of national
opposition Napoleon could make but little headway; the French people
were tired of the conscription; they had not approved of the invasion
of Russia; and were indisposed at the moment of crisis to support the
Emperor.
[Sidenote: Campaign in the Peninsula 1813.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Vittoria. 21st June.]
[Sidenote: Wellington invades France. Oct. 1813.]
While the French armies were suffering the succession of disasters
which expelled them from Germany, a similar series of catastrophes
occurred in Spain. Wellington broke up from his quarters in the summer
of 1813, and marching in a north-easterly direction attempted to
cut off all communication between France and Madrid. This movement
completely overthrew the French domination in Spain. Joseph Bonaparte
with all the troops he could collect fled from Madrid. He was unable to
defend himself behind the Ebro as in 1812, for the positions on that
river had been skilfully turned. Wellington eventually came up with
the French army at Vittoria. There Marshal Jourdan, who commanded for
King Joseph, endeavoured to resist, but he was completely defeated by
the Anglo-Portuguese army on the 21st of June 1813. This victory drove
the French back into France, for Suchet was likewise obliged to abandon
his conquests in Valencia, and to retire into the mountains of Arragon
and Catalonia. The victory in the field was followed as in Germany
by a burst of national enthusiasm. The Spanish guerillas destroyed
every isolated French post, and even managed to place some serviceable
divisions at the disposition of Wellington. The English general took up
a position on the French frontier between Pampeluna and San Sebastian,
blockading the former and besieging the latter place. To face him Soult
was sent to the south-west of France to defend the frontier. On the
31st of August San Sebastian was stormed; Pampeluna speedily fell;
and Wellington was able to establish a new base of operations, and to
invade France. On the 10th of November the Anglo-Portuguese army drove
Soult from his positions on the Nivelle, and after the battles of the
Nive or Saint Pierre from the 9th to the 13th of December Wellington
invested Bayonne.
[Sidenote: Negotiations for Peace.]
These repeated disasters in different quarters induced Napoleon to
consider the advisability of concluding a peace. He was now only too
ready to accept the terms offered to him at the Congress of Prague.
The allies were by no means so united as they seemed. The Austrian
Minister Metternich, in particular, was not desirous of destroying the
power of France. England had no wish to come to any conclusion which
should disproportionately increase the strength of Russia, and the aim
of all the allied monarchs was to allow France to develop in her own
way as long as she withdrew her pretensions to interfere in Europe.
Metternich’s proposals, in November 1813, were that France should
preserve her natural limits of the Rhine and the Alps, but should
restore all former rulers in Holland, Italy, and Spain. Napoleon gave
evidence of his desire for peace at this period by the dismissal of
his Foreign Secretary, Maret, Duc de Bassano, and the appointment of
Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicenza, who was known to be in favour of peace
and was also a personal friend of the Emperor Alexander, at whose Court
he had been ambassador during the palmy days of the alliance between
France and Russia. The terms of peace offered by Metternich, which
are known as the Proposals of Frankfort, at which city the allied
monarchs were residing, were confided to M. de Saint-Aignan, a French
diplomatist who had been taken prisoner during the advance of the
allies and who was the brother-in-law of Caulaincourt. The proposals
were definitely acceded to by Lord Aberdeen on the part of England and
by Hardenberg on the part of Prussia. The favourable nature of them
was dictated by the fear entertained by the allied monarchs that France
would rise in her might as she had done in 1793 if her borders were
invaded. For this reason the allies remained for some weeks upon the
right bank of the Rhine, concentrating their forces and hesitating to
advance. Napoleon, however, could not understand that he was beaten.
Instead of replying at once to the Proposals of Frankfort, which were
dated the 9th of November, it was not until late in December that he
instructed Caulaincourt to go to the allied quarters and discuss them.
His instructions to Caulaincourt showed how little he appreciated the
position of affairs. He demanded that, in addition to the natural
limits of France, he should hold the cities of Wesel, Cassel opposite
Mayence, and Kehl opposite Strasbourg on the right bank of the Rhine,
which fairly signified that he did not abandon his projects on Germany.
He further demanded that a kingdom should be formed for his brother
Jerome in Germany, and for Eugène de Beauharnais in Italy. Before these
counter-propositions reached the headquarters of the allied monarchs,
they had resolved to invade France, and the opportunity was gone for
ever for France to attain her natural limits under the sanction of
Europe.
[Sidenote: The Invasion of France 1814. First Campaign.]
