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THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ QUESTION.
THE
ISTHMUS OF SUEZ
QUESTION.
BY
M. FERDINAND DE LESSEPS,
MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY.
“APERIRE TERRAM GENTIBUS.”
LONDON:
LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS.
PARIS:
GALIGNANI AND CO.
1855.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
THE QUESTION SUBMITTED 7
APPENDIX.
NO.
I. M. DE LESSEPS’ MEMORIAL TO THE VICEROY 18
II. FIRMAN OF CONCESSION 28
III. M. DE LESSEPS’ INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ENGINEERS 52
IV. PRECURSORY SCHEME 58
V. LETTER FROM THE GRAND VIZIER TO THE VICEROY 170
VI. M. DE LESSEPS’ REPORT 174
VII. OPINION OF MR. ANDERSON 182
VIII. OPINION OF CAPTAIN VETCH 204
IX. ARTICLE FROM THE MONITEUR 212
_Explanation of the French Monies, Weights, and Measures used in the
following pages._
1 Franc = about 9½ d. or, 25 fr. = 1£.
81 Livres = 80 francs.
1 Quintal = about 220½ lbs.
1 Metre = 39⅜ inches nearly.
1 Kilometre = about 1093⅔ yards, or nearly 5 furlongs.
1 Hectare = 2 acres, 4712, or nearly 2½ acres.
1 Litre about 1¾ pint.
The figures following the denomination are decimal parts; thus: 7 _fr._
25, 6 _met._ 50 represent respectively 7¼ _francs_, 6½ _metres_.
THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ QUESTION
SUBMITTED TO THE PUBLIC OPINION OF ENGLAND.
“Aperire terram gentibus.”
In the month of October, 1854, I left Europe for Egypt, in consequence
of an invitation I had received from the new Viceroy, Mohammed Saïd, who
for twenty years has honoured me with his friendship. I had no mission
from my Government. It was in the course of a journey across the Libyan
desert from Alexandria to Cairo which I made in company with the Prince,
that the question of cutting through the Isthmus of Suez, was for the
first time mooted between us. He requested me to draw up a memorial on
the subject, (Appendix, No. 1) and, as my ideas met with his approbation,
he issued to the Consuls General of foreign powers a firman (Appendix,
No. 2), destined to receive the sanction of the Sultan, granting to a
company composed of the capitalists of all nations without distinction,
the right to construct a canal between the two Seas. Mr. Bruce, the agent
of the British Government, was the first of the Consuls General who was
informed of the Viceroy’s project, so that France and England received
intimation of it at the same time.
MM. Linant Bey and Mougel Bey, engineers, who have been engaged, the
one for the last twenty, the other for the last thirty years, in the
construction of important hydraulic works in Egypt, were appointed by
the Viceroy to accompany me in an exploring expedition to the Isthmus
of Suez, and to complete, by a fresh examination of the ground, the
investigations they had already made.
This expedition was made during last December and January; after
presenting an account of it to His Highness Mohammed Saïd, I gave
instructions (Appendix, No. 3), in his name, to the engineers, calculated
to assist them in the preparation of their report.
In the month of March, MM. Linant Bey and Mougel Bey delivered the
precursory scheme (Appendix, No. 4), which quite convinced the Viceroy of
the possibility of executing this great undertaking in which he has taken
the initiative. They establish by calculations and data, which may be
verified by any one, that a maritime canal direct from Suez to Pelusium
thirty leagues long, one hundred metres wide, and eight metres deep,
extending sufficiently far into the two seas by means of jetties, to
obtain the depth necessary to enable ships to enter without difficulty,
having an inland port in the natural basin of Lake Timsah, and which
should be completed in six years, would cost, at the most, 160,000,000
francs, (£6,400,000); or, about half the amount expended on the Great
Northern railway from London to York, or on that between Paris and Lyons.
In a journey that I made to Constantinople,[1] I ascertained that the
Sultan and his ministers were favourable to the project, and I delivered
to the Viceroy a letter from the Grand Vizier, in which he aptly
characterized the opening of the Isthmus of Suez by a maritime canal as
a work of the most useful and interesting character. (Appendix, No. 5.)
His Highness immediately transmitted to the Divan, the documents, maps,
and plans necessary for understanding the question of construction, and
which were required for obtaining the sanction of the Sovereign.
I was then commissioned to return to Europe for the purpose of calling
public attention to the subject and to take measures for organizing the
undertaking, on a cosmopolitan basis in accordance with the principles
which have from the commencement guided the projectors.
Prince Mohammed Saïd has declared in his instructions (Appendix, No. 6),
that the labours of his engineers, who at this moment are engaged in
preparing their definitive scheme, shall be submitted to the judgment of
engineers, chosen from England, from France, from Holland, from Germany,
and from Italy; and that the organization of the Universal Company
entrusted with the construction of the Canal shall be based upon the
scientific decision of Europe.
Until then no call will be made on the shareholders, and, the
administration of the Company being in the hands of capitalists and
other persons of all nations, in proportion to the relative commercial
importance of their country, they will not support the undertaking unless
they are convinced that it will be to their interest to do so.
