OPENING OF THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE
(_March 21—April 9, 1918_)
Before dawn on March 21, 1918, a terrific bombardment along more than
fifty miles of the British front, from east of Arras to south of St.
Quentin, heralded the opening of the mightiest attack in the history
of warfare. More than one hundred divisions—including many transferred
from the Russian front—highly trained for the special purpose for which
they were to be used, were suddenly launched against less than fifty.
The German storm-troops were concentrated in depth on narrow fronts
opposite what were judged to be the most vulnerable points in the British
line; fresh troops passing through those of the exhausted or shattered
divisions that had been used to break open the gaps. Before they
could be brought to a standstill still further troops, with hordes of
machine-guns, moved forward through the wreckage of the others, forcing
their way to the flanks and even to the rear of the British positions.
The greater the number shot down the more they seemed to multiply. The
enemy was staking everything upon the success of this gigantic onslaught,
and he was fighting with a courage, skill, determination, and confidence
in numbers which would mean the triumph of Barbarism unless met by still
greater resolution and endurance. Forced back by the weight of numbers,
the Fifth Army, under General Sir H. de la P. Gough, on the right of the
area attacked, and to a lesser extent the Third Army, under General Sir
J. H. G. Byng, on the left, withdrew step by step, fighting desperately
to stem the overwhelming onslaught, and again fell back still farther
as their flanks and rear were enveloped. Village after village, town
after town, recovered for France at a heavy price in the earlier British
offensives, fell once more into the hands of the enemy; thousands of
prisoners, many guns, and great quantities of material were lost.
[Illustration]
Divisions in reserve were hurriedly brought forward to block the gaps,
and to stem the onrush or check its pace. A certain amount of confusion
was unavoidable. The enemy once more seemed to have established control
over the weather, the ground remaining firm and dry and a mist screening
his movements. At times it was impossible to carry out orders literally,
as between their issue and receipt the situation had changed entirely,
and defensive positions which brigades or battalions of the relieving
divisions had been ordered to take up, were found to be in the occupation
of the enemy.
[Sidenote: _March 23, 1918_]
On the morning of the 23rd March the infantry brigades of the 42nd
Division, packed into many hundreds of motor-busses and lorries, pressed
southwards through St. Pol to Doullens, and then turned north-east along
the Arras road to Beaumetz-les-Loges, where they turned south-east in the
direction of Ayette, a village more than eight miles south of Arras and
nearly eight miles north-west of Bapaume. At this stage of the journey
they were met by straggling groups of refugees, women, children, and old
men, hastening with the more portable of their poor possessions out of
the reach of Hun savagery and rapacity. Some of these homeless wanderers
appeared haggard and despairing; some numbed and hopeless; others simply
bewildered. It was a pitiful and pathetic sight, which aroused feelings
of mingled pity and anger, and intensified the Lancashire men’s longing
to get to close quarters with the oppressor. They were to have their
wish. Those who had joined the Division since August 1915 found the few
remaining days of March more crammed with incident and fighting than the
whole of their previous careers.
As they drew nearer to their destination progress became more and
more difficult, the roads being packed with troops moving in the same
direction; and with an increasing stream of traffic retiring before the
enemy’s advance. The Divisional Commander and G.S.O. 1. (Lieut.-Colonel
R. F. Guy, D.S.O.) had gone on some hours in advance of the Division to
reconnoitre, glean information, and attempt to unravel the tangled skein
of conflicting reports. At 5 p.m. on March 23, D.H.Q. was established
at Adinfer, about two miles north-east of Ayette. The 125th and 126th
Brigades debussed at 7 p.m. and proceeded to Adinfer Wood to bivouac. In
the wood were many green woodpeckers, which greeted the men with their
jeering cry. “Aye, _you_ can ⸺ well laugh!” growled a Salford man, for
the night spent in this wood was not a cheerful or restful one. There
was a keen frost, and as fires were forbidden, most of the men tried to
find warmth by walking up and down during the night. Before midnight the
127th Brigade debussed on the Ayette—Douchy road and took up an outpost
position, facing south-east, with two battalions in the outpost line on
the Ablainzevelle—Moyenneville Ridge, a few miles south-east of Adinfer,
with Brigade H.Q. at Courcelles Aerodrome. Owing to the congested state
of the roads the transport was unable to rejoin the Division until the
night of the 25th. The Division was therefore without horses or wagons;
there were no telephones and no mounted messengers. The Divisional
Commander succeeded in borrowing horses from the 40th Division for the
many reconnaissances made prior to taking over command of the sector. But
great as the difficulties were, they were many times greater when it came
to actual command in battle.
