THE OCCUPATION AND DESTRUCTION OF MOSCOW
THE morning of the 8th of September found the army of Napoleon
bivouacked among the dead and wounded on the field of Borodino. Only
the Guard was really ready for further combat. The corps of Davout
and Ney were terribly cut up; the 17th, 30th and 106th Regiments were
nearly destroyed. The cavalry, which had to compensate for Napoleon’s
comparative weakness in infantry, had suffered fearfully. Nearly all
its corps and divisional commanders were killed or wounded; several
regiments were almost annihilated. The four corps of the reserves
counted some 19,000 men on September 2nd; on the 20th they could muster
little more than 10,000. Thousands of horses had been killed, and there
was no present possibility of being able to replace them, while the
wounded animals were mostly doomed to perish from lack of forage and
proper care. The cavalry of the Guard alone was in a state for serious
combat.
The fate of the wounded was horrible. Means of every kind for tending
them were lacking, and fortunate were those whose end was hastened by
the incurable nature of their hurts, or thirst and starvation. Days
elapsed before all had received so much as first aid; and this was but
the commencement of their miseries. The great monastery of Kolotskoï
became the principal hospital, and in its buildings the victims of
Borodino were huddled literally in heaps, without beds even of straw,
without food or fire, and without a tenth of the medical aid that was
needed. Some of the wounded officers were able to buy food, at enormous
prices, from the convoys which passed these dens of horror; but for
the unhappy rank and file, who possessed little or no money, there
was no hope. Sanitation there was none, and the unfortunate beings
died in thousands, amid filth, pestilence and neglect. François says
that in one hospital a dead officer was found who, in the agonies of
starvation, _had devoured his own arm to the bone_. It is a painful
task even to touch upon these sickening details, but to fail to do so
is to neglect the primary duty of an historian.
Besides the enormous diminution of the effective strength, the state
of the ammunition-trains was by no means reassuring. There is reason
to believe that the artillery had fired 90,000 rounds during the 5th
and 7th; the infantry must have expended millions of cartridges. It
is certain that, immediately after Borodino, Napoleon was anxiously
pressing for fresh supplies of ammunition; and it is doubtful if he
could have delivered another pitched battle before they arrived.
Worse than all, the spirit of the troops was grievously depressed.
The gaiety which commonly characterises Frenchmen, even in untoward
circumstances, had vanished. Gloomy silence reigned during the march
and in the bivouacs. The negative results of the great battle had
completed the discouragement of the troops. The French soldiers, at any
rate, were too intelligent not to have some inkling of the disasters
that might too probably lie before them.
On the whole Kutuzov might perhaps have remained longer on the field
of battle. It is, however, probable that his withdrawal to Mozhaïsk
was wise. He had dealt a tremendous blow at the efficiency and morale
of Napoleon’s army, but in doing so his own forces had been fearfully
shattered. Had he remained in position the circumstance might have
decided Napoleon to use the almost untouched Guards, and so at the last
moment wring a victory from frowning Fortune.
When the sun dissipated the autumn fog which had enwrapped the field,
the Russian position was seen to be guarded only by the hovering
_pulks_ of Platov’s Cossacks. Against them Murat moved such of his
exhausted horsemen as could be rallied; and before the advance of
regular squadrons the riders withdrew. Behind them, however, were
supports of infantry--the four Chasseur regiments of the 2nd Corps.
They gave back very slowly, and did not reach Mozhaïsk until 4 p.m.
By that time a large number of the Russian wounded had already been
evacuated. The town, however, was still choked with disabled men,
many of whom were in a state to be moved, and to cover this operation
Kutuzov directed Platov to hold it as long as possible. The Russian
main body was in position behind it.
Napoleon, as soon as he was assured that the Russians had really
retired, ordered Murat to press their retreat. The King had the
four reserve cavalry corps and the light horse of Ney and Davout as
before,--a total now of not more than 14,000 lances and sabres--but
Compan’s shattered division was replaced by that of Dufour (_vice_
Friant wounded). The Emperor apparently at first believed that Kutuzov
was in full retreat, and the head-quarters baggage was directed on
Mozhaïsk; but Murat, as aforesaid, made little or no headway against
Platov; and the head-quarters could not be transferred. Desultory
skirmishing and cannonading went on until nightfall, when Platov was
still in possession of Mozhaïsk.