The attitude of the allies, as indicated in the Proposals of Frankfort,
was mainly dictated by Metternich, who did not desire to see his
Emperor’s son-in-law dethroned or to see France greatly weakened.
But the Emperor Alexander and his friend, the King of Prussia, soon
repented of the assent they had given to Metternich’s ideas. Alexander
desired to invade France as a reply to the invasion of Russia in 1812,
and hoped to occupy Paris as Napoleon had occupied Moscow. The King
of Prussia, and still more his generals and ministers, had felt most
keenly the humiliating condition to which Prussia had been degraded,
and desired to wreak their vengeance on France. It was therefore agreed
that since the Proposals of Frankfort had not been promptly accepted,
the result of a successful invasion of France should be the return of
that country into the limits she possessed at the beginning of the wars
of the Revolution. The attitude of Russia and Prussia was that adopted
by England. Lord Castlereagh heard with dismay, that it was intended
to allow France the limits of the Rhine, for by that concession she
would hold Belgium and Antwerp, which it had been the consistent policy
of all English Ministers for many generations to keep independent of
France. The barrier treaties of former days, and the wars against
Louis XIV. had been sustained for the purpose of keeping France out of
the Belgian Netherlands, and the English cabinet resolved to continue
this classic policy. For this purpose, Lord Castlereagh was in person
despatched to the headquarters of the allied monarchs, with the
greatest powers ever granted to a British statesman. He was given ‘full
powers to negotiate and conclude of his own authority, and without
further consultation with the government, all conventions or treaties,
either for the prosecution of war or for the restoration of peace.’[12]
Lord Castlereagh sailed from Harwich on the 31st of December 1813, on
which day Blücher with the main Prussian army, known as the Army of
Silesia, crossed the Rhine in three columns at Coblentz, Mannheim, and
Mayence. Blücher was supported by three Russian _corps d’armée_, but
it was further south that the main Russian army in conjunction with
the Austrians invaded France under the command of Schwartzenberg. It
was not without some difficulty that the Emperor Alexander was induced
to consent to the violation of the neutrality of Switzerland. But the
military arguments put forward by his generals overcame his scruples.
By marching through Switzerland, Schwartzenberg’s army was enabled to
turn the mountains of the Jura, and to leave the French fortresses
on the Rhine, behind him. This invasion on two distinct lines gave
Napoleon the opportunity of carrying out one of the military manœuvres
of which he was most fond. He concentrated between the two invading
armies a force of between 50,000 and 70,000 men. This was a terrible
falling off from the vast armies with which he had invaded Russia in
1812, and fought the allies in Saxony in 1813; it was a falling off not
only in numbers, but in military efficiency, for with the exception
of the remnant of the Guard, he had only under his command some
regiments of conscripts and national guards untrained to war. At this
period Napoleon bitterly repented the mistake he had made, in leaving
over 150,000 veteran soldiers as garrisons in the various fortresses
in Europe. The presence of these men would very likely have turned
the scale. He had left, for instance, 12,000 men in Hamburg under
the command of Marshal Davout, 16,000 in Magdeburg, 8000 in Dantzic,
and large garrisons in other distant cities, such as Stettin. These
fortresses were blockaded by local militia; their occupation did not
withdraw many regular troops from the allied armies, while it fatally
weakened the resources of France.
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Victories in France. 1814.]
Nevertheless, with his boy conscripts and his Guard, Napoleon fought
one of his greatest campaigns. Blücher foolishly scattered his troops,
after his entry into Champagne. Napoleon quickly took advantage of
his mistake. He cut up division after division of Blücher’s army
at Brienne, Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps, between the
29th of January and the 14th of February, and then turning against
Schwartzenberg, who had also scattered his forces, he defeated a
Russian division at Nangis, and an Austrian division at Montereau
on the 17th and 18th of February. These rapid blows startled and
disconcerted the allies. Blücher’s army was practically destroyed;
Schwartzenberg fell back, and asked for an armistice; and proposals
were made for the evacuation of France. It was only the constancy of
the Emperor Alexander and the determination of Lord Castlereagh which
induced the allies to persist. Two _corps d’armée_, one of Prussians
under Bülow, the other of Russians under Wintzingerode, were on
Lord Castlereagh’s sole authority detached from Bernadotte’s army
and ordered to reinforce Blücher. Meanwhile, Alexander insisted that
Schwartzenberg should concentrate instead of retiring. In reality,
Napoleon’s successes were more fatal to himself than to the allies,
for they induced him to break off the negotiations at the Congress of
Châtillon.
