CHAPTER VII

THE BEST WAY TO CRUSH PAN-GERMANY

I

THE UNITED STATES AND THE VASSALS OF BERLIN

In the wholly novel plan which I am about to set forth, the United

States may play a preponderating and decisive part; but by way of

preamble I must call attention to the fact that the United States is

not, in my judgment, as I write these lines, in a position to give

its full effective assistance in the conflict, because it is not

officially and wholeheartedly at war with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,

and Turkey—states in thrall to Berlin and constituent parts of

Pan-Germany. This situation is, I am fully convinced, unfavorable to

the interests of the Allies, and it paralyzes American action, for

these reasons.

As a matter of fact, Germany can no longer carry on the war against

the Entente save by virtue of the troops and resources which are

placed at her disposal by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

If the Allies wish to conquer Germany, their chief adversary, it

is necessary that they understand that they must _first of all_

deprive Prussian militarism of the support—apparently secondary, but

really essential—which it receives from its allied vassals. It is,

furthermore, eminently desirable that it should be recognized in the

United States that Turkish, Bulgar, Magyar, and Austrian imperialism

are bases of Prussian imperialism, and that in order to establish a

lasting peace, the disappearance of these secondary imperialisms is

as necessary as that of Prussian imperialism itself. Moreover, the

fact that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are not officially at

war with the United States enables Berlin to maintain connections in

America of which we may be sure that she avails herself to the utmost.

This situation is propitious also for that German manœuvre which

consists in making people think that a separate peace is possible

between Turkey, or Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary on the one side and

the powers of the Entente on the other. However, as the game to be

played is complicated and difficult, good sense suggests that we

proceed from the simple to the complex, and hence that we strike the

enemy first of all in his most vulnerable part. Now, as we shall

see, it is mainly in the territory of the three vassals of Germany

that the new plan which I am about to set forth can be carried out

in the first instance, without, however, causing any prejudice—_far,

far_ from it,—to the invaluable assistance which the Americans are

preparing to bring to the Allies on the Western front. For all these

reasons, it seems desirable that American public opinion should

admit the imperious necessity of a situation absolutely unequivocal

with regard to the governments of Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna,

and Budapest, which are vassals of Berlin and by that same token

substantial pillars of Pan-Germany.

II

DESTRUCTION OF PAN-GERMANY BY INTERNAL EXPLOSION

I believe that I have demonstrated, in earlier chapters of this

book that, because of the advantages, economic and military, which

the existence of Central Pan-Germany guarantees to Germany for both

present and future, the essential, vital problem that the Allies have

to solve—a problem which sums up all the others—is, how to destroy

this Central Pan-Germany.

It is infinitely easier to destroy than is generally supposed among

the Allies, because it contains potent sources of dissolution. The

Allied leaders seem not to have bestowed upon this situation the

extremely careful attention which it deserves. In any event, down to

the present time they have not sought to take advantage of a state of

affairs which is eminently favorable to them.

To understand this situation, and how it may be utilized at once, we

must set out from the following starting-point. Of about 176,000,000

inhabitants of Pan-Germany in 1917, about 73,000,000 Germans, with

the backing of only 21,000,000 vassals—Magyars, Bulgars, Turks,—have

to-day reduced to slavery the immense number of 82,000,000 allied

subjects—Slavs, Latins, or Semites, belonging to thirteen different

nationalities, all of whom desire the victory of the Entente, since

that alone will assure their liberation. In addition, a considerable

portion of Germany’s vassals would, under certain conditions, gladly

throw off the yoke of Berlin.

Among the 176,000,000 people of Pan-Germany we distinguish the

following three groups.

_Group 1._ Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals capable of

immediate action favorable to the Entente—say, 63,000,000, made up as

follows:—

(_a_) In Turkey,—

Arabs 8,000,000

Generally speaking the Arabs detest the Turks. A portion of them have

risen in revolt in Arabia, under the leadership of the King of Hedjaz.

(_b_) In Central Europe,—

Polish-Lithuanians 22,000,000

Ruthenians 5,500,000

Czechs 8,500,000

Jugo-Slavs 11,000,000

Roumanians 8,000,000

——————————

55,000,000

There are, then, in Central Europe alone, 55,000,000 people

determinedly hostile to Germanism, forming an enormous, favorably

grouped mass, occupying a vast territory, commanding a part of the

German lines of communication, and comparatively far from the fronts

where the bulk of the German military forces is.

