1914-1918 PASSENGERS AND GOODS
"Unless we had order, unless we had certainty, in the moving of large
masses, the day of battle, which might come, would be to us a day of
disaster."--Colonel McMurdo, late Inspector-General of the Volunteer
Forces, January 9th, 1865.
_Der Tag_, which came on August 4th, 1914, was not fated after all,
as we know, to be a day of disaster. That it was not so is perhaps
attributable in the main to two causes. "Miraculous" is the manner
in which escape from disaster has been described; but as we have
already seen (and of this fact we cannot remind ourselves too often),
the miracle was performed primarily and essentially by the loss of
those "many thousands of brave men whose sacrifice we deplore, while
we regard their splendid gallantry and self-devotion with unstinted
admiration and gratitude." A secondary, but by no means inconsiderable,
cause contributory to the successful working of the miracle lay in the
fact that we did possess the "order," the "certainty," in regard to the
moving--not exactly of "large masses" in the more recently accepted
meaning of the term, but at any rate--of that part of the Army which
was detailed for home defence, and of the six divisions of which the
original Expeditionary Force was composed, and which were flung across
the Channel to assist in stemming the initial German onrush. And it
is with regard to this "order," this "certainty," and the attendant
successful working of the railways that the ensuing pages are concerned.
We have already traced in some degree of detail the antecedents of
the Railway Executive Committee, that body of distinguished civilian
railway experts, who, from the time that the Government assumed,
under provisions of the Act of 1871, nominal control of the railways,
became, and throughout the war remained, responsible to the Government
for the maintenance and the efficient working of the entire railway
systems of the British Isles; and in order to acquire some insight into
the amazing and complex detail involved in this efficient working,
we cannot very well do better than probe a few of the more salient
facts concerning the London and North-Western Railway, which, on the
outbreak of hostilities, and appropriately enough, was deputed to
act as the "Secretary" Company to the Western and Eastern Commands
and afterwards to the Central Force, that is to say, the Company
specified by the Army Command Headquarters, for the purpose of making
arrangements with the other railway companies concerned in the Commands
named for the main troop movements during the first two months of the
war.
In an extremely interesting report, dated October 1st, 1914, Mr. L. W.
Horne, who, prior to his appointment as secretary to the "Secretary"
Company to the Commands previously mentioned, was acting secretary
to the Railway Executive Committee, describes the measures that were
adopted both prior to and during mobilisation, in conformity with the
War Office programme.
A Communications' Board "consisting of representatives of all
Government departments and also the Railway Executive Committee,"
was instituted to consider Government "recommendations to meet their
various requirements so far as the railways were concerned." Owing
to the "very drastic alterations in the mobilisation time tables"
made by the War Office, a staff was specially appointed to deal with
the matter, and as a result of herculean efforts on the part of this
devoted body of enthusiasts, involving many hours of overtime, "on
mobilisation being ordered, not only was our scheme complete, but time
tables and sheets numbering many thousands were ready for immediate
issue."
Existing accommodation at certain stations on the line, where large
concentrations of troops were foreshadowed, was totally inadequate,
so that plans and estimates were at once prepared for the necessary
extensions, and the Company arranged to carry out the work with all
possible speed.
Special troop trains, of which 1465 (exclusive of "empties" to and
from entraining and detraining stations respectively) were run between
August 4th and September 30th, 1914, were "signalled by a special
code of 4-4-4 beats," this code signifying "precedence over all other
trains," the ordinary passenger service being curtailed as occasion
demanded. Seven hundred and fifty-one was the total of special trains
required for the "large quantities of stores, equipment, etc.," and "in
order to ensure that such consignments should be worked forward without
delay," it was agreed that "they should be given 'Perishable transit.'"
As will doubtless be within the memory of most of us, already on August
3rd, 1914, Sir Edward Grey was in a position to inform the House that
"the mobilisation of the Fleet has taken place," the credit for the
promptitude of this precautionary measure being in due course claimed
by Mr. Winston Churchill, and resulting shortly afterwards in the
resignation from his post as a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty of
Prince Louis of Battenberg, eldest son of Prince Alexander of Hesse;
and "at this grave moment in our national history," so ran the message
spontaneously addressed by His Majesty the King to Admiral Sir John
Jellicoe, "I send you, and through you to the officers and men of
the Fleets of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my
confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the
old glories of the Royal Navy, and prove once again the sure shield of
Britain and of her Empire in the hour of trial." To enable officers
and men to "revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy,"
coal, not canvas, was needed, this entailing the provision forthwith
of six hundred and fifty-one special trains for the conveyance of
approximately 150,000 tons of Admiralty coal from the South Wales
collieries to certain points on the East Coast.
