WASHINGTON, D.C., _March 25, 1868_.
_To the Senate of the United States_:
I have considered, with such care as the pressure of other duties has
permitted, a bill entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to
amend the judiciary act, passed the 24th of September, 1789.'" Not being
able to approve all of its provisions, I herewith return it to the
Senate, in which House it originated, with a brief statement of my
objections.
The first section of the bill meets my approbation, as, for the purpose
of protecting the rights of property from the erroneous decision of
inferior judicial tribunals, it provides means for obtaining uniformity,
by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, in cases which have
now become very numerous and of much public interest, and in which such
remedy is not now allowed. The second section, however, takes away the
right of appeal to that court in cases which involve the life and
liberty of the citizen, and leaves them exposed to the judgment of
numerous inferior tribunals. It is apparent that the two sections were
conceived in a very different spirit, and I regret that my objections
to one impose upon me the necessity of withholding my sanction from the
other.
I can not give my assent to a measure which proposes to deprive
any person "restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
Constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States" from
the right of appeal to the highest judicial authority known to our
Government. To "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity" is one of the declared objects of the Federal Constitution.
To assure these, guaranties are provided in the same instrument, as well
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" as against the suspensions
of "the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_, * * * unless when, in
cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it." It
was doubtless to afford the people the means of protecting and enforcing
these inestimable privileges that the jurisdiction which this bill
proposes to take away was conferred upon the Supreme Court of the
nation. The act conferring that jurisdiction was approved on the 5th day
of February, 1867, with a full knowledge of the motives that prompted its
passage, and because it was believed to be necessary and right. Nothing
has since occurred to disprove the wisdom and justness of the measures,
and to modify it as now proposed would be to lessen the protection of
the citizen from the exercise of arbitrary power and to weaken the
safeguards of life and liberty, which can never be made too secure
against illegal encroachments.
The bill not only prohibits the adjudication by the Supreme Court
of cases in which appeals may hereafter be taken, but interdicts its
jurisdiction on appeals which have already been made to that high
judicial body. If, therefore, it should become a law, it will by its
retroactive operation wrest from the citizen a remedy which he enjoyed
at the time of his appeal. It will thus operate most harshly upon those
who believe that justice has been denied them in the inferior courts.
The legislation proposed in the second section, it seems to me, is not
in harmony with the spirit and intention of the Constitution. It can
not fail to affect most injuriously the just equipoise of our system
of Government, for it establishes a precedent which, if followed, may
eventually sweep away every check on arbitrary and unconstitutional
legislation. Thus far during the existence of the Government the Supreme
Court of the United States has been viewed by the people as the true
expounder of their Constitution, and in the most violent party conflicts
its judgments and decrees have always been sought and deferred to with
confidence and respect. In public estimation it combines judicial wisdom
and impartiality in a greater degree than any other authority known to
the Constitution, and any act which may be construed into or mistaken
for an attempt to prevent or evade its decision on a question which
affects the liberty of the citizens and agitates the country can
not fail to be attended with unpropitious consequences. It will be
justly held by a large portion of the people as an admission of the
unconstitutionally of the act on which its judgment may be forbidden or
forestalled, and may interfere with that willing acquiescence in its
provisions which is necessary for the harmonious and efficient execution
of any law.
For these reasons, thus briefly and imperfectly stated, and for others,
of which want of time forbids the enumeration, I deem it my duty to
withhold my assent from this bill, and to return it for the
reconsideration of Congress.