As England is evidently interested more than any other power in the
construction of a canal through the Isthmus of Suez, my first step has
been to come to London, both in order to ascertain the state of public
opinion in England on this question, and also to give to all who desire
it such information as will enable them fully to appreciate the moral and
material aspects of the undertaking.
I have already remarked with satisfaction that, in general, men of
intelligence with whom I have had the honour of conversing on the
subject, do not admit that an event which would advance the interests
of the whole world, could possibly do injury to the power or commerce
of England. They frankly discard all idea of a prejudice against the
project; they assert on the contrary, that if feasible their country
cannot but gain by it, and that it would be a source of regret if the
idea were entertained in France that what would be beneficial to other
countries should not be of equal benefit to England.
Objections, however, which to my mind, I am proud to acknowledge,
do honour to the candour of English politicians, have been made, in
perfectly good faith, and without any feeling of distrust towards a
friendly nation, the alliance with which, cemented by the blood of their
brave armies, has been recently sanctioned by the unanimous demonstration
of the English people, as it will shortly be by the people of France.
I shall reproduce these objections, and reply to them in very few words.
I begin by setting aside all those which relate to the supposed
impossibility of execution, and to the idea that the canal can only
be constructed at an expenditure out of proportion to the advantages
reasonably to be expected.
If the canal should be found to be physically impossible, of course the
scheme will not be entertained, and if European science should not make
it clear that the advantages to be derived are commensurate with the
expenses to be incurred, capitalists will not come forward.
The report of the engineers replies triumphantly to other objections
respecting the sands of the desert, the alluvial deposits at Pelusium
and Suez, and the navigation of the Red Sea.
It has been affirmed that the project of a canal might retard the
construction of a railway from Alexandria to Suez, which the policy of
England has always considered essential to her Indian interests.
Far from being retarded by the canal project, the railway will, on the
contrary, be indebted to this very design, for its speedy completion; for
it can only obtain sufficient returns from the activity occasioned by a
considerable maritime commerce across the Isthmus of Suez. The Egyptian
Government, which has already completed, at its own expense, the first
two sections of the railway, viz., from Alexandria to the Nile, and from
the Nile to Cairo, takes this view of the question, and is at the same
time desirous of giving satisfaction to England, whose main object is
to secure for her despatches and travellers the most direct and speedy
route. The Viceroy, being thus persuaded, that of the two undertakings,
the railway and the canal, each forms the complement of the other, has
just decided on the completion of the third section, from Cairo to Suez.
He has given the order for the rails to an English house, and engineers
are at this moment engaged in levelling and in the superintendence of the
earth-works.
It has also been said that if a considerable number of European workmen,
or agricultural labourers, were taken to the Isthmus of Suez, there
would be some fear of their forming a colony of natives of one single
country—of France for instance—which might have a prejudicial effect
on the policy of England. In the first place, there is no motive for a
universal company to employ, for a special political object, workmen
of any one country in preference to those of any other. Again, it is
not necessary to demonstrate that a company of capitalists will attend
to their own interests, and they will certainly have an incontestable
advantage in employing Egyptians only, as workmen and agricultural
labourers. The _fellah_ of Egypt has alone constructed, under the
direction of skilful and experienced engineers and foremen, all the
extensive works undertaken in that country, and no nation can more
easily, or on more favourable terms, furnish disciplined armies, of
robust, active, and intelligent workmen, equally fit for the construction
of canals, for hydraulic and for agricultural operations.[2]
But what is of greater moment, and indeed alone deserves the
consideration of a people who have the fortunate custom of interesting
themselves in their political affairs, is the apprehension
conscientiously entertained by statesmen, whose right and whose duty it
is to ask themselves and maturely to consider:—
1. Whether shortening the distance by 3000 leagues for all the countries
of Northern Europe, and by 3400 leagues on an average for the ports of
the Mediterranean, including Malta, may not in future, in case of war,
menace the safety of the British possessions in India.
2. Whether the commercial and maritime relations of Great Britain will
not be disadvantageously affected by the opening of a new route, which,
while shortening the distance for her own navigation, will at the same
time facilitate and increase the navigation of all other nations towards
the extreme East.
The following passage from a recent publication replies to these
objections:—
“The power in possession of Aden opens and shuts at its will the Red Sea,
and if it is true that the influence of nations and governments chiefly
depends on the good they can do to their friends and the harm they can
do to their enemies, that revolution would be of no slight advantage to
England which would lead the principal current of the world’s commerce
under the guns of her ships and the batteries of her fortresses. Besides,
is it from the naval armaments of the Mediterranean that England has
most reason to fear an invasion of India? It requires no more than
ordinary foresight to perceive, that if her Indian possessions were ever
seriously threatened, it could only be from Russia by land, and from
North America by sea. In either case, the safety of her possessions would
depend on the shortening of her line of operations.
“India is not the only British possession to which the route will be
abridged by the passage _viâ_ Suez. Australia will profit no less by the
change; and it will be all the more necessary to facilitate the defence
of that country, as it will become, if the cutting through of the Isthmus
of Panama be effected, more accessible to the ships of war of the United
States.
