The Engagement at Hormigueros
_Topography of the battlefield_--_Macomb's cavalry fired into by Spanish
skirmishers_--_Our advance-guard comes into contact with the foe_--_General
Schwan reaches the firing line_--_The main body arrives and joins in the
fray_--_Subsequent manoeuvres of our column_--_The Spanish retreat_--_A
computation of losses_.
The ensuing account of our fight with the Alphonso XIII Regiment of
Cazadores, on the 10th of August, is taken bodily from the official report
made by General Schwan to Major-General Miles under date of August 21:--
At a distance of about seven miles from Mayaguez the Rio Rosario, coming
from the east, parallels the road for nearly a mile, and empties into the
Rio Grande just south of Hormigueros. A sugar-mill stands just off the road
to the left; and a wagon-road branches off to the right, lined with hedge
and brush, and, crossing the Rosario on an iron bridge, leads to the hamlet
of Hormigueros, which is located on a side hill 1,500 yards from the main
road. The ground to the south of Hormigueros is covered with banana groves
and cane fields. At about 600 yards from where the Hormigueros road leaves
the main road the latter crosses the Rio Grande on a wooden bridge. Just
beyond this bridge the road to Cabo Rojo branches off to the south. From
this point, for nearly a mile, the main road passes through very low, flat
ground, cut up with deep furrows, which extend to the hills on the left
and the river on the right, and contain considerable water from recent
rains.... To resume the narrative of the day's events, near a point on the
main road where it is flanked by sugar-mills our cavalry was fired into,
though without effect, by the enemy's scouts, who were concealed behind a
hedge lining the Hormigueros road. They were easily dispersed. The infantry
and advance-guard having passed this point, the cavalry took the latter
road, and, crossing the Rosario, turned westward, and advanced under cover
of the railroad embankment until--taking every opportunity to damage the
enemy by its fire action--it reached a position beyond the covered wooden
bridge.
[Illustration: Guenar Bridge, Mayaguez.]
The brigade commander had left San German at the head of the main body.
When he heard the firing in his front, he sent word to commanding officers
to advance without further halt, and to keep their commands closed up.
Similar orders were sent to the train. He was informed and approved of
the route taken by the cavalry before reaching the bridge. He crossed the
latter about half-past three o'clock, being at that time about 500 yards in
advance of the main body.
[Illustration: Upper End of the Calle Mendez-Vigo, Mayaguez.]
A staff officer, who had been sent ahead to select camp, reported at this
time the ground west of the Cabo Rojo road as suitable for this purpose;
but owing to the suspected proximity of the enemy, whose position had not
yet been determined, it was decided to push ahead and beyond the iron
bridge. This, despite the fact that the men had now marched 13 miles and
were very tired. Once in possession of the bridge and the high ground to
the north of it, the command would occupy a strong position, which
would make it hard to check its advance on Mayaguez. Accordingly, the
advance-guard, under Captain Hoyt, moved forward, deploying its advance
party as skirmishers and its supports into a line of squads. In this
formation it continued until it had approached the bridge within about 400
yards. At this juncture the enemy opened fire, at first individual fire.
The firing aimed at the advance-guard accelerated the march of the Eleventh
Infantry, which ... reported to the brigade commander, whose staff had
already commenced the demolition of the wire fences enclosing the road.