Various difficulties presented themselves in regard to the "supply of
rolling stock, and the making-up of the troop trains of the required
composition"; in regard to the working of Westinghouse and Vacuum
stock, as the case might be; in regard to congestion of traffic,
necessitating the diversion of trains by alternative routes; and in
regard to the requisitioning by the Government of certain steamers,
goods-vans, horses, motors, etc., belonging to the Company.
But, as Mr. Horne points out, "no hitch whatever occurred so far as
the London and North-Western Company was concerned in carrying out,
not only the pre-arranged programme, but also the additional movements
which have been arranged at short notice. The time-keeping of the
trains has been excellent both from a traffic department and locomotive
department standpoint, and the entraining and detraining at the various
stations on the London and North-Western line were successfully carried
out in every case."
Apropos of all of which data, one cannot but call to mind once again
the ungrudging acknowledgment which the late Lord Kitchener saw fit
to make on the occasion of his first appearance in the House of Lords
as Secretary of State for War: "I have to remark that when war was
declared, mobilisation took place without any hitch whatever.... We
know how deeply the French people appreciate the prompt assistance
we have been able to afford them at the very outset of the war." The
official announcement, too, issued by the Press Bureau on Tuesday,
August 18th, 1914, itself remains a landmark in the epic chapter of
events: "The Expeditionary Force as detailed for foreign service has
been landed in France ... and without a single casualty."
It is a matter of common knowledge that during the initial stages of
the war the French authorities undertook the whole of the transport by
rail of the British Army in France, basing their decision and ability
to do so largely, no doubt, upon the opinion prevalent at the time,
which was to the effect that for various seemingly obvious reasons--of
which perhaps the most palpable was the unprecedented and unparalleled
strain necessarily imposed upon the human and material resources of the
belligerent nations--the war could not continue for a period exceeding
a few weeks, or months, at the outside. We even find it stated in the
_Times_ of August 20th, 1914, under the heading "Peace Insurance Rate,"
that "for a premium of 25 per cent., underwriters yesterday undertook
to pay a total loss claim should Germany ask for peace on or before
September 30th next."
When, however, it began to dawn upon the parties engaged that the
struggle, far from diminishing in intensity, was becoming increasingly
bitter and severe, the advisability of, or perhaps rather the necessity
for, easing the onus devolving upon the French railways was obvious to
all. In the early part of 1915, therefore, rolling stock on a small
scale was sent over from England; but in proportion as the numerical
strength of the British overseas forces rose, so did the requirements
in respect of means of transport increase, until towards the winter of
1916, a period synchronising with the British offensive on the Somme,
matters reached such a pitch that the only solution to the difficulty
seemed to lie in the appointment of a "mission" of home railway
experts for the purpose of investigating the situation on the spot.
With this end in view the more prominent of the two world-renowned
"Geddes-Goddesses," to wit, Sir Eric, was nominated the responsible
head, and as a result of his inquiry and subsequent report, there came
into being the office of "Director-General of Transportation," the
sound principle underlying this new departure being that of employing
"individuals in war, on work which they have been accustomed to perform
in peace," the immediate outcome, too, being that the important
position was filled _au début_ by none other than Sir Eric Geddes
himself, who, as the Earl of Derby was at some pains to impress upon
his noble confrères in the House of Lords (cp. the _Times_, November
30th, 1916), undertook the work only "from purely patriotic reasons."