“We may conclude from these observations, that there would be small risk
of the opening of the Isthmus of Suez weakening the military power of
Great Britain. Her commercial power could only be compromised by it, if
it were possible for the multiplicity of her transactions with the East
Indies to be decreased by shortening the intervening distance by 3000
leagues, or if it were possible for the producers and sellers of the
commodities of the extreme East to lose by the consumption of them in
Europe being doubled.
“If England must gain by the opening of the Isthmus an increase of
military and commercial power, the genius of calculation within her
will soon triumph over an ill-considered opposition. She will not
sacrifice the positive elevation, the basis of which is enlarged by the
developement of what surrounds it, to that relative elevation which is
satisfied with the degradation of others, and she will not give any one
the right to attribute to her, with regard to all the nations bordering
on the Mediterranean, the language lately addressed by the Emperor
Nicholas to the English Minister on the subject of Greece, and of the
East. Such a policy she leaves to its fitting home. She does more, she
opposes it by force of arms. Convinced that her strength lies in her
power of expansion, and in her commercial capabilities, she endeavours
by the prosperity of her neighbours to enlarge the basis of her own, and
for this reason it is that she animates with her co-operation so many
enterprises which enrich the Continent; no undertaking that she has ever
assisted will prove more productive of beneficial results to herself than
the operations at the Isthmus of Suez.”
To the preceding quotation, which is conclusive, I add some figures which
also have their value.
The Mediterranean ports will profit, it is true, by the opening of
the Isthmus of Suez, but England with the 5,000,000 tons employed in
her commerce—a tonnage greater than that of all the navies of Europe,
including France, united—cannot fail to profit in a much greater degree
by the increase of relations which must necessarily result from the
shortening of the distance between the points of traffic; to this opening
moreover she will be indebted for the inestimable advantage of finding
herself in closer connection with her colonies, than another nation whose
competition might otherwise be really formidable in the eyes of the
upholders of an exclusive system.
But on the contrary, England, adopting the policy of commercial freedom,
has been seen to favour the attempts which have been made to cut through
the American Isthmus, although, if successful, it would bring the United
States nearer the British possessions in India and still nearer to
Australia. She is not, however, ignorant of the fact that the maritime
commerce of the United States, which twenty years ago employed only
1,000,000 tons, now, in 1854, requires no less than 5,400,000, and that
this vast tonnage, already larger than her own, is constantly increasing.
But England on her part does not remain at a stand-still, and she has
done well in showing no fear of the contest. The law of progress has been
justified by official statistical documents. The burthen of the English
ships built in 1842 was 130,000 tons; in 1843, shipping to the amount
of 203,000 tons was built. It is especially since the relations of the
United States with the Indian Seas have been extended, that the commerce
of Great Britain has in those very regions experienced a still farther
developement. Thus, the imports from the Indian Peninsula, which in 1849
amounted to £9,238,000, had in 1853 increased to £13,610,000. Those from
China, which in 1849 were £6,200,000, rose in 1853, to £8,300,000. Again,
the tonnage employed in the trade between Great Britain and her Eastern
possessions, including the other countries in the Indian Seas, to and
fro, amounted in 1849 to 967,076, and in 1853 to 1,595,138 tons.
It may perhaps not be superfluous to reply to those persons who still
believe in the supposed monopoly which they think it advisable for
England to retain in her commerce with the East; we have just seen
that there is in fact no such monopoly as far as the United States are
concerned, and that England does not suffer from the want of it. It is
the same with respect to Europe. This state of things has a tendency to
increase every day, even with the existing means of communication by the
Cape of Good Hope and the imperfect transit through Egypt. Marseilles,
Bordeaux, Havre, Genoa, Trieste, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Hamburg,
all despatch vessels direct to the Indies. Marseilles and Trieste now
receive, _viâ_ Egypt, cases of indigo from India and bales of silk goods
from China. Powerful companies, in anticipation of peace, are at this
moment engaged in building ships expressly for trading to the East, or
else in devoting to that purpose the steamers and sailing vessels now
used as transports in the Black Sea.
Other objections have been made, and as they have been seriously brought
forward, I cannot allow them to pass without remark. Some very modest
Englishmen have compared their country to Venice, and have contended,
that if Venice lost her power by the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope,
England would see hers decline by a return to the shortest route. In
the first place, the shortest route is a geographical fact which no one
can get rid of, and, from the moment that it is ascertained that no
material obstacle prevents the opening of this direct line, it will not
be for any Government, much less for the one which has inaugurated the
era of commercial freedom, to oppose the realization of a work which
will satisfy the interests of all. Then, Great Britain in the nineteenth
century cannot be compared to Venice in the fifteenth: the latter, in
consequence of her defeats in 1291 and 1298, had been obliged to cede
the supremacy to Genoa, and, after having still shone in the first rank
when she put herself at the head of the league against Charles VIII.