Moreover, at the present crisis, these 55,000,000 human beings,

subjected to the most heartless German and Bulgarian terrorism,

are coming to understand better and better that the only means of

escape from a ghastly slavery, from which there is no appeal, is to

contribute at the earliest possible moment to the victory of the

Entente. The insurrectionary commotions that have already taken

place in Poland, Bohemia, and Transylvania, prove what a limitless

development these outbreaks might take on if the Allies should do

what they ought to do to meet this psychological condition. It is

clear that, if these 55,000,000 slaves of Central Europe should

revolt in increasing numbers, this result would follow first of all:

_the default of Russia would be supplied_. Indeed, the Germans, being

harassed in rear of their Eastern fronts, would be considerably

impeded in their military operations and in their communications.

Under such conditions the attacks of the Allies would have much more

chance of success than they have to-day.

_Group 2._ Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals, who cannot stir

to-day, being too near the military fronts, but whose action might

follow that of the first group—nearly 16,000,000, made up as follows:—

(_a_) In Turkey,—

Ottoman Greeks 2,000,000

Armenians 1,000,000

—————————

3,000,000

(_b_) On the Western front,—

French 3,000,000

Belgians 7,500,000

Alsatians and Lorrainers 1,500,000

Italians 800,000

——————————

12,800,000

_Group 3._ Vassals of Germany, possible rebels against the yoke of

Berlin after the uprising of the first group—about 9,000,000.

Of 10,000,000 Magyars, there are—a fact not generally known among the

Allies—9,000,000 poor agricultural laborers cynically exploited by

one million nobles, priests, and officials. These 9,000,000 Magyar

proletarians are exceedingly desirous of peace. As they did not want

the war, they detest those who forced it on them. They would be

quite capable of revolting at the last moment against their feudal

exploiters, if the Allies, estimating accurately the shocking social

conditions of these poor Magyars, were able to assure them that the

victory of the Entente would put an end to the agrarian and feudal

system under which they suffer.

Is not this a state of affairs eminently favorable to the interests

of the Allies? Would not the Germans in our place have turned it

to their utmost advantage long ago? Does not common sense tell us

that if, in view of the pressure on their battle fronts, the Allies

knew enough to do what is necessary to induce the successive revolts

of the three groups whose existence we have pointed out, a potent

internal element in the downfall of Pan-Germany would become more and

more potent, adding its effects to the efforts which the Allies have

confined themselves thus far to putting forth on the extreme outer

circumference of Pan-Germany?

Let us inquire how this assistance of the 88,000,000 persons confined

in Pan-Germany in their own despite can be obtained and made really

effective.

Let us start with an indisputable fact. The immense results which the

German propaganda has achieved in barely five months in boundless

Russia, with her 182,000,000 inhabitants, where it has brought

about, in Siberia as well as in Europe, separatist movements which,

for the most part,—I speak of them because I have traveled and

studied much in Russia,—would never have taken place but for their

artificial agitation,—these results constitute, beyond dispute, a

striking demonstration of what the Allies might do if they should

exert themselves to act upon races radically anti-Boche, held captive

against their will in Pan-Germany. Assuredly, in the matter of

propaganda, the Allies are very far from being as well equipped as

the Germans and from knowing how to go about it as they do. But the

Germans and their vassals are so profoundly detested by the people

whom they are oppressing in Pan-Germany; these people understand so

fully that the remnant of their liberty is threatened in the most

uncompromising way; they are so clearly aware that they can free

themselves from the German-Turkish-Magyar yoke only as a result

of this war and of the decisive victory of the Entente, that they

realize more clearly every day that their motto must be, ‘Now or

never.’

Considering this state of mind, so favorable to the Allies, a

propaganda on the part of the Entente, even if prepared with

only moderate skill, would speedily obtain very great results.

Furthermore, the desperate efforts which Austria-Hungary, at the

instigation of Berlin and with the backing of the Stockholmists

and the Pope, was making to conclude peace before its threatening

internal explosion, show how precarious German hegemony in Central

Europe still is. The Austro-Boches are so afraid of the extension

of the local disturbances which have already taken place in Poland

and Bohemia, that they have not yet dared to repress them root

and branch. Those wretches, to fortify themselves against these

anti-German popular commotions, resort to famine. At the present

moment, notably in the Jugo-Slav districts and in Bohemia, the

Austro-Germans are removing the greatest possible quantity of

provisions in order to hold the people in check by hunger. But this

hateful expedient itself combines with all the rest to convince these

martyrized peoples of the urgent necessity of rising in revolt if

they prefer not to be half annihilated like the Serbs.

To make sure of the constant spread and certain effectiveness of the

latent troubles of the oppressed Slavs and Latins of Central Europe,

there is need on the part of the Allies, first of moral suasion, then

of material assistance.

