MILITARY OPERATIONS
I
As a prelude to the further consideration of certain aspects of the
world-war, I should like, if I may, to quote a few paragraphs which I
printed early last summer, by way of forecast, and which events have
not wholly belied.
Let us now attempt to forecast the German military plans for 1917.
For some weeks persistent reports have been telling of their
tremendous preparations for hurling an offensive against the Russian
front. As for the Franco-British front in the West, it was stated
that the General Staff at Berlin would be glad to hold things
stationary on that side until, after winning the victory on which
they count in the East, they are free to devote their attentions
to the occidental theatre. This project, of course, cannot be
confirmed; but the voluntary shortening of the western line by the
Germans would lend color to its probability. Moreover, such a plan
would coincide perfectly with the present interests of Berlin, with
the habitual methods of the Kaiser’s General Staff, with the broad
Pan-Germanist scheme, and with the personal preferences of Marshal
von Hindenburg. It is natural also that the Germans should avail
themselves of the sinister and undeniable effects of the Russian
imperial administration on the army and civil population of the
country before the new government at Petrograd has time to repair the
all-too-abundant harm that has been wrought.
We must cherish no illusions. As long as it can dispose of the vast
resources of Pan-Germany, which, to my thinking, are still taken too
lightly by the Allies; while the results of the Russian Revolution
are still uncertain; while the reorganization of the Muscovite armies
still remains uncompleted, the government at Berlin, in spite of its
serious problems connected with the food supply, is still convinced
that it can win a decisive military victory by dealing with its
adversaries one by one. And so we should foresee that the German
General Staff will meet its problems in succession.
It seems probable, then, that it will follow the basic principles
of warfare and concentrate all the forces at its disposal against
the weakest front. This, without question, is the Roumano-Russian
line. Its great extent, together with the formidable development
of the German railway system,—infinitely superior to that of the
Russians,—makes it easier to introduce the element of surprise,
which is of capital importance for swift, decisive victory. The
Russians, too, are certainly less well provided with munitions of
war than the Franco-British troops; and the Germans have succeeded in
further weakening them by means of the terrible explosions recently
engineered by their spies at Archangel. As a result of the execrable
administration of the former government, the food situation in Russia
is most critical, while the revolutionists are not yet sure of the
reorganization of the military forces. The Germans, therefore, have
an unquestionable interest in profiting without delay by this state
of affairs.
A vigorous offensive on the Eastern front is also in harmony with the
Pangermanist plan, which for twenty-five years has looked forward
to the seizure by Germany of Riga, Little Russia, and Odessa. And a
German success in the south of Russia would be big with economic,
naval, military, and moral consequences of world-import. The Germans
would become masters of the rich and boundless wheat-lands of Little
Russia, which, from the midst of their food-problems, they watch with
greedy eyes. The capture of Odessa and the complete conquest of the
Black Sea, by means of transports (sent in large numbers down the
Danube, thus permitting surprise attacks at vital points), would end
in the loss of the Crimea and, probably, the fall of the Caucasus
into the hands of the Turco-Germans. The British, then, could no
longer hold out at Bagdad. Freed by such successes from all immediate
fear of Russia, the Germans could then turn in enormous strength
against the Balkan front of the Allies. Under these hypothetical
conditions, one may assume that the Allied army north of Saloniki,
demoralized by the Russian reverses, would be taken prisoners or
driven into the sea.
These various operations in the East vigorously taken in hand, as the
General Staff at Berlin knows so well how to do, would require four
or five months for their execution. This interval of time, combined
with the depressing moral effect brought about by the supposed German
victories, would act, as it were, as an automatic preparation for the
final Teutonic offensive on the Western front. It must be remembered
that during these four or five months the submarine warfare,
pursued more and more ruthlessly, would considerably impede neutral
navigation and decimate the tonnage of the Franco-British merchant
marine. The food-problems and the war-expenditure of the Allies
would be enormously increased. Even if their pressure has forced the
Kaiser to evacuate a considerable portion of France and Belgium, the
importance of this retreat would be only relative, for it would be
temporary. Following our hypothesis, then, if Russia were beaten,
the army of Saloniki driven into the sea, and the food crisis in the
West intensified, the moral depression and discouragement among the
soldiers and civilians of France would be most profound. Under the
given material and psychological conditions, the concentration of all
the Pan-German forces on the Western front would probably permit them
to break through. This would spell ruin for France and for England as
well, and assure that decisive German victory which would mean the
mastery of Europe.
If this theoretical German plan is to be accomplished in 1917,
however, the general technical situation in Europe must remain much
as it stands at present. No new power capable of making itself felt
on the battlefield must come to the support of the Allies. It is
necessary, then, that the scheme be carried out in 1917, before the
Russian Revolution, which is essentially favorable to the Allies,
has time to repair the damage done by the former régime, and before
the United States, realizing that it is to their vital interest to
take part directly and without delay in the war on the Continent, are
ready to do so effectively.