The situation was obscure, changing as it did from hour to hour. As the
enemy thrust forward, gaining here and there, by weight of numbers,
a position of tactical importance threatening a flank, plans must be
hurriedly re-cast and movements diverted or stopped. At 2 p.m. on March
24 orders were received from the Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Haldane,
for the relief of the 40th Division by the 42nd that night on the right
sector of the 6th Corps front. The Divisional Commander went round the
40th Division’s advanced lines, and at 2 p.m., in the 40th D.H.Q. two
miles east of Bucquoy, he issued orders to his Brigadiers. The 125th and
126th Brigades were moved up to Logeast Wood to facilitate the relief,
and Divisional H.Q. was moved to Monchy-au-Bois. At 6 p.m. notification
was received that the 40th Division would leave outposts in front of a
line east of the Arras—Bapaume road, running north and south through
the villages of Ervillers, Behagnies, and Sapignies, a few miles north
of Bapaume, which was now in the enemy’s hands, and these would be
withdrawn when the 42nd were in position. The 125th Brigade was ordered
to take over the right sub-sector and the 127th the left, the 126th
being in Divisional Reserve. A Special Order of the Day was issued by
Major-General Solly-Flood—
“On this, the first occasion on which the Major-General has had
the honour of leading the Division into action, he desires to
wish all ranks the best of luck. When the enemy attacks, the
Divisional Commander is convinced that the Division will give
such an account of itself as to make the enemy regret that they
tried conclusions with East Lancashire.
“This is the opportunity we want to ‘GO ONE BETTER.’”
[Illustration: GOMIECOURT CHÂTEAU.]
[Illustration: ERVILLERS, WHERE THE 1/10 BN. MANCHESTER REGT. REPULSED
EIGHT ATTACKS.]
[Illustration: SAPIGNIES, THE SCENE OF HEAVY FIGHTING FOR 125TH BRIGADE.]
[Illustration: LT.-COL. P. V. HOLBERTON (THE MANCHESTER REGT.) COMMANDING
1/5 BN. LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS. KILLED IN ACTION.
(_From a snapshot_)]
[Illustration: ACHIET-LE-GRAND. THE RAILWAY CUTTING.]
[Illustration: ACHIET-LE-GRAND. THE RAILWAY EMBANKMENT.]
[Illustration: ESSARTS. DUG OUT USED AS BRIGADE HQRS. DURING FIGHTING
BETWEEN MARCH 28 AND APRIL 7.]
[Illustration: BUCQUOY CROSS ROADS: THE SCENE OF SEVERE HAND-TO-HAND
FIGHTING ON APRIL 5, 1918, BY THE 125TH BRIGADE.]
Along the road from Bapaume, through Achiet-le-Grand, batteries of heavy
guns were being withdrawn to positions farther back, and processions of
wounded, and the personnel of stationary hospitals and clearing stations,
were moving to the rear as the infantry brigades set off at dusk. They
proceeded in a north-easterly direction towards Gomiecourt, where they
expected to be met by guides who would lead them to the positions they
were to take over from the 40th Division, which had been in action for
forty-eight hours about Mory—more than two miles east of Gomiecourt—and
had suffered heavily. Twice had Mory been taken by the enemy, and twice
re-taken by counter-attack, and fighting was still in progress there. The
region through which the Brigades passed was familiar to many, though
it wore a very different aspect now, and as the rifle-range used during
the previous summer and the old camp of the 125th Brigade were passed,
the contrast between the conditions then and now was the subject of
much comment. Instead of the lines of canvas tents one could see dimly
the heavy artillery in action and, when the gun-flashes lighted up the
surroundings, the horses harnessed ready to remove the guns in case
of emergency. Soon after the leading battalion had left Gomiecourt a
Staff Officer of the 40th Division brought word that “as the enemy are
reported to have broken through between Sapignies and Behagnies,” the
order for the relief had been cancelled, so he diverted the direction
of the 125th and 127th Brigades. The report that the enemy had broken
through at Sapignies was later found to be incorrect. The 127th Brigade,
deflected to the right—that is, to the south instead of to the east—moved
across the open in artillery formation, and the 125th before long passed
diagonally across their lines. The enemy were pressing to the north and
north-west through the gap made by their break-through at Bapaume, and
the leading brigades had turned south and south-east to stand across
their path. Near Forest Lodge the 126th Brigade met the same Staff
Officer, but as Brigadier-General Seymour knew that the other Brigades
had changed direction, he considered that they would be able to deal
with the situation on the right, and decided to carry out the original
orders. The 127th Brigade was therefore on the right of the divisional
front, facing south and south-east; the 125th in the centre, facing
south-east and east; and the 126th (supposed to be in Divisional Reserve)
on the left, facing east and north-east. Commanding officers, subordinate
officers and men of all three Brigades deserve the greatest credit for
the skilful dispositions made under such unfavourable conditions. The
difficult operation of taking up defensive positions on ground that had
not been reconnoitred had been accomplished in darkness.
