DE WET LOOMS UP.
Now we will go to the western border of the Transvaal and see what has
been done at Mafeking. No one ever displayed any interest in Mafeking,
yet some skirmishing and letter writing was going on daily. General
Snyman commanded the Boers and Baden-Powell the English. Mafeking is
situated in an open flat dotted with a few small hills here and there.
Baden-Powell dug holes and put his men and some women in them. They
lived like prairie dogs. He had three or four years' supply of good
ammunition, and there was no reason why he should not have been happy
and contented. He laid big mines, but they never caught any one. He
loaded cars with dynamite and tried to explode them among the Boers,
but he always failed. He would make bold attacks, lose a lot of men,
then run back, crawl into his hole, and write a long letter complaining
of ill-treatment. So it went on from day to day until the place was
relieved. Captain Eloff had the place taken once, but old Snyman failed
to come up with his 300 men, so the brave Eloff was left alone and
captured. Snyman had given his solemn word to Eloff that he would not
fail him.
[Illustration: GENERAL DE WET]
Of all of the many utterly worthless generals the Boers had at the
beginning of the war, I am sure that Snyman was the worst, and I am not
certain that he would be a success at herding sheep. After Baden-Powell
was released from Mafeking, we heard but little more about him as a
fighting man. Judging by the volume of insane letters that he wrote
while imprisoned, it is easy to conclude that he had at least two
screws loose in his head. Many of the constabulary police we captured
told us that although Baden-Powell was nominally in command, yet he
never exercised any authority over them.
"Every little while," they said, "he would have to go home for private
treatment because there was something wrong about his head." I fully
believe this, for the papers would announce his departure for London
on account of sickness, and, after a three or four months' absence we
would see him in some of the London illustrated papers togged up in
great style, with a huge Texas sombrero on his head, the loose flowing
cowboy shirt, trousers to match, and a very tall pair of top boots.
Then it was that he intended to return. To be shot--with a camera--is
his greatest delight, and to write foolish letters is his hobby.
After all, General Baden-Powell, there were worse specimens than you
in the English army during the war, and there are still many worse
specimens in that same army to-day, many of whom hold higher rank
than you. When I say that you have two screws loose in your head,
I may be doing you a good service in the eyes of humanity, for you
know that you armed several hundred Kaffirs and had them with you in
Mafeking, and that several hundred of the British-armed Kaffirs outside
of Mafeking murdered many old Boer men, women and children in their
homes, who took no part in the war. No sane man, no honorable man, no
true soldier would resort to such beastly methods to outdo his ten-fold
weaker foe. In fact nobody but a Britisher would be guilty of such
infamous conduct. Colonel Plumer with his mixed command of regulars
and volunteers north of Mafeking and on the northern boundary of the
Transvaal came so near doing nothing, that I will pass him by and give
some of the reasons why the Boers laid siege to Ladysmith, Kimberley
and Mafeking. I admit that I cannot give a good one, for I don't
believe there is one. However, the Boer officers generally thought
it the best thing to do. Commandant-General Joubert told me that he
thought that by holding Ladysmith closely invested, General White would
soon consent to a surrender, and thereby save much bloodshed. The idea
of killing people was repulsive to him, and, furthermore, he could see
no reason for it. We could easily have gone to Maritzburg and then
to Durban before Buller arrived, and at the same time held General
White's line of communication. This would actually have put General
White in a worse predicament than he was in at Ladysmith. He could have
done nothing, for all bridges and the railway behind would be destroyed
and our total force was as large as his by the fifth of November. Once
the Boers had seized Maritzburg, General White could have done nothing.
It was all in our hands, and besides we would have received several
thousand recruits from the Natal Boers. For no other reason except to
save life was Ladysmith besieged.
Kimberley could have easily been taken, but here another factor came
in. To take the place, all the Boers had to do was to destroy De Aar
Junction, the supply depot there, and the branch line to Kimberley.
Having done this, the next step was to proceed on the Cape Railway
line and destroy it. The English could have done nothing without these
lines, and Kimberley would have fallen without one shot being fired.
But President Steyn prevented this because it put the Dutch Cape
Ministry in a bad dilemma. This Ministry was friendly to the Boers and
no doubt wished them every success, but had the Boers proceeded as I
have suggested, the British Government would have charged the Ministry
with treasonable conduct. So De Aar Junction and all the railway lines
were allowed to remain in good order for the use of Lord Roberts and
his army. The Boers in their every act were always swayed by their
love of justice and humanity, and were always ready to sacrifice
themselves in order to do good to others. It was a vital mistake they
made, and I repeatedly told them so, because they knew, and I knew,
that the liberty and independence of their land were at stake. I used
to beg General Joubert to throw the whole force of the Boers in the
Free State into Cape Colony and destroy all bridges and railway lines,
for I knew, if this was done, we would get 15,000 or 20,000 recruits in
Cape Colony, and the English could never then push their way across the
Orange River. But the good, humane General Joubert would never consent
to do anything that might cause trouble for his friends in Cape Town. I
respected him for the stand he took; in fact, I admired and loved him
for it; but it was not business in dealing with such an unscrupulous
enemy as Great Britain.