(1495), finally lost her preponderance when the Portuguese destroyed her
fleets in the Red Sea, and the Emperor, the Pope and the kings of France
and Aragon formed the league of Cambray against her (1508). It would be
useless to prove by historical evidence that the decline of the Queen
of the Adriatic was due to other causes than the discovery of the Cape
(1497), by which she might have profited as well as the Portuguese, if
she had had the same elements of strength and vitality. Trieste, which
has succeeded to her commercial prosperity, and even surpassed it, has
had no need of the re-establishment of the ancient route to India. If
Trieste participates largely, as is to be hoped, in the advantages of
the Isthmus Company, if her neighbour of the Adriatic finds therein a
new life, Great Britain will lose nothing thereby. Has it ever been seen
that a capital city, brought into communication with a great market by
a railroad, has had to regret the shortening of the distance and the
amelioration of its own relations, because some secondary towns on the
line were nearer to the market and participated in the common benefit?
Marseilles, Trieste, Greece, the ports of Italy, of Spain and of Turkey,
are nearer to Egypt than London and Liverpool. Well; in the present
state of the relations of Europe with Alexandria, England absorbs
to herself alone _half the value_ of the commerce between all other
countries and Egypt, and her tonnage comprises _two-thirds_ of the
navigation to and fro under all flags.
I wrote the following from Cairo, December 3rd, 1854, to a friend of
mine, a member of the British Parliament.
“Some persons assert that the Viceroy of Egypt’s project will meet
with opposition in England. I cannot believe it: your statesmen are
too enlightened for me to entertain such a supposition under present
circumstances. What! England herself transacts more than half the general
commerce with India and China; she has an immense empire in Asia; she
may reduce by one-third the charges on her commerce, and bring that
Eastern Empire nearer by one-half; and she would not allow it to be done.
Wherefore? To prevent the Mediterranean nations from taking advantage
of their situation to increase their commerce in the Eastern Seas,—she
would deprive herself of the immense advantages which must accrue to
her, in material respects, and in a political point of view, from this
new communication, solely because others are more favourably situated
than herself, as if geographical position was all-in-all, and as if,
everything considered, England had not more to gain by this work than
all the nations together. Finally, England, it is said, must dread the
reduction in the number of vessels employed in Indian commerce which
would result from the diminution of more than one-third in the duration
of the voyage. And has not England proved in her experience of railways,
by results which have surpassed the boldest anticipations, that the
necessary consequence of shortening the distance and diminishing the
duration of a journey, is the infinite augmentation of intercourse and
circulation. One cannot understand why those who entertain this fear do
not advise the English Government to direct, that the voyage to India now
shall be _viâ_ Cape Horn, for that would employ still more ships than the
way by the Cape of Good Hope and furnish better sailors.
“If, as is not unlikely, the difficulties with which I am threatened
should be brought forward, public opinion, so powerful in England, will
soon do justice to interested opposition and superannuated objections.”
Her Majesty’s Government concluded with the United States, on the 19th
of April, 1850, a treaty of neutrality for the projected canal through
the American Isthmus. The cabinets of London and Paris are now on such
intimate terms as to make it a matter of no difficulty for them to agree
upon a convention, if it suited their political interests to do so,
relative to the passage of the Isthmus of Suez, assimilating it to that
of the Dardanelles. The other powers would not fail to give in their
adhesion to the convention, which would be open to them.
In this manner commercial navigation would be guaranteed against the
chances of war, and military armaments could neither remain in nor pass
through the Isthmus without the permission of the Sovereign of the
country.
The question of the importance to the commercial interests of Great
Britain of cutting through the Isthmus of Suez, has been considered in
the most favourable light by the principal men of science, engineers,
economists, and public writers of England. I shall quote hereafter
the opinions of Mr. Anderson, the present director of the Peninsular
and Oriental Company, and of Captain James Vetch, R. E., from their
respective works. (Appendix, Nos. 8 and 9.) The fact of the question
having been frequently treated with favour by the press, seems to show
that it has already been accepted by the feeling of the country; the
remarkable extract from the “Papers for the People” in the memorial
of the engineers (Appendix, No. 4) will be read with interest. The
celebrated novelist, Charles Dickens himself, has not disdained to
devote several eloquent pages to a very practical consideration of the
project for constructing a canal through the Isthmus of Suez.
It is to be remarked that the English authors who have written upon this
question, have, without exception, advocated the direct line from Suez to
Pelusium. This view is taken by all the inhabitants of Egypt, and I doubt
if the indirect line, complicated as it is by traversing the Nile, would
have been adopted by two of my compatriots so distinguished as M. Baude
and M. Paulin Talabot, if they had themselves been on the spot before
they gave their opinions.
The _Moniteur Universel_ of France, in the Number for the 6th of July,
has proved the advantage of the direct track over the indirect one. I
refer my readers to that article (Appendix, No. 9).