The tactics of Berlin, after being forced to a diplomatic rupture
with Washington, consist in doing everything to avoid actual blows
with the United States, while keeping up a vigorous submarine
campaign, and in making frantic efforts to effect a miscarriage
of American military preparation—especially as regards sending
reinforcements to Europe. In pursuance of this scheme, Berlin
instructed Vienna to send Washington a dilatory answer concerning
submarine warfare, in order to avoid a diplomatic break and thus
gain time. This procedure was specifically intended to make America
believe that Austro-Hungary can act independently of Germany. And so,
by virtue of this delusion, William II veils the existence of that
Pan-Germany whose reality, for the sake of his plans, must not be
revealed until the latest possible moment.
II
If the programme for 1917, which we have good reason to attribute to
the Germans, were substantially carried out (and, after all, this is
not impossible), in six to eight months the United States would find
themselves face to face with a Germany controlling the resources,
not only of the present-day Pan-Germany, but of all Europe. And,
Americans, do not think your turn would be long in coming. Do not
take it for granted that the German people, worn out by the endless
horrors of war, would cry to their masters, ‘Peace at any price!’ The
German people, as I know them, filled with enthusiasm by a victory
that would be without parallel in the history of the world, maddened
by incalculable plunder, would follow the lead of their Emperor
more blindly than ever. The pride and ambition of the Kaiser and
his General Staff are so prodigious that, unless all signs fail,
they would give the United States no chance to organize against a
Prussianized Europe. In eight or ten months, after new advances
had been made to Japan, who would be isolated by the defeat of
her allies in Europe, and with the aid of the German-Mexicans and
German-Americans whose mission, as every one knows, is to paralyze by
every possible means the military organization of the United States,
it would be possible to look for ruthless action against America by
the Pan germanized forces of Europe.
The prediction of such extraordinary eventualities will no doubt
seem fantastic and improbable to many of my American readers. I
beg them, nevertheless, to consider them seriously. As a matter
of fact, if we consider all that has been achieved by the Germans
since August, 1914, the events which I have forecast are much
less amazing than those indicated by me in 1901, when, in my book
_L’Europe et la Question d’Autriche au Seuil du XXe Siècle_, I
unmasked the Pan-German plot, which was then looked on as a mere
phantasmagoria—although as a matter of fact it was so real that it
now stands almost completely fulfilled.
You Americans, then, should learn your lesson from the past. Your
own best interest lays on you the obligation to face facts which
may at present seem improbable, and to prepare yourselves without
losing a day for meeting the gravest perils. As the situation now
stands, a delay in making a decision may involve disastrous results.
For instance, the three weeks of parleying indulged in by the
Allies before deciding to send troops to Serbia were of the utmost
significance. Those three lost weeks simply prevented the Allies from
achieving victory, and resulted in an unthinkable prolongation of the
war.
The surest, the most economical way for Americans to avoid excessive
risks is to prepare at once for the severest kind of struggle, on the
hypothesis that the Allies may sustain grave reverses. Everything
favors concerted action by the United States and the Allies. Their
material and moral interests are identical, and, in doing away with
autocracy, Russia removed the well-justified distrust felt in the
United States for the land of the Tsars. As we have seen, a German
victory over Russia, involving the fall of Saloniki and, later, the
breaking of the Western front, would be unquestionably the most
dangerous eventuality imaginable for the future security of the
United States. American interest therefore demands, not only that
support should be given France and Great Britain, but that the United
States should hasten to help the Russians, who will probably be
called on first to meet the onslaught.
On reflection, perhaps, Americans may even find it worth while to
give further thought to an idea which, a few months ago, would have
seemed preposterous to them. Since President Wilson cherishes the
ideal of the brotherhood of nations,—a noble conception, but one
which can be realized only after Prussian militarism is ground in
the dust, after the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns have gone the
way of the Romanoffs,—why should not this world-crisis provide an
opportunity for intimate coöperation between the United States and
Japan?
Even if Americans were to admit the necessity of so doing, it will
be long before they are in the position to throw into the European
conflict those reinforcements which, by exercising a decisive
influence, would hasten the end of the mad slaughter. At the present
moment Japan alone, outside of Europe, has at her disposal a trained
army capable of taking the field at once. Everything considered,
President Wilson might well decide that the interests of humanity
called for the intervention of Japan in Europe. If he succeeded
in convincing Tokyo of this, he would stand out as the great,
decisive figure of the war. From the technical point of view, it
is certain that victory for the Allies calls for a simultaneous
concentric attack on all the fronts of Pan-Germany. For that reason,
Japanese troops on the Russian line, at Bagdad, Alexandretta, and
Saloniki, would furnish the Eastern positions of the Allies with the
supplementary strength that they need to achieve decisive results and
so hasten the end of the whole war.
Let me again urge my point that the line of action morally and
materially most profitable to the United States is that which,
by achieving the total destruction of Pan-Germany and Prussian
militarism, will terminate the horrible carnage once for all. This
is the moral pointed by the past. If the Allies had undertaken the
Saloniki-Belgrade expedition in the beginning of 1915, the war would
have ended a year ago. If you, Americans, had cast your lot with
us a year ago, it would be ending about now. If you act to-day,
with all your energies, and especially if you compass the Japanese
intervention, you will save the lives of millions of men who, without
your military and diplomatic support, will surely be sacrificed.
The real problem for America is clearly to discern Pan-Germany
lurking beneath the Quadruple Alliance of the Central Powers, and to
decide to strike this Pan-Germany quick and hard. This is the one and
only way to foil the odious Prussian militarism which threatens the
liberty of the world.