In the issue dated September 6th, 1919, of that practical and
very-much-up-to-date weekly journal, _Modern Transport_, is to be found
tabulated in full and comprehensive form the "pedigree stock" emanating
from the Director-General of Transportation; numerous personalities,
bearing awe-inspiring affixes such as D.G.M.R., I.G.T., A.D.G.M.R.,
D.D.R.T., etc., _ad lib._; appearing on the scenes as representing
the direct lineal descent of the great D.G.T. himself. And subsidiary
to these personalities, or heads of sections and sub-sections, was
enrolled a galaxy of assistants, engineers furnished in part by the
British railway companies on recommendation from the Railway Executive
Committee, in part by colonial or foreign railways, and under whom,
in turn, there served a numerous personnel, whose name was "legion,"
recruited mostly from the home railways.
And the reason for this gigantic scheme of organisation cannot be
explained in any manner more convincing than in the words of Sir
Douglas Haig, who, dealing in his final despatch with the "Rearward
Services," insists that "the immense expansion of the Army from 6 to
over 60 infantry divisions, combined with the constant multiplication
of auxiliary arms, called inevitably for a large increase in the size
and scope of the services concerned in the supply and maintenance of
our fighting forces."
Some staggering statistics now stare us in the face. "By the end of
November, 1918," for instance, we learn that "the number of individual
landings in France at the various ports managed by us exceeded 10-1/4
million persons," and "during the eleven months, January to November,
1918, the tonnage landed at these ports averaged some 175,000 tons per
week."
One can easily imagine the resultant effect upon these different
ports situated on the northern coast of France. Let us take Boulogne,
as being, perhaps, one of the most familiar of all, and any one who
has chanced upon a little volume, bearing as its title "An Airman's
Outings," cannot fail to recall the distinctly happy vein in which
the author, writing under the _nom-de-plume_ of "Contact," describes
the inevitable change which came over the place during the war. "It
(Boulogne)," so he tells us, "has become almost a new town. Formerly
a head-quarters of pleasure, a fishing centre, and a principal port of
call for Anglo-Continental travel, it has been transformed into an
important military base.... The multitude of visitors from across the
Channel is larger than ever; but instead of Paris, the Mediterranean,
and the East, they are bound for less attractive destinations--the
muddy battle area and Kingdom Come."
Small wonder, then, that the strain of supplying the means of transit,
not only for these multitudes of visitors but for their personal
impedimenta and food supplies as well, became too great for the
French camel's back. The whole business, if such it may be termed,
was assuming a degree of which the proportions were verging on the
prodigious. Thus, "for the maintenance of a single division for one
day, nearly 200 tons dead-weight of supplies and stores are needed,"
and "for an army of 2,700,000 men (the total feeding strength of our
forces in France) the addition of one ounce to each man's daily rations
involves the carrying of an extra 75 tons of goods."
Again, "in the six months May to October, 1918, a weekly average of
1,800 trains were run for British Army traffic, carrying a weekly
average load of approximately 400,000 tons, while a further 130,000
tons were carried weekly by our light railways." Kolossal, indeed, with
a capital K, are the figures which the Field-Marshal asks us to digest.
And in order to cope with this vast volume of traffic, in order that it
might move freely and speedily to the various points of distribution on
the British Front, "the number of locomotives imported ... rose from
62 in 1916 to 1200 by the end of 1918; while the number of trucks rose
from 3,840 to 52,600," and in addition to the already-existing mileage
of permanent way available in the rearward areas, during 1918 "were
built or reconstructed 2,340 miles of narrow-gauge railway."
As was reasonably to be expected, "the introduction of new weapons and
methods of war" accounted largely for the "huge bulk of the supplies to
be handled," and another factor further responsible for the gigantic
nature of the task imposed was to be found in "the establishment of
a higher standard of comfort for the troops." The force of the logic
in regard to "feeding the brute" may be said to apply equally to the
soldier as to the husband; "_Une bataille ne se perd matériellement_,"
in fact, Napoleon is said to have expressed the view that "the moral
is to the material in war as three to one." Consequently "great
installations were set up," not merely for the repair of damaged
material, but "installations of all kinds," embracing "hutments, camps,
and hospitals," and "the Expeditionary Force canteens made it possible
to obtain additional comforts close up to the Front."
Without any shadow of doubt "no war has been fought with such ample
means of quick transportation as were available during the recent
struggle.... It was possible to effect great concentrations of troops
with a speed which, having regard to the numbers of men and bulk of
material moved, has never before been equalled."
