SECTION II.

_Contraband of War_.

[Sidenote: Contraband of War.]

The general freedom of neutral commerce is subject to certain

restrictions with respect to neutral commerce. Among these is the

trade with the enemy in certain articles, called _Contraband of War_.

These are generally warlike stores, and articles which are directly

auxiliary to warlike purposes. Writers on this subject have made

distinctions between those things useful only for the purposes of war,

those which are not so, and those which are susceptible of

indiscriminate use in war and peace.

All seem to agree in excluding the first class from neutral trade;

and, in general, admitting the second. The chief difference is about

the third class. The last kind of articles--for example, money,

provisions, ships, and naval stores, according to Grotius, are

sometimes lawful articles of neutral trade, and sometimes not; and the

question depends upon circumstances. This is perhaps the truest ground

of decision, as we shall see in subsequent illustrations.[166]

Thus, these articles become contraband, _ipso facto_, if carried to a

besieged town, camp, or port. So in a _naval_ war, ships and materials

for ships, are contraband, although timber and cordage may be used for

other purposes, besides fitting out ships of war; and so horses and

saddles are not of necessity warlike stores, except when comparing the

quality, manufacture, or quantity attempted to be imported into the

hostile state, with the circumstances and condition of the war, it

appears (if not to be impossible) to be in the highest degree

unlikely, that they should be designed for any other purposes besides

the purposes of war.[167]

[Sidenote: Provisions, when Contraband.]

Common Provisions are not Contraband in general prize law, except in

the single case of being sent to a beseiged or blockaded place.[168]

It is a modern practice, in order to remove all possible doubt as to

what goods are contraband, for nations at war to enumerate them

particularly in treaties or compacts with neutral states; and such

treaties leave the neutral, with which they are made, at liberty to

supply the enemy with all goods that are not enumerated in them. These

treaties do not operate as a law; but like other treaties, are binding

only between the nations that are parties to them.[169]

[Sidenote: Lord Stowell's Opinion on Contraband of War.]

The Opinions of our great English authority, Lord Stowell, on this

subject, are contained in two judgments, of which the following is the

substance:--

"In 1673, many unwarrantable rules were laid down by public

authority respecting Contraband. It was expressly asserted

by a person of great knowledge and experience in the English

Admiralty, that by its practice _corn, wine, and oil_, were

liable to be deemed contraband. In much later times, many

sorts of provisions, such as butter, salted fish, and rice,

have been condemned as Contraband. The modern established

rule was, that generally they are not contraband, but may

become so under circumstances arising out of the peculiar

situation of the war, or the condition of the parties

engaged in it; among the causes which tend to prevent

provisions from being treated as contraband, one is that

they are of the growth of the country which exports them.

"Another circumstance, to which some indulgence, by the

practice of nations, is shown, is where the articles are in

their native and unmanufactured state. Thus, iron is treated

with indulgence, though anchors and other instruments

fabricated out of it, are directly contraband. Hemp is more

favourably considered than cordage; and wheat is not

considered so noxious a commodity as any of the final

preparations of it for human use. But the most important

destination is, whether the articles are destined for the

ordinary uses of life, or for military uses. The nature and

quality of the port to which the articles are going, is a

test of the matter of fact on which the distinction is to be

applied. If the port is a general commercial port, it shall

be understood that the articles were going for civil use,

although occasionally a frigate or other ship of war may be

constructed in that port. On the contrary, if the great

predominant character of a port is that of a port of naval

equipment, it shall be contended that the articles were

going for military use, although, merchant ships resort to

the same place, and although it is possible that the

articles might have been applied to civil consumption; for

it being impossible to ascertain the final application of an

article, _ancipitis usus_, it is not an injurious rule which

deduces both ways the final use from immediate destination;

and the presumption of a hostile use, founded on its

destination to a military port, is very much inflamed, if at

the time when the articles were going, a considerable

armament was notoriously preparing, to which a supply of

those articles would be eminently useful."[170]

In a later case he seems to have modified his opinion with respect to

undoubted naval stores, either so by nature, or intended as such for

the occasion. He says--

"The character of the port is immaterial, since naval

stores, if they are to be considered as contraband, are so

without reference to the nature of the port, and equally,

whether bound to a mercantile port only, or to a port of

military equipment. The consequences of the supply may be

nearly the same in either case. If sent to a mercantile

port, they may be applied to immediate use in the equipment

of privateers, or they may be conveyed from the mercantile

to the naval port, and there become subservient to every

purpose to which they could have been applied if going

directly to a port of naval equipment."[171]

[Sidenote: Controversy between England and America on Contraband

Provisions.]