To understand the necessity and the usefulness of the first, it must

be said that, despite all the precautions taken by the Austro-Boche

authorities, the declarations of the Entente in behalf of the

oppressed peoples of Central Europe become known to these latter

comparatively soon, and that these declarations help greatly to

sustain their _morale_. For example, President Wilson’s message of

January 22, 1917, in which he urged the independence and unification

of Poland, and his ‘Flag Day’ speech, on June 15, in which he set

forth the great and intolerable peril of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf

scheme, manifestly strengthened the determination of the Poles, the

Czechs, and the Jugo-Slavs to free themselves at whatever cost from

the fatal yoke of Vienna and Berlin. In addition, the constantly

increasing power of the aeroplane enables the Allies to spread

important communications broadcast over enemy territory.

First of all, it is essential that the three races which, by

reason of their geographical situation and their ethnographical

characteristics are indispensable in any reconstitution of Central

Europe based on the principle of nationalities, and who consequently

have a leading part to play in the centre of the Pan-Germany of

to-day, should be, one and all, absolutely convinced that the victory

of the Entente will make certain their complete independence. The

Poles have received this assurance on divers occasions, notably from

President Wilson, and very recently from M. Ribot, commemorating in a

dispatch to the Polish Congress at Moscow ‘the reconstitution of the

independence and unity of all the Polish territories to the shores of

the Baltic.’ But the 11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs and the 8,500,000 Czechs

have not yet received from the leaders of the Entente sufficiently

explicit and repeated assurances.

There are two reasons why this is so. In the first place, the

absolutely chimerical hope of separating Austria-Hungary from Germany

has obsessed, down to a very recent date, certain exalted personages

of the Entente, who, having never had an opportunity to study on the

spot the latest developments in Austria, still believe in the old

classic formula, ‘If Austria did not exist, we should have to create

it.’ In the second place, certain other personages of the Entente

incline to the belief that, in order to obtain a swift victory, the

problem of Central Europe is a problem to be avoided. Now, as to this

point, the few men who unquestionably know Austria well—for example,

the Frenchmen Louis Léger, Ernest Denis, M. Haumant, Auguste Gauvain,

and others, and the Englishmen, Sir Arthur Evans, Seton-Watson,

Wickham Steed, and others—are unanimous in being as completely

convinced as I myself am that the breaking-up of the monarchy of

the Hapsburgs is indispensable to the establishment of a lasting

peace—and furthermore, such a breaking-up as a result of the revolt

of the oppressed peoples is one of the most powerful instruments in

the hands of the Entente to bring the war to a victorious close.

In fact, there are certain quasi-mechanical laws which should guide

in the reconstruction of a Europe that can endure. Now, without

a free Bohemia and Jugo-Slavia it is impossible—impossible, I

insist—that Poland should be really free, that Serbia and Roumania

should be restored, that Russia should be released from the grip

of Germany, that Alsace-Lorraine should be restored permanently

to France, that Italy should be protected from German domination

in the Adriatic, in the Balkans, and in Turkey, that the United

States should be warranted against the world-wide results of the

Hamburg-Persian Gulf enterprise. Bohemia is the central point of the

whole. With its circle of mountains, it is the indispensable keystone

of the European edifice, rebuilt upon the basis of the principle of

nationalities. Whosoever is master of Bohemia is master of Europe. It

must be, therefore, that liberty shall be master of Bohemia.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the successive uprisings of

8,500,000 Czechs and 11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs, taking place concurrently

with that of 22,000,000 Poles, is absolutely in line with the present

military interests of the Entente. Therefore, for the Allies to

assume an attitude of reserve toward the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs is as

contrary to the democratic principles they invoke as to their most

urgent strategic interests. But this mistake has been frequently

made, solely because the exceptional importance of Bohemia has not

yet been fully grasped. Mr. Asquith, in his speech of September 26

last, furnishes an example of this regrettable reserve with respect

to the Czechs—a reserve which is diminishing, no doubt, but which

still exists. He said:—

‘If we turn to Central and Eastern Europe, we see purely artificial

territorial arrangements, which are repugnant to the wishes and

interests of the populations directly concerned, and which, so long

as they remain unchanged, will constitute a field fertile in new

wars. There are, first, the claims of Roumania and Italy, so long

overdue; there is heroic Serbia, which not only must be restored

to her home, but which is entitled to more room in which to expand

nationally; and there is Poland. The position of Greece and the South

Slavs must not be forgotten.’