The firm front shown by Platov must have convinced Napoleon that the
spirit of the Russians was unbroken. He spent a part of the day in
going over the battle-field, examining the positions and reviewing
the troops according to his custom. In the afternoon he went forward
to join Murat, and on the way received another unpleasant reminder
of the unabated courage of his foes, some foragers being driven in by
Cossacks, and an alarm caused. On this day, however, a much needed
reinforcement arrived in the form of Pino’s Italian division.
At about 10 a.m. on the 9th Platov was fiercely attacked by Murat,
expelled, and driven along the Moscow road. Murat’s pursuit was checked
by a reinforcement of twelve battalions and a heavy battery sent
back by Kutuzov, but Mozhaïsk was lost, and Napoleon transferred his
head-quarters thither. Some thousands of the most seriously injured of
the Russian wounded were still there; and there were hideous scenes as
they were cast out of the houses for those of the French army, who, in
carriages and waggons, or dragging themselves along on foot, streamed
in piteous procession in rear of the leading troops. The Russian main
body retired deliberately to Semlino (or Shelkovka) about 12 miles east
of Mozhaïsk.
Napoleon himself remained for three days at Mozhaïsk recovering from
his cold, and transacting arrears of business. Already on August 27th
he had sent orders to Victor to bring the 9th Corps from the Niemen up
to Smolensk; and from Mozhaïsk fresh directions were despatched for
him. From Mozhaïsk also was sent the bulletin announcing the battle of
Borodino. As his cold rendered him speechless Napoleon wrote it with
his own hand; and, being at best an execrable writer, the result may
be imagined. The French losses are stated in it at 10,000. This would,
according to Napoleon’s usual standard, indicate from 40,000 to 50,000
casualties.
Meanwhile the Russian army was still steadily retiring on the high-road
to Moscow, and Murat deliberately following. Eugène, as before, marched
on the north by a track running roughly parallel with the main road by
the towns of Rusa and Zvenigorod, while Poniatowski formed the right
flank guard on the south. Junot remained at Borodino and Kolotskoï
to guard the hospitals. In support of Murat marched Mortier with the
divisions of Roguet and Claparède; and behind him Davout and Ney in
the order named.
Kutuzov was displeased with Platov for abandoning Mozhaïsk prematurely,
as he considered, and superseded him in the command of the rear-guard
by Miloradovich. On the 10th the Russian main body made another
deliberate march of about 8 miles, while Miloradovich stood to fight at
Krymskoië, some 3 miles short of Kutuzov’s evening position. His force
consisted of six weak regiments of Chasseurs, four line regiments,
Uvarov’s nearly intact cavalry division, and some Cossacks. He occupied
a low, partly wooded ridge; his left was covered by a marsh, his right
by woods, while in the centre the high-road approached the ridge by
a narrow gully which was commanded by the Russian guns. Clausewitz,
however, who was present, does not consider that the position was
particularly advantageous. The twenty defending battalions can hardly
have mustered over 6000 bayonets. Murat came up towards 5 p.m., and
developed a fierce attack by Dufour’s division upon the right of the
position, defended by three Chasseur regiments under Colonel Potemkin.
After a hard struggle Potemkin was forced back from the summit of
the ridge, but he held firm, supported by three regiments sent to
his support by Miloradovich. Uvarov’s horsemen succeeded in keeping
Murat’s broken regiments at bay; and the Russians fought on doggedly
until darkness put an end to the contest. The Russian loss is stated,
probably with some exaggeration, at 2000. As Martinien’s lists show 71
officers killed and wounded between the 8th and 10th, the French can
scarcely have lost less than 1200.
On the 11th the main Russian army marched 16 miles to Viazema (Viazma
on modern maps). Miloradovich retired to Kubinskoi, 8 miles from
Krymskoië, unpursued by Murat. Eugène and Poniatowski were nearly
level with Murat on the north and south, Mortier and Davout some
distance behind, and Ney only a short way past Mozhaïsk. On the
12th Kutuzov retrograded to Momonovo, a bare ten miles from Moscow,
while Miloradovich withdrew to Malo Viazema, 12 miles to the westward,
leisurely followed by Murat. On the same day Napoleon left Mozhaïsk for
the front.