It is incumbent on me to add, that, although the two tracks may be
entertained, theoretically speaking, practically only one is now to be
thought of; for the Viceroy of Egypt, who consents to the cutting of the
Isthmus, has a perfect right to refuse to allow the whole of Egypt to be
cut through. He has, in his written instructions, specially charged me to
make known his declaration, which is in the following terms:—
“_After having passed in review the numerous projects submitted to
various Governments or to the public for more than fifty years, I grant
perfect liberty for the application of those means that science shall
recognise to be best to bring the Red Sea and the Mediterranean into
communication at any point of the Isthmus, eastward of the course of the
Nile; but I declare that I will not authorize the Grand Maritime Suez
Canal Company to adopt any track which shall have its point of departure
on the Mediterranean coast, to the west of the Damietta branch, and which
shall traverse the course of the Nile._”
If it were necessary, reference might be made to the East India Company,
the merchants of Australia, of Singapore, of Madras, of Calcutta and
of Bombay, the commercial houses of the City, the shipowners of London
and Liverpool, the manufacturers of Manchester, the proprietors of iron
mines, the manufacturers of machines, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Company, the directors of banks and of extensive industrial
undertakings, the Chambers of Commerce, the proprietors of coal-fields,
who in 1854 exported 1,309,251 tons of coal, of the value of £2,127,156,
an amount which, immense as it already is, will be still farther
increased, and to a considerable extent, by the opening of the Isthmus of
Suez.
I appeal to their interests, and leave the decision to their judgment.
Lastly, the objection has been made, that the canal project would not be
received with favour by the Turkish Government; but, like every question
in which the principle is just, the consequences are infallible; and from
whatever point of view we regard this question of the Isthmus of Suez, we
see nothing but universal benefit arise from it.
As I have already remarked, I met with no opposition at Constantinople on
the part of the Porte. Turkey is aware that the Canal of the two Seas is
destined to add to her power and prosperity, by bringing Constantinople
nearer by 4300 leagues to the Indian Ocean, and by facilitating the
communication with the Holy Places of Arabia, the source of the authority
the Sultan possesses over his Mussulman population.
Turkey can rise from her present languor only by borrowing capital and
intelligence from Europe. The prosperity of the East is intimately
connected at the present day with the interests of civilization in
general, and the most effectual means of working its welfare, in
connection with that of humanity, is to break down the barriers that
still separate individuals, races, and nations.
War and commerce have civilized the world. War will have played out
its part with that last effort which is being made under our eyes. The
victories hereafter to be gained will be those of commerce only. Let
us exert ourselves to open up for her a new route. This object may be
pursued and attained—in the words of a great writer—“A travers les orages
et les ténèbres de la guerre.” (_Guizot._)
Let us bring the populations of Polynesia, of Australia and China, of the
Indies and of Africa, nearer to Europe; let us make them participators in
the blessings of civilization.
To accomplish this great undertaking, we appeal to all religious and
intelligent men, for it is worthy of their sympathy and co-operation.
We invoke the support of all statesmen, because in the establishment
of new and easy means of communication between the two hemispheres
all nations are interested. Lastly, we will address ourselves to the
capitalists, when they have satisfied themselves of the pecuniary
advantages to be derived from the undertaking.
FERD. DE LESSEPS.
London, July, 1855.
APPENDIX.
No. I.
MEMORIAL ADDRESSED TO HIS HIGHNESS MOHAMMED SAID.
MEMORIAL ADDRESSED TO HIS HIGHNESS MOHAMMED SAID, VICEROY OF EGYPT.
The Camp, Marea, In the Lybian Desert,
15th November, 1854.
The junction of the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, by a navigable canal,
is an undertaking the utility of which has attracted the attention of
all the great men who have reigned in, or conquered, Egypt: Sesostris,
Alexander the Great, Julius Cæsar, the Arab Conqueror Amrou, Napoleon I.
and Mehemet Ali.
A canal, communicating with the Nile, was in existence in ancient times;
first, for a period of 100 years, down to about the middle of the ninth
century before the Hegira; secondly, for a period of 445 years, from the
reign of the first successors of Alexander the Great, down to about the
fourth century before the Hegira; thirdly and lastly, for a period of 130
years after the Arabian conquest.
Napoleon, upon his arrival in Egypt, immediately organized a commission
of engineers to ascertain whether it would be possible to re-establish
that ancient channel of navigation: the question was resolved in the
affirmative, and when the learned M. Lepère delivered to him the report
of the commission, on the eve of his return to France, he said: “It is
an important affair, it is not now in my power to accomplish it, but the
Turkish Government will perhaps one day owe its preservation and its
glory to the execution of this project.”
The moment has now arrived to realize Napoleon’s prediction. The work
of cutting through the Isthmus of Suez is certainly destined, more than
any other, to contribute to the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, and
to demonstrate to those who have been wont to proclaim its decay and
ruin, that it still has a productive existence, and that it is capable of
adding a brilliant page to the history of the world’s civilization.
Why have the governments and the peoples of the West combined to uphold
the Sultan in the possession of Constantinople, and why has he who has
thought fit to menace that position met with the armed opposition of
Europe? Because the passage from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea is
of so much importance, that whatever European Power might become master
of it would domineer over all the rest, and destroy that balance which
the whole world is interested in preserving.