[Sidenote: _The Night of March 24-25_]
About midnight on the 24th-25th the 127th Brigade was in position, facing
south-east, with outposts on the Bihucourt—Sapignies road, and the 6th
Manchesters on the right, near Bihucourt, established touch with the 41st
Division. At 1 a.m. on the 25th Sapignies and Behagnies were reported
clear of the enemy by the Lancashire Fusiliers, who took up a line facing
east on the high ground east of the Arras—Bapaume road, covering those
two villages. Stragglers from other divisions passed through and gave
much conflicting information as to what had happened and was happening.
A telephone message from Corps H.Q. stated that the enemy had possession
of Ervillers, as well as of Mory, but this report, like many others
received from the rear at this time, proved unfounded, for patrols of
the 10th Manchesters discovered that Ervillers was clear of the enemy.
This battalion was then ordered to push two companies forward and take
up a position on the south-western edge of the village, and send patrols
through it. This was done and touch obtained with the 31st Division.
Thus the Division went into battle on the morning of March 25 with all
three infantry brigades in the line. It possessed neither transport
for units nor horses for reconnoitring, and the lack of means of rapid
reconnaissance and inter-communication was sorely felt. Though the
Motor-Cycle Dispatch Riders of the Signal Company proved invaluable,
the Signal Company was unable to function properly until its transport
arrived; and during the following two or three days a heavy expenditure
of cable was caused by the continual moving of Divisional and Brigade
Headquarters. The Division was not covered by its own artillery, and
two infantry brigades of the 40th Division and one of the 59th Division
were still in the line. However, Major-General Solly-Flood took over the
command of the sector, and the Division was then transferred from the 6th
Corps to the 4th Corps under Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper.
At dawn the enemy attacked along the whole divisional front. The 10th
Manchesters pushed two companies forward through Ervillers to the
north-eastern outskirts, and brought up a third company on their right
into a trench which ran parallel with the Ervillers—Behagnies road. In
this trench were men from various brigades, practically “done in” after
four days of hard fighting without rest; but when Lieut.-Colonel Peel
enrolled these oddments among his own men it was found that they could
still fight gallantly. At 8.45 a.m. a message was received from the
125th Brigade reporting that other troops were falling back, and asking
whether the Division was to conform. The Divisional Commander replied
that the Division would fight on the position taken up, and no withdrawal
would take place without orders. This message was repeated to the other
infantry brigades, and two M.G. companies were moved up to cover the
flanks. Machine and Lewis gunners had carried their guns into action
a distance of seven to ten miles, and in the absence of transport all
ammunition had been carried by the troops. It was not the ideal prelude
to a thirty-hours’ battle against odds.
Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. (March 25), owing to the withdrawal of troops
of the 40th Division, the enemy penetrated the north end of Sapignies,
in spite of a gallant attempt to check their advance on the part of the
5th L.F. and a company of the 7th, who held an angle in the line a little
way beyond the village. The enemy massed his machine-guns, and brought
up a battery of field-guns, concentrating his fire upon this point. “A”
Company of the 5th L.F. was enveloped on three sides, but fought until
all ammunition was spent. A dozen men got away, and a few were captured,
but the rest of the company became casualties. Lieut.-Colonel Holberton,
commanding the 5th L.F., brought up two companies of the 8th L.F., who
were in support, and Major M. G. Bird and Captain Fairhurst, the O.C. and
Adjutant of the 8th, collected headquarters details and led them forward.