[Sidenote: Other movements against Napoleon. 1814.]
[Sidenote: Bernadotte.]
While the first campaign of 1814 was being fought out in France, the
movement against Napoleon was becoming general. Bernadotte had after
the victory of Leipzig been placed in command of the army in northern
Germany. Full of the idea which had been suggested to him by the
Emperor Alexander in 1812, that he might succeed Napoleon on the throne
of France, Bernadotte did not wish to appear before his own countrymen
in the light of an invader. He had occupied himself for some weeks
after the battle of Leipzig with blockading Davout in Hamburg, and
fighting the Danes in Holstein. Even if he could not obtain the throne
of France, he was quite resolved to win Norway, and for this purpose he
attacked the Danes, and after some fighting, compelled Frederick VI.
of Denmark to sign the Treaty of Kiel on 14th January 1814, by which
Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden, in exchange for Swedish Pomerania.
Bernadotte even went so far as to negotiate with Davout, to whom he
promised a free passage to France with all his troops as the price of
the surrender of Hamburg. But the Emperor Alexander would not submit to
this, and Bernadotte was imperiously ordered only to leave a blockading
force before Hamburg, and to advance to the French frontier.
[Sidenote: Holland.]
It was at this juncture that Bernadotte was deprived of his two finest
_corps d’armée_, which were ordered up to the assistance of Blücher.
But in addition to the danger threatened by Bernadotte’s army, Napoleon
also met with serious opposition in the Netherlands. The Dutch people
declared for the Prince of Orange, and Holland was quickly lost.
A force under the command of the Prince marched into Belgium, and
besieged Antwerp, which was defended by the former member of the
Committee of Public Safety, Carnot, who, though neglected by Napoleon
in the days of his greatness, had come to the help of France in the
time of her distress. To assist the Prince an English division under
Sir Thomas Graham had, as has been said, been despatched to Holland.
Graham failed to take Bergen-op-Zoom on the 20th of February, but
his presence in the Netherlands not only encouraged the Dutch, but
prevented Napoleon from obtaining help from that quarter.
[Sidenote: Augereau.]
[Sidenote: Wellington wins battle of Orthez. 27th February]
In the south, Marshal Augereau, whom the Emperor had placed in
command at Lyons, was, as he himself said, no longer the Augereau of
Castiglione. He had been directed to make a diversion against the
Austrian left as it entered France with some conscripts and troops
drawn from the former Army of Spain, but he remained inactive, and his
operations were of no assistance to the Emperor. In the south-west
corner of France, Soult was unable to do more than make head against
Wellington and the Anglo-Portuguese army. After the battles of the Nive
or of Saint Pierre, Bayonne was completely invested, and Wellington,
leaving the left of his army to carry on the siege, marched eastwards
against Soult. That marshal had been weakened by the detachments
he had been ordered to send to Augereau, and to Napoleon himself.
Nevertheless, he made a gallant stand at Orthez on the 27th of
February, but was defeated and forced to fall back further into France.
[Sidenote: Italy.]
In Italy the Viceroy, Eugène de Beauharnais, who in the retreat from
Russia had given evidence that he was a general of the very first
order, offered a gallant resistance to the Austrians under General
Hiller. But the defection of the King of Bavaria, his father-in-law,
opened the passes of the Tyrol to the Austrians, and Eugène de
Beauharnais was then compelled to retreat. At the commencement of
1814, Metternich entered into negotiations with Murat, the King of
Naples. Through the influence of his wife, Caroline Murat, sister of
Napoleon, with whom Metternich had been in most intimate relations
when he was ambassador at Paris, Murat, in the hope of preserving
his kingdom, issued a violent proclamation against his benefactor,
Napoleon, and advanced to the banks of the Po, at the head of a
Neapolitan army of 80,000 men. This movement caused Eugène de
Beauharnais, whose fidelity to his stepfather shines out in bright
contrast to the treachery of Murat, to fall back still further. He
defeated the Austrians under Marshal Bellegarde on the Mincio on the
8th of February, but was unable to follow up his success owing to the
position of Murat. In his rear, Lord William Bentinck had landed at
Genoa and issued a proclamation promising independence to that city,
and the support of England in securing the independence and unity of
Italy. Napoleon at one time thought of calling Eugène de Beauharnais to
his side, but his rapid victories over the isolated _corps d’armée_ of
the allies in February caused him to abandon this wise project.
[Sidenote: The Congress of Châtillon. 3d Feb.-19th March 1814.]