Do but establish at another point of the Ottoman Empire a similar, and
a yet more important position; do but make Egypt the highway of the
commercial world by cutting through the Isthmus of Suez; and thereby
you will create in the East another immoveable seat of power; for, as
far as the new passage is concerned, the great powers of Europe, from
fear of seeing it one day seized upon by one amongst them, will regard
the necessity of guaranteeing its neutrality, as a question of vital
importance.
M. Lepère fifty years ago required 10,000 workmen, four years’ labour,
and from 30 to 40,000,000 francs for the construction of the Suez Canal,
but upon a plan which would now be insufficient for the demands of
commerce and navigation; and his idea was the possibility of a direct
cutting through the Isthmus towards the Mediterranean.
Prior to the year 1840, some skilful English Engineers, who were
employed in levelling operations in the Isthmus, had the honour of first
ascertaining that no difference existed between the levels of low water
in the Mediterranean and in the Gulf of Arabia.
M. Paulin Talabot, one of the three distinguished Engineers chosen in
1847 by a society for the investigation of the Isthmus of Suez,[3]
(and who also had important operations in levelling executed by M.
Bourdaloue,) had adopted the indirect route from Alexandria to Suez:
availing himself of the barrage for the passage of the Nile, he estimated
the entire cost at 130,000,000 francs for the Canal, and 20,000,000 for
the port and roadstead of Suez.
M. Linant _Bey_, who for the last thirty years has ably conducted canal
works in Egypt, has made the question of the Canal of the _two Seas_
the study of his life on the spot itself. He was appointed in 1853 to
direct fresh levelling operations, and has proposed to cut through the
Isthmus in an almost direct line at its narrowest part, establishing a
large inland port in the basin of Lake _Timsah_, and making the channels
from Pelusium, and from Suez, into the Mediterranean and the Red Sea,
available for the largest vessels.
The General of engineers, Gallice _Bey_, on his part, submitted to
Mehemet Ali a proposal for a direct cutting across the Isthmus. M. Mougel
_Bey_, director of the Nile barrage-works, and chief engineer of bridges
and highways, also submitted to Mehemet Ali the possibility and utility
of cutting through the Isthmus of Suez; and, in 1840, at the request of
Count Walewsky, at that time an envoy in Egypt, he was instructed to take
preliminary measures which political events did not allow to be carried
out.
A thorough examination will decide which of the lines is most suitable;
and, as the undertaking has been acknowledged to be practicable, it only
remains to make a choice. Whatever the operations that may be necessary,
and however difficult, they will not intimidate modern art; their success
can be no matter of doubt at the present time: it is a question of money,
which the spirit of enterprise and association will not fail to resolve,
provided the benefits resulting from it are in proportion to the outlay.
It is easy to demonstrate that the cost of the Canal of Suez, admitting
the highest estimate, is not out of proportion with the utility and the
profits of this important work, which would curtail by more than one-half
the distance of India from the principal countries of Europe and America.
This result is made obvious in the following Table, drawn up by M.
Cordier, professor of Geology:—
LIST OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PORTS.
_Distance to Bombay in leagues_:
_Viâ Suez_ | _Viâ the Atlantic_ | _Difference._
| |
Constantinople 1.800 | 6.100 | 4.300
Malta 2.062 | 5.800 | 3.778
Trieste 2.340 | 5.960 | 3.620
Marseilles 2.374 | 5.650 | 3.276
Cadiz 2.224 | 5.200 | 2.976
Lisbon 2.500 | 5.350 | 2.850
Bordeaux 2.800 | 5.650 | 2.850
Havre 2.824 | 5.800 | 2.976
London 3.100 | 5.950 | 2.850
Liverpool 3.050 | 5.900 | 2.850
Amsterdam 3.100 | 5.950 | 2.850
St. Petersburgh 3.700 | 6.550 | 2.850
New York 3.761 | 6.200 | 2.439
New Orleans 3.724 | 6.450 | 2.726
With such figures before us, comment is useless; they show that all the
nations of Europe, and even the United States of America, are alike
interested in the opening of the canal of Suez, as well as in the
rigorous and inviolable neutrality of that thoroughfare.
Mohammed Saïd clearly comprehends that there is no undertaking within his
power, which, from its immensity and the utility of its results, could
bear comparison with that which I propose to him. What a splendid title
to fame for him! What an everlasting source of wealth for Egypt!
The pilgrimage to Mecca henceforth assured and facilitated to all
Mussulmans; an immense impulse given to steam navigation and to distant
voyages; the countries on the coasts of the Red Sea and the Gulf of
Persia, the eastern coast of Africa, India, the kingdom of Siam, Cochin
China, Japan, the vast empire of China, with its more than 300,000,000
of inhabitants, the Philippine Islands, Australia and that immense
Archipelago, towards which the emigration from old Europe is directed,
brought nearer by nearly 3000 leagues to the Mediterranean Sea and the
north of Europe: such are the sudden and immediate effects of cutting
through the Isthmus of Suez.
