souls of the lower animals, we have first to inform ourselves as to the
savage man’s idea, which is very different from the civilized man’s, of
the nature of these lower animals. A remarkable group of observances
customary among rude tribes will bring this distinction sharply into
view. Savages talk quite seriously to beasts alive or dead as they would
to men alive or dead, offer them homage, ask pardon when it is their
painful duty to hunt and kill them. A North American Indian will reason
with a horse as if rational. Some will spare the rattlesnake, fearing
the vengeance of its spirit if slain; others will salute the creature
reverently, bid it welcome as a friend from the land of spirits,
sprinkle a pinch of tobacco on its head for an offering, catch it by the
tail and dispatch it with extreme dexterity, and carry off its skin as a
trophy. If an Indian is attacked and torn by a bear, it is that the
beast fell upon him intentionally in anger, perhaps to revenge the hurt
done to another bear. When a bear is killed, they will beg pardon of
him, or even make him condone the offence by smoking the peace-pipe with
his murderers, who put the pipe in his mouth and blow down it, begging
his spirit not to take revenge.[750] So in Africa, the Kafirs will hunt
the elephant, begging him not to tread on them and kill them, and when
he is dead they will assure him that they did not kill him on purpose,
and they will bury his trunk, for the elephant is a mighty chief, and
his trunk is his hand that he may hurt withal. The Congo people will
even avenge such a murder by a pretended attack on the hunters who did
the deed.[751] Such customs are common among the lower Asiatic tribes.
The Stiens of Kambodia ask pardon of the beast they have killed;[752]
the Ainos of Yesso kill the bear, offer obeisance and salutation to him,
and cut up his carcase.[753] The Koriaks, if they have slain a bear or
wolf, will flay him, dress one of their people in the skin, and dance
round him, chanting excuses that they did not do it, and especially
laying the blame on a Russian. But if it is a fox, they take his skin,
wrap his dead body in hay, and sneering tell him to go to his own people
and say what famous hospitality he has had, and how they gave him a new
coat instead of his old one.[754] The Samoyeds excuse themselves to the
slain bear, telling him it was the Russians who did it, and that a
Russian knife will cut him up.[755] The Goldi will set up the slain
bear, call him ‘my lord’ and do ironical homage to him, or taking him
alive will fatten him in a cage, call him ‘son’ and ‘brother,’ and kill
and eat him as a sacrifice at a solemn festival.[756] In Borneo, the
Dayaks, when they have caught an alligator with a baited hook and rope,
address him with respect and soothing till they have his legs fast, and
then mocking call him ‘rajah’ and ‘grandfather.’[757] Thus when the
savage gets over his fears, he still keeps up in ironical merriment the
reverence which had its origin in trembling sincerity. Even now the
Norse hunter will say with horror of a bear that will attack man, that
he can be ‘no Christian bear.’
The sense of an absolute psychical distinction between man and beast, so
prevalent in the civilized world, is hardly to be found among the lower
races. Men to whom the cries of beasts and birds seem like human
language, and their actions guided as it were by human thought,
logically enough allow the existence of souls to beasts, birds, and
reptiles, as to men. The lower psychology cannot but recognize in beasts
the very characteristics which it attributes to the human soul, namely,
the phenomena of life and death, will and judgment, and the phantom seen
in vision or in dream. As for believers, savage or civilized, in the
great doctrine of metempsychosis, these not only consider that an animal
may have a soul, but that this soul may have inhabited a human being,
and thus the creature may be in fact their own ancestor or once familiar
friend. A line of facts, arranged as waymarks along the course of
civilization, will serve to indicate the history of opinion from
savagery onward, as to the souls of animals during life and after death.
North American Indians held every animal to have its spirit, and these
spirits their future life; the soul of the Canadian dog went to serve
his master in the other world; among the Sioux, the prerogative of
having four souls was not confined to man, but belonged also to the
bear, the most human of animals.[758] The Greenlanders considered that a
sick human soul might be replaced by the sorcerer with a fresh healthy
soul of a hare, a reindeer, or a young child.[759] Maori tale-tellers
have heard of the road by which the spirits of dogs descend to Reinga,
the Hades of the departed; the Hovas of Madagascar know that the ghosts
of beasts and men, dwelling in a great mountain in the south called
Ambondrombe, come out occasionally to walk among the tombs or
execution-places of criminals.[760] The Kamchadals held that every
creature, even the smallest fly, would live again in the
under-world.[761] The Kukis of Assam think that the ghost of every
animal a Kuki kills in the chase or for the feast will belong to him in
the next life, even as the enemy he slays in the field will then become
his slave. The Karens apply the doctrine of the spirit or personal
life-phantom, which is apt to wander from the body and thus suffer
injury, equally to men and to animals.[762] The Zulus say the cattle
they kill come to life again, and become the property of the dwellers in
the world beneath.[763] The Siamese butcher, when in defiance of the
very principles of his Buddhism he slaughters an ox, before he kills the
creature has at least the grace to beseech its spirit to seek a happier
abode.[764] In connexion with such transmigration, Pythagorean and
Platonic philosophy gives to the lower animals undying souls, while
other classic opinion may recognize in beasts only an inferior order of
soul, only the ‘anima’ but not the human ‘animus’ besides. Thus Juvenal:
‘Principio indulsit communis conditor illis
Tantum animas; nobis animum quoque....’[765]
Through the middle ages, controversy as to the psychology of brutes has
lasted on into our own times, ranging between two extremes; on the one
the theory of Descartes which reduced animals to mere machines, on the
other what Mr. Alger defines as ‘the faith that animals have immaterial
and deathless souls.’ Among modern speculations may be instanced that of
Wesley, who thought that in the next life animals will be raised even
above their bodily and mental state at the creation, ‘the horridness of
their appearance will be exchanged for their primæval beauty,’ and it
even may be that they will be made what men are now, creatures capable
of religion. Adam Clarke’s argument for the future life of animals rests
on abstract justice: whereas they did not sin, but yet are involved in
the sufferings of sinful man, and cannot have in the present state the
happiness designed for them, it is reasonable that they must have it in
another.[766] Although, however, the primitive belief in the souls of
animals still survives to some extent in serious philosophy, it is
obvious that the tendency of educated opinion on the question whether
brutes have soul, as distinguished from life and mind, has for ages been
in a negative and sceptical direction. The doctrine has fallen from its
once high estate. It belonged originally to real, though rude science.
It has now sunk to become a favourite topic in that mild speculative
talk which still does duty so largely as intellectual conversation, and
even then its propounders defend it with a lurking consciousness of its
being after all a piece of sentimental nonsense.
Animals being thus considered in the primitive psychology to have souls
like human beings, it follows as the simplest matter of course that
tribes who kill wives and slaves, to dispatch their souls on errands of
duty with their departed lords, may also kill animals in order that
their spirits may do such service as is proper to them. The Pawnee
warrior’s horse is slain on his grave to be ready for him to mount
again, and the Comanche’s best horses are buried with his favourite
weapons and his pipe, all alike to be used in the distant happy
hunting-grounds.[767] In South America not only do such rites occur, but
they reach a practically disastrous extreme. Patagonian tribes, says
D’Orbigny, believe in another life, where they are to enjoy perfect
happiness, therefore they bury with the deceased his arms and ornaments,
and even kill on his tomb all the animals which belonged to him, that he
may find them in the abode of bliss; and this opposes an insurmountable
barrier to all civilization, by preventing them from accumulating
property and fixing their habitations.[768] Not only do Pope’s now
hackneyed lines express a real motive with which the Indian’s dog is
buried with him, but on the North American continent the spirit of the
dog has another remarkable office to perform. Certain Esquimaux, as
Cranz relates, would lay a dog’s head in a child’s grave, that the soul
of the dog, who is everywhere at home, might guide the helpless infant
to the land of souls. In accordance with this, Captain Scoresby in
Jameson’s Land found a dog’s skull in a small grave, probably a child’s.
Again, in the distant region of the Aztecs, one of the principal funeral
ceremonies was to slaughter a techichi, or native dog; it was burnt or
buried with the corpse, with a cotton thread fastened to its neck, and
its office was to convey the deceased across the deep waters of
Chiuhnahuapan, on the way to the Land of the Dead.[769] The dead
Buraet’s favourite horse, led saddled to the grave, killed, and flung
in, may serve for a Tatar example.[770] In Tonquin, even wild animals
have been customarily drowned at funeral ceremonies of princes, to be at
the service of the departed in the next world.[771] Among Semitic
tribes, an instance of the custom may be found in the Arab sacrifice of
a camel on the grave, for the dead man’s spirit to ride upon.[772] Among
the nations of the Aryan race in Europe, the prevalence of such rites is
deep, wide, and full of purpose. Thus, warriors were provided in death
with horses and housings, with hounds and falcons. Customs thus
described in chronicle and legend, are vouched for in our own time by
the opening of old barbaric burial-places. How clear a relic of savage
meaning lies here may be judged from a Livonian account as late as the
fourteenth century, which relates how men and women slaves, sheep and
oxen, with other things, were burnt with the dead, who, it was believed,
would reach some region of the living, and find there, with the
multitude of cattle and slaves, a country of life and happiness.[773] As
usual, these rites may be traced onward in survival. The Mongols, who
formerly slaughtered camels and horses at their owner’s burial, have
been induced to replace the actual sacrifice by a gift of the cattle to
the Lamas.[774] The Hindus offer a black cow to the Brahmans, in order
to secure their passage across the Vaitaranî, the river of death, and
will often die grasping the cow’s tail as if to swim across in
herdsman’s fashion, holding on to a cow.[775] It is mentioned as a
belief in Northern Europe that he who has given a cow to the poor will
find a cow to take him over the bridge of the dead, and a custom of
leading a cow in the funeral procession is said to have been kept up to
modern times.[776] All these rites probably belong together as connected
with ancient funeral sacrifice, and the survival of the custom of
sacrificing the warrior’s horse at his tomb is yet more striking.
Saint-Foix long ago put the French evidence very forcibly. Mentioning
the horse led at the funeral of Charles VI., with the four
valets-de-pied in black, and bareheaded, holding the corners of its
caparison, he recalls the horses and servants killed and buried with
præ-Christian kings. And that his readers may not think this an
extraordinary idea, he brings forward the records of property and horses
being presented at the offertory in Paris, in 1329, of Edward III.
presenting horses at King John’s funeral in London, and of the funeral
service for Bertrand Duguesclin, at St. Denis, in 1389, when horses were
offered, the Bishop of Auxerre laid his hand on their heads, and they
were afterwards compounded for.[777] Germany retained the actual
sacrifice within the memory of living men. A cavalry general, Count
Friedrich Kasimir Boos von Waldeck, was buried at Treves in 1781
according to the forms of the Teutonic Order; his horse was led in the
procession, and the coffin having been lowered into the grave the horse
was killed and thrown in upon it.[778] This was, perhaps, the last
occasion when such a sacrifice was consummated in solemn form in Europe.
But that pathetic incident of a soldier’s funeral, the leading of the
saddled and bridled charger in the mournful procession, keeps up to this
day a lingering reminiscence of the grim religious rite now passed away.
Plants, partaking with animals the phenomena of life and death, health
and sickness, not unnaturally have some kind of soul ascribed to them.
In fact, the notion of a vegetable soul, common to plants and to the
higher organisms possessing an animal soul in addition, was familiar to
mediæval philosophy, and is not yet forgotten by naturalists. But in the
lower ranges of culture, at least within one wide district of the world,
the souls of plants are much more fully identified with the souls of
animals. The Society Islanders seem to have attributed ‘varua,’ i.e.
surviving soul or spirit, not to men only but to animals and
plants.[779] The Dayaks of Borneo not only consider men and animals to
have a spirit or living principle, whose departure from the body causes
sickness and eventually death, but they also give to the rice its
‘samangat padi,’ or ‘spirit of the paddy,’ and they hold feasts to
retain this soul securely, lest the crop should decay.[780] The Karens
say that plants as well as men and animals have their ‘là’ (‘kelah’),
and the spirit of sickly rice is here also called back like a human
spirit considered to have left the body. Their formulas for the purpose
have even been written down, and this is part of one:—‘O come, rice
kelah, come. Come to the field. Come to the rice.... Come from the West.