[Illustration:
MOSCOW FROM THE SPARROW HILLS
This is practically the scene which Napoleon contemplated in 1812]
The question of the fate of Moscow was now imminent. It is at least
possible that Kutuzov would have risked another battle had there been
a fair prospect of success. But it cannot be said that this was the
case. All the way from Mozhaïsk the militia had been steadily joining,
but even so the army mustered less than 90,000 men, and of these only
65,000 were regulars, as against over 90,000 still under Napoleon’s
hand. Many of the militia were as yet unequipped with fire-arms, and
all were raw and without training. Kutuzov could expect no further
reinforcements of regulars for weeks, whereas Napoleon would be joined
within ten days by Laborde’s division as well as by some _régiments de
marche_. The defective state of his ammunition Kutuzov did not know.
The spirit of the Russian troops was indeed excellent, but against it
was the greatest military genius of modern times, backed by an army
wearied indeed, and in part much disheartened, but not yet demoralised,
and including 20,000 untouched and undiscouraged veterans.
On June 10th Count Feodor Vasilievich Rostopchin, a former favourite
and confidant of the ill-fated Emperor Paul, and a fanatical opponent
of the French alliance, had been appointed Governor-General of Moscow.
Whether he was the right man for his position must be questioned.
It does not appear that anything was done to organise and arm the
inhabitants or fortify the city. Nevertheless Rostopchin was furious
at the idea of abandoning Moscow. According to Wilson he never forgave
Kutuzov for keeping him in ignorance of the critical state of affairs.
As a fact he must have known that the evacuation of the city was to be
expected; and he appears to have been steadily clearing it as far as
possible of its inhabitants. This was the more practicable because in
the summer Moscow was considerably less populated than in the winter,
the nobles and their large households of serfs and retainers being
absent on their estates. Otherwise the Governor, who was not a soldier,
seems to have considered a good many rather wild plans of resistance.
It would have been perfectly feasible to defend Moscow with the 90,000
troops of Kutuzov, but its destruction would thereby have been rendered
inevitable. As regards Rostopchin’s project of arming the inhabitants,
it is certain that such muskets as were available were obsolete and of
bad quality. For the rest, 200,000 human beings cannot abandon their
homes in a day, and since the French found the city nearly deserted it
is obvious that the exodus of the Muscovites had long been in progress.
On the 13th the Russians fell back to Fili, and took up a position on
the east side of Moscow, chosen by Bennigsen, who eulogises it in his
memoirs, saying that its only defect was that it was rather long. On
arriving Barclay proceeded to inspect it, while Kutuzov, who could ill
support the fatigue of the campaign, rested. Dokhturov, who apparently
had a touch of the courtier about him, proceeded to serve him a meal,
but the little picnic was quickly interrupted by Colonel Löwenstern
asking for Dokhturov, with whom Barclay wished to confer.
“As usual!” said Barclay as he sent off Löwenstern. “There they all
are, dancing attendance on the Prince, and not troubling about what
_they_ (the French) may do. Fetch Dokhturov here, even if his mouth is
still full.”
Kutuzov apparently rather enjoyed Dokhturov’s disappointment on being
thus interrupted. “You must not keep General Barclay waiting,” he
remarked. “I shall manage very well by myself,” and therewith proceeded
with his meal, while poor Dokhturov was obliged to go. Barclay and he
studied the position and came to the conclusion that it was too weak.
A council of war was called for four o’clock in the afternoon.
Bennigsen, still busy examining the position, kept the other generals
waiting until six. There were present Kutuzov, Barclay, Bennigsen,
Dokhturov, Konovnitzin, Raievski, Uvarov, Ostermann-Tolstoï, Yermólov,
Toll, and, later on, Platov. Bennigsen opened the discussion by asking
whether it was better to give battle or to abandon the capital. Kutuzov
interrupted him, pointing out that the question was not of Moscow, but
the salvation of all Russia, and that this clearly depended upon the
preservation of the army.