About the time that the brigade commander caused the deployment of
two companies to re-enforce the advance-guard,--Major Gilbraith in
command,--the enemy, from his position in the hills to the right front,
fired volleys at the main body through the interval separating the infantry
advance-guard from the cavalry, wounding a number of men, also an officer
and several horses of the brigade staff. Meanwhile the artillery battalion,
under the authority of the brigade commander, had taken up a position
to the left of the road. As the powder used by the enemy was absolutely
smokeless, and his position being, moreover, for the most part screened by
the trees along the Rio Grande, the question of the exact direction to be
given Major Gilbraith's detachment, and to the lines of battle about to be
formed from the main column, became a most perplexing one. Luckily, this
uncertainty did not last long, those of the enemy's bullets that struck the
ground near us solving the problem. Some slight confusion was caused by
a premature and hurried deployment of the remaining companies, which
interfered somewhat with the brigade commander's intention of forming two
additional lines, one to support the fighting line and the other to act
as a reserve, or as the changing conditions of the combat might render
expedient. But under his supervision this defective formation was soon
rectified, three companies being placed on the right and four companies on
the left of the road, the former, under Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, moving
forward in support of Major Gilbraith, and the latter being held back for a
time. Major Gilbraith and Colonel Burke's troops, being unable to cross the
creek, passed over the bridge that spans it by the left flank, the former's
companies having previously occupied a sheltered place in a ditch parallel
to and to the right of the main road. About this time the advance-guard,
one of the companies of which (Penrose's) had previously held for a short
time a knoll on the left of the road, moved forward and crossed the iron
bridge, the advance sections of the companies being led by Lieutenants
Alexander and Wells, respectively. After ... a time the entire
advance-guard, including the two Gatling guns, was concentrated on the
right of the railroad. It dislodged the enemy, and with the cavalry troop
to the right,--the troop had arrived about this time, after doing effective
service in threatening the enemy's flank,--and with the companies of Major
Gilbraith pushed forward in the centre, took up a position on the northern
line of hills. Here they were rejoined by the infantry and by two pieces
of artillery under First Lieutenant Archibald Campbell, which the brigade
commander had ordered forward, and which by their fire added to the
discomfiture of the enemy. The two Gatling guns under Lieutenant Maginnis,
with the advance, did good work, at first in a place near the creek where
the gunners had a good view of the enemy, and later on at the various
positions of the advance-guard. The two guns from the main body were also
operated from the crest of the hill during the latter stage of the combat.
[Illustration: The Town of Sabana Grande.]
The affair ended about six o'clock; and the troops, including all the
artillery, bivouacked on or near the position occupied by the enemy. The
wagon train afterward went into park between the railroad and the Rio
Grande, near enough to enable the men to get what was necessary for their
comfort during the night. Before darkness set in, Captain Macomb with his
troop was directed to make an effort to capture a railway train in plain
sight from the hill occupied by the command; but the train got under way
before he could reach it. It also escaped some shots that were fired at it
by the artillery. Although it had now become quite dark, the captain picked
up a few prisoners, including a wounded lieutenant.
The difficulty in locating the enemy, and hence in giving proper direction
to the attack formations, has already been alluded to. Another cause of
anxiety during the earlier stage of the fight were the reports that came to
the brigade commander from different parts of the field, through officers,
that the enemy was getting around our right (or left) flank, and
endeavoring to capture our train. There may have been some foundation for
these reports; but, if so, the flanking parties were probably small, and
deterred from pursuing their design by our steady advance. It may be added
that the train was well guarded.
[Illustration: Witch River, near Cabo Rojo.]
Our loss embraced 1 enlisted man killed and 1 officer and 15 men wounded.
All the wounded, the surgeons say, will recover. The enemy's loss cannot be
definitely ascertained, but it is estimated at 15 killed alone. It probably
did not fall short of 50 in killed and wounded.
The command continued its march at an early hour the following morning, the
advance-guard and the main body proceeding slowly and with great caution.
This extra care was unnecessary. Those of the enemy's forces that were held
in reserve (some of them not far from the city) had fled precipitately as
soon as they realized the extent of their defeat.
In connection with the foregoing report I consider the subjoined document
as being of interest:--
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY
EXPEDITION IN CAMP AT MAYAGUEZ,
PUERTO RICO, Aug. 12, 1898.
GENERAL ORDERS
No. 14.
The brigadier-general commanding desires to convey to the officers and
soldiers of his command his thanks for their excellent conduct in the
engagement they had on the 10th instant, near the town of Hormigueros, with
the Spanish forces in that vicinity. Concealed in a strong position, they
poured a murderous fire into our troops about to go into camp after a
fatiguing march. Had the disposition of the cavalry screen and of the
advance-guard--which latter included both infantry and artillery--been less
perfect, or had the command been deficient in discipline or other soldierly
qualities, such an attack might have proved disastrous. As it was, it was
promptly and gallantly repulsed, the repulse resulting in the enemy's
precipitate evacuation of the city of Mayaguez, though it had been placed
in a state of defence.
[Illustration: American Camp at Mayaguez.]
The major-general commanding the army has been pleased to commend the
troops for their gallant action on this occasion,--a fact which it affords
the brigade commander genuine satisfaction to announce.
By command of Brigadier-General Schwan.
GROTE HUTCHESON,
_Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General._