It has been said that one effect of Napoleon’s victories was to break
up the Congress of Châtillon. It had been suggested that a congress
should meet at Mannheim at the time of the Proposals of Frankfort, but
Napoleon’s delay prevented it from assembling until after the invasion
of France was an accomplished fact. The success of this invasion
altered the attitude of the allies towards France. They saw that the
French nation was not going to arise in its might as it had done in
1793. They heard through sure hands that the people were almost in open
rebellion against the Emperor. The Legislative Body had dared to oppose
his wishes. Everywhere the conscription was evaded, and there was a
muttered feeling throughout France that the country had had enough of
war and that it was time that the blood-tax on the French youth should
cease. Even the army itself was beginning to despair. The Emperor had
lost his prestige in Russia and at Leipzig. His soldiers were not the
veterans of his former wars; his generals and his marshals began to
murmur and to fear that a war _à outrance_ would end in their personal
ruin. Under these circumstances the Congress of Châtillon met on the 3d
of February 1814. The French plenipotentiary was Caulaincourt, the most
upright of Napoleon’s statesmen. The other powers nominated, not their
chief ministers, Metternich, Nesselrode, Hardenberg, and Castlereagh,
although they were all at headquarters, but subordinate diplomatists,
namely, Count Philip Stadion, the predecessor of Metternich, for
Austria, William von Humboldt for Prussia, Razumovski for Russia, and
Lord Cathcart, Lord Aberdeen, and Sir Charles Stewart for England.
At Châtillon very different conditions from the Proposals of Frankfort
were offered. The main stipulation was that France should return to
her limits before the Revolution. England haughtily declared that the
naval question with regard to the rights of neutrals was not to be
mentioned, and everything was made subject to the great question of
the French limits. Caulaincourt disputed the proposals on the ground
that it was unfair that France should be reduced to the limits she had
held in 1789 while the other powers had been so vastly increased by
the rearrangement of Germany and the partition of Poland. Nevertheless
he was most anxious that Napoleon should accept these proposals. He
granted that they were worse than the Proposals of Frankfort, but
argued that if the war continued they were likely to be worse still.
Napoleon, however, looked upon the Congress as an opportunity for
gaining time. He believed that by his military successes he would avert
the disasters which threatened him, and on the day of the battle of
Montereau, the 18th of February, he wrote that he was only willing
to agree to a peace on the basis of the Frankfort Proposals, and in
his own handwriting he added to his despatch to Caulaincourt, ‘Sign
nothing.’[13] It is worthy of note that in the Proposals of Châtillon
nothing was said about Napoleon himself. The Emperor Francis assumed
that his son-in-law would remain upon the throne of France, and Lord
Castlereagh expressed no view to the contrary. But the English Minister
was absolutely determined not to yield to Napoleon’s demand for the
natural limits of France. England was the paymaster of the coalition,
and Castlereagh having just promised £10,000,000 to pay the military
expenses of 1814 felt that he had the right to insist on his demand.
Napoleon in after years declared that his persistence in retaining
Belgium was the reason for his refusal to accede to the Proposals of
Châtillon. ‘Antwerp,’ he said to Las Cases, ‘was to me a province in
itself; it was the principal cause of my exile to Saint Helena, for
it was the required cession of that fortress which made me refuse the
terms offered at Châtillon. If they would have left it to me peace
would have been concluded.’[14] Metternich wrote to Caulaincourt
pressing the acceptance of the Proposals of Châtillon, but Napoleon
obstinately refused, and the Congress had practically failed by the
beginning of March, though it did not actually break up until the 19th
of that month.
[Sidenote: Attitude of France towards Napoleon.]
The fact that the French nation did not rise in arms against the
invaders has been mentioned as the primary cause for the difference
between the terms offered at Frankfort and at Châtillon. Nothing proves
more completely how thoroughly Napoleon had extinguished the spirit of
the Revolution than the lukewarmness with which his call to arms was
received in 1814. In 1793 the invasion of France had caused a frenzy of
patriotism. The people had submitted to the Reign of Terror, because
it meant a strong government which could expel the English, Prussians,
and Austrians. France was at that time hemmed in by difficulties
infinitely greater than those which she had to face in 1814. Then
she had no great general. In 1814 she possessed one of the greatest
generals the world has ever seen. In 1793 she was torn by civil war
in La Vendée and by brigands in every sparsely populated district. In
1814 she had enjoyed fifteen years of internal tranquillity. In 1793
her finances were utterly disordered, her industries were destroyed,
and the whole country a prey to anarchy. In 1814 she had been for years
the chief nation in Europe, and the wealth of other countries had
been drained to enrich her. But the difference was that in 1793 and
the succeeding years the French people felt that they were fighting
to ward off the interference of foreign nations in their internal
affairs, whereas in 1814 they were called on to defend the power of
a single man who had infringed the rights and the freedom of other
nations. By his bureaucratic system Napoleon had crushed out the power
of popular initiative which had been the strength of the Republic; by
his suppression of individual liberty he had made the majority of the
French people disaffected to his Empire.