Barclay strongly supported Kutuzov, and he was followed by Raievski,
Konovnitzin, and Ostermann-Tolstoï. Barclay appears otherwise to have
had no great confidence in the ability of the Russian troops, diluted
with militia, to manoeuvre. When fighting generals such as Raievski and
Konovnitzin ranged themselves with him the question was practically
decided. According to Bennigsen he was supported by Dokhturov and
Platov; but his claim to have had the votes of Konovnitzin and Yermólov
is elsewhere contradicted. To his suggestion that battle should be
delivered Ostermann-Tolstoï replied with a blunt question as to whether
he was ready to answer for victory. Bennigsen evaded this embarrassing
query; but Kutuzov, who had perhaps already made up his mind, ended
the discussion by deciding upon retreat. As to its direction Barclay
appears to have considered that it should be to the eastward on
Vladimir and Nizhnii Novgorod; but Toll, thinking more of the question
of supplies, suggested a retirement towards Kaluga. A direct retreat
on the latter place would have exposed the army to one of Napoleon’s
dreaded flanking attacks. Strategically Barclay’s suggestion was
sound enough, if perhaps over-cautious. Clausewitz points out that
Napoleon’s offensive power was exhausted, and that he could scarcely
have pursued.
Kutuzov decided that the line of the retreat should be by Kolomna
on Riazan, thus intermediate between that suggested by Barclay and
that proposed by Toll. By taking it no opening was afforded for a
flank attack; and it would be easy to manoeuvre on either wing should
occasion arise. The commissariat of the army would be assured since it
would have at its back the fertile “Black Soil” provinces; and it would
furthermore be in easy communication with the manufactories of arms at
Tula and elsewhere. Orders were therefore issued for the retreat of
the army by the Kolomna road. Bennigsen was extremely discontented,
and showed his displeasure by leaving the council. He attributed it to
Barclay, and their relations, already strained, became more hostile
than ever.
There can be no doubt that Kutuzov and Barclay were correct in their
resolution to retreat, but it was no light thing to make it. Kutuzov
was greatly agitated; he passed a sleepless night, and more than once
tears were seen to roll down his cheeks. No Englishman can perhaps
fully understand what it meant to a Russian to leave “White-Walled
Moscow,” the mother of the Russian land, to the mercy of an enemy.
Barclay, though now in bad health, took executive command of the
evacuation. At 2 a.m. on the 14th the army began its passage through
the city. The troops, in the deepest dejection, tramped through the
streets with furled standards and silent bands, many of them, officers
and men, sobbing with rage and despair. The foreign commandant of the
Kremlin garrison regiment began the evacuation with band playing,
according to the usages of war, and there was a violent outcry
among the retreating soldiery. They indignantly shouted that he was
rejoicing, and the music had to cease.
[Illustration:
NAPOLEON’S FIRST VIEW OF MOSCOW
The Emperor is standing on the Sparrow Hills, from which an imposing
view of the old Russian capital is obtained.
From the painting by Verestchagin.]
Barclay stationed his staff-officers along the line of retreat to
enforce order. Knowing the especial weakness of the Russian soldiers,
he issued strict orders that anyone found in a beer-shop or intoxicated
was to be summarily punished. He worked himself to death in directing
the march, and was on horseback for eighteen hours. He complained
bitterly of the inefficiency of the staff, which, as usual, did little
or nothing to facilitate the march. There was frequently disorder
among the retiring columns. None the less it must be said that the
operation was remarkably successful. By 9 o’clock in the evening, after
eighteen hours of incessant toil, 90,000 fighting men, more than 600
guns and thousands of vehicles, had been passed through the great city
and were on the Kolomna road. Kutuzov himself traversed Moscow in the
morning. An eyewitness states that he saw him near the Kolomna gate
sitting in his carriage quite alone, resting his head on his hands,
silent and sad, while before him troops, guns, and waggons poured in
an endless stream. The head of the army halted for the night at Panki,
a village about ten miles from the city, where Kutuzov established his
head-quarters.
Meanwhile, early on the 13th, Napoleon halted his army, fearing that
Kutuzov was manoeuvring to attack his right flank. That he could
conceive such an eventuality shows how completely, and not for the
first time in the campaign, his cavalry had failed to keep touch with
the enemy. At 10 a.m., however, he became convinced that the Russian
army was still in his front, and resumed his march. At 1 p.m. on the
14th Murat’s vanguard crowned the Sparrow Hills, about a mile and a
half west of Moscow, and saw before them in the plain the Russian
rear-guard, and beyond it the widespreading city--the goal which they
had toiled so strenuously to attain.
The Russian army was still pouring through the streets, and
Miloradovich sent an officer to Murat to propose a short armistice,
adding that if it were not granted he should defend the city step by
step, and fire it as he fell back. After a while a sort of informal
suspension of arms until 7 p.m. was made between Miloradovich and
Sebastiani, now commanding the 2nd Cavalry Corps. The Russians
evacuated the Dorogomilov suburb at 3 p.m., and Murat quietly followed.
