SOME QUESTIONS RELATING TO FRIENDSHIP.

The subject of friendship has a lower place in the modern than in the

ancient world, partly because a higher place is assigned by us to love

and marriage. The very meaning of the word has become slighter and more

superficial; it seems almost to be borrowed from the ancients, and has

nearly disappeared in modern treatises on Moral Philosophy. The received

examples of friendship are to be found chiefly among the Greeks and

Romans. Hence the casuistical or other questions which arise out of the

relations of friends have not often been considered seriously in modern

times. Many of them will be found to be the same which are discussed

in the Lysis. We may ask with Socrates, 1) whether friendship is 'of

similars or dissimilars,' or of both; 2) whether such a tie exists

between the good only and for the sake of the good; or 3) whether there

may not be some peculiar attraction, which draws together 'the neither

good nor evil' for the sake of the good and because of the evil; 4)

whether friendship is always mutual,--may there not be a one-sided and

unrequited friendship? This question, which, like many others, is only

one of a laxer or stricter use of words, seems to have greatly exercised

the minds both of Aristotle and Plato.

5) Can we expect friendship to be permanent, or must we acknowledge

with Cicero, 'Nihil difficilius quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae

permanere'? Is not friendship, even more than love, liable to be swayed

by the caprices of fancy? The person who pleased us most at first sight

or upon a slight acquaintance, when we have seen him again, and under

different circumstances, may make a much less favourable impression

on our minds. Young people swear 'eternal friendships,' but at these

innocent perjuries their elders laugh. No one forms a friendship with

the intention of renouncing it; yet in the course of a varied life it

is practically certain that many changes will occur of feeling, opinion,

locality, occupation, fortune, which will divide us from some persons

and unite us to others. 6) There is an ancient saying, Qui amicos amicum

non habet. But is not some less exclusive form of friendship better

suited to the condition and nature of man? And in those especially who

have no family ties, may not the feeling pass beyond one or a few,

and embrace all with whom we come into contact, and, perhaps in a few

passionate and exalted natures, all men everywhere? 7) The ancients

had their three kinds of friendship, 'for the sake of the pleasant, the

useful, and the good:' is the last to be resolved into the two first; or

are the two first to be included in the last? The subject was puzzling

to them: they could not say that friendship was only a quality, or a

relation, or a virtue, or a kind of virtue; and they had not in the age

of Plato reached the point of regarding it, like justice, as a form or

attribute of virtue. They had another perplexity: 8) How could one

of the noblest feelings of human nature be so near to one of the most

detestable corruptions of it? (Compare Symposium; Laws).

Leaving the Greek or ancient point of view, we may regard the question

in a more general way. Friendship is the union of two persons in mutual

affection and remembrance of one another. The friend can do for his

friend what he cannot do for himself. He can give him counsel in time of

difficulty; he can teach him 'to see himself as others see him'; he can

stand by him, when all the world are against him; he can gladden and

enlighten him by his presence; he 'can divide his sorrows,' he can

'double his joys;' he can anticipate his wants. He will discover ways

of helping him without creating a sense of his own superiority; he will

find out his mental trials, but only that he may minister to them. Among

true friends jealousy has no place: they do not complain of one another

for making new friends, or for not revealing some secret of their lives;

(in friendship too there must be reserves;) they do not intrude upon one

another, and they mutually rejoice in any good which happens to either

of them, though it may be to the loss of the other. They may live apart

and have little intercourse, but when they meet, the old tie is as

strong as ever--according to the common saying, they find one

another always the same. The greatest good of friendship is not daily

intercourse, for circumstances rarely admit of this; but on the great

occasions of life, when the advice of a friend is needed, then the word

spoken in season about conduct, about health, about marriage, about

business,--the letter written from a distance by a disinterested person

who sees with clearer eyes may be of inestimable value. When the heart

is failing and despair is setting in, then to hear the voice or grasp

the hand of a friend, in a shipwreck, in a defeat, in some other failure

or misfortune, may restore the necessary courage and composure to the

paralysed and disordered mind, and convert the feeble person into a

hero; (compare Symposium).

It is true that friendships are apt to be disappointing: either we

expect too much from them; or we are indolent and do not 'keep them in

repair;' or being admitted to intimacy with another, we see his faults

too clearly and lose our respect for him; and he loses his affection for

us. Friendships may be too violent; and they may be too sensitive. The

egotism of one of the parties may be too much for the other. The word of

counsel or sympathy has been uttered too obtrusively, at the wrong time,

or in the wrong manner; or the need of it has not been perceived until

too late. 'Oh if he had only told me' has been the silent thought of

many a troubled soul. And some things have to be indicated rather than

spoken, because the very mention of them tends to disturb the equability

of friendship. The alienation of friends, like many other human evils,

is commonly due to a want of tact and insight. There is not enough

of the Scimus et hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim. The sweet

draught of sympathy is not inexhaustible; and it tends to weaken the

person who too freely partakes of it. Thus we see that there are many

causes which impair the happiness of friends.

We may expect a friendship almost divine, such as philosophers

have sometimes dreamed of: we find what is human. The good of it is

necessarily limited; it does not take the place of marriage; it affords

rather a solace than an arm of support. It had better not be based on

pecuniary obligations; these more often mar than make a friendship.

It is most likely to be permanent when the two friends are equal and

independent, or when they are engaged together in some common work or

have some public interest in common. It exists among the bad or inferior

sort of men almost as much as among the good; the bad and good, and

'the neither bad nor good,' are drawn together in a strange manner by

personal attachment. The essence of it is loyalty, without which it

would cease to be friendship.

Another question 9) may be raised, whether friendship can safely exist

between young persons of different sexes, not connected by ties of

relationship, and without the thought of love or marriage; whether,

again, a wife or a husband should have any intimate friend, besides his

or her partner in marriage. The answer to this latter question is rather

perplexing, and would probably be different in different countries

(compare Sympos.). While we do not deny that great good may result

from such attachments, for the mind may be drawn out and the character

enlarged by them; yet we feel also that they are attended with many

dangers, and that this Romance of Heavenly Love requires a strength, a

freedom from passion, a self-control, which, in youth especially, are

rarely to be found. The propriety of such friendships must be estimated

a good deal by the manner in which public opinion regards them; they

must be reconciled with the ordinary duties of life; and they must be

justified by the result.

Yet another question, 10). Admitting that friendships cannot be always

permanent, we may ask when and upon what conditions should they be

dissolved. It would be futile to retain the name when the reality has

ceased to be. That two friends should part company whenever the relation

between them begins to drag may be better for both of them. But then

arises the consideration, how should these friends in youth or friends

of the past regard or be regarded by one another? They are parted, but

there still remain duties mutually owing by them. They will not

admit the world to share in their difference any more than in their

friendship; the memory of an old attachment, like the memory of the

dead, has a kind of sacredness for them on which they will not allow

others to intrude. Neither, if they were ever worthy to bear the name

of friends, will either of them entertain any enmity or dislike of the

other who was once so much to him. Neither will he by 'shadowed hint

reveal' the secrets great or small which an unfortunate mistake has

placed within his reach. He who is of a noble mind will dwell upon his

own faults rather than those of another, and will be ready to take upon

himself the blame of their separation. He will feel pain at the loss of

a friend; and he will remember with gratitude his ancient kindness.

But he will not lightly renew a tie which has not been lightly

broken...These are a few of the Problems of Friendship, some of them

suggested by the Lysis, others by modern life, which he who wishes to

make or keep a friend may profitably study. (Compare Bacon, Essay on

Friendship; Cic. de Amicitia.)

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