Come from the East. From the throat of the bird, from the maw of the
ape, from the throat of the elephant.... From all granaries come. O rice
kelah, come to the rice.’[781] There is reason to think that the
doctrine of the spirits of plants lay deep in the intellectual history
of South-East Asia, but was in great measure superseded under Buddhist
influence. The Buddhist books show that in the early days of their
religion, it was matter of controversy whether trees had souls, and
therefore whether they might lawfully be injured. Orthodox Buddhism
decided against the tree-souls, and consequently against the scruple to
harm them, declaring trees to have no mind or sentient principle, though
admitting that certain dewas or spirits do reside in the body of trees,
and speak from within them. Buddhists also relate that a heterodox sect
kept up the early doctrine of the actual animate life of trees, in
connexion with which may be remembered Marco Polo’s somewhat doubtful
statement as to certain austere Indians objecting to green herbs for
such a reason, and some other passages from later writers. The subject
of the spirits of plants is an obscure one, whether from the lower races
not having definite opinions, or from our not finding it easy to trace
them.[782] The evidence from funeral sacrifices, so valuable as to most
departments of early psychology, fails us here, from plants not being
thought suitable to send for the service of the dead.[783] Yet, as we
shall see more fully elsewhere, there are two topics which bear closely
on the matter. On the one hand, the doctrine of transmigration widely
and clearly recognises the idea of trees or smaller plants being
animated by human souls; on the other, the belief in tree-spirits and
the practice of tree-worship involve notions more or less closely
coinciding with that of tree-souls, as when the classic hamadryad dies
with her tree, or when the Talein of South-East Asia, considering every
tree to have a demon or spirit, offers prayers before he cuts one down.
Thus far the details of the lower animistic philosophy are not very
unfamiliar to modern students. The primitive view of the souls of men
and beasts, as asserted or acted on in the lower and middle levels of
culture, so far belongs to current civilized thought, that those who
hold the doctrine to be false, and the practices based upon it futile,
can nevertheless understand and sympathise with the lower nations to
whom they are matters of the most sober and serious conviction. Nor is
even the notion of a separable spirit or soul as the cause of life in
plants too incongruous with ordinary ideas to be readily appreciable.
But the theory of souls in the lower culture stretches beyond this
limit, to take in a conception much stranger to modern thought. Certain
high savage races distinctly hold, and a large proportion of other
savage and barbarian races make a more or less close approach to, a
theory of separable and surviving souls or spirits belonging to stocks
and stones, weapons, boats, food, clothes, ornaments, and other objects
which to us are not merely soulless but lifeless.
Yet, strange as such a notion may seem to us at first sight, if we place
ourselves by an effort in the intellectual position of an uncultured
tribe, and examine the theory of object-souls from their point of view,
we shall hardly pronounce it irrational. In discussing the origin of
myth, some account has been already given of the primitive stage of
thought in which personality and life are ascribed not to men and beasts
only, but to things. It has been shown how what we call inanimate
objects—rivers, stones, trees, weapons, and so forth—are treated as
living intelligent beings, talked to, propitiated, punished for the harm
they do. Hume, whose ‘Natural History of Religion’ is perhaps more than
any other work the source of modern opinions as to the development of
religion, comments on the influence of this personifying stage of
thought. ‘There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all
beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities
with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are
intimately conscious.... The _unknown causes_, which continually employ
their thought, appearing always in the same aspect, are all apprehended
to be of the same kind or species. Nor is it long before we ascribe to
them thought and reason, and passion, and sometimes even the limbs and
figures of men, in order to bring them nearer to a resemblance with
ourselves.’ Auguste Comte has ventured to bring such a state of thought
under terms of strict definition in his conception of the primary mental
condition of mankind—a state of ‘pure fetishism, constantly
characterized by the free and direct exercise of our primitive tendency
to conceive all external bodies soever, natural or artificial, as
animated by a life essentially analogous to our own, with mere
differences of intensity.’[784] Our comprehension of the lower stages of
mental culture depends much on the thoroughness with which we can
appreciate this primitive, childlike conception, and in this our best
guide may be the memory of our own childish days. He who recollects when
there was still personality to him in posts and sticks, chairs, and
toys, may well understand how the infant philosophy of mankind could
extend the notion of vitality to what modern science only recognises as
lifeless things; thus one main part of the lower animistic doctrine as
to souls of objects is accounted for. The doctrine requires for its full
conception of a soul not only life, but also a phantom or apparitional
spirit; this development, however, follows without difficulty, for the
evidence of dreams and visions applies to the spirits of objects in much
the same manner as to human ghosts. Everyone who has seen visions while
lightheaded in fever, everyone who has ever dreamt a dream, has seen the
phantoms of objects as well as of persons. How then can we charge the
savage with far-fetched absurdity for taking into his philosophy and
religion an opinion which rests on the very evidence of his senses? The
notion is implicitly recognized in his accounts of ghosts, which do not
come naked, but clothed, and even armed; of course there must be spirits
of garments and weapons, seeing that the spirits of men come bearing
them. It will indeed place savage philosophy in no unfavourable light,
if we compare this extreme animistic development of it with the popular
opinion still surviving in civilized countries, as to ghosts and the
nature of the human soul as connected with them. When the ghost of
Hamlet’s father appeared armed cap-a-pe,
‘Such was the very armour he had on,
When he the ambitious Norway combated.’
And thus it is a habitual feature of the ghost-stories of the civilized,
as of the savage world, that the ghost comes dressed, and even dressed
in well-known clothing worn in life. Hearing as well as sight testifies
to the phantoms of objects: the clanking of ghostly chains and the
rustling of ghostly dresses are described in the literature of
apparitions. Now by the savage theory, according to which the ghost and
his clothes are alike real and objective, and by the modern scientific
theory, according to which both ghost and garment are alike imaginary
and subjective, the facts of apparitions are rationally met. But the
modern vulgar who ignore or repudiate the notion of ghosts of things,
while retaining the notion of ghosts of persons, have fallen into a
hybrid state of opinion which has neither the logic of the savage nor of
the civilized philosopher.
Among the lower races of mankind, three have been observed to hold most
explicitly and distinctly the doctrine of object-souls. These are the
Algonquin tribes, extending over a great district of North America, the
islanders of the Fijian group, and the Karens of Burma. Among the
Indians of North America, Father Charlevoix wrote, souls are, as it
were, the shadows and the animated images of the body, and it is by a
consequence of this principle that they believe everything to be animate
in the universe. This missionary was especially conversant with the
Algonquins, and it was among one of their tribes, the Ojibwas, that
Keating noticed the opinion that not only men and beasts have souls, but
inorganic things, such as kettles, &c., have in them a similar essence.
In the same district Father Le Jeune had described, in the seventeenth
century, the belief that the souls, not only of men and animals, but of
hatchets and kettles, had to cross the water to the Great Village, out
where the sun sets.[785] In interesting correspondence with this quaint
thought is Mariner’s description of the Fiji doctrine—‘If an animal or a
plant die, its soul immediately goes to Bolotoo; if a stone or any other
substance is broken, immortality is equally its reward; nay, artificial
bodies have equal good luck with men, and hogs, and yams. If an axe or a
chisel is worn out or broken up, away flies its soul for the service of
the gods. If a house is taken down or any way destroyed, its immortal
part will find a situation on the plains of Bolotoo; and, to confirm
this doctrine, the Fiji people can show you a sort of natural well, or
deep hole in the ground, at one of their islands, across the bottom of
which runs a stream of water, in which you may clearly perceive the
souls of men and women, beasts and plants, of stocks and stones, canoes
and houses, and of all the broken utensils of this frail world,
swimming, or rather tumbling along one over the other pell-mell into the
regions of immortality.’ A full generation later the Rev. Thomas
Williams, while remarking that the escape of brutes and lifeless
substances to the spirit-land of Mbulu does not receive universal credit
among the Fijians, nevertheless confirms the older account of it:—‘Those
who profess to have seen the souls of canoes, houses, plants, pots, or
any artificial bodies, swimming with other relics of this frail world on
the stream of the Kauvandra well, which bears them into the regions of
immortality, believe this doctrine as a matter of course; and so do
those who have seen the footmarks left about the same well by the ghosts
of dogs, pigs, &c.’[786] The theory among the Karens is stated by the
Rev. E. B. Cross, as follows:—‘Every object is supposed to have its
“kelah.” Axes and knives, as well as trees and plants, are supposed to
have their separate “kelahs.”’ ‘The Karen, with his axe and cleaver, may
build his house, cut his rice, and conduct his affairs, after death as
before.’[787]
As so many races perform funeral sacrifices of men and animals, in order
to dispatch their souls for the service of the soul of the deceased, so
tribes who hold this doctrine of object-souls very rationally sacrifice
objects, in order to transmit these souls. Among the Algonquin tribes,
the sacrifice of objects for the dead was a habitual rite, as when we
read of a warrior’s corpse being buried with musket and war-club,
calumet and war-paint, and a public address being made to the body at
burial concerning his future path; while in like manner a woman would be
buried with her paddle and kettle, and the carrying-strap for the
everlasting burden of her heavily-laden life. That the purpose of such
offerings is the transmission of the object’s spirit or phantom to the
possession of the man’s is explicitly stated as early as 1623 by Father
Lallemant; when the Indians buried kettles, furs, &c., with the dead,
they said that the bodies of the things remained, but their souls went
to the dead who used them. The whole idea is graphically illustrated in
the following Ojibwa tradition or myth. Gitchi Gauzini was a chief who
lived on the shores of Lake Superior, and once, after a few days’
illness, he seemed to die. He had been a skilful hunter, and had desired
that a fine gun which he possessed should be buried with him when he
died. But some of his friends not thinking him really dead, his body was
not buried; his widow watched him for four days, he came back to life,
and told his story. After death, he said, his ghost travelled on the
broad road of the dead toward the happy land, passing over great plains
of luxuriant herbage, seeing beautiful groves, and hearing the songs of
innumerable birds, till at last, from the summit of a hill, he caught
sight of the distant city of the dead, far across an intermediate space,
partly veiled in mist, and spangled with glittering lakes and streams.
He came in view of herds of stately deer and moose, and other game,
which with little fear walked near his path. But he had no gun, and
remembering how he had requested his friends to put his gun in his
grave, he turned back to go and fetch it. Then he met face to face the
train of men, women, and children who were travelling toward the city of
the dead. They were heavily laden with guns, pipes, kettles, meats, and
other articles; women were carrying basket-work and painted paddles, and
little boys had their ornamented clubs and their bows and arrows, the
presents of their friends. Refusing a gun which an overburdened
traveller offered him, the ghost of Gitchi Gauzini travelled back in
quest of his own, and at last reached the place where he had died. There
he could see only a great fire before and around him, and finding the
flames barring his passage on every side, he made a desperate leap
through, and awoke from his trance. Having concluded his story, he gave
his auditors this counsel, that they should no longer deposit so many
burdensome things with the dead, delaying them on their journey to the
place of repose, so that almost everyone he met complained bitterly. It
would be wiser, he said, only to put such things in the grave as the
deceased was particularly attached to, or made a formal request to have
deposited with him.[788]
With purpose no less distinct, when a dead Fijian chief is laid out
oiled and painted and dressed as in life, a heavy club is placed ready
near his right hand, which holds one or more of the much-prized carved
‘whale’s tooth’ ornaments. The club is to serve for defence against the
adversaries who await his soul on the road to Mbulu, seeking to slay and
eat him. We hear of a Fijian taking a club from a companion’s grave, and
remarking in explanation to a missionary who stood by, ‘The ghost of the
club has gone with him.’ The purpose of the whale’s tooth is this; on
the road to the land of the dead, near the solitary hill of
Takiveleyawa, there stands a ghostly pandanus-tree, and the spirit of
the dead man is to throw the spirit of the whale’s tooth at this tree,
having struck which he is to ascend the hill and await the coming of the
spirits of his strangled wives.[789] The funeral rites of the Karens
complete the present group. They kept up what seems a clear survival
from actual human and animal sacrifice, fastening up near an important
person’s grave a slave and a pony; these invariably released themselves,
and the slave became henceforth a free man. Moreover, the practice of
placing food, implements and utensils, and valuables of gold and silver,
near the remains of the deceased, was general among them.[790]
Now the sacrifice of property for the dead is one of the great religious
rites of the world; are we then justified in asserting that all men who
abandon or destroy property as a funeral ceremony believe the articles
to have spirits, which spirits are transmitted to the deceased? Not so;
it is notorious that there are people who recognize no such theory but
who nevertheless deposit offerings with the dead. Affectionate fancy or
symbolism, a horror of the association of death leading the survivors to
get rid of anything that even suggests the dreadful thought, a desire to
abandon the dead man’s property, an idea that the hovering ghost may
take pleasure in or make use of the gifts left for him, all these are or
may be efficient motives.[791] Yet, having made full allowance for all
this, we shall find good reason to judge that many other peoples, though
they may never have stated the theory of object-souls in the same
explicit way as the Algonquins, Fijians, and Karens, have recognized it
with more or less distinctness. It has given me the more confidence in
this opinion to find it held, under proper reservation, by Mr. W. R.
Alger, an American investigator, who in a treatise entitled ‘A Critical
History of the Doctrine of a Future Life’ has discussed the ethnography
of his subject with remarkable learning and sagacity. ‘The barbarian
brain,’ he writes, ‘seems to have been generally impregnated with the
feeling that everything else has a ghost as well as man.... The custom
of burning or burying things with the dead probably arose, in some cases
at least, from the supposition that every object, has its _manes_.’[792]
It will be desirable briefly to examine further the subject of funeral
offerings, as bearing on this interesting question of early psychology.
A wide survey of funeral sacrifices over the world will plainly show one
of their most usual motives to be a more or less defined notion of
benefiting the deceased, whether out of kindness to him or from fear of
his displeasure. How such an intention may have taken this practical
shape we can perhaps vaguely guess, familiar as we are with a state of
mind out of which funeral sacrifices could naturally have sprung. The
man is dead, but it is still possible to fancy him alive, to take his
cold hand, to speak to him, to place his chair at the table, to bury
suggestive mementoes in his coffin, to throw flowers into his grave, to
hang wreaths of everlastings on his tomb. The Cid may be set on Babieca
with his sword Tizona in his hand, and carried out to do battle as of
old against the unbeliever; the dead king’s meal may be carried in to
him in state, although the chamberlain must announce that the king does
not dine to-day. Such childlike ignoring of death, such childlike
make-believe that the dead can still do as heretofore, may well have led
the savage to bury with his kinsman the weapons, clothes, and ornaments
that he used in life, to try to feed the corpse, to put a cigar in the
mouth of the skull before its final burial, to lay playthings in the
infant’s grave. But one thought beyond would carry this dim blind fancy
into the range of logical reasoning. Granted that the man is dead and
his soul gone out of him, then the way to provide that departed soul
with food or clothes or weapons is to bury or burn them with the body,
for whatever happens to the man may be taken to happen to the objects
that lie beside him and share his fate, while the precise way in which
the transmission takes place may be left undecided. It is possible that
the funeral sacrifice customary among mankind may have rested at first,
and may to some extent still rest, on vague thoughts and imaginations
like these, as yet fitted into no more definite and elaborate
philosophic theory.
There are, however, two great groups of cases of funeral sacrifice,
which so logically lead up to or involve the notion of souls or spirits
of objects, that the sacrificer himself could hardly answer otherwise a
point-blank question as to their meaning. The first group is that in
which those who sacrifice men and beasts with the intention of conveying
their souls to the other world, also sacrifice lifeless things
indiscriminately with them. The second group is that in which the
phantoms of the objects sacrificed are traced distinctly into the
possession of the human phantom.
The Caribs, holding that after decease man’s soul found its way to the
land of the dead, sacrificed slaves on a chief’s grave to serve him in
the new life, and for the same purpose buried dogs with him, and also
weapons.[793] The Guinea negroes, at the funeral of a great man, killed
several wives and slaves to serve him in the other world, and put fine
clothes, gold fetishes, coral, beads, and other valuables, into the
coffin, to be used there too.[794] When the New Zealand chief had slaves
killed at his death for his service, and the mourning family gave his
chief widow a rope to hang herself with in the woods and so rejoin her
husband,[795] it is not easy to discern here a motive different from
that which induced them at the same time to provide the dead man also
with his weapons. Nor can an intellectual line well be drawn between the
intentions with which the Tunguz has buried with him his horse, his bow
and arrows, his smoking apparatus and kettle. In the typical description
which Herodotus gives of the funeral of the ancient Scythian chiefs, the
miscellaneous contents of the burial-mound, the strangled wife and
household servants, the horses, the choice articles of property, the
golden vessels, fairly represent the indiscriminate purpose which
actuated the barbaric sacrifice of creatures and things.[796] So in old
Europe, the warrior with his sword and spear, the horse with his saddle,
the hunter’s hound and hawk and his bow and arrow, the wife with her gay
clothes and jewels, lie together in the burial-mound. Their common
purpose has become one of the most undisputed inferences of Archæology.
As for what becomes of the objects sacrificed for the dead there are on
record the most distinct statements taken from the sacrificers
themselves. Although the objects rot in the grave or are consumed on the
pile, they nevertheless come in some way into the possession of the
disembodied souls they are intended for. Not the material things
themselves, but phantasmal shapes corresponding to them, are carried by
the souls of the dead on their far journey beyond the grave, or are used
in the world of spirits; while sometimes the phantoms of the dead appear
to the living, bearing property which they have received by sacrifice,
or demanding something that has been withheld. The Australian will take
his weapons with him to his paradise.[797] A Tasmanian, asked the reason
of a spear being deposited in a native’s grave, replied ‘To fight with
when he is asleep.’[798] Many Greenlanders thought that the kayak and
arrows and tools laid by a man’s grave, the knife and sewing implements
laid by a woman’s, would be used in the next world.[799] The instruments
buried with the Sioux are for him to make a living with hereafter; the
paints provided for the dead Iroquois were to enable him to appear
decently in the other world.[800] The Aztec’s water-bottle was to serve
him on the journey to Mictlan, the land of the dead; the bonfire of
garments and baskets and spoils of war was intended to send them with
him, and somehow to protect him against the bitter wind; the offerings
to the warrior’s manes on earth would reach him on the heavenly
plains.[801] Among the old Peruvians, a dead prince’s wives would hang
themselves in order to continue in his service, and many of his
attendants would be buried in his fields or places of favourite resort,
in order that his soul, passing through those places, might take their
souls along with him for future service. In perfect consistency with
these strong animistic notions, the Peruvians declared that their reason
for sacrifice of property to the dead was that they ‘have seen, or
thought they saw, those who have long been dead walking, adorned with
the things that were buried with them, and accompanied by their wives
who had been buried alive.’[802]
As definite an implication of the spirit or phantom of an object appears
in a recent account from Madagascar, where things are buried to become
in some way useful to the dead. When King Radama died, it was reported
and firmly believed that his ghost was seen one night in the garden of
his country seat, dressed in one of the uniforms which had been buried
with him, and riding one of the best horses killed opposite his
tomb.[803] Turanian tribes of North Asia avow that the motive of their
funeral offerings of horses and sledges, clothes and axes and kettles,
flint and steel and tinder, meat and butter, is to provide the dead for
his journey to the land of souls, and for his life there.[804] Among the
Esths of Northern Europe, the dead starts properly equipped on his
ghostly journey with needle and thread, hairbrush and soap, bread and
brandy and coin; a toy, if it is a child. And so full a consciousness of
practical meaning survived till lately, that now and then a soul would
come back at night to reproach its relations with not having provided
properly for it, but left it in distress.[805] To turn from these now
Europeanized Tatars to a rude race of the Eastern Archipelago, among the
Orang Binua of Sambawa there prevails this curious law of inheritance;
not only does each surviving relative, father, mother, son, brother, and
so forth, take his or her proper share, but the deceased inherits one
share from himself, which is devoted to his use by eating the animals at
the funeral feast, burning everything else that will burn, and burying
the remainder.[806] In Cochin China, the common people object to
celebrating their feast of the dead on the same day with the upper
classes, for this excellent reason, that the aristocratic souls might
make the servant souls carry home their presents for them. These people
employ all the resources of their civilization to perform with the more
lavish extravagance the savage funeral sacrifices. Here are details from
an account published in 1849 of the funeral of a late king of Cochin
China. ‘When the corpse of Thien Tri was deposited in the coffin, there
were also deposited in it many things for the use of the deceased in the
other world, such as his crown, turbans, clothes of all descriptions,
gold, silver, and other precious articles, rice and other provisions.’
Meals were set out near the coffin, and there was a framed piece of
damask with woollen characters, the abode of one of the souls of the
defunct. In the tomb, an enclosed edifice of stone, the childless wives
of the deceased were to be perpetually shut up to guard the sepulchre,
‘and prepare daily the food and other things of which they think the
deceased has need in the other life.’ At the time of the deposit of the
coffin in a cavern behind the tomb building, there were burnt there
great piles of boats, stages, and everything used in the funeral, ‘and
moreover of all the objects which had been in use by the king during his
lifetime, of chessmen, musical instruments, fans, boxes, parasols, mats,
fillets, carriages, &c., &c., and likewise a horse and an elephant of
wood and pasteboard.’ ‘Some months after the funeral, at two different
times, there were constructed in a forest near a pagoda two magnificent
palaces of wood with rich furnishings, in all things similar to the
palace which the defunct monarch had inhabited. Each palace was composed
of twenty rooms, and the most scrupulous attention was given in order
that nothing might be awanting necessary for a palace, and these palaces
were burned with great pomp, and it is thus that immense riches have
been given to the flames from the foolish belief that it would serve the
dead in the other world.’[807]
Though the custom is found among the Beduins of arraying the dead with
turban, girdle, and sword, yet funeral offerings for the service of
the dead are by no means conspicuous among Semitic nations. The
mention of the rite by Ezekiel, while showing a full sense of its
meaning, characterizes it as not Israelite, but Gentile: ‘The mighty
fallen of the uncircumcised, which are gone down to Hades with weapons
of war, and they have laid their swords under their heads.’[808] Among
the Aryan nations, on the contrary, such funeral offerings are known
to have prevailed widely and of old, while for picturesqueness of rite
and definiteness of purpose they can scarcely be surpassed even among
savages. Why the Brahman’s sacrificial instruments are to be burnt
with him on the funeral pile, appears from this line of the Veda
recited at the ceremony: ‘Yadâ gachâhatyasunîtimetâmathâ devânâm
vasanîrbhavâti,’—‘When he cometh unto that life, faithfully will he do
the service of the gods.’[809] Lucian is sarcastic, but scarcely
unfair, in his comments on the Greek funeral rites, speaking of those
who slew horses and slave-girls and cupbearers, and burned or buried
clothes and ornaments, as for use and service in the world below; of
the meat and drink offerings on the tombs which serve to feed the
bodiless shades in Hades; of the splendid garments and the garlands of
the dead, that they might not suffer cold upon the road, nor be seen
naked by Kerberos. For Kerberos was intended the honey-cake deposited
with the dead; and the obolus placed in the mouth was the toll for
Charon, save at Hermione in Argolis, where men thought there was a
short descent to Hades, and therefore provided the dead with no coin
for the grim ferryman. How such ideas could be realized, may be seen
in the story of Eukrates, whose dead wife appeared to him to demand
one of her golden sandals, which had been dropped underneath the
chest, and so not burnt for her with the rest of her wardrobe; or in
the story of Periander, whose dead wife Melissa refused to give him an
oracular response, for she was shivering and naked, because the
garments buried with her had not been burnt, and so were of no use,
wherefore Periander plundered the Corinthian women of their best
clothes, which he burned in a great trench with prayer, and now
obtained his answer.[810] The ancient Gauls were led, by their belief
in another life, to burn and bury with the dead things suited to the
living; nor is the record improbable that they transferred to the
world below the repayment of loans, for even in modern centuries the
Japanese would borrow money in this life, to be repaid with heavy
interest in the next.[811] The souls of the Norse dead took with them
from their earthly home servants and horses, boats and ferry-money,
clothes and weapons. Thus, in death as in life, they journeyed,
following the long dark ‘hell-way’ (helvegr). The ‘hell-shoon’
(helskó) were bound upon the dead man’s feet for the toilsome journey;
and when King Harald was slain in the battle of Bravalla, they drove
his war-chariot, with the corpse upon it into the great burial-mound,
and there they killed the horse, and King Hring gave his own saddle
beside, that the fallen chief might ride or drive to Walhalla, as it
pleased him.[812] Lastly, in the Lithuanian and old Prussian district,
where Aryan heathendom held its place in Europe so firmly and so late,
accounts of funeral sacrifice of men, and beasts, and things, date on
even beyond the middle ages. Even as they thought that men would live
again in the resurrection rich or poor, noble or peasant, as on earth,
so ‘they believed that the things burned would rise again with them,
and serve them as before.’ Among these people lived the Kriwe
Kriweito, the great priest, whose house was on the high steep mountain
Anafielas. All the Souls of their dead must clamber up this mountain,
wherefore they burned with them claws of bears and lynxes for their
help. All the souls must pass through the Kriwe’s house, and he could
describe to the surviving relatives of each the clothes, and horse,
and weapons he had seen him come with, and even show, for greater
certainty, some mark made with lance or other instrument by the
passing soul.[813] Such examples of funeral rites show a common
ceremony, and to a great degree a common purpose, obtaining from
savagery through barbarism, and even into the higher civilization. Now
could we have required from all these races a distinct answer to the
question, whether they believed in spirits of all things, from men and
beasts down to spears and cloaks, sticks and stones, it is likely that
we might have often received the same acknowledgment of fully
developed animism which stands on record in North America, Polynesia,
and Burma. Failing such direct testimony, it is at least justifiable
to say that the lower culture, by practically dealing with
object-souls, goes far towards acknowledging their existence.
Before quitting the discussion of funeral offerings for transmission to
the dead, the custom must be traced to its final decay. It is apt not to
die out suddenly, but to leave surviving remnants, more or less dwindled
in form and changed in meaning. The Kanowits of Borneo talk of setting a
man’s property adrift for use in the next world, and even go so far as
to lay out his valuables by the bier, but in fact they only commit to
the frail canoe a few old things not worth plundering.[814] So in North
America, the funeral sacrifice of the Winnebagos has come down to
burying a pipe and tobacco with the dead, and sometimes a club in a
warrior’s grave, while the goods brought and hung up at the burial-place
are no longer left there, but the survivors gamble for them.[815] The
Santals of Bengal put two vessels, one for rice and the other for water,
on the dead man’s couch, with a few rupees, to enable him to appease the
demons on the threshold of the shadowy world, but when the funeral pile
is ready these things are removed.[816] The fanciful art of replacing
costly offerings by worthless imitations is at this day worked out into
the quaintest devices in China. As the men and horses dispatched by fire
for the service of the dead are but paper figures, so offerings of
clothes and money may be represented likewise. The imitations of Spanish
pillar-dollars in pasteboard covered with tinfoil, the sheets of
tinfoil-paper which stand for silver money, and if coloured yellow for
gold, are consumed in such quantities that the sham becomes a serious
reality, for the manufacture of mock-money is the trade of thousands of
women and children in a Chinese city. In a similar way trunks full of
property are forwarded in the care of the newly deceased, to friends who
are gone before. Pretty paper houses, ‘replete with every luxury,’ as
our auctioneers say, are burnt for the dead Chinaman to live in
hereafter, and the paper keys are burnt also, that he may unfasten the
paper locks of the paper chests that hold the ingots of gold-paper and
silver-paper, which are to be realized as current gold and silver in the
other world, an idea which, however, does not prevent the careful
survivors from collecting the ashes to re-extract the tin from them in
this.[817] Again, when the modern Hindu offers to his dead parent
funeral cakes with flowers and betel, he presents a woollen yam which he
lays across the cake, and naming the deceased says, ‘May this apparel,
made of woollen yam, be acceptable to thee.’[818] Such facts as these
suggest a symbolic meaning in the practically useless offerings which
Sir John Lubbock groups together—the little models of kayaks and spears
in Esquimaux graves, the models of objects in Egyptian tombs, and the
flimsy unserviceable jewelry buried with the Etruscan dead.[819]
Just as people in Borneo, after they had become Mohammedans, still kept
up the rite of burying provisions for the dead man’s journey, as a mark
of respect,[820] so the rite of interring funeral offerings survived in
Christian Europe. The ancient Greek burial of the dead with the obolus
in his mouth for Charon’s toll is represented in the modern Greek world,
where Charon and the funeral coin are both familiar. As the old
Prussians furnished the dead with spending-money to buy refreshment on
his weary journey, so to this day German peasants bury a corpse with
money in his mouth or hand, a fourpenny-piece or so. Similar little
funeral offerings of coin are recorded in the folklore books elsewhere
in Europe.[821] Christian funeral offerings of this kind are mostly
trifling in value, and doubtful as to the meaning with which they were
kept up. The early Christians retained the heathen custom of placing in
the tomb such things as articles of the toilette and children’s
playthings; modern Greeks would place oars on a shipman’s grave, and
other such tokens for other crafts; the beautiful classic rite of
scattering flowers over the dead still holds its place in Europe.[822]
Whatever may have been the thoughts which first prompted these kindly
ceremonies, they were thoughts belonging to far præ-Christian ages. The
change of sacrifice from its early significance is shown among the
Hindus, who have turned it to account for purposes of priestcraft: he
who gives water or shoes to a Brahman will find water to refresh him,
and shoes to wear, on the journey to the next world, while the gift of a
present house will secure him a future palace.[823] In interesting
correspondence with this, is a transition from pagan to Christian
folklore in our own land. The Lyke-Wake Dirge, the not yet forgotten
funeral chant of the North Country, tells, like some savage or barbaric
legend, of the passage over the Bridge of Death and the dreadful journey
to the other world. But though the ghostly traveller’s feet are still
shod with the old Norseman’s hell-shoon, he gains them no longer by
funeral offering, but by his own charity in life:—
‘This a nighte, this a nighte
Every night and alle;
Fire and fleet and candle-light,
And Christe receive thy saule.
When thou from hence away are paste
Every night and alle;
To Whinny-moor thou comes at laste,
And Christe receive thy saule.
If ever thou gave either hosen or shoon,
Every night and alle;
Sit thee down and put them on,
And Christe receive thy saule.
But if hosen nor shoon thou never gave neean,
Every night and alle;
The Whinnes shall prick thee to the bare beean,
And Christe receive thy saule.
From Whinny-moore when thou may passe,
Every night and alle;
To Brig o’ Dread thou comes at laste,
And Christe receive thy saule.
From Brig o’ Dread when thou are paste,
Every night and alle;
To Purgatory Fire thou comes at laste,
And Christe receive thy saule.
If ever thou gave either milke or drink,
Every night and alle;
The fire shall never make thee shrinke,
And Christe receive thy saule.
But if milk nor drink thou never gave neean,
Every night and alle;
The fire shall burn thee to the bare beean
And Christe receive thy saule.’[824]
What reader, unacquainted with the old doctrine of offerings for the
dead, could realize the meaning of its remnants thus lingering in
peasants’ minds? The survivals from ancient funeral ceremony may here
again serve as warnings against attempting to explain relics of
intellectual antiquity by viewing them from the changed level of modern
opinion.
Having thus surveyed at large the theory of spirits or souls of objects,
it remains to point out what, to general students, may seem the most
important consideration belonging to it, namely, its close relation to
one of the most influential doctrines of civilized philosophy. The
savage thinker, though occupying himself so much with the phenomena of
life, sleep, disease, and death, seems to have taken for granted, as a
matter of course, the ordinary operations of his own mind. It hardly
occurred to him to think about the machinery of thinking. Metaphysics is
a study which first assumes clear shape at a comparatively high level of
intellectual culture. The metaphysical philosophy of thought taught in
our modern European lecture-rooms is historically traced back to the
speculative psychology of classic Greece. Now one doctrine which there
comes into view is especially associated with the name of Democritus,
the philosopher of Abdera, in the fifth century B.C. When Democritus
propounded the great problem of metaphysics, ‘How do we perceive
external things?’—thus making, as Lewes says, an era in the history of
philosophy,—he put forth, in answer to the question, a theory of
thought. He explained the fact of perception by declaring that things
are always throwing off images εἴδωλα of themselves, which images,
assimilating to themselves the surrounding air, enter a recipient soul,
and are thus perceived. Now, supposing Democritus to have been really
the originator of this famed theory of ideas, how far is he to be
considered its inventor? Writers on the history of philosophy are
accustomed to treat the doctrine as actually made by the philosophical
school which taught it. Yet the evidence here brought forward shows it
to be really the savage doctrine of object-souls, turned to a new
purpose as a method of explaining the phenomena of thought. Nor is the
correspondence a mere coincidence, for at this point of junction between
classic religion and classic philosophy the traces of historical
continuity may be still discerned. To say that Democritus was an ancient
Greek is to say that from his childhood he had looked on at the funeral
ceremonies of his country, beholding the funeral sacrifices of garments
and jewels and money and food and drink, rites which his mother and his
nurse could tell him were performed in order that the phantasmal images
of these objects might pass into the possession of forms shadowy like
themselves, the souls of dead men. Thus Democritus, seeking a solution
of his great problem of the nature of thought, found it by simply
decanting into his metaphysics a surviving doctrine of primitive savage
animism. This thought of the phantoms or souls of things, if simply
modified to form a philosophical theory of perception, would then and
there become his doctrine of Ideas. Nor does even this fully represent
the closeness of union which connects the savage doctrine of flitting
object-souls with the Epicurean philosophy. Lucretius actually makes the
theory of film-like images of things (simulacra, membranæ) account both
for the apparitions which come to men in dreams, and the images which
impress their minds in thinking. So unbroken is the continuity of
philosophic speculation from savage to cultured thought. Such are the
debts which civilized philosophy owes to primitive animism.
The doctrine of ideas, thus developed in the classic world, has, indeed,
by no means held its course thenceforth unchanged through metaphysics,
but has undergone transition somewhat like that of the doctrine of the
soul itself. Ideas, fined down to the abstract forms or species of
material objects, and applied to other than visible qualities, have at
last come merely to denote subjects of thought. Yet to this day the old
theory has not utterly died out, and the retention of the significant
term ‘idea’ (ἰδέα, visible form) is accompanied by a similar retention
of original meaning. It is still one of the tasks of the metaphysician
to display and refute the old notion of ideas as being real images, and
to replace it by more abstract conceptions. It is a striking instance
that Dugald Stewart can cite from the works of Sir Isaac Newton the
following distinct recognition of ‘sensible species:’ ‘Is not the
sensorium of animals, the place where the sentient substance is present;
and to which the sensible species of things are brought, through the
nerves and brain, that there they may be perceived by the mind present
in that place?’ Again, Dr. Reid states the original theory of ideas,
while declaring that he conceives it ‘to have no solid foundation,
though it has been adopted very generally by philosophers.... This
notion of our perceiving external objects, not immediately, but in
certain images or species of them conveyed by the senses, seems to be
the most ancient philosophical hypothesis we have on the subject of
perception, and to have, with small variations, retained its authority
to this day.’ Granted that Dr. Reid exaggerated the extent to which
metaphysicians have kept up the notion of ideas as real images of
things, few will deny that it does linger much in modern minds, and that
people who talk of ideas do often, in some hazy metaphorical way, think
of sensible images.[825] One of the shrewdest things ever said about
either ideas or ghosts was Bishop Berkeley’s retort upon Halley, who
bantered him about his idealism. The bishop claimed the mathematician as
an idealist also, his ‘ultimate ratios’ being ghosts of departed
quantities, appearing when the terms that produced them vanished.
It remains to sum up in few words the doctrine of souls, in the various
phases it has assumed from first to last among mankind. In the attempt
to trace its main course through the successive grades of man’s
intellectual history, the evidence seems to accord best with a theory of
its development, somewhat to the following effect. At the lowest levels
of culture of which we have clear knowledge, the notion of a ghost-soul
animating man while in the body, and appearing in dream and vision out
of the body, is found deeply ingrained. There is no reason to think that
this belief was learnt by savage tribes from contact with higher races,
nor that it is a relic of higher culture from which the savage tribes
have degenerated; for what is here treated as the primitive animistic
doctrine is thoroughly at home among savages, who appear to hold it on
the very evidence of their senses, interpreted on the biological
principle which seems to them most reasonable. We may now and then hear
the savage doctrines and practices concerning souls claimed as relics of
a high religious culture pervading the primæval race of man. They are
said to be traces of remote ancestral religion, kept up in scanty and
perverted memory by tribes degraded from a nobler state. It is easy to
see that such an explanation of some few facts, sundered from their
connexion with the general array, may seem plausible to certain minds.
But a large view of the subject can hardly leave such argument in
possession. The animism of savages stands for and by itself; it explains
its own origin. The animism of civilized men, while more appropriate to
advanced knowledge, is in great measure only explicable as a developed
product of the older and ruder system. It is the doctrines and rites of
the lower races which are, according to their philosophy, results of
point-blank natural evidence and acts of straightforward practical
purpose. It is the doctrines and rites of the higher races which show
survival of the old in the midst of the new, modification of the old to
bring it into conformity with the new, abandonment of the old because it
is no longer compatible with the new. Let us see at a glance in what
general relation the doctrine of souls among savage tribes stands to the
doctrine of souls among barbaric and cultured nations. Among races
within the limits of savagery, the general doctrine of souls is found
worked out with remarkable breadth and consistency. The souls of animals
are recognized by a natural extension from the theory of human souls;
the souls of trees and plants follow in some vague partial way; and the
souls of inanimate objects expand the general category to its extremest
boundary. Thenceforth, as we explore human thought onward from savage
into barbarian and civilized life, we find a state of theory more
conformed to positive science, but in itself less complete and
consistent. Far on into civilization, men still act as though in some
half-meant way they believed in souls or ghosts of objects, while
nevertheless their knowledge of physical science is beyond so crude a
philosophy. As to the doctrine of souls of plants, fragmentary evidence
of the history of its breaking down in Asia has reached us. In our own
day and country, the notion of souls of beasts is to be seen dying out.
Animism, indeed, seems to be drawing in its outposts, and concentrating
itself on its first and main position, the doctrine of the human soul.
This doctrine has undergone extreme modification in the course of
culture. It has outlived the almost total loss of one great argument
attached to it,—the objective reality of apparitional souls or ghosts
seen in dreams and visions. The soul has given up its ethereal
substance, and become an immaterial entity, ‘the shadow of a shade.’ Its
theory is becoming separated from the investigations of biology and
mental science, which now discuss the phenomena of life and thought, the
senses and the intellect, the emotions and the will, on a ground-work of
pure experience. There has arisen an intellectual product whose very
existence is of the deepest significance, a ‘psychology’ which has no
longer anything to do with ‘soul.’ The soul’s place in modern thought is
in the metaphysics of religion, and its especial office there is that of
furnishing an intellectual side to the religious doctrine of the future
life. Such are the alterations which have differenced the fundamental
animistic belief in its course through successive periods of the world’s
culture. Yet it is evident that, notwithstanding all this profound
change, the conception of the human soul is, as to its most essential
nature, continuous from the philosophy of the savage thinker to that of
the modern professor of theology. Its definition has remained from the
first that of an animating, separable, surviving entity, the vehicle of
individual personal existence. The theory of the soul is one principal
part of a system of religious philosophy which unites, in an unbroken
line of mental connexion, the savage fetish-worshipper and the civilized
Christian. The divisions which have separated the great religions of the
world into intolerant and hostile sects are for the most part
superficial in comparison with the deepest of all religious schisms,
that which divides Animism from Materialism.
Footnote 607:
J. D. Lang, ‘Queensland,’ pp. 340, 374, 380, 388, 444 (Buddai appears,
p. 379, as causing a deluge; he is probably identical with Budyah).
Footnote 608:
Moffat, ‘South Africa,’ p. 261.
Footnote 609:
Azara, ‘Voy. dans l’Amérique Méridionale,’ vol. ii. pp. 3, 14, 25, 51,
60, 91, 119, &c.; D’Orbigny, ‘L’Homme Américain,’ vol. ii. p. 318.
Footnote 610:
Muir, ‘Sanskrit Texts,’ part ii. p. 435; Euseb. ‘Hist. Eccl.’ iv. 15;
Bingham, book i. ch. ii.; Vanini, ‘De Admirandis Naturae Arcanis,’
dial. 37; Lecky, ‘Hist. of Rationalism,’ vol. i. p. 126; Encyclop.
Brit. (5th ed.) s.v. ‘Superstition.’
Footnote 611:
J. de Verrazano in Hakluyt, vol. iii. p. 300.
Footnote 612:
See W. Ellis, ‘Hist. of Madagascar,’ vol. i. p. 429; Flacourt, ‘Hist.
de Madagascar,’ p. 59.
Footnote 613:
Dampier, ‘Voyages,’ vol. ii. part ii. p. 76.
Footnote 614:
Roe in Pinkerton, vol. viii. p. 2.
Footnote 615:
Lubbock, ‘Prehistoric Times,’ p. 564: see also ‘Origin of
Civilization,’ p. 138.
Footnote 616:
Sproat, ‘Scenes and Studies of Savage Life,’ p. 205.
Footnote 617:
Mouat, ‘Andaman Islanders,’ pp. 2, 279, 303. Since the above was
written, the remarkable Andaman religion has been described by Mr. E.
H. Man, in ‘Journ. Anthrop. Inst.’ vol. xii. (1883) p. 156. (Note to
3rd ed.)
Footnote 618:
Baker, ‘Races of the Nile Basin,’ in Tr. Eth. Soc. vol. v. p. 231;
‘The Albert Nyanza,’ vol. i. p. 246. See Kaufmann, ‘Schilderungen aus
Central-afrika,’ p. 123; Brun-Rollet, ‘Le Nil Blanc et le Soudan,’ pp.
100, 222, also pp. 164, 200, 234; G. Lejean in ‘Rev. des Deux M.’
April 1, 1862, p. 760; Waitz, ‘Anthropologie,’ vol. ii. pp. 72-5;
Bastian, ‘Mensch,’ vol. iii. p. 208. Other recorded cases of denial of
religion of savage tribes on narrow definition or inadequate evidence
may be found in Meiners, ‘Gesch. der Rel.’ vol. i. pp. 11-15
(Australians and Californians); Waitz, ‘Anthropologie,’ vol. i. p. 323
(Aru Islanders, &c.); Farrar in ‘Anthrop. Rev.’ Aug. 1864, p. ccxvii,
(Kafirs, &c.); Martius, ‘Ethnog. Amer.’ vol. i. p. 583 (Manaos); J. G.
Palfrey, ‘Hist. of New England,’ vol. i. p. 46 (New England tribes).
Footnote 619:
The term has been especially used to denote the doctrine of Stahl, the
promulgator also of the phlogiston-theory. The Animism of Stahl is a
revival and development in modern scientific shape of the classic
theory identifying vital principle and soul. See his ‘Theoria Medica
Vera,’ Halle, 1737; and the critical dissertation on his views,
Lemoine, ‘Le Vitalisme et l’Animisme de Stahl,’ Paris, 1864.
Footnote 620:
Bonwick, ‘Tasmanians,’ p. 182.
Footnote 621:
Tanner’s ‘Narr.’ p. 291, Cree atchâk==soul.
Footnote 622:
Brasseur, ‘Langue Quichée,’ s.v.
Footnote 623:
Martius, ‘Ethnog. Amer.’ vol. i. p. 705; vol. ii. p. 310.
Footnote 624:
Dobrizhoffer, ‘Abipones,’ vol. ii. p. 194.
Footnote 625:
Döhne, ‘Zulu Dic.’ s.v. ‘tunzi;’ Callaway, ‘Rel. of Amazulu,’ pp. 91,
126; ‘Zulu Tales,’ vol. i. p. 342.
Footnote 626:
Casalis, ‘Basutos,’ p. 245; Arbousset and Daumas, ‘Voyage,’ p. 12.
Footnote 627:
Goldie, ‘Efik Dictionary,’ s.v.; see Kölle, ‘Afr. Native Lit.’ p. 324
(Kanuri). Also ‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ vol. v. p. 713 (Australian).
Footnote 628:
Dante, ‘Div. Comm. Purgatorio,’ canto iii. Compare Grohmann,
‘Aberglauben aus Böhmen,’ p. 221. See _ante_, p. 85.
Footnote 629:
Rochefort, pp. 429, 516; J. G. Müller, p. 207.
Footnote 630:
Mariner, ‘Tonga Is.’ vol. ii. p. 135; S. S. Farmer, ‘Tonga,’ &c. p.
131.
Footnote 631:
Casalis, l.c. See also Mariner, ibid.
Footnote 632:
Bastian, ‘Psychologie,’ pp. 15-23.
Footnote 633:
J. H. Bernau, ‘Brit. Guiana,’ p. 134.
Footnote 634:
Grimm, ‘D. M.’ pp. 1028, 1133. Anglo-Saxon _man-lica_.
Footnote 635:
Lieber, ‘Laura Bridgman,’ in Smithsonian Contrib. vol. ii. p. 8.
Footnote 636:
G. F. Moore, ‘Vocab. of W. Australia,’ p. 103.
Footnote 637:
Brinton, p. 50, see p. 235; Bastian, ‘Psychologie,’ p. 15.
Footnote 638:
Cranz, ‘Grönland,’ p. 257.
Footnote 639:
Crawfurd, ‘Malay Gr. and Dic.’ s.v.; Marsden, ‘Sumatra,’ p. 386.
Footnote 640:
Oviedo, ‘Hist. du Nicaragua,’ pp. 21-51.
Footnote 641:
Pott, ‘Zigeuner,’ vol. ii. p. 306; ‘Indo-Germ. Wurzel-Wörterbuch,’
vol. i. p. 1073; Borrow, ‘Lavengro,’ vol. ii. ch. xxvi. ‘write the lil
of him whose _dook_ gallops down that hill every night,’ see vol. iii.
ch. iv.
Footnote 642:
Brinton, ‘Myths of New World,’ p. 253; Comm. in Virg. Æn. iv. 684;
Cic. Verr. v. 45; Wuttke, ‘Volksaberglaube,’ p. 210; Rochholz,
‘Deutscher Glaube,’ &c. vol. i. p. 111.
Footnote 643:
Williams, ‘Fiji,’ vol. i. p. 241.
Footnote 644:
Ellis, ‘Madagascar,’ vol. i. p. 393.
Footnote 645:
Charlevoix, ‘Nouvelle France,’ vol. vi. pp. 75-8; Schoolcraft, ‘Indian
Tribes,’ part i. pp. 33, 83, part iv. p. 70; Waitz, vol. iii. p. 194;
J. G. Müller, pp. 66, 207-8.
Footnote 646:
Cross in ‘Journ. Amer. Oriental Soc.’ vol. iv. p. 310.
Footnote 647:
Macpherson, pp. 91-2. See also Klemm, ‘C. G.’ vol. iii. p. 71 (Lapp);
St. John, ‘Far East,’ vol. i. p. 189 (Dayaks).
Footnote 648:
Shürmann, ‘Vocab. of Parnkalla Lang.’ s.v.
Footnote 649:
Tanner’s ‘Narr.’ p. 291; Keating, ‘Narr. of Long’s Exp.’ vol. ii. p.
154.
Footnote 650:
Williams, ‘Fiji,’ vol. i. p. 242; see the converse process of catching
away a man’s soul, causing him to pine and die, p. 250.
Footnote 651:
J. L. Wilson, ‘W. Afr.’ p. 220.
Footnote 652:
Bastian, ‘Mensch,’ vol. ii. p. 319; also Sproat, p. 213 (Vancouver’s
I.).
Footnote 653:
Bastian, ‘Psychologie,’ p. 34; Gmelin, ‘Reisen durch Sibirien,’ vol.
ii. p. 359 (Yakuts); Ravenstein, ‘Amur,’ p. 351 (Tunguz).
Footnote 654:
Bastian, ‘Oestl. Asien,’ vol. i. p. 143; vol. ii. pp. 388, 418; vol.
iii. p. 236. Mason, ‘Karens,’ l.c. p. 196, &c.; Cross, ‘Karens,’ in
‘Journ. Amer. Oriental Soc.’ vol. iv. 1854, p. 307. See also St. John,
‘Far East,’ l.c. (Dayaks).
Footnote 655:
Doolittle, ‘Chinese,’ vol. i. p. 150.
Footnote 656:
Cardan, ‘De Varietate Rerum,’ Basel, 1556, cap. xliii.
Footnote 657:
Stanbridge, ‘Abor. of Victoria,’ in ‘Tr. Eth. Soc.’ vol. i. p. 300.
Footnote 658:
Macpherson, ‘India,’ p. 103.
Footnote 659:
Cranz, ‘Grönland,’ p. 269. See also Sproat, l.c.
Footnote 660:
Rühs, ‘Finland,’ p. 303; Castrén, ‘Finn. Myth.’ p. 134; Bastian,
‘Mensch,’ vol. ii. p. 319.
Footnote 661:
Vatnsdæla Saga; Baring-Gould, ‘Werewolves,’ p. 29.
Footnote 662:
Plin. vii. 53; Lucian. Hermotimus, Musc. Encom. 7.
Footnote 663:
R. D. Owen, ‘Footfalls on the Boundary of another World,’ p. 259. See
A. R. Wallace, ‘Scientific Aspect of the Supernatural,’ p. 43.
Footnote 664:
Brand, ‘Pop. Ant.’ vol. i. p. 331, vol. iii. p. 236. See Calmet,
‘Diss. sur les Esprits;’ Maury, ‘Magie,’ part ii. ch. iv.
Footnote 665:
Cranz, ‘Grönland,’ p. 257.
Footnote 666:
Waitz, vol. iii. p. 195.
Footnote 667:
Taylor, ‘New Zealand,’ pp. 104, 184, 333; Baker in ‘Tr. Eth. Soc.’
vol. i. p. 57.
Footnote 668:
Bastian, ‘Mensch,’ vol. ii. p. 319; Jagor in ‘Journ. Eth. Soc.,’ vol.
ii. p. 175.
Footnote 669:
Mason, ‘Karens,’ l.c. p. 199; Cross, l.c.; Bastian, ‘Oestl. Asien,’
vol. i. p. 144, vol. ii. p. 389, vol. iii. p. 266.
Footnote 670:
Bastian, ‘Psychologie,’ pp. 16-20; Eisenmenger, vol. i. p. 458, vol.
ii. pp. 13, 20, 453; Franck, ‘Kabbale,’ p. 235.
Footnote 671:
Augustin. De Civ. Dei, xviii. 18.
Footnote 672:
Grimm, ‘D. M.’ p. 1036.
Footnote 673:
Charlevoix, ‘Nouvelle France,’ vol. vi. p. 78; Lafitau, ‘Mœurs des
Sauvages,’ vol. i. p. 363.
Footnote 674:
Callaway, ‘Relig. of Amazulu,’ pp. 228, 260, 316; ‘Journ. Anthrop.
Inst.’ vol. i. p. 170. See also St. John, ‘Far East,’ vol. i. p. 199
(Dayaks).
Footnote 675:
Williams, ‘Fiji,’ vol. i. p. 242.
Footnote 676:
Mayne, ‘Brit. Columbia,’ p. 261; see Sproat, l.c.
Footnote 677:
J. L. Wilson, ‘W. Africa,’ pp. 210, 395; M. H. Kingsley, ‘W. African
Studies,’ p. 205. See also Ellis, ‘Polyn. Res.’ vol. i. p. 396; J. G.
Müller, ‘Amer. Urrel.’ p. 287; Buchanan, ‘Mysore,’ in Pinkerton, vol.
viii. p. 677; ‘Early Hist. of Mankind,’ p. 8.
Footnote 678:
Homer. Il. xxiii. 59. See also Odyss. xi. 207, 222; Porphyr. De Antro
Nympharum; Virgil. Æn. ii. 794; Ovid. Fast. v. 475.
Footnote 679:
Cicero De Divinatione, i. 27.
Footnote 680:
Augustin. De Curâ pro Mortuis, x.-xii. Epist. clviii.
Footnote 681:
Compare Voltaire’s remarks, ‘Dict. Phil.’ art. ‘ame,’ &c.
Footnote 682:
Steinhauser, ‘Religion des Negers,’ in ‘Magazin der Evang. Missionen’,
Basel, 1856, No. 2, p. 135.
Footnote 683:
‘Historie del S. D. Fernando Colombo,’ tr. Alfonso Ulloa, Venice,
1571, p. 127, Eng. Tr. in Pinkerton, vol. xii. p. 80.
Footnote 684:
Castrén, ‘Finn. Myth.’ p. 120.
Footnote 685:
1 Sam. xxviii. 12.
Footnote 686:
Brinton, ‘Myths of New World,’ p. 269.
Footnote 687:
Pennant, ‘2nd Tour in Scotland,’ in Pinkerton, vol. iii. p. 315;
Johnson, ‘Journey to the Hebrides.’
Footnote 688:
J. Gardner, ‘Faiths of the World,’ s.v. ‘bilocation.’
Footnote 689:
Mason, ‘Karens,’ l.c. p. 198.
Footnote 690:
Shortland, ‘Trads. of New Zealand,’ p. 140; Polack, ‘M. and C. of New
Zealanders,’ vol. i. p. 268. See also Ellis, ‘Madagascar,’ vol. i. p.
393; J. G. Müller, p. 261.
Footnote 691:
Calmet, ‘Diss. sur les Esprits,’ vol. i. ch. xl.
Footnote 692:
Wuttke, ‘Volksaberglaube,’ pp. 44, 56, 208; Brand, ‘Popular
Antiquities,’ vol. iii. pp. 155, 235; Johnson, ‘Journey to the
Hebrides;’ Martin, ‘Western Islands of Scotland,’ in Pinkerton, vol.
iii. p. 670.
Footnote 693:
See R. D. Owen, ‘Footfalls on the Boundary of another World;’ Mrs.
Crowe, ‘Night-Side of Nature;’ Howitt’s Tr. of Ennemoser’s ‘Magic,’
&c.
Footnote 694:
The conception of the soul as a small human image is found in various
districts; see Eyre, ‘Australia,’ vol. ii. p. 356; St. John, ‘Far
East,’ vol. i. p. 189 (Dayaks); Waitz, vol. iii. p. 194 (N. A. Ind.).
The idea of a soul as a sort of ‘thumbling’ is familiar to the Hindus
and to German folklore; compare the representations of tiny souls in
mediæval pictures.
Footnote 695:
Magalhanes de Gandavo, p. 110; Maffei, ‘Indie Orientali,’ p. 107.
Footnote 696:
Oldfield in ‘Tr. Eth. Soc.’ vol. iii. p. 287.
Footnote 697:
Waitz, vol. ii. p. 194; Römer, ‘Guinea,’ p. 42.
Footnote 698:
Meiners, vol. ii. pp. 756, 763; Purchas, vol. iii. p. 495; J. Jones in
‘Tr. Eth. Soc.’ vol. iii. p. 138.
Footnote 699:
Calmet, vol. i. ch. xxxvi.; Plin. Ep. vii. 27; Hunt, ‘Pop. Romances,’
vol. ii. p. 156.
Footnote 700:
Le Jeune in ‘Rel. des Jésuites,’ 1639, p. 43; see 1634, p. 13.
Footnote 701:
Shortland, ‘Trads. of N. Z.’ p. 92; Yate, p. 140; R. Taylor, pp. 104,
153; Ellis, ‘Polyn. Res.’ vol. i. p. 406.
Footnote 702:
Callaway, ‘Rel. of Amazulu,’ pp. 265, 348, 370.
Footnote 703:
Homer, II. xxiii. 100.
Footnote 704:
Ovid, Fast. v. 457.
Footnote 705:
Isaiah viii. 19; xxix. 4. The Arabs hate whistling (el sifr), it is
talking to devils (Burton, ‘First Footsteps in East Africa,’ p. 142).
‘Nicolaus Remigius, whose “Daemonolatreia” is one of the ghastliest
volumes in the ghastly literature of witchcraft, cites Hermolaus
Barbarus as having heard the voice _sub-sibilantis daemonis_, and,
after giving other instances, adduces the authority of Psellus to
prove that the devils generally speak very low and confusedly in order
not to be caught fibbing,’ Dr Sebastian Evans in ‘Nature,’ June 22,
1871, p. 140. (Nicolai Remigii Daemonolatreia, Col. Agripp. 1596, lib.
i. c. 8, ‘pleraeque aliae vocem illis esse aiunt qualem emittunt qui
os in dolium aut restam rimosam insertum habent’—‘ut Daemones e pelvi
stridulâ voce ac tenui sibilo verba ederent’).
Footnote 706:
Morgan, ‘Iroquois,’ p. 176.
Footnote 707:
Flacourt, ‘Madagascar,’ p. 101.
Footnote 708:
N. B. Dennys, ‘Folk-Lore of China,’ p. 22.
Footnote 709:
Monnier, ‘Traditions Populaires,’ p. 142; Wuttke, ‘Volksaberglaube,’
p. 209; Grimm, ‘D. M.’ p. 801; Meiners, vol. ii. p. 761.
Footnote 710:
Lang, ‘Queensland,’ p. 441; Bonwick, ‘Tasmanians,’ p. 187.
Footnote 711:
Charlevoix, ‘Nouvelle France,’ vol. vi. pp. 76, 122; Le Jeune in ‘Rel.
des Jésuites,’ 1634, p. 23; 1639, p. 44; Tanner’s ‘Narr.’ p. 292;
Peter Jones, ‘Hist. of Ojebway Indians,’ p. 99.
Footnote 712:
Bastian, ‘Mensch,’ vol. ii. p. 323.
Footnote 713:
Meiners, vol. i. p. 318.
Footnote 714:
Festus, s.v. ‘everriatores;’ see Bastian, l.c., and compare Hartknoch,
cited below, vol. ii. p. 40.
Footnote 715:
Wuttke, ‘Volksaberglaube,’ pp. 132, 216.
Footnote 716:
Casalis, ‘Basutos,’ p. 285; Glanvil, ‘Saducismus Triumphatus,’ part
ii. p. 161; Wuttke, p. 216; Bastian ‘Psychologie’ p. 192.
Footnote 717:
Mariner, ‘Tonga Is.’ vol. ii. p. 135.
Footnote 718:
Cranz, ‘Grönland,’ p. 257.
Footnote 719:
Rochefort, ‘Iles Antilles,’ p. 429.
Footnote 720:
Loubere, ‘Siam,’ vol. i. p. 458; Bastian, ‘Oestl. Asien,’ vol. iii. p.
259; see p. 278.
Footnote 721:
Diog. Laert. x. 67-8; see Serv. ad. Æn. iv. 654.
Footnote 722:
Irenæus contra Hæres. v. 7, 1; see Origen, De Princep. ii. 3, 2.
Footnote 723:
Tertull. De Anima, 9.
Footnote 724:
Hampole, ‘Ayenbite of Inwyt.’
Footnote 725:
Wuttke, ‘Volksaberglaube,’ pp. 216, 226.
Footnote 726:
A. J. Davis, ‘Philosophy of Spiritual Intercourse,’ New York, 1851, p.
49.
Footnote 727:
Calmet, vol. i. ch. xli. &c.
Footnote 728:
‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ vol. ii. p. 359; vol. iii. pp. 104, 556; Earl,
‘Eastern Seas,’ p. 266; St. John, ‘Far East,’ vol. i. pp. 52, 73, 79,
119; Mundy, ‘Narr. from Brooke’s Journals,’ p. 203. Heads were taken
as funeral offerings by the Garos of N. E. India, Eliot in ‘As. Res.’
vol. iii. p. 28, Dalton, ‘Descr. Ethnol. of Bengal,’ p. 67; see also
pp. 46-7 (Kukis).
Footnote 729:
T. Williams, ‘Fiji,’ vol. i. pp. 188-204; Mariner, ‘Tonga Is.’ vol.
ii. p. 220. For New Zealand accounts, see R. Taylor, ‘New Zealand,’
pp. 218, 227; Polack, ‘New Zealanders,’ vol. i. pp. 66, 78, 116.
Footnote 730:
J. M’Coy, ‘Hist. of Baptist Indian Mission,’ p. 360; Waitz, vol. iii.
p. 200.
Footnote 731:
Rochefort, ‘Iles Antilles,’ pp. 429, 512; see also J. G. Müller, pp.
174, 222.
Footnote 732:
Oviedo, ‘Hist. de las Indias,’ lib. xxix. c. 31; Charlevoix, ‘Nouv.
Fr.’ vol. vi. p. 178 (Natchez); Waitz, vol. iii. p. 219. See Brinton,
‘Myths of New World,’ p. 239.
Footnote 733:
Brasseur, ‘Mexique,’ vol. iii. p. 573.
Footnote 734:
Piedrahita, ‘Nuevo Reyno de Granada,’ part i. lib. i. c. 3.
Footnote 735:
Cieza de Leon, p. 161; Rivero and Tschudi, ‘Peruv. Ant.’ p. 200;
Prescott, ‘Peru,’ vol. i. p. 29. See statements as to effigies, J. G.
Müller, p. 379.
Footnote 736:
Simpson, ‘Journey,’ vol. i. p. 190; similar practice among Takulli or
Carrier Ind., Waitz, vol. iii. p. 200.
Footnote 737:
Burton, ‘Central Afr.’ vol. i. p. 124; vol. ii. p. 25; ‘Dahome,’ vol.
ii. p. 18, &c.; ‘Tr. Eth. Soc.’ vol. iii. p. 403; J. L. Wilson, ‘W.
Afr.’ pp. 203, 219, 394. See also H. Rowley, ‘Mission to Central
Africa,’ p. 229.
Footnote 738:
Cavazzi, ‘1st. Descr. de’ tre Regni Congo, Matamba, et Angola,’
Bologna, 1687, lib. i. 264; Waitz, vol. ii. pp. 419-21; Callaway,
‘Religion of Amazulu,’ p. 212.
Footnote 739:
Renaudot, ‘Acc. by two Mohammedan Travellers,’ London, 1733, p. 81;
and in Pinkerton, vol. vii. p. 215; Marco Polo, book iii. chap. xx.;
and in Pinkerton, vol. vii. p. 162.
Footnote 740:
Caron, ‘Japan,’ ibid., p. 622; Siebold, ‘Nippon,’ v. p. 22.
Footnote 741:
‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ new series, vol. ii. p. 374.
Footnote 742:
Legge, ‘Confucius,’ p. 119; Doolittle, ‘Chinese,’ vol. i. pp. 108,
174, 192. The practice of attacking or killing all persons met by a
funeral procession is perhaps generally connected with funeral human
sacrifice; any one met on the road by the funeral of a Mongol prince
was slain and ordered to go as escort; in the Kimbunda country, any
one who meets a royal funeral procession is put to death with the
other victims at the grave (Magyar, ‘Süd. Afrika,’ p. 353); see also
Mariner, ‘Tonga Is.’ vol. i. p. 403; Cook, ‘First Voy.’ vol. i. pp.
146, 236 (Tahiti).
Footnote 743:
Jakob Grimm, ‘Verbrennen der Leichen,’ contains an instructive
collection of references and citations.
Footnote 744:
Homer, Il. xxiii. 175; Eurip. Suppl.; Pausanias, iv. 2.
Footnote 745:
Edda, ‘Gylfaginning,’ 49; ‘Brynhildarqvitha,’ &c.
Footnote 746:
Cæsar., Bell. Gall. vi. 19.
Footnote 747:
Hanusch, ‘Slaw. Myth.’ p. 145.
Footnote 748:
Strabo, xv. 1, 62; Cic. Tusc. Disp. v. 27, 78; Diod. Sic. xvii. 91;
xix. 33, &c.; Grimm, ‘Verbrennen,’ p. 261; Renaudot, ‘Two
Mohammedans,’ p. 4; and in Pinkerton, vol. vii. p. 194. See Buchanan,
ibid. pp. 675, 682; Ward, ‘Hindoos,’ vol. ii. pp. 298-312.
Footnote 749:
H. H. Wilson, ‘On the supposed Vaidik authority for the Burning of
Hindu Widows,’ in ‘Journ. Roy. As. Soc.’ vol. xvi. (1854) p. 201; in
his ‘Works,’ vol. ii. p. 270. Max Müller, ‘Todtenbestattung bei den
Brahmanen,’ in ‘Zeitschr. der Deutsch. Morgenl. Ges.’ vol. ix.;
‘Chips,’ vol. ii. p. 34.
Footnote 750:
Schoolcraft, ‘Indian Tribes,’ part i. p. 543; part iii. pp. 229, 520;
Waitz, vol. iii. pp. 191-3.
Footnote 751:
Klemm, ‘Cultur-Gesch.’ vol. iii. pp. 355, 364; Waitz, vol. ii. p. 178.
Footnote 752:
Mouhot, ‘Indo-China,’ vol. i. p. 252.
Footnote 753:
Wood in ‘Tr. Eth. Soc.’ vol. iv. p. 36.
Footnote 754:
Bastian, ‘Mensch,’ vol. iii. p. 26.
Footnote 755:
De Brosses, ‘Dieux Fétiches,’ p. 61.
Footnote 756:
Ravenstein, ‘Amur,’ p. 382; T. W. Atkinson, p. 483.
Footnote 757:
St. John, ‘Far East,’ vol. ii. p. 253 (Dayaks).
Footnote 758:
Charlevoix, ‘Nouvelle France,’ vol. vi. p. 78; Sagard, ‘Hist. du
Canada,’ p. 497; Schoolcraft, ‘Indian Tribes,’ part iii. p. 229.
Footnote 759:
Cranz, ‘Grönland,’ p. 257.
Footnote 760:
Taylor, ‘New Zealand,’ p. 271; Ellis, ‘Madagascar,’ vol. i. p. 429.
Footnote 761:
Steller, ‘Kamtschatka,’ p. 269.
Footnote 762:
Stewart, ‘Notes on Northern Cachar,’ in ‘Journ. As. Soc. Bengal,’ vol.
xxiv. p. 632; Cross, ‘Karens,’ l.c.; Mason, ‘Karens,’ l.c.
Footnote 763:
Callaway, ‘Zulu Tales,’ vol. i. p. 317.
Footnote 764:
Low in ‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ vol. i. p. 426. See Meiners, vol. i. p.
220; vol. ii. p. 791.
Footnote 765:
Juvenal, Sat. xv. 148.
Footnote 766:
Alger, ‘Future Life,’ p. 632, and see ‘Bibliography,’ appendix ii.;
Wesley, ‘Sermon on Rom. viii. 19-22;’ Adam Clarke, ‘Commentary,’ on
same text. This, by the way, is the converse view to Bellarmine’s, who
so patiently let the fleas bite him, saying, ‘We shall have heaven to
reward us for our sufferings, but these poor creatures have nothing
but the enjoyment of the present life.’—Bayle ‘Biog. Dic.’ The
argument in Butler’s ‘Analogy,’ part i. ch. i. puts the evidence for
souls of brutes on much the same footing as that for souls of men.
Footnote 767:
Schoolcraft, ‘Indian Tribes,’ part i. pp. 237, 262; part ii. p. 68.
Footnote 768:
D’Orbigny, ‘L’Homme Américain,’ vol. i. p. 196; vol. ii. pp. 23, 78;
Falkner, ‘Patagonia,’ p. 118; Musters, ‘Patagonians,’ p. 178.
Footnote 769:
Egede, ‘Greenland,’ p. 152; Cranz, p. 301: sec Nilsson, p. 140.
Torquemada, ‘Monarquia Indiana,’ xiii. ch. 47; Clavigero, ‘Messico,’
vol. ii. pp. 94-6.
Footnote 770:
Georgi, ‘Reise im Russ. R.’ vol. i. p. 312.
Footnote 771:
Baron, ‘Tonquin,’ in Pinkerton, vol. ix. p. 704.
Footnote 772:
W. G. Palgrave, ‘Arabia,’ vol. i. p. 10; Bastian, ‘Mensch,’ vol. ii.
p. 334; Waitz, vol. ii. p. 519 (Gallas).
Footnote 773:
Grimm, ‘Verbrennen der Leichen.’ A curious correspondence in the
practice of cutting off a fowl’s head as a funeral rite is to be
noticed among the Yorubas of W. Africa (Burton, ‘W. and W.’ p. 220),
Chuwashes of Siberia (Castrén, ‘Finn. Myth.’ p. 120), old Russians
(Grimm, ‘Verbrennen,’ p. 254).
Footnote 774:
Bastian, ‘Mensch,’ vol. ii. p. 335.
Footnote 775:
Colebrooke, ‘Essays,’ vol. i. p. 177; Ward, ‘Hindoos,’ vol. ii. pp.
62, 284, 331.
Footnote 776:
Mannhardt, ‘Götterwelt der Deutschen, &c.’ vol. i. p. 319.
Footnote 777:
Saint-Foix, ‘Œuvres,’ Maestricht, 1778, vol. iv. p. 150.
Footnote 778:
Chr. von Stramberg, ‘Rheinischer Antiquarius,’ i. vol. i., Coblence,
1851, p. 203; J. M. Kemble, ‘Horæ Ferales,’ p. 66.
Footnote 779:
Moerenhout, ‘Voy. Aux Iles du Grand Océan,’ vol. i. p. 430.
Footnote 780:
St. John ‘Far East,’ vol. i. p. 187.
Footnote 781:
Mason, ‘Karens,’ in ‘Journ. As. Soc. Bengal,’ 1865, part ii. p. 202;
Cross in ‘Journ. Amer. Oriental Soc.’ vol. iv. p. 309. See comparison
of Siamese and Malay ideas; Low in ‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ vol. i. p.
340.