The doctrine of the English Admiralty Court, as to provisions becoming

contraband, was adopted by the Government in the instructions given to

their cruisers, on the 8th June, 1793, directing them to stop all

vessels laden wholly, or in part, with corn, flour, or meal, bound for

France, and to send them into a British port to be purchased by

Government; or to be released on condition that the master should.

give security to dispose of his cargo in the ports of some country in

amity with his Britannic Majesty. This was resisted by the Neutral

Powers, Sweden, Denmark, and especially the United States.

This order was justified upon the ground, that by the modern law of

nations, all provisions are to be considered as contraband, and as

such liable to confiscation, wherever depriving an enemy of these

supplies is one of the means intended to be employed for reducing him

to terms. The actual situation of France, (it was said,) was

notoriously such, as to lead to the employing this mode of distressing

her by the joint operations of the various powers engaged in the war;

and the reasonings of the text writers applying to all cases of this

sort were more applicable to the present case, in which the distress

resulted from the unusual mode of war adopted by the enemy himself, in

having armed almost the whole laboring class of the French nation, for

the purpose of commencing and supporting hostilities against almost

all European Governments; but this reasoning was most of all

applicable to a trade, which was in a great measure carried on by the

then actual rulers of France, and was no longer to be regarded as a

mercantile speculation of individuals, but as an immediate operation

of the very persons who had declared war, and were then carrying it on

against Great Britain.

This reasoning was resisted by the neutral powers--Sweden, Denmark,

and especially the United States. The American Government insisted,

that when two nations go to war, other nations who choose to remain at

peace, retain their natural right to pursue their agriculture,

manufactures, and ordinary vocations; to carry the produce of their

industry for exchange to all countries, belligerent or neutral, (as

usual;) to go and come freely without injury or molestation; in short,

that the war, (amongst other) should be for neutral purposes, as if it

did not exist; the only exceptions being trade in implements of war,

or to a place blockaded by its enemy. That there were sufficient

treaties to decide what were implements of war. Corn, flour, and meal,

were not of the class of contraband.

The result of this controversy was a treaty with the United States in

1794. It confined contraband to military and naval stores; and with

respect to provisions not generally contraband, it was agreed,

"That whenever such articles became contraband by the Law of

Nations, and should for that reason be seized, the same

should not be confiscated, but the owners thereof should be

speedily and completely indemnified; and the captors, or in

their default, the Government under whose authority they

act, should pay to the masters or owners of such vessels the

full value of all such articles, with a reasonable

mercantile profit thereon, together with the freight, and

also the demurrage incident to such detention."

The instructions of June, 1793, had been revoked previously to the

signature of this treaty; but before its ratification, the British

Government issued, in April, 1795, an order in council, instructing

its cruizers to stop and detain all vessels laden wholly, or in part,

with corn, flour, meal, and other provisions, and bound to any port in

France, and to send them to such ports as might be most convenient, in

order that such corn, &c., might be purchased on behalf of Government.

This last order was subsequently revoked, and the question of its

legality became the subject of discussion in a mixed commission,

constituted under the treaty, to decide upon the claims of American

citizens, by reason of irregular or illegal seizures of their vessels

and cargoes, under the authority of the British Government.

A full indemnification was allowed by the commissioners, under the 7th

article of the Treaty of 1794, to the owners of vessels and cargoes

seized under the orders in council, as well for the loss of a market

as for the other consequences of their detention.

It was, however, urged on the part of the United States, that the 18th

article of the Treaty of 1794, manifestly intended to leave the

question where it was before, namely, that when _the law of nations_,

existing at the time the case arises, pronounces the articles

contraband, they may for that reason be seized; when otherwise, not

so. Each party was thus left free to decide what was contraband in its

own courts of the law of nations, leaving any false appeal to that law

to the usual remedy of reprisals and war.[172]

Since the ratification of this treaty, we have a decision of Lord

Stowell, in 1799, on this very subject, in the case of the Haabet,

which, however, arose on a question of insurance.

"The right of taking possession of provisions is no peculiar

claim of this country; it belongs generally to belligerent

nations: the ancient practice of Europe, or at least of

several maritime states of Europe, was to confiscate them

entirely. A century has now elapsed since this claim has

been asserted by some of them. A more mitigated practice has

prevailed in later times, of holding such cargoes subject

only to a right of pre-emption; that is, to a right of

purchase, upon a reasonable compensation, to the individual

whose property is thus diverted. This claim on the part of

the belligerent cannot go beyond cargoes avowedly bound to

the enemy's ports, or suspected on just grounds to have a

concealed destination of that kind. The neutral can only

expect a reasonable compensation. He cannot look to the

price he would obtain in the enemy's port. An enemy,

distressed by famine, may be driven by his necessities to

pay a famine price; but it does not follow that the

belligerent, in the exercise of his rights of war, is to pay

the price of distress."[173]

"It is a mitigated exercise of war, on which any purchase is

made; and no rule has established that such a purchase shall

be regulated exactly on the same terms of profit which would

have followed the adventure, if no such exercise of war had

intervened; it is a _reasonable_ indemnification, and a

_fair profit_, that is due, reference being had to the price

originally paid by the exporter, and the expenses he has

incurred."