It has been calculated that the European and American navigation, _viâ_
the Cape of Good Hope and _viâ_ Cape Horn, may carry on a yearly traffic
of 6,000,000 tons, and that on the half only of that tonnage the world’s
commerce would realize a benefit of 150,000,000 francs annually, by
sending the ships _viâ_ the Gulf of Arabia.
There is no doubt that the canal of Suez will occasion a considerable
increase of tonnage; but in reckoning only upon 3,000,000 tons, there
will yet be an annual produce of 30,000,000 francs by collecting dues of
ten francs per ton, which might be reduced in proportion to the increase
of navigation.
After having indicated the financial advantages of the undertaking, let
us consider its general political advantages, which we believe to be
equally incontestable.
Everything that results in contributing to the extension of the commerce,
of the industry, and of the navigation of the world, is especially
advantageous to England, a power which stands foremost amongst all
others from the importance of its navy, from the productions of its
manufactories, and from its commercial relations.
A deplorable prejudice, based upon the political antagonism which so long
and so unhappily existed between France and England, has alone accredited
the opinion that the opening of the canal of Suez, so useful for the
interests of civilization and of the common weal, could damage those of
England. The alliance of the two nations which rank highest in the scale
of civilization, an alliance which has already proved the possibility of
solutions hitherto reckoned impossible by vulgar tradition, will, amongst
its other numerous benefits, allow us to investigate with impartiality
this mighty question of the Canal of Suez, to form an exact estimate of
its influence upon the prosperity of nations and to consider it heresy
to believe, that an undertaking calculated to halve the distance between
the Western and Eastern hemispheres of the globe, should not be suitable
for Great Britain, the mistress of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands,
Aden, important stations on the east coast of Africa, India, Singapore,
and Australia.
England, as well as France, and even more so, must wish to see a cutting
through that strip of land of thirty leagues, which no one who pays
attention to the subject of civilization and progress can behold upon
the map, without feeling the most ardent wish for the disappearance of
that only obstacle that Providence has left in the highway of the world’s
traffic.
The railway, by itself, is not sufficient; it will never acquire any
substantial importance, and will only be assured of its revenues when it
has become the auxiliary of the maritime Canal of Suez. The completion of
the railway, so useful to travellers, and so justly desired by England,
will then become a necessity, and will no longer be a heavy charge upon
the Egyptian Government.
Germany will also hail all the efforts for the construction of the
Canal across the Isthmus. It will be to her the complement to the free
navigation of the Danube. Prince Metternich, who for more than twenty
years has interested himself in the cutting of the Canal of the two Seas,
and Baron de Bruck, one of the promoters of the investigations made in
1847, saw that in this question lay the aggrandizement of Trieste and
of Venice, as well as the opening of important outlets for the produce
of the Imperial provinces, and of the kingdom of Hungary, where the
projected canal from the Danube to Kustendje, on the Black Sea, in
the line of the ancient trench or rampart of Trajan, will facilitate
exportation.
Russia will find in the opening of the Canal of Suez a just satisfaction
of that national aspiration towards the East which led her on one
occasion to extend the limits of her vast Empire to the confines of
British India, and, on another, to threaten the integrity of Turkey.
The mission of civilization devolving upon the Czar over the numerous
tribes of whom he is arbiter, may yet suffice the noblest ambition; the
new outlets which will be pacifically thrown open to their activity and
to their necessity of expansion, will be more profitable to them than
a policy of conquest and exclusive dominion which it is now no longer
possible for any one nation to carry on triumphantly.
The United States of America, whose traffic with Indo-China and Australia
has for many years immensely developed itself; Spain with the Philippine
Islands; Holland with Java, Sumatra and Borneo; the towns formerly so
flourishing on the coasts of Italy; the ports and islands of Greece;
all the nations in short which have held or hold a high maritime and
commercial position; will hasten to take part in a work which will
augment their wealth, or create new sources of it, and to the success of
which I believe I can promise His Highness Mohammed Saïd the active and
energetic co-operation of the enlightened men of all countries.
(Signed) FERD. DE LESSEPS.
APPENDIX.
No. II.
FIRMAN OF CONCESSION.
FIRMAN OF CONCESSION.
Our friend Mons. Ferdinand de Lesseps, having called our attention to
the advantages which would result to Egypt from the junction of the
Mediterranean and Red Seas, by a navigable passage for large vessels, and
having given us to understand the possibility of forming a company for
this purpose composed of capitalists of all nations; we have accepted the
arrangements which he has submitted to us, and by these presents grant
him exclusive power for the establishment and direction of a Universal
Company, for cutting through the Isthmus of Suez, and the construction
of a canal between the two Seas, with authority to undertake or cause to
be undertaken all the necessary works and erections, on condition that
the Company shall previously indemnify all private persons in case of
dispossession for the public benefit. And all within the limits, upon
the conditions and under the responsibilities, settled in the following
Articles.
ARTICLE I.
Mons. Ferdinand de Lesseps shall form a company, the direction of which
we confide to him, under the name of the UNIVERSAL SUEZ MARITIME CANAL
COMPANY, for cutting through the Isthmus of Suez, the construction
of a passage suitable for extensive navigation, the foundation or
appropriation of two sufficient entrances, one from the Mediterranean and
the other from the Red Sea, and the establishment of one or two ports.