[Sidenote: Exhaustion of France.]
There must be considered also the exhaustion of actual physical
resources. In the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, it is estimated that
nearly 750,000 Frenchmen were either killed, wounded, or taken
prisoner. Before that time the Grand Army had been slowly destroyed
on many a field of battle, and there simply were not sufficient men
of military instinct and physical strength to fill the ranks. In
1813 Napoleon enrolled the conscripts whose turn would have come in
1815—mere boys of sixteen, who had melted away after the battle of
Leipzig—and the men he called to the ranks in 1814 were those who had
been passed over by the conscription in previous years, and were too
long inured to civil life to be willing to serve as soldiers.
To the feeling that resistance to the invaders was not a national
duty, must be added a general indisposition to support the Empire. The
opinions which had found vent during the French Revolution had not been
extinguished by the Empire; they had only been suppressed; and all
the educated part of the nation was united in desiring representative
institutions so as to exercise a share in directing the policy of the
government. This opinion showed itself in the Legislative Body which
was summoned in December 1813. Napoleon had announced that his cause
was the cause of France; but in return the leaders of the Legislative
Body only begged him to make peace. A paragraph was inserted in the
report of the Legislative Body upon the Proposals of Frankfort, which
contains the following words: ‘It belongs to the Government according
to the Constitution to propose the most effectual means to repel the
enemy and secure peace. These means will only be effectual if the
French people are convinced that their blood will be shed only to
defend the country and our protective laws. It appears, therefore,
indispensable that at the same time that His Majesty shall propose
the most prompt and efficacious measures for the safety of the State,
the Government should be besought to maintain the entire and constant
execution of the laws which guarantee to the French people the rights
of liberty, security, and property, and to the nation the complete
enjoyment of its political rights. That guarantee appears the most
effectual means for restoring to the French people the energy necessary
for their defence in the present crisis.’ Napoleon was much irritated
by this attack on his arbitrary authority, and although this paragraph
was expunged from the report by 254 votes to 223 he nevertheless
dissolved the Legislative Body in a rage.
[Sidenote: The Bourbons.]
Neither at the Congress of Châtillon nor in the Legislative Body was
a single word said about restoring the Bourbons. They had lost all
credit during their exile. The French people did not want them. The
allied powers did not care about them. By Lord Castlereagh’s orders
Wellington received the Duc d’Angoulême, son of the Comte d’Artois, in
his camp in the south of France, but he distinctly refused to recognise
him in any way whatever. The English general went further and issued
a proclamation in which he declared that the war was being waged for
security to Europe, not for a change of dynasty in France, and that no
interference was either intended or would be permitted in the free
decision of the French people with regard to their internal government.
When the Duc d’Angoulême was favourably received in Bordeaux and the
Mayor of that city hoisted the white flag, Wellington wrote to the
Bourbon prince defining his attitude and censuring the assertion in the
Duke’s proclamation, that he was supported by England.
[Sidenote: Treaty of Chaumont. 1st March 1814.]
In spite of his real weakness Napoleon was so infatuated by his
successes in February 1814 that, as has been said, the Congress came to
an end, but he was not far wrong in his estimation of the effect of his
victories upon the allied monarchs. So profoundly was Schwartzenberg
terrified by the destruction of Blücher’s army and the victories of
Nangis and Montereau that he wished to retreat from France. Differences
between the powers at this juncture threatened to break up the
coalition, and it was only the determination of Lord Castlereagh that
kept them together. The English minister on the 1st of March 1814
concluded the secret Treaty of Chaumont. By this treaty the relations
of the allied monarchs to each other on several points were defined,
and though many fresh causes of dissension arose at a later date, it
was the Treaty of Chaumont which kept the powers together until the
overthrow of Napoleon, and which laid the basis of the final settlement
at Vienna. By this treaty the four great powers, England, Russia,
Austria and Prussia, bound themselves, if France refused to return
within her ancient limits, to form an offensive and defensive alliance.
Each member of the coalition was to maintain 150,000 men in the field,
and England bound herself, in addition to paying her own contingent
and maintaining her navy, to contribute a subsidy of £5,000,000 a year
to be divided equally amongst the other three contracting parties.
As England by this arrangement offered more than twice as much as
any other country, Castlereagh practically became the master of the
coalition. After peace was concluded each of the powers was to furnish
a contingent of 60,000 men if any one of them were attacked. The
resettlement of Europe was to be arranged on the following bases: that
the German Empire should be restored as a federal union; that Holland
and Belgium should be united into a monarchy under the House of Orange;
that Spain should be restored to its ancient sovereign; that Italy
should be divided into independent states; and that Switzerland should
be guaranteed as independent and neutral by all the great powers.
[Sidenote: Napoleon’s Second Campaign in France. March 1814.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Paris. 30th March 1814.]
[Sidenote: Occupation of Paris by the Allies.]
The result of the Treaty of Chaumont was to stiffen the attitude of
the allies in France. All thought of retreat was abandoned and both
the Austrians under Schwartzenberg, and the Army of Silesia under
Blücher recommenced their advance upon Paris. Napoleon pursued the
tactics which had been crowned with success in the month of February,
and prepared to strike at each of the invading armies in turn. His
first movement as before was against Blücher. The Army of Silesia
had been reduced by the actions of Champaubert, Montmirail, etc.,
from 60,000 to 30,000 men, but it was now increased to more than its
former number by the arrival of Saint Priest’s Russians and of the
two corps of Bülow and Wintzingerode which had been detached from
Bernadotte by Lord Castlereagh. Napoleon was not aware of the extent
of these reinforcements, and he therefore with his army of barely
30,000 men ventured to attack Blücher. On the 7th and 9th of March,
the severe actions of Craonne and Laon were fought. Neither side won
victories, but Napoleon failed to repeat his former successes, which
was tantamount to a defeat. After the battle of Laon both Blücher and
Napoleon reviewed the armies at their disposal, and the disparity of
their strength is shown by the fact that whereas Blücher reviewed
109,000 men, Napoleon found that including all reinforcements, he had
but 46,000. Having failed to check the Prussians, Napoleon turned to
attack Schwartzenberg’s army. On the 20th of March he fought an action
at Arcis-sur-Aube, in which the Russians repulsed the French attack.
The Emperor then resolved on a final effort. He determined to attack
the lines of communication of the invaders, and marched towards the
Vosges Mountains. But the invaders were in too strong force to be
terrified by this manœuvre. A few divisions only were left to watch
him, and the main armies continued their advance on Paris. On March
the 30th, Schwartzenberg and Blücher arrived in front of the French
capital. They had under their command about 200,000 men, whereas
Marshals Marmont and Mortier, who had been charged with the defence of
Paris, could not get under arms more than 28,000 including the National
Guard. In spite of this enormous difference of strength the two
marshals took up a position and prepared to defend Paris. But after the
most obstinate resistance the allies carried the French position after
ten hours’ fighting on the 30th of March, and on the following day
the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia entered Paris. Napoleon
rapidly followed the allied army, but the occupation of Paris was fatal
to his cause. He was ready to continue the war, but his marshals were
not. On the 4th of April Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot, and Lefebvre had an
interview with the Emperor, and told him that the army would fight no
more. Napoleon was obliged to give heed to their remonstrances, and he
sent Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt to make what arrangements might
be possible with the allied monarchs.
[Sidenote: The Provisional Government at Paris.]
On entering Paris the Emperor Alexander and King Frederick William
proceeded at once to the residence of Talleyrand. That astute statesman
quickly decided upon a definite policy. He understood that the allies
had hitherto treated with Napoleon, and that they were not favourably
disposed to the Bourbons. He knew that the French nation did not
desire the return of the former dynasty. But he felt that the only
method which would enable France to take up a logical position on the
Continent was by the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. If Louis
XVIII. were accepted as King of France, it would be a contradiction in
terms to their professed belief in hereditary rights, and their hatred
for the results of the Revolution, for the allied monarchs to attack
the unity of France. For this reason Talleyrand persuaded Alexander
that it would be inadmissible either to accept the government of the
Empress Marie Louise in the name of her son, the King of Rome, or
still less to recognise Alexander’s candidate, Bernadotte. In his own
words to the Emperor: ‘Any attempt to create a Regency or to appoint
Bernadotte is a mere intrigue; nothing remains but Bonaparte or the
Bourbons.’ Alexander then declared that he would no longer treat with
Napoleon, and Talleyrand as Vice-Arch-Chancellor of the Empire summoned
the Senate to meet upon the 1st of April.