[Sidenote: Neutral Vessels Transporting Enemy's Forces.]

Transporting the _Enemy's Forces_, subjects a Neutral Vessel to

confiscation, if captured by the opposite belligerent. Sir Wm. Scott

says, in the leading case on this subject--

"That a vessel hired, by the enemy, for the conveyance of

military persons is to be considered _as a transport_,

subject to condemnation, has been in a recent case, held by

this Court, and on other occasions.[174] What is the number

of military persons that shall constitute such a case it may

be difficult to define. In the former cases there were many,

in the present they are fewer in number; number alone is an

insignificant circumstance in the considerations on which

the principles of law on this subject are built; since fewer

persons of high quality and character may be of more

importance than a much greater number of persons of lower

condition. To send out _one veteran general_ of France to

take command of the forces at Batavia might be a much more

noxious act than the conveyance of a whole regiment. The

consequences of such assistance are greater, and therefore

it is what the belligerent has a stronger right to prevent

and punish. In this instance the military persons are

three,[175] and there are besides two other persons who were

going to be employed in civil capacities in the Government

of Batavia. *** It appears to me, _on principle_, to be but

reasonable that, whenever it is of sufficient importance to

the enemy that such persons should be sent out on the public

service, and at the public expense, it should afford equal

ground of forfeiture against the vessel that may be let out

for a purpose so intimately connected with hostile

operations.[176] The fact of the vessel having been pressed

into the enemy's service does not exempt her. The master

cannot aver that he was an involuntary agent."[177]

[Sidenote: Neutral Ships Carrying Enemy's Despatches.]

Carrying the _Despatches of the Enemy_ is also a ground of

condemnation.

"In the transmission of Despatches may be conveyed the

entire plan of a campaign, that may defeat all the plans of

the other belligerent, in the world. It is a service,

therefore, which, in whatever degree it exists, can only be

considered in one character--as an act of the most hostile

nature. The offence of _fraudulently_ carrying despatches in

the service of the enemy being greater than other

contraband, some other penalty has to be affixed. The

confiscation of the noxious article would be ridiculous when

applied to _Despatches_. There would be _no_ freight

dependent on their transportation. The _vehicle_ (_i.e._ the

ship) in which they are carried must, therefore, be

forfeited."[178]

[Sidenote: Ambassadors excepted.]

The Despatches of an Ambassador or other Public Minister of the Enemy,

resident in a neutral country, are an exception to this rule, being

the despatches of persons who are in a peculiar manner the favourite

object of the Law of Nations, residing in the neutral country for the

purpose of preserving peace and the relations of amity between that

state and their own government.

The ambassador of the enemy may be stopped on his passage, but when he

has arrived in the neutral country, he becomes a sort of _middleman_,

and is entitled to peculiar privileges.[179]

[Sidenote: Penalty for Contraband Trade.]

Under the present Law of Nations, a Contraband Cargo cannot affect the

ship; the carrying of contraband articles is attended only with loss

of freight and expenses, except where the ship belongs to the owner of

the contraband cargo, or where the simple misconduct of carrying a

contraband cargo has been connected with some malignant and

aggravating circumstances.[180]

[Sidenote: Additional Penalties.]

The aggravation of fraud justifies additional Penalties; thus, the

carriage of contraband with a false destination, will work a

condemnation of the ship as well as the cargo; the false destination

being intended to defeat the right of pre-emption.[181] Generally,

_false_ papers will extend the taint of contraband to the vessel.

It is also an established rule, that the transfer of contraband by a

neutral, from one port of a country to another, where it is required

for the purposes of war, is subject to be treated in the same manner

as an original importation into the country itself.[182]

[Sidenote: Return Voyage Free.]

Generally, the proceeds of the Return Voyage cannot be taken. From the

moment of quitting port on a hostile destination, indeed, the offence

is complete, and it is not necessary to wait till the goods are

actually endeavouring to enter the enemy's port; but beyond that, if

the goods are not taken _in delicto_, and in actual prosecution of

such a voyage, the penalty is not now generally held to attach.[183]

The Laws of War, Affecting Commerce and Shipping · 第 2 / 4 章