Having noted, therefore, the more salient facts and figures, set out
in so lucid a manner by Sir Douglas Haig, it is only natural, perhaps,
that there should follow in direct sequence a desire to fathom, in some
respect, the influences which rendered animate this gigantic scheme
or organisation, this mammoth conglomeration of machinery, admirably
planned no doubt, then set and kept in motion; to trace the sources
whence flowed these "ample means of quick transportation"; and to
become acquainted with the responsible practicians by whom they were
provided.
The influences at work--as a brief reflective glance through the pages
of our mind will suffice to recall--are surely to be found in that
"dauntless spirit of the people at home," and in "their incessant
toil." The sources are clearly indicated by the "mine, the factory,
the shipyard." The responsible practicians are personified by those
"distinguished scientific men" who "placed their learning and their
skill at the disposal of their country."
Briefly, the position amounted to this; the fighting line could not be
held without the support and replenishment afforded by the rearward
services; the rearward services could not perform their part unaided
by the people at home, and, as was only to be expected, the London and
North-Western Railway Company was second to none in stepping forward
and rendering that aid which was vital to the continued sustenance of
the rearward services.
But charity, as we know, begins at home, and even though no effort was
spared in regard to supplying the wants of the overseas forces, the
Company obviously could not afford so to denude itself of its available
working resources as to court the risk of failure to "carry on," to
carry out the task imposed upon it by the State at home.
A further report issued from the office of the Superintendent of
the Line, dated July 8th, 1919, and retrospective of the strenuous
times experienced by the Company during the war, describes how "the
ramifications of the London and North-Western Railway system were
quickly appreciated by the naval and military authorities," for being,
as it was, "the main trunk line, the direct route to and from London
and the west of England (viâ Crewe) with the west, north and north-east
of Scotland," it also afforded every facility to passengers travelling
"between the north-east of England and the west and south-west of
England." But apart from this it is an incontrovertible fact that the
Company did absolutely "lay itself out," and in a manner unparalleled
in any other quarter, to study the convenience, and to relieve the
anxieties, of the military from the lordly "Brass Hat" to the humble
Tommy with his tin helmet; with the result that, instinctively as
it were, Euston became the quest of all, a haven of refuge to many
thousands of war-worn warriors, home for a few days' leave.
As evidence of this, we may note that a total of 7,300,000 officers
and men "on leave" were conveyed in "special trains"; that a further
2,864,000 specified as "small units of troops and pre-arranged by
ordinary services," were accommodated in the ordinary trains; and that,
in addition to these figures, there were many thousands of troops
conveyed "every week in small units by the ordinary existing services,
of which actual figures are not available," but of which most of us,
retaining vivid recollections of overcrowded compartments and the crush
of corridors, will no doubt be able to form some vague if inadequate
estimate.
Luggage evidently was not in the habit of getting lost or left behind,
as the figure "89,745 tons of baggage conveyed" will go to prove;
45,517 cycles received careful handling in transit, and the necessary
accommodation was provided for the safe journeying of 500,000 horses,
plus the rolling-stock necessary for the conveyance of 5,476 guns.
Then, in spite of a number of the vessels comprising the London and
North-Western fleet being commandeered by the Admiralty, "a fairly
regular service both for passengers and cargo" was maintained viâ
Holyhead and Dublin, "the principal route between England and Ireland";
the two other sea routes viâ Fleetwood and Belfast, and Larne and
Stranraer, respectively, assisting materially in the working of this
"very heavy passenger and cargo traffic."
Turning next to "the requirements of the Fleet on the east and
north-east coast of Scotland, there was a continuous coming and
going of personnel, and movement of supplies, between the depôts
in Scotland and those in the south and west of England, and the
Admiralty concentrated the whole of this traffic on the west coast
route." In this connection (and incidentally we may note the strict
observance by the naval authorities of the Fourth Commandment) for two
consecutive years, and on every day of the week except the seventh,
which is the Sabbath, a special train provided exclusively for the
use of the Admiralty, was run "between Euston and Thurso (serving the
Rosyth depôt), the total number of men so conveyed being 500,000 and
the mileage incurred over the L. & N. W. system alone being 388,700
miles." Then, "owing to the position of the Fleet, rail-borne coal was
conveyed from the South Wales coalfields to such points as Newcastle,
Grangemouth, Burntisland, etc., entailing an average of about twenty
trains per day, in each direction, of loaded and empty wagons."
A further, and by no means inconsiderable, call to be made upon, as it
was gladly accepted by, the Company, was that of tending the wounded
on arrival in "Blighty." Special ambulance trains of the most approved
design were supplied, and run with unfailing precision and regularity.
Refugees were catered for; and in direct contrast to the treatment
meted out by the enemy to our own men, enemy prisoners and captives in
our own hands were shown such pity that special trains were actually
provided for their conveyance by rail. When all is said and done,
however,
"Be England what she will,
With all her faults she is my country still."
Fresh still in the minds of most of us must be Mr. Lloyd George's
memorable "for-God's-sake-hurry-up" message, calling upon the United
States of America, at the time when the hammer blow of the final and
despairing German offensive fell with full force upon the British Army
in France, "to send American reinforcements across the Atlantic in the
shortest possible space of time," and whatever may be the opinion held
"pace" Mr. Wilson and his famous "too-proud-to-fight" utterance, there
is no doubt but that at long last the great American people realised
to the full the nature of the menace which threatened from the German
aspiration to world-domination.
Speaking at Spartanburg (cp. the _Times_, March 26th, 1918), General
O'Ryan declared that "the only distressing feature of the news (of the
German offensive) was the fact that the British had been obliged to
make such enormous sacrifices because American assistance was not yet
fully at hand. We have been galvanised now," he said, "into realising
the immensity of our obligations."
Telegraphing to Sir Douglas Haig on the same date, President Wilson
deigned to express "to you my warm admiration for the splendid
steadfastness and valour with which your troops have withstood the
German onset." And in the meantime, the complicated problem of
transportation was occupying the keenest brains on the other side of
the Herring-pond, for as the _New York World_ (cp. the _Times_, March
30th, 1918) pointed out, "it (transportation) certainly cannot be
solved by the kind of people who for ever wring their hands crying,
'For God's sake do something.' Godsaking will not drive a single rivet
in a ship, or transport a solitary soldier across the Atlantic."
Having realised, then, the menace, "the Yanks" without doubt set to
work and responded with a will, and the effect of their coming was
felt, not only by the enemy, but--even though in a different manner--by
the London & North-Western Railway Company as well, for "the majority
of American troops which passed through England," as Mr. Home goes on
to narrate, "were dealt with through the Port of Liverpool, the whole
of the arrangements being in our hands," these necessitating "the
running of 2,333 special trains (of which 1,684 were provided by the
London & North-Western Railway) which conveyed a total of 1,182,505
officers and men, and 25,978 tons of baggage"; the record or heaviest
day, August 28th, 1918, witnessing the dispatch of no fewer than 35
special trains with 17,274 officers and men, with 245 tons of baggage.
The conclusion drawn by the majority of level-headed Americans may
perhaps best be summed up in the words of Mr. Taft, who, writing in
the _Public Ledger_ (cp. the _Times_, March 30th, 1918), says:--"We
have been living in a fool's paradise.... This drive has been a rude
awakening. We are rubbing our eyes and asking if they (the Germans)
break through, then what the answer is. We shall be left naked to our
enemies."
Reference has previously been made to Crewe being, figuratively
speaking, the pivot of the London and North-Western Railway compass:
and the Company's system being, as Mr. Horne points out in his report,
"the main artery running through the centre of England, and serving so
many of the important centres of industry in the country," necessarily
"carried an immense amount of traffic of varying character."
[Illustration: PASSENGER TRAIN MILEAGE--L.N.W.R.]
In this respect the two accompanying diagrams are of no little
interest, showing as they do in manner unmistakable how, in
proportion as the volume of passenger traffic decreased, as a result
of the abolition of excursion trains and cheap tickets, the general
curtailment of services, and the increase of ordinary fares, so, owing
to the exigencies of the war, did the amount of goods traffic show in
direct contrast an enormous increase.
Increase of mileage obviously implies a corresponding increase of
tonnage carried, and in this connection we may select at random a few
out of many "interesting facts and figures," which have been compiled
in regard to the "new traffic created, which passed in goods trains
over the L. & N. W. system," facts and figures, in short, which clearly
speak for themselves.
[Illustration: GOODS TRAIN MILEAGE--L.N.W.R.]