The Senate at once elected a Provisional Government consisting of
Talleyrand as President and the Comte de Bournonville, former War
Minister of the Republic, the Comte de Jaucourt, a former leader of
the Legislative Assembly, the Abbé de Montesquiou, a former leader of
the Constituent Assembly, and the Duc de Dalberg, nephew of the Prince
Primate of Germany. The Senate then resolved that, whatever government
should be adopted, the sale of the national and ecclesiastical estates
in the days of the Revolution should be ratified, the liberty of
worship and of the press established, and a general amnesty declared.
On the following day the Emperor Alexander addressed the Senate. He
said: ‘It is neither ambition nor the love of conquest which has
led me hither; my armies have only entered France to repel unjust
aggressions. Your Emperor carried war into the heart of my dominions
when I only wished for peace. I am a friend of the French People; I
impute their faults to their chief alone; I am here with the most
friendly intentions; I wish only to protect your deliberations. You
are charged with one of the most glorious missions which generous men
can discharge,—that of securing the happiness of a great people, in
giving France institutions, at once strong and liberal, with which she
cannot dispense in the advanced state of civilisation to which she has
attained.’ Alexander in conclusion, as a sign of his goodwill, declared
that he would release the 150,000 French prisoners of war then in
Russia.
[Sidenote: Abdication of Napoleon. 6th April 1814.]
That evening the Senate solemnly declared Napoleon to be no longer
Emperor, and formed a Provisional Ministry, including Comte Beugnot,
Minister of the Interior, Baron Louis, Minister of Finance, and General
Dupont, who had been disgraced for the Capitulation of Baylen, Minister
for War. Matters had reached this stage when Napoleon’s emissaries
Ney, Macdonald, and Caulaincourt, arrived at the headquarters of the
allied monarchs. These faithful adherents proposed that Napoleon
should abdicate in favour of his infant son. This offer, which would
have been gladly received some days before, was now rejected, owing
to the influence of Talleyrand, and on April the 6th, when Napoleon
received the news of this rejection, he unconditionally abdicated
at Fontainebleau. This step was made necessary by the fact that the
faithful marshals could not even speak in the name of the whole army on
behalf of Napoleon. Marshal Marmont, who had distinguished himself in
the great battle before Paris, had made separate terms for himself and
placed his army at the disposal of the allies. The desertion of Marmont
deprived Napoleon of the greater part of the forces on which he relied,
and rendered his unconditional abdication necessary.
[Sidenote: Provisional Treaty of Paris. 11th April 1814.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Toulouse. 10th April 1814.]
The abdication of Napoleon was followed by the arrival of Lord
Castlereagh in Paris. The English minister had since the breaking up of
the Congress of Châtillon remained at the headquarters of the Emperor
of Austria at Dijon. It was there that he had entered into intimate
relations with Metternich, relations which were to lead to most
important results. On the 11th of April 1814, the Provisional Treaty
of Paris was signed. It was essentially a treaty between the Emperor
Napoleon, through his plenipotentiaries, and the allied monarchs. It
was not a treaty with France, for Louis XVIII. had not arrived from
England, or been recognised as king, and the Provisional Government
could only enter into provisional arrangements. By this treaty, which
was signed by Caulaincourt, Macdonald, Ney, Metternich, Nesselrode,
Hardenberg, and Castlereagh, Napoleon renounced for himself and his
descendants the Empire of France and the Kingdom of Italy. He was,
however, to retain the title of Emperor; the island of Elba was erected
into an independent principality for him, and an income of £180,000 a
year was granted to him. The duchies of Parma and Piacenza were secured
in full sovereignty to the Empress Marie Louise, and after her decease
to the King of Rome, and the divorced Empress Josephine was given an
annuity of £40,000 a year. On the day before this treaty was signed,
April 10th, 1814, the Battle of Toulouse was fought. Wellington after
his victory of Orthez had rapidly followed Soult into the heart of
Southern France. When he attacked the French positions in front of
Toulouse, he was ignorant of the great events which had been passing at
Paris and at Fontainebleau, and it was only after his entrance into the
city that he perceived the white cockade was being worn.
[Sidenote: Arrival of Louis XVIII.]