Thus, while Mr. Asquith manifests the best intentions toward the

oppressed peoples of Central Europe, he does not even mention the

Czechs, that is, Bohemia. Now, in reality, all the promises that the

Entente can make concerning Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and Italy, are

not capable of lasting fulfillment unless Bohemia is set free, for

Bohemia dominates all Central Europe. Furthermore, Mr. Asquith’s

silence as to the fate of Bohemia may be a legitimate cause of

uneasiness to the Czechs, who are now doing the impossible to contend

with Germanism, despite the shocking terrorism which lies so heavy

upon them. So we may say, that Mr. Asquith would have served the

interest of the Entente more effectively if he had emphatically named

Bohemia and the Czechs who are so much in need of being supported

and encouraged by the Allies, whom they regard as their liberators.

The misconceptions that have led to the ignoring of the claims of

the Central European Slavs, and of their extreme importance in the

solution of the war-problem, will soon prove themselves an even

heavier load to carry than those committed in Bulgaria and Greece.

To put an end to these vagaries, it is necessary that henceforth

the leaders of the Entente should earnestly encourage, at least the

Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs—that is to say, about 42,000,000 slaves

of Berlin in Central Europe. The encouragement of these peoples as

a single body is indispensable, for, although the Boches are able

to control the local and, so to say, individual insurrectionary

movements, on the contrary, because of the vast area which a general

insurrection of the 42,000,000 would involve, its repression by

the Austro-Boches would be practically impossible. The example of

a successful general uprising would certainly induce a similar

movement by the balance of the 88,000,000 human beings who are

vitally interested in the destruction of Pan-Germany. To bring about

this result, then, the first essential thing to be done is for the

leaders of the Entente to put forth a most unequivocal declaration,

giving the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs assurance that the victory

of the Entente will make certain their complete liberation. It is

impossible to see what there is to hinder such a declaration. Its

effects would soon be discerned if it were enthusiastically supported

by the Allied press and by the Allied Socialists, who, let us hope,

will finally realize that, while it is impossible to bring about a

revolution against Prussian militarism in Germany, it can very easily

be effected in Austria-Hungary.

But, some one will say, a revolution is not possible without material

resources. Naturally, I shall discuss this point only so far as the

interests of the Entente will allow me to do it publicly. In the

first place I will call attention to the fact that, by reason of the

immensity of the territory they occupy, simple passive resistance on

the part of the oppressed races of Central Europe, provided that it

is offered in concert and accompanied by certain essays in the way of

sabotage and strikes, which are easy enough to practice without any

outside assistance, would create almost inextricable difficulties for

the Austro-Germans.

But there is something much better to be done. At first sight, it

seems very difficult for the Allies to bear effective material aid to

the oppressed peoples of Pan-Germany, because they are surrounded by

impregnable military lines. In fact, by combining the results of the

tremendous development of the aviation branch made possible by the

adhesion of the United States, _with certain technical resources_

which are available, the Entente can, comparatively quickly and

easily, supply the Poles and the rest with material assistance which

would prove extraordinarily efficacious.

I am not writing carelessly. I have studied for twenty years these

down-trodden races and the countries in which they live. I know about

the material resources to which I refer. If I do not describe them

more explicitly, it is because no one has yet thought of employing

them, and in such matters silence is a bounden duty. But I am, of

course, at the disposition of the American authorities if they

should wish to know about the resources in question, and to study

them seriously. I am absolutely convinced that, if employed with

due method, determinedly, and scientifically, in accordance with a

special technique, these resources, after a comparatively simple

preparation,—much less in any event than those which have been made

in other enterprises,—would lead to very important results which

would contribute materially to the final decision.[2]

To sum up—in Central Europe, through the liberation, preceded by the

legitimate and necessary revolution, of its martyred peoples, are

found in conjunction: (_a_) the means of making good the default of

Russia; (_b_) the basis of a new and decisive conclusion of the war;

(_c_) the possibility of destroying Central Pan-Germany; (_d_) the

consequent wiping out of the immense advantages from the war which

the mere existence of Pan-Germany assures to Germany; and (_e_) the

elements of a lasting peace upon terms indisputably righteous and

strictly in accordance with the principles of justice invoked by the

Entente.

[Illustration: Decoration]

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FOOTNOTES:

[2] To the editor, M. Chéradame has written with less reserve on this

vital subject; but it seems best to put in print at this time no more

than the suggestion indicated.—_The Editor of the Atlantic Monthly._

THE WAR AND THE SPIRIT OF YOUTH

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Transcriber’s Notes

pg 28 Changed: at her allies’ expense constitutute

to: at her allies’ expense constitute

pg 53 Changed: the reconstruction of these devasted

to: the reconstruction of these devastated

pg 72 Changed: the slavery of eight-two millions

to: the slavery of eighty-two millions

Pan-Germany · 第 7 / 7 章