Over 100,000 tons of timber and sawdust were put on rail at Penrith by
the Canadian Forestry Corps. Leeds, Huddersfield, and Manchester were
responsible for the delivery of immense quantities of raw material, in
addition to manufactured articles, such as army clothing and blankets,
and other kinds of munitions. From Warrington were sent 323,188 miles
of wire, barbed, telegraph, and telephone. Runcorn supplied 630,000
vessels containing poison and weeping gas; also 384,000 cylinders
containing 150 million feet of compressed hydrogen gas, used both for
the inflation of airships and for a new process of metal-plate cutting.
At Liverpool, in addition to the traffic entailed by the arrival of
American troops, and the receipt of railway material from America,
there was the question of "the allocation of Military Meat Traffic,"
which during a period of nine months alone meant the ordering and
disposal of 21,989 refrigerator cars.
A Government factory near Chester, engaged in the manufacture of
gun-cotton and T.N.T., handed over for transit a tonnage of 1,513,000
tons. At Crewe, a great part of the locomotive paint shop, and of the
carriage sheds, devoted to the storing of shells, resulted in traffic
being created to the extent of 330,000 tons, in addition to the
output from the Works of the many mechanical contrivances previously
mentioned. In the Birmingham district, one firm alone turned out 965
large tanks, each "over gauge" and approximately 30 tons in weight.
Another firm being responsible for an output of about 1800 sea mines.
Sheffield was busy with the supply--_inter alia_--of 2000 tons of
knives, forks, and spoons.
[Illustration: Naval Gun weighing 68 tons. A Typical Instance of
War-time Traffic. [_To face p. 173._]
The Coventry Ordnance Works dispatched 40,000 tons by the London and
North-Western route, and the town of Coventry, being the centre of
sixty-two Government owned and controlled establishments, sent out
300,000 tons of war munitions and Government stores.
Northampton forwarded an aggregate of 11,641,920 pairs of boots,
weighing 36,881 tons.
In the London area "practically every firm of any size was engaged upon
the manufacture of war stores of various descriptions, involving in
most cases enlarged premises and increased output; and herein the North
London Line--an offspring of the London and North-Western Railway--was
destined to fulfil a _rôle_ of no mean importance"; it was, in fact,
"throughout the whole of the war an exceptionally busy section of the
railway systems of the country," being "the main artery between the
northern trunk lines and the railway system south of the Thames, in
addition to forming the connecting link between the Great Eastern and
the Great Western Companies."
Speaking generally, amongst "exceptional articles of national
importance" which were conveyed by the London and North-Western Railway
may be said to figure heavy guns; large cases of aeroplanes; ships'
boats, propellers, frames, rudders, booms; armour plates; boilers;
tanks; tractors; girders; etc., etc., and a vague idea of the truly
enormous amount of goods traffic dealt with may perhaps be had when it
is stated that the "approximate number of munition works, Government
factories, aeroplane depôts, and camps," situated on the London and
North-Western system was 1269, in addition to which there were a
further "1237 factories, quarries, shipbuilding yards, etc., opened or
extended during the war."
Such in brief outline was the task performed at home by the London and
North-Western Railway Company during the world struggle, and in face of
everything the marvel perhaps was that the indefatigable staff never
ran the danger of "ruining all, by trying to do too much."
The force of the argument, however, that "a wise man can ask more
questions in a minute than a fool can answer in a year," becomes
apparent when we reflect that, although nominally under State control,
the staff on each railway remained during the war under the same
control as prior to the war, and received their instructions as
previously also; the result being that, undisturbed by an "unnumbered
number of inexpert experts," and free from any such "deadly deterrent,"
unmolested, too, as they were by any kind of official bureaucracy, the
railway companies were able to, and did, carry through the stupendous
programme apportioned to them by the State.
In the knowledge of this happy circumstance, the country may indeed
congratulate itself, for not only did the London and North-Western
Railway perform its allotted task at home, but, as will now be seen,
the staff of the Company's locomotive department at Crewe further
succeeded by their "incessant toil" in rendering a very large
proportion of that material aid, without which the "rearward services"
of our overseas forces could never, in their turn, have enabled the
fighting men at the front to bring the war to a successful conclusion.