At about the same time Napoleon reached the Sparrow Hills. He is said
to have gazed long and eagerly upon the goal of his wishes, now spread
out before his greedy eyes; but he may well have muttered the words
attributed to him: “It is full time!”
The Emperor approved of the informal truce concluded by Murat. The
peaceful occupation of Moscow was an end bought cheaply enough at the
price of the quiet withdrawal of the Russian rear-guard. Mortier was to
be Governor, General Durosnel Military Commandant, and M. Lesseps, who
had formerly been French Consul-General at St. Petersburg, Intendant
of the province of Moscow. Orders were issued to prevent the ingress
of plunderers. Eugène and Poniatowski were ordered to halt some miles
short of the city. Mortier was directed to occupy the Kremlin, and to
maintain order by severe methods. As the day wore on the 1st and 3rd
Corps and the old Guard closed up on Murat. It is a characteristically
French touch that the men had decked themselves out in their parade
uniforms to take part in the triumphal entry.
As Miloradovich evacuated quarter after quarter of the city Murat
advanced, dreading surprise, and taking great precautions against it.
The streets were deserted; silence reigned everywhere. Near the Kremlin
a tumultuous gathering of citizens and stragglers opened a scattering
fire. They were dispersed by cannon shots, and Murat moved on, only
to find silence and apparent desertion. Miloradovich marched through
the city and established himself for the night some 4 miles from the
Kolomna gate. Winzingerode’s detachment, which had been falling back
before Eugène, was on the St. Petersburg road, and another cavalry
detachment was escorting the public treasure and the archives of Moscow
to Vladimir.
When at last it became evident that Moscow was indeed deserted by
most of its native inhabitants, a deputation of foreign residents was
collected to be presented to Napoleon. His mortification was extreme.
He quartered himself in the Dorogomilov suburb, and, between his
anxiety and the dirt and vermin of an ill-kept abode, spent a restless
night.
Mortier had duly occupied the Kremlin with Roguet’s division, sending
Claparède to support Murat. The silence of the city impressed even the
reckless soldiery of Napoleon. Sergeant Bourgogne naïvely expresses
it by remarking how disappointed they were to see not even a pretty
girl listening to the regimental bands. With darkness disorder broke
forth everywhere. It was impossible to prevent ill-fed and ill-clad
men from pillaging when all that they needed, not to speak of wealth,
which appeared to their ignorance inconceivable, lay ready to hand.
In the evening fires were already breaking out. In the morning of the
15th Napoleon, escorted by the Old Guard, took up his residence in the
Imperial Palace in the Kremlin.
It should here be said that the _Kreml_, or citadel, commonly known in
Western Europe as the “Kremlin,” was the original fortress or walled
town of Moskva, fortified in 1147 by Prince Yurí Dolgorúki (Long-handed
George), the son of the famous Great Prince Vladimir Monomakh. Around
it grew up in the course of ages various suburbs, and these were in
their turn walled. As the streets were wide, and there were many very
large buildings--palaces, monasteries, and the like--often standing in
spacious gardens or enclosures, the city covered an enormous area. It
had the characteristics in general of a vast country suburb rather than
of a city.
A volume might be written concerning the burning of Moscow. The
catastrophe has been described in the works of numerous eyewitnesses,
and lengthy reference to the event itself hardly falls within the
compass of this work. Three points must, however, be dealt with: the
causes of the conflagration; its extent; and its effects upon the
fortunes of Napoleon.
As regards the origin of the fire it may be regarded as certain that
it was not the outcome of Russian patriotic frenzy. The whole evidence
is to the contrary; and the fury and grief of the Russians at the
destruction of their holy city were obviously genuine. It was equally
not due to the deliberate action of the invaders, who had every
motive for preserving the city for their own convenience. It remains
to be considered whether it was the act of Rostopchin or due to mere
accident, assisted by a fortuitous combination of circumstances.
Public opinion at the time attributed the conflagration to Rostopchin.
Two of his own residences were destroyed, and a few weeks later
he deliberately fired his country mansion at Voronovo in order to
prevent its seizure by the French. Sir Robert Wilson, who had means
of knowing, says that Rostopchin’s design was notorious, and that in
order to prevent him from carrying it into execution Kutuzov repeatedly
announced his intention of delivering battle before Moscow. Buturlin,
the contemporary Russian historian, also attributes the fire to the
Governor.
