This respondent, as President of the United States, was thereon of
opinion that, having regard to the necessary official relations and
duties of the Secretary for the Department of War to the President of
the United States, according to the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and having regard to the responsibility of the President for
the conduct of the said Secretary, and having regard to the permanent
executive authority of the office which the respondent holds under
the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was impossible,
consistently with the public interests, to allow the said Stanton to
continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War;
and it then became the official duty of the respondent, as President of
the United States, to consider and decide what act or acts should and
might lawfully be done by him, as President of the United States, to
cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.
This respondent was informed and verily believed that it was practically
settled by the First Congress of the United States, and had been so
considered and uniformly and in great numbers of instances acted on by
each Congress and President of the United States, in succession, from
President Washington to and including President Lincoln, and from the
First Congress to the Thirty-ninth Congress, that the Constitution of
the United States conferred on the President, as part of the executive
power and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing
the executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of
taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and
all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be
judged of by the President alone. This respondent had, in pursuance of
the Constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the
Executive Departments upon this question of constitutional executive
power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including
the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under
the Constitution of the United States this power was lodged by
the Constitution in the President of the United States, and that,
consequently, it could be lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress
could not deprive him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of
President of the United States, and because in that capacity he was both
enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question, did, in
good faith and with an earnest desire to arrive at the truth, come to
the conclusion and opinion, and did make the same known to the honorable
the Senate of the United States by a message dated on the 2d day of
March, 1867 (a true copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked A), that
the power last mentioned was conferred and the duty of exercising it in
fit cases was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United
States, and that the President could not be deprived of this power
or relieved of this duty, nor could the same be vested by law in the
President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole; and this has
ever since remained and was the opinion of this respondent at the time
when he was forced as aforesaid to consider and decide what act or acts
should and might lawfully be done by this respondent, as President of
the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said
office.
This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of "An act
regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867,
by a constitutional majority of both Houses of Congress, it was enacted
as follows:
That every person holding any civil office to which he has been
appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every
person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office and shall
become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold
such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed
and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: _Provided_,
That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy,
and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General
shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the
President by whom they may have been appointed and one month thereafter,
subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended
to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act
was passed that the power to remove executive officers for cause might
by law be taken from the President and vested in him and the Senate
jointly; and although this respondent had arrived at and still retained
the opinion above expressed, and verily believed, as he still believes,
that the said first section of the last-mentioned act was and is wholly
inoperative and void by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of
the United States, yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the
constitutional majority in each of the two Houses of that Congress, this
respondent considered it to be proper to examine and decide whether the
particular case of the said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's
duty to act, was within or without the terms of that first section of
the act, or, if within it, whether the President had not the power,
according to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the
office of Secretary for the Department of War; and having, in his
capacity of President of the United States, so examined and considered,
did form the opinion that the case of the said Stanton and his tenure of
office were not affected by the first section of the last-named act.
And this respondent, further answering, says that although a case thus
existed which, in his judgment, as President of the United States,
called for the exercise of the executive power to remove the said
Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War; and
although this respondent was of opinion, as is above shown, that under
the Constitution of the United States the power to remove the said
Stanton from the said office was vested in the President of the United
States; and although this respondent was also of the opinion, as is
above shown, that the case of the said Stanton was not affected by
the first section of the last-named act; and although each of the
said opinions had been formed by this respondent upon an actual case,
requiring him, in his capacity of President of the United States, to
come to some judgment and determination thereon, yet this respondent,
as President of the United States, desired and determined to avoid, if
possible, any question of the construction and effect of the said first
section of the last-named act, and also the broader question of the
executive power conferred upon the President of the United States by
the Constitution of the United States to remove one of the principal
officers of one of the Executive Departments for cause seeming to him
sufficient; and this respondent also desired and determined that if,
from causes over which he could exert no control, it should become
absolutely necessary to raise and have in some way determined either
or both of the said last-named questions, it was in accordance with the
Constitution of the United States, and was required of the President
thereby, that questions of so much gravity and importance, upon which
the legislative and executive departments of the Government had
disagreed, which involved powers considered by all branches of the
Government, during its entire history down to the year 1867, to have
been confided by the Constitution of the United States to the President,
and to be necessary for the complete and proper execution of his
constitutional duties, should be in some proper way submitted to that
judicial department of the Government intrusted by the Constitution
with the power, and subjected by it to the duty, not only of
determining finally the construction and effect of all acts of Congress,
but of comparing them with the Constitution of the United States
and pronouncing them inoperative when found in conflict with that
fundamental law which the people have enacted for the government of
all their servants. And to these ends, first, that through the action
of the Senate of the United States the absolute duty of the President
to substitute some fit person in place of Mr. Stanton as one of his
advisers, and as a principal subordinate officer whose official conduct
he was responsible for and had lawful right to control, might, if
possible, be accomplished without the necessity of raising any one
of the questions aforesaid; and, second, if this duty could not
be so performed, then that these questions, or such of them as might
necessarily arise, should be judicially determined in manner aforesaid,
and for no other end or purpose, this respondent, as President of the
United States, on the 12th day of August, 1867, seven days after the
reception of the letter of the said Stanton of the 5th of August,
hereinbefore stated, did issue to the said Stanton the order
following, namely: