But if this cannot be, the lover will be the friend of that which is
loved?
True.
And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?
Certainly.
Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the preceding instance, that a
man may be the friend of one who is not his friend, or who may be his
enemy, when he loves that which does not love him or which even hates
him. And he may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy, and is even
his friend: for example, when he hates that which does not hate him, or
which even loves him.
That appears to be true.
But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both
together, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one
another? Do any remain?
Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any.
But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our
conclusions?
I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis. And he blushed
as he spoke, the words seeming to come from his lips involuntarily,
because his whole mind was taken up with the argument; there was no
mistaking his attentive look while he was listening.
I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted to
give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis, that
what you say is true, and that, if we had been right, we should never
have gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for
the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other path into
which we turned, and see what the poets have to say; for they are to us
in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends
in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes
them and draws them to one another; and this they express, if I am not
mistaken, in the following words:--
'God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.'