Rostopchin’s own testimony cannot unfortunately be trusted. He, at the
time, admitted the responsibility of having burned Moscow. Nevertheless
later, as a voluntary exile abroad, he repudiated it. All that can
be said is that either he was really responsible, or that if not he
claimed the credit in the belief that the burning of Moscow would be
regarded as an heroic action, and only disowned complicity when he
found that it was generally considered atrocious.
The French believed that the fire was caused by Rostopchin’s
incendiaries, and hundreds or thousands of the Muscovites remaining in
the city were hanged, bayoneted, or shot as such. The French, however,
as all their history goes to show, have an unhappy tendency to lose
their heads at a crisis, and it is certain that during the burning of
Moscow they were wellnigh insane with panic. For the rest, they were
utterly ignorant of their victims’ language.
Certain facts appear to emerge from the confusion as proved:--
(1) The city was by no means entirely deserted by the more respectable
classes. Tutulmin, the director of the foundling hospital, remained
at his post; and a certain number of merchants and gentlemen, some
of Francophil leanings, did not leave. The foreign colony--chiefly
French--also remained.
(2) The lowest of the lower classes naturally remained; and the
disreputable elements probably preferred to take their chance of
making their profit out of the invaders. The criminals in the prisons
had also been released.
(3) Whatever may have been the case as regards the mass of ordinary
private dwellings, the palaces and mansions, of which Moscow was full,
as well as most of the many warehouses and shops, were abandoned, as a
seaman might say, “all standing.”
(4) The fire was beginning as the Russian rear-guard left the city.
(5) Plundering on the part of the invaders commenced almost
immediately after their entry.
(6) The wind changed its direction more than once.
(7) The French captured and utilised a vast quantity of gunpowder.
(8) Several thousand Russian wounded were left in the city.
The obvious deduction from (1) and (3) is that Moscow was hurriedly
evacuated, and this is further supported by the evidence of (7) and
(8). Had there been any settled plan of destruction one does not see
why the powder-magazines were not fired, and the buildings of most
importance to the invaders ruined. Nothing of this description was
attempted, and the ammunition was for the most part saved by the
French, to their great advantage. For the rest, with a mob of soldiery,
together with a mixed horde of camp-followers of all nations, beggars,
criminals, and prostitutes, plundering indiscriminately, there was
every opportunity for wanton destruction. The frequent changes of the
wind helped to spread the conflagration, and it was further assisted by
the fact that the great majority of the private dwellings were wooden
constructions.
On the whole, regarding the question solely from the standpoint of the
established facts, it seems at least possible that the conflagration
of Moscow, like most events of the kind recorded in history, was
accidental in its origin.
It is probable that four-fifths of Moscow vanished in the
conflagration, but it is doubtful if the material injury inflicted
upon the invaders was very serious. In the city itself some 500
secular buildings of stone and brick survived, besides many churches
and convents. The Kremlin was little injured. It is also clear that
there were available great stores of food and other supplies. Forage
alone was lacking. De Fezensac, who now commanded the 4th Regiment of
Ney’s corps, which was generally encamped outside the city, speaks of
trouble in obtaining supplies, and of poor and coarse fare, but not of
actual want. In Moscow itself there appears to have been a superfluity
of food, though flour was less abundant than other less necessary
supplies. Clothing and materials for manufacturing it were seized in
quantities, and no doubt the whole army could have been refitted had
organised attempts been made to that end.
It was the possession of Moscow which exercised a disastrous influence
upon the fortunes of Napoleon. Having failed to crush the Russian
field-army, and thereby force Alexander to make peace, he had now
become obsessed with the idea that the occupation of Moscow would bring
about the desired consummation of his hopes. There was, indeed, hardly
ever the slightest chance of their fulfilment, but Napoleon could not
bring himself to admit this, and lingered among the ruins for week
after week.
It is certain that fires were already commencing as the Russians
evacuated the city; but the first serious outbreak appears to have
occurred at a Government spirit store. It was extinguished, but
soon afterwards the great bazaar in which, as at Constantinople
and other Oriental cities, the bulk of the retail trade of Moscow
was concentrated, was found to be on fire. Both spirit stores and
shops would be natural marks for plunderers. The wind rose, drifted
inflammable wreckage across the city, and scattered it among the
wood-built suburbs, through which the conflagration spread with
terrifying rapidity. The stories that the fire engines had disappeared,
and that the ropes of the wells had been cut, may be taken for what
they are worth. It is obvious that little organised endeavour to
control the conflagration of a vast and largely wood-built city was, or
could be, made. The Guards in the central quarters soon abandoned all
efforts to fight the flames in order to devote themselves to plunder,
and the officers of the corps encamped outside, convinced that it was
vitally necessary to fill their nearly empty store-waggons, permitted,
or connived at, the entry of their own men to take part in the sack.
Napoleon himself remained in the Kremlin until the 16th, when a change
in the wind brought the conflagration from the suburbs to the inner
quarters of the city, and rendered residence in the Imperial Palace
dangerous, more especially since the larger part of the captured
powder-magazines were within the citadel. The Emperor left by the
river gate--the land fronts of the walled enclosure being practically
encircled by the flames--and proceeded along the quays, eventually
reaching the Imperial palace of Petrovski, some 2 miles on the
Petersburg road.
With Napoleon’s departure pillage became universal. Some officers
endeavoured to induce their men to take food and clothing, but
apparently with little success, and that vast quantities of food were
saved was due to the fact that the half-famished troops naturally
turned to it. Murder and outrage went hand in hand with pillage. Many
inhabitants were massacred by the soldiery, maddened with licence and
intoxicating liquor; many others perished in the flames of their homes,
or in attempting to escape from them. The miscellaneous horde of female
camp-followers behaved as badly as the men. Paymaster Duverger relates
how he knocked down a ruffianly _cantinière_ who was robbing a sick
and helpless Russian lady. There is unhappily evidence that many of
the officers set a disgraceful example. Some pillaged openly; others
made a levy upon the plunder of their men. The Guards had the best
opportunities and gained an unenviable pre-eminence in misconduct.
Drunkenness was everywhere rife. The men of the 1st Corps were almost
as bad as the Guards, and probably this carnival of licence was the
event which contributed most to the destruction of their discipline
early in the retreat. It is worthy of note that Ney’s corps, which took
little direct share in the sack, was the one which kept the best order
amid the horrors of the retreat. Marshal Lefebvre was furious at the
disorder in the Old Guard, and issued a severe order on the subject.
[Illustration:
NAPOLEON WATCHING THE BURNING OF MOSCOW
From the picture by Verestchagin]
On the 19th the conflagration began to die away, partly owing to the
equinoctial rains, and on the 20th Napoleon returned to the Kremlin.
Useless efforts were made to induce the inhabitants to return to the
ruined city, and the peasants to bring their produce to market.
For payment Napoleon had provided a supply of forged Russian paper
rúbles; but opportunities for uttering them were not forthcoming,
though some were distributed to the surviving inhabitants and to
charitable institutions. A few merchants and tradesmen accepted office
under the French, but after the destruction of Moscow the Russians who
entertained any feeling towards the invaders but that of bitter hatred
were few indeed.
On evacuating Moscow the Russian army made two leisurely marches on
the Kolomna road to where it crossed the Moskva, about 20 miles from
the capital. Kutuzov appears at first to have intended to continue
his march to Kolomna; but a conference with the Intendant-General
Lanskoï convinced him that there would be difficulty in diverting the
line of supply, and he decided to manoeuvre towards Kaluga. On the
17th, therefore, leaving Raievski’s corps to cover the rear, he turned
westward, and marched along the Pakhra, a rivulet which here joins
the Moskva, until he reached the Moscow-Kaluga road. On the 21st he
took up a position behind the Pakhra, with an advance-guard, composed
of the 8th Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, under Miloradovich at
Desna, only some 10 miles from Moscow. At the same time Dorokhov,
with the hussars of Yelisabetgrad, the Dragoons of the Guard, and
three regiments of Cossacks, was detached towards Mozhaïsk. This last
movement was perhaps premature, since it gave Napoleon early warning of
an intention to operate against his communications.
During the night of the 15th the glare of a vast conflagration had
reddened the sky to the north-west. All through the next four days
the bivouacs of the Russians were illuminated by the flames of their
burning “Mother City,” while by day dense banks of smoke lay upon the
horizon, and charred fragments were frequently borne by the fierce
gales among their marching files. The effect upon the soldiers may
perhaps better be imagined than described. Whether the destruction of
Moscow were deliberate or accidental in its origin, it kindled in the
Russian army a flame of vengeful desire that endured until it marched
triumphantly into Paris in 1814.
Murat, with his advanced guard, strengthened by Claparède’s division,
and supported by Poniatowski, was following the Russians. At the
Pakhra he lost touch, and not until the 23rd was the true direction of
Kutuzov’s march ascertained and followed up, Raievski retiring on the
main army. Napoleon apparently did not believe that Kutuzov’s whole
force was to the south of Moscow--at all events he adopted a dangerous
half-measure, which might have resulted in disaster. Murat was to press
the Russians’ right, while a column under Bessières marched from Moscow
against their front. Bessières’ force comprised the infantry division
of Friederichs (_vice_ Desaix), now increased by the 33rd Léger, a
brigade of light cavalry, Colbert’s Lancers, and the 3rd Cavalry Corps
detached from Murat. Its strength cannot have exceeded 11,000 men,
while Murat certainly had not more than 25,000. Barclay and Bennigsen
urged an attack, and it is clear that Murat must have been destroyed,
or forced to retreat in haste. The cautious Kutuzov, however, inferred
that Bessières was merely Napoleon’s advance-guard--as a fact the
Emperor did on the 28th issue orders for a general advance on the
Pakhra. As Kutuzov envisaged the situation, he would have the whole
_Grande Armée_, enormously superior in regular troops, upon his own
weakened forces. The superior condition of his cavalry and artillery
could scarcely be relied upon to give him more than a doubtful success.
On the other hand, every day would bring the winter nearer and ensure
the steady increase of the Russian numbers. He accordingly decided
to retire towards Kaluga. The 4th Corps was detailed to strengthen
Raievski, and Miloradovich took command of the rear-guard. On the
27th there was a brisk encounter of cavalry on the Pakhra. On the 29th
another engagement took place at Czerikovo. Poniatowski’s infantry were
checked; General Ferrier was wounded and taken, and the advantage was,
on the whole, with Miloradovich, who retired very slowly, contesting
every mile of country.
On October 2nd the main Russian army reached Tarutino on the Nara,
some 50 miles from Moscow, and took up a position, to protect which
entrenchments were immediately commenced. Next day Sebastiani, always
unlucky, experienced a slight check near Voronovo, but when Murat’s
main column began to arrive Miloradovich retreated to Spas Kuplia, 10
miles north of Tarutino. The 4th and 7th Corps were drawn back towards
the main army, covered by the 8th and most of the cavalry. Early on
the 4th Murat and Poniatowski surprised the Russians. Spas Kuplia was
carried and the 8th Corps driven back behind the Chernishnia rivulet,
half-way to Tarutino. Konovnitzin, with whom was Sir Robert Wilson, was
nearly captured, but he rode out of the danger-zone, his night-cap,
in which he had been surprised, showing under his cocked hat, puffing
coolly at his pipe all the time. So Löwenstern describes the scene. The
8th Corps rallied and held firm upon the Chernishnia until night, and
eventually retired across the Nara to Tarutino. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th
Cavalry Divisions (the first two now amalgamated) and some Cossacks
remained in observation of the French north of the Nara. Murat’s
offensive power had exhausted itself, and he halted, disposing the bulk
of his force along the Chernishnia, with his advance troops at the
village of Vinkovo.
Meanwhile the presence of Dorokhov south-east of Moscow had caused
Napoleon to send some twenty miles on the road to Mozhaïsk, Broussier’s
infantry division, the light cavalry of the 4th Corps, and the Dragoons
and Chasseurs of the Guard. This for the moment relieved the road to
Mozhaïsk, but the whole route to Smolensk was infested by Cossacks;
and Napoleon was obliged to issue an order that no body of troops less
than 1500 strong was to be risked along it. Kutuzov’s withdrawal to
Tarutino seems for a short time to have improved matters near Moscow.
Murat, with the reserve cavalry, the bulk of the light horse of the
1st and 3rd Corps, the 5th Corps, Dufour’s and Claparède’s divisions,
remained on the Chernishnia. Broussier was stationed about 9 miles
west of Moscow; Friederichs on the Pakhra; the Guard Cavalry returned
to Moscow. Foraging detachments were despatched over the surrounding
country to gather in food and fodder--with poor results--and in this
manner a fortnight passed away.