Ladysmith and Kimberley were practically relieved on the same day,
February 27th, and a few days afterwards followed the relief of
Mafeking. To lay siege to Mafeking was positively foolish, and had
the Boers allowed General Baden-Powell to come out, why, they would
have had him and all his men in Pretoria for their Christmas dinner at
President Kruger's expense. Mafeking was of little or no importance to
either party in the war, so long as the English were not permitted to
cross the Orange River, and they never could have crossed or reached
the Orange River if all the bridges and railways in Cape Colony had
been destroyed. The Karoo, a wide desert, must first be crossed, and no
large army would dare make the venture of crossing.
The way the English managed their transportation, and the food they
furnished to the soldier, would have sufficed to kill half the army.
Had the Boers of the Free State combined and entered Cape Colony,
General Buller would have given up all hope of relieving Ladysmith,
and General White would have been a prisoner of war. What a fatal,
fatal mistake it was to give so much consideration to the personal
feelings of others, when the very life of the land was at stake! There
were so many ways by which the Boers could have beaten the English
and maintained the independence of the two little Republics, that it
is positively painful for me to think or write about the incidents
and outcome of the war. I hope with all my heart that the Boers in
the future will remember and never forget that it is absolutely
impossible for religion and humanity to contend successfully against
unscrupulousness and treachery in this civilized age of the twentieth
century. If they will only remember this, and act accordingly, the day
is not far distant when they will drive the British from South Africa's
shores, and the Africander race will, for the first time in 250 years,
breathe the air of permanent peace and be recognized by all the
nations of the earth as a free and independent people, in a land over
which will wave the Africander flag to the end of time.
In the last days of March General De Wet scored another victory against
a far superior force under the command of General Broadwood. It was
at Sanna's Post that General De Wet placed his 300 men in the bed of
Koorn Spruit on both sides of the road crossing, and gave orders that
not a shot was to be fired until he gave the command. The previous
day he had directed Generals P. Cronje, J.B. Wessels, C.L. Froneman
and Piet De Wet with some 1,100 burghers and four guns, to proceed to
the east side of the Modder River, and bombard Sanna's Post as soon
as it was light on the following morning. This would drive General
Broadwood, his 2,000 men and nine guns, by him and his men concealed
in the Koorn Spruit, for this was directly on their line of retreat to
Bloemfontein. When General De Wet gave these orders, General Broadwood
was at Thaba'Nchu but, to his surprise, he, General Broadwood, after it
became dark moved his force to the Bloemfontein Water Works in the very
presence of General De Wet and his men concealed in the Koorn Spruit.
At daylight General De Wet discovered this overwhelming force at close
quarters, but he was not frightened for he felt that in his position
he was equal to it. General Broadwood was breaking camp, and some of
his teams and men were just starting on their way to Bloemfontein. The
Boers by strict orders, lay low and said nothing until the carts and
wagons reached them, when, as fast as they arrived, they were made
prisoners and concealed in the bed of the spruit, that is, a deep
ravine. After nearly all the wagons and carts and some 200 Tommies
had been made prisoners, General Broadwood discovered that there was
something wrong about that spruit, and as he had five cannon very near
to it he concluded to withdraw them and put them in a safer place. He
was sorely disappointed for General De Wet had his eye on those five
guns and besides the other generals with their 1,100 men opened fire
on Broadwood's camp at the same time. Now was the time for confusion,
and General Broadwood and his 2,000 men were so terribly confused that
they lost no time in running for their lives, but they had sense enough
to dodge the ford where General De Wet and his 300 men were concealed.
On both sides of General De Wet, General Broadwood's brave 2,000
Britishers passed within easy rifle range and as fast as they could run.
As the 2,000 panic-stricken brave Britishers passed in review, General
De Wet and his 300 patriots did not fail to make their mausers sing
in unerring tones and give them a good send off. General Broadwood
and two-thirds of his men escaped. He left behind 350 men killed and
wounded, 480 prisoners, seven cannon and 117 wagons to the tender
mercies of General De Wet. The total Boer loss was three killed and
five wounded. The British Government and all London rejoiced over
General Broadwood's escape. I must confess that he deserved a great
deal of credit and merited the gratulations of his Queen, for some
other British general might have fared worse.
In the first days of April, after his great success at Sanna's Post,
General De Wet collected more men and went to Reddersberg where he knew
there were some English troops. On his arrival he found the English,
but they did not make much resistance. They abused the white flag,
and by so doing, killed one of his veldcornets and killed six of his
men. The English having hoisted their white flag and all firing having
ceased, General De Wet and his men advanced to receive their arms,
ammunition, etc. On arriving within close range the English suddenly
began firing again although their white flag was still flying. General
De Wet's men followed their example, and within five minutes several
more white flags were flying, but so furious were the burghers at the
English treachery that General De Wet was unable to restrain them till
100 English had been killed and wounded. Now the remaining 470 gladly
and promptly laid down their arms. That one act of treachery caused
the death of that brave and good veldtcornet, Du Plessis, and General
De Wet failed to appreciate the cause of humanity when he did not shoot
down every officer among his 470 prisoners.