ARTICLE II.
The Director of the Company shall be always appointed by the Egyptian
Government, and selected, as far as practicable, from the shareholders
most interested in the undertaking.
ARTICLE III.
The term of the grant is ninety-nine years, commencing from the day of
the opening of the Canal of the two Seas.
ARTICLE IV.
The works shall be executed at the sole cost of the Company, and all the
necessary land not belonging to private persons shall be granted to it
free of cost. The fortifications which the Government shall think proper
to establish shall not be at the cost of the Company.
ARTICLE V.
The Egyptian Government shall receive from the Company annually fifteen
per cent. of the net profits shown by the balance sheet, without
prejudice to the interest and dividends accruing from the shares which
the Government reserves the right of taking upon its own account at
their issue, and without any guarantee on its part either for the
execution of the works or for the operations of the Company; the
remainder of the net profits shall be divided as follows:—Seventy-five
per cent. to the benefit of the Company, ten per cent. to the benefit of
the members instrumental to its foundation.
ARTICLE VI.
The tariffs of dues for the passage of the Canal of Suez, to be agreed
upon between the Company and the Viceroy of Egypt, and collected by the
Company’s agents, shall be always equal for all nations; no particular
advantage can ever be stipulated for the exclusive benefit of any one
country.
ARTICLE VII.
In case the Company should consider it necessary to connect the Nile by
a navigable cut with the direct passage of the Isthmus, and in case the
Maritime Canal should follow an indirect course, the Egyptian Government
will give up to the Company the uncultivated lands belonging to the
public domain, which shall be irrigated and cultivated at the expense of
the Company, or by its instrumentality.
The Company shall enjoy the said lands for ten years free of taxes,
commencing from the day of the opening of the canal; during the remaining
eighty-nine years of the grant, the Company shall pay tithes to the
Egyptian Government, after which period it cannot continue in possession
of the lands above mentioned without paying to the said Government an
impost equal to that appointed for lands of the same description.
ARTICLE VIII.
To avoid all difficulty on the subject of the lands which are to be
given up to the Company, a plan drawn by M. Linant _Bey_, our Engineer
Commissioner attached to the Company, shall indicate the lands granted
both for the line and the establishments of the maritime Canal and
for the alimentary Canal from the Nile, as well as for the purpose of
cultivation, conformably to the stipulations of Article VII.
It is moreover understood, that all speculation is forbidden from the
present time, upon the lands to be granted from the public domain, and
that the lands previously belonging to private persons and which the
proprietors may hereafter wish to have irrigated by the waters of the
alimentary Canal, made at the cost of the Company, shall pay a rent
of.... per _feddan_ cultivated (or a rent amicably settled between the
Government and the Company).
ARTICLE IX.
The Company is farther allowed to extract from the mines and quarries
belonging to the public domain, any materials necessary for the works of
the canal and the erections connected therewith, without paying dues; it
shall also enjoy the right of free entry for all machines and materials
which it shall import from abroad for the purposes of carrying out this
grant.
ARTICLE X.
At the expiration of the grant the Egyptian Government will take the
place of the Company, and enjoy all its rights without reservation, the
said Government will enter into full possession of the Canal of the two
Seas, and of all the establishments connected therewith. The indemnity to
be allowed the Company for the relinquishment of its plant and moveables,
shall be arranged by amicable agreement or by arbitration.
ARTICLE XI.
The statutes of the Society shall be moreover submitted to us by the
Director of the Company, and must have the sanction of our approbation.
Any modifications that may be hereafter introduced must previously
receive our sanction. The said statutes shall set forth the names of
the founders, the list of whom we reserve to ourselves the right of
approving. This list shall include those persons whose labours, studies,
exertions or capital have previously contributed to the execution of the
grand undertaking of the Canal of Suez.
ARTICLE XII.
Finally, we promise our true and hearty co-operation, and that of all the
functionaries of Egypt in facilitating the execution and carrying out of
the present powers.
TO MY ATTACHED FRIEND M. FERDINAND DE LESSEPS, OF HIGH BIRTH AND ELEVATED
RANK.
Cairo, 30th of November, 1854.
The grant made to the Company having to be ratified by his Imperial
Majesty the Sultan, I send you this copy that you may keep it in your
possession. With regard to the works connected with the excavation of
the Canal of Suez, they are not to be commenced until after they are
authorized by the Sublime Porte.
3 Ramadan, 1271.
(_The Viceroy’s Seal._)
A true translation of the Turkish text.
KŒNIG BEY,
Secretary of Mandates
to his Highness the Viceroy.
Alexandria, May 19th, 1855.
APPENDIX.
No. III.
INSTRUCTIONS TO MM. LINANT _BEY_ AND MOUGEL _BEY_.
INSTRUCTIONS TO MM. LINANT _BEY_ AND MOUGEL _BEY_,
_For the Scheme of a Maritime Canal from the Red Sea to the
Mediterranean, and an Alimentary Canal derived from the Nile._
Cairo, January 15, 1855.