On the 20th of April 1814, Napoleon bade farewell to the Guard at
Fontainebleau, and started for Elba, and on the 24th his successor,
Louis XVIII., who had not entered France since his escape in
1791, landed at Calais. The new King was eminently fitted by his
natural character, which had been matured by his long exile, for a
constitutional monarch, but unfortunately he was surrounded by men who
had shared his exile, and who did not share his placable disposition.
On the 2d of May, when he had reached the neighbourhood of Paris, Louis
XVIII. published what is known as the Declaration of St. Ouen. In this
declaration, he promised a constitution to the French people, which
should provide among other things for a representative government with
two chambers, complete liberty of worship and the press, the right
of the representatives to grant taxation, the inviolability of all
property, including national and ecclesiastical estates, which had
been sold during the Revolution, the responsibility of the ministers,
irremoveability of the judges, and complete equality before the law.
On the following day, he entered Paris amid general rejoicings, for
the French people had forgotten their grievances of olden time in the
memory of their more recent sufferings in the latter years of Napoleon.
He was not in any way treated with by the Provisional Government; his
return was tacitly accepted as inevitable; and he returned to the
Tuileries as of divine right, without any bargain being made with him.
[Sidenote: First Treaty of Paris. 30th May 1814.]
The first important duty which fell to Louis XVIII. was the signature
of a definitive treaty of peace with the allies. The evacuation of
French territory by the invaders had been arranged with the Provisional
Government on the 23d of April, and the foreign troops were already
beginning to retire. By the definitive Treaty of Paris, which was
negotiated by Talleyrand on behalf of Louis XVIII., it was agreed that
France should return to her limits of 1792. By this arrangement, the
early annexations of the Revolution before the outbreak of war were
secured to France. These additions included Avignon and the County of
the Venaissin, which had formerly belonged to the Pope, and several
districts in Alsace, of which the most noteworthy were the Principality
of Montbéliard formerly the property of the King of Würtemberg, and
the Republic of Mulhouse. France also received Chambéry, and part of
Savoy, with certain rectifications of the frontier in the neighbourhood
of Geneva, and on the north-eastern border. All the former French
colonies, except the islands of the Mauritius, Tobago, and Saint Lucia,
were restored to France. With regard to other countries, it was agreed,
as had been laid down in the Treaty of Chaumont, that Germany was to
become a Confederacy instead of an Empire, that Holland and Belgium
were to be united, that Italy was to be divided into independent
states, and that the independence of Switzerland was to be guaranteed
by all the great powers. At the same time that this treaty was signed,
a secret treaty was agreed to between the four invading powers, without
consulting France. This secret treaty dealt largely with the future
apportionment of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine which
had been administered by France ever since 1794. It was roughly agreed
that these provinces should be annexed to Prussia, and it was further
laid down, that Austria should possess the whole of Lombardy, and that
Genoa should be united to Sardinia. The details of this arrangement,
and the many other questions which were certain to arise were
adjourned, and it was settled that they should be considered at a great
congress which was to meet at Vienna.
[Sidenote: Conclusion.]
The two nations which had done the most to overthrow the excessive
power of Napoleon were England and Russia, and the two men most
conspicuously concerned were the Emperor Alexander and Lord
Castlereagh. The two rival German powers, Austria and Prussia,
naturally inclined to different sides. Prussia was the declared ally of
Russia; the Emperor Alexander and the King Frederick William had formed
one of the romantic personal friendships which Alexander loved; and
the Russian and Prussian ministers were in perfect accord in desiring
to punish France and her allies, and to aggrandise themselves. Austria
on the other hand naturally inclined to support England. Both feared
the increasing preponderance of Russia; both felt that enough had
been done in deposing Napoleon, and did not desire to wreak vengeance
on France; both were inclined to be moderate in their demands. This
rivalry between Russia with Prussia, and Austria with England had
appeared in its incipient stages before the Treaty of Chaumont, and it
was to rise to its height during the Congress of Vienna. The return of
the Bourbons to France was to have an important result on the rivalry
between the allies, and it is a significant proof of the inherent
power of France, and of the greatness of the ascendency which she had
won, that she was enabled at Vienna to act the most decisive part. The
overthrow of Napoleon had not really weakened France; she had lost her
natural territorial limits of the Rhine and the Alps which she might
have obtained but for the stubbornness of Napoleon; nevertheless, she
was still strong enough to be feared, and in the day of her greatest
disaster she was able to exert a greater influence in the affairs of
Europe than she had ever done since the time of Louis XIV.