Footnote 782:
Hardy, ‘Manual of Budhism,’ pp. 291, 443; Bastian, ‘Oestl. Asien,’
vol. ii. p. 184; Marco Polo, book iii. ch. xxii. (compare various
readings); Meiners, vol. i. p. 215; vol. ii. p. 799.
Footnote 783:
Malay evidence has since been noticed by Wilken, ‘Het Animisme bij den
Volken van den Indischen Archipel.’ p. 104. (Note to 3rd edition.)
Footnote 784:
Hume, ‘Nat. Hist. of Rel.’ sec. ii.; Comte, ‘Philosophie Positive,’
vol. v. p. 30.
Footnote 785:
Charlevoix, vol. vi. p. 74; Keating, ‘Long’s Exp.’ vol. ii. p. 154; Le
Jeune, ‘Nouvelle France,’ p. 59; also Waitz, vol. iii. p. 199; Gregg,
‘Commerce of Prairies,’ vol. ii. p. 244; see Addison’s No. 56 of the
‘Spectator.’
Footnote 786:
Mariner, ‘Tonga Is.’ vol. ii. p. 129; Williams, ‘Fiji,’ vol. i. p.
242. Similar ideas in Tahiti, Cook’s 3rd Voy. vol. ii. p. 166.
Footnote 787:
Cross, l.c. pp. 309, 313; Mason, l.c. p. 202. Compare Meiners, vol. i.
p. 144; Castrén, ‘Finn. Myth.’ pp. 161-3.
Footnote 788:
Schoolcraft, ‘Indian Tribes,’ part ii. p. 68; ‘Algec Res.’ vol. ii. p.
128; Lallemant in ‘Rel. des Jésuites dans la Nouvelle France,’ 1626,
p. 3.
Footnote 789:
Williams, ‘Fiji,’ vol. i. pp. 188, 243, 246; Alger, p. 82; Seemann,
‘Viti,’ p. 229.
Footnote 790:
‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ new series, vol. ii. p. 421.
Footnote 791:
For some cases in which horror or abnegation are assigned as motives
for abandonment of the dead man’s property, see Humboldt and Bonpland,
vol. v. p. 626; Dalton in ‘Journ. As. Soc. Bengal,’ 1866, part ii. p.
191, &c.; Earl, ‘Papuans,’ p. 108; Callaway, ‘Rel. of Amazulu,’ p. 13;
Egede, ‘Greenland,’ p. 151; Cranz, p. 301; Loskiel, ‘Ind. N. A.’ part
i. p. 64, but see p. 76. The destruction or abandonment of the whole
property of the dead may plausibly, whether justly or not, be
explained by horror or abnegation; but these motives do not generally
apply to cases where only part of the property is sacrificed, or new
objects are provided expressly, and here the service of the dead seems
the reasonable motive. Thus, at the funeral of a Garo girl, earthen
vessels were broken as they were thrown in above the buried ashes.
‘They said, the spirit of the girl would not benefit by them if they
were given unbroken, but for her the fragments would unite again.’
(Dalton, ‘Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal,’ p. 67.) The mere fact of
breaking or destruction of objects at funerals does not carry its own
explanation, for it is equally applicable to sentimental abandonment
and to practical transmission of the spirit of the object, as a man is
killed to liberate his soul. For good cases of the breaking of vessels
and utensils given to the dead, see ‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ vol. i. p.
325 (Mintira); Grey, ‘Australia,’ vol. i. p. 322; G. F. Moore, ‘Vocab.
W. Australia,’ p. 13 (Australians); Markham in ‘Tr. Eth. Soc.’ vol.
iii. p. 188 (Ticunas); St. John, vol. i. p. 68 (Dayaks); Ellis,
‘Madagascar,’ vol. i. p. 254; Schoolcraft, ‘Indian Tribes,’ part i. p.
84 (Appalachicola); D. Wilson, ‘Prehistoric Man,’ vol. ii. p. 196 (N.
A. I. and ancient graves in England). Cases of formal sacrifice where
objects are offered to the dead and taken away again, are generally
doubtful as to motive; see Spix and Martius, vol. i. p. 383; Martius,
vol. i. p. 485 (Brazilian Tribes); Moffat, ‘S. Africa,’ p. 308
(Bechuanas); ‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ vol. iii. p. 149 (Kayans).
Footnote 792:
Alger, ‘Future Life,’ p. 81. He treats, however (p. 76), as
intentionally symbolic the rite of the Winnebagos, who light fires on
the grave to provide night after night camp-fires for the soul on its
far journey (Schoolcraft, ‘Ind. Tr.’ vol. iv. p. 55; the idea is
introduced in Longfellow’s ‘Hiawatha,’ xix.). I agree with Dr. Brinton
(‘Myths of New World,’ p. 241) that to look for recondite symbolic
meaning in these simple childish rites is unreasonable. There was a
similar Aztec rite (Clavigero, vol. ii. p. 94). The Mintira light
fires on the grave for the spirit to warm itself at (‘Journ. Ind.
Archip.’ vol. i. p. 325, see p. 271, and compare Martius, vol. i. p.
491). So Australians will light a fire near their camp at night for
the ghost of some lately dead relative to sit by (Millett, ‘Australian
Parsonage,’ p. 76.)
Footnote 793:
J. G. Müller, ‘Amer. Urrelig.’ p. 222, see 420.
Footnote 794:
Bosman, ‘Guinea,’ in Pinkerton, vol. xvi. p. 430.
Footnote 795:
Polack, ‘M. of New Zealanders,’ vol. ii. pp. 66, 78, 116, 127.
Footnote 796:
Georgi, ‘Russ. R.’ vol. i. p. 266; Herodot. iv. 71, see note in
Rawlinson’s Tr. &c. &c.
Footnote 797:
Oldfield in ‘Tr. Eth. Soc.’ vol. iii. pp. 228, 245.
Footnote 798:
Bonwick, ‘Tasmanians,’ p. 97.
Footnote 799:
Cranz, ‘Grönland,’ pp. 263, 301.
Footnote 800:
Schoolcraft, ‘Indian Tribes,’ part iv. pp. 55, 65; J. G. Müller,
‘Amer. Urrel.’ pp. 88, 287.
Footnote 801:
Sahagun, book iii. App. in Kingsborough, ‘Antiquities of Mexico,’ vol.
vii.; Clavigero, vol. ii. p. 94; Brasseur, vol. iii. pp. 497, 569.
Footnote 802:
Cieza de Leon, p. 161; Rivero and Tschudi, ‘Peruvian Antiquities,’ pp.
186, 200.
Footnote 803:
Ellis, ‘Hist, of Madagascar,’ vol. i. pp. 254, 429; see Flacourt, p.
60.
Footnote 804:
Castrén, ‘Finn. Myth,’ p. 118; J. Billings, ‘Exp. to N. Russia,’ p.
129; see ‘Samoiedia’ in Pinkerton, vol. i. p. 532, and Leems,
‘Lapland,’ ibid. p. 484.
Footnote 805:
Boecler, ‘Ehsten Gebraüche,’ p. 69.
Footnote 806:
‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ vol. ii. p. 691; see vol. i. pp. 297, 349.
Footnote 807:
Bastian, ‘Psychologie,’ p. 89; ‘Journ. Ind. Archip.’ vol. iii. p. 337.
For other instances, see Bastian, ‘Mensch,’ vol. ii. p. 332, &c.;
Alger, ‘Future Life,’ part ii.
Footnote 808:
Klemm, ‘C. G.’ vol. iv. p. 159; Ezek. xxxii. 27.
Footnote 809:
Max Müller, ‘Todtenbestattung der Brahmanen,’ in D. M. Z. vol. ix. pp.
vii.-xiv.
Footnote 810:
Lucian. De Luctu, 9, &c.; Philopseudes, 27; Strabo, viii. 6, 12;
Herodot. v. 92; Smith’s ‘Dic. Gr. and Rom. Ant.’ art. ‘funus.’
Footnote 811:
Valer. Max. ii.; Mela, iii. 2. Froius (1565) in Maffei, ‘Histor.
Indicarum,’ lib. iv.
Footnote 812:
Grimm, ‘Verbrennen der Leichen,’ pp. 232, &c., 247, &c.; ‘Deutsche
Myth.’ pp. 795-800.
Footnote 813:
Dusburg, ‘Chronicon Prussiæ,’ iii. c. v.; Hanusch, ‘Slaw. Myth.’ pp.
898, 415 (Anafielas is the glass-mountain of Slavonic and German myth,
see Grimm, ‘D. M.’ p. 796). Compare statement in St. Clair and Brophy,
‘Bulgaria,’ p. 61; as to food transmitted to dead in other world, with
more probable explanation, p. 77.
Footnote 814:
St. John, ‘Far East,’ vol. i. pp. 54, 68. Compare Bosman, ‘Guinea,’ in
Pinkerton, vol. xvi. p. 430.
Footnote 815:
Schoolcraft, ‘Indian Tribes,’ part iv. p. 54.
Footnote 816:
Hunter, ‘Rural Bengal,’ p. 210.
Footnote 817:
Davis, ‘Chinese,’ vol. i. p. 276; Doolittle, vol. i. p. 193; vol. ii.
p. 275; Bastian, ‘Mensch,’ vol. ii. p. 334; see Marco Polo, book ii.
ch. lxviii.
Footnote 818:
Colebrooke, ‘Essays,’ vol. i. pp. 161, 169.
Footnote 819:
Lubbock, ‘Prehistoric Times,’ p. 142; Wilkinson, ‘Ancient Eg.’ vol.
ii. p. 319.
Footnote 820:
Beeckmann, ‘Voy. to Borneo,’ in Pinkerton, vol. xi. p. 110.
Footnote 821:
Politis, ‘Neohellen. Mythologia,’ vol. i. part i. p. 266; Hartknoch,
‘Alt. und Neues Preussen,’ part i. p. 181; Grimm, ‘D. M.’ pp. 791-5;
Wuttke, ‘Deutsche Volksaberglaube,’ p. 212; Rochholz, ‘Deutscher
Glaube,’ &c. vol. i. p. 187, &c.; Maury, ‘Magie,’ &c. p. 158 (France).
Footnote 822:
Maitland, ‘Church in the Catacombs,’ p. 137; Forbes Leslie, vol. ii.
p. 502; Meiners, vol. ii. p. 750; Brand, ‘Pop. Ant.’, vol. ii. p. 307.
Footnote 823:
Ward, ‘Hindoos,’ vol. ii. p. 284.
Footnote 824:
From the collated and annotated text in J. C. Atkinson, ‘Glossary of
Cleveland Dialect,’ p. 595 (a = one, neean = none, beean = bone).
Other versions in Scott, ‘Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border,’ vol. ii.
p. 367; Kelly, ‘Indo-European Folk-lore,’ p. 115; Brand, ‘Pop. Ant.’
vol. ii. p. 275. Two verses have perhaps been lost between the fifth
and sixth. J. C. A. reads ‘meate’ in vv. 7 and 8; the usual reading
‘milke’ is retained here. The sense of these two verses may be that
the liquor sacrificed in life will quench the fire: an idea parallel
to that known to folklore, that he who gave bread in his lifetime will
find it after death ready for him to cast into the hellhound’s jaws
(Mannhardt, ‘Götterwelt der Deutschen und Nordischen Völker,’ p. 319),
a sop to Cerberus.
Footnote 825:
Lewes, ‘Biographical History of Philosophy,’ Democritus (and see his
remarks on Reid); Lucretius, lib. iv.; ‘Early Hist. of Mankind,’ p. 8;
Stewart, ‘Philosophy of Human Mind,’ vol. i. chap. i. sec. 2; Reid,
‘Essays,’ ii. chaps. iv. xiv.; see Thos. Browne, ‘Philosophy of the
Mind,’ lect. 27.
END OF VOL. I.
● Transcriber’s Notes:
○ Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).
○ Footnotes have been moved to follow the chapters in which they are
referenced.