The counter-attack was a brilliant one, and Sapignies was regained, and
a line established east of the village. Major Bird, who was awarded the
D.S.O., was unfortunately seriously wounded. Shortly afterwards the enemy
again succeeded in entering and pushing through Sapignies, but was met by
the 5th Manchesters on the Sapignies—Bihucourt road, and driven back into
the village.
[Sidenote: _March 25_]
As the enemy was reported to be assembling east and south-east of
Bihucourt, a company of the 6th Manchesters under Captain S. L.
Bridgford was ordered there. It arrived simultaneously with the Germans,
and, in spite of their great numerical superiority, immediately attacked
them. Fighting desperately, the company was forced out of the village
step by step, but in a brilliant counter-attack the ground was regained
by sheer grit, backed by superiority with the bayonet. Again overwhelming
numbers prevailed, and the survivors of the company were once more driven
out. With the handful that remained Bridgford made another gallant
effort, but he was severely wounded and died in the enemy’s hands. The
prompt and determined action of this company gained time for troops to
be moved in support, and prevented the enemy debouching from Bihucourt.
Had they been able to do so and reach Achiet-le-Grand, they could have
commanded the reverse slopes of the ridge on which rested the centre of
the Brigade. The O.C. 6th Manchesters was ordered to deny Achiet-le-Grand
to the enemy at all costs, and the Pioneer Battalion (7th N.F.) was
placed at his disposal. The 6th Manchesters, however, accomplished their
task, though heavily engaged and under increasing artillery fire, without
calling upon the Pioneers.
Towards midday the situation about Bihucourt on the right of the
divisional front having become critical, the Tanks in Logeast Wood were
ordered to counter-attack, and the 62nd Division, which had moved up to
Bucquoy during the morning, was called upon to support the right flank of
the Division about Achiet-le-Petit. This manœuvre was successful, four
Tanks with a detachment of the 127th Brigade inflicting heavy casualties.
About 2 p.m. scouts of the 5th East Lancashires on the left confirmed
the report that the enemy had seized Behagnies and were advancing on
Gomiecourt in strong force.[13] Lieut.-Colonel Clare, commanding the 5th
East Lancashires, seeing that this move threatened to cut off his own
battalion and also the 10th Manchesters between Gomiecourt and Ervillers,
immediately sent forward headquarters details to hold the enemy back
for a few precious moments. The handful of scouts, police, signallers,
and runners reached the ridge in front of the enemy and, having good
targets at short range, did great execution. Time was thus gained for two
companies of the battalion to advance from the cross-roads south-east
of Gomiecourt in artillery formation, shaking out into extended order
below the crest, and doubling forward into fire positions from which they
opened rapid fire, breaking up two lines of infantry in extended order
not more than 200 yards away. Two Lewis guns were then brought to bear
upon a large body in close formation farther back, scattering it. The
remaining companies were brought up, and the battalion linked up with the
125th Brigade. The enemy’s losses were heavy, and the position appeared
to be satisfactory.
Meanwhile the 10th Manchesters had achieved fame by their defence of
Ervillers, and Oldham folk will always regard with pride the distinction
their men earned here. Eight separate determined attacks upon the
battalion had been made by superior numbers, but the 10th, assisted by a
company of machine-gunners which had been pushed up to cover their left
flank, had repulsed them all, losing good men, but inflicting far greater
loss upon the enemy. For this day’s work the 10th Manchesters had the
honour to be one of the very few battalions mentioned individually in Sir
Douglas Haig’s despatch. But, owing to the withdrawal to the Courcelles
line of a brigade of the division on their left, they were forced to
withdraw from the village about 9.30 p.m., and take up a position 1000
yards east of Gomiecourt. The Divisional Artillery, which had arrived
about noon, and had immediately come into action, now covered the
divisional front, some of the batteries being within 800 yards of the
front line, and Battery D/211 had every gun knocked out.
About 10 p.m. (March 25), the 125th Brigade, which had dug in on the
ridge between Gomiecourt and the Ervillers—Behagnies road, with the 7th
L.F. on the right, the 5th on the left, and the 8th in support, was again
heavily attacked. Lieut.-Colonel Holberton, with his habitual disregard
of personal safety, walked along the line encouraging and heartening
his men, and was shot through the head and killed instantly. Colonel
Holberton, who went out with the Division in September 1914 as Adjutant
of the 6th Manchesters, was a fine soldier and cheery, gallant comrade,
whose death was deplored by all ranks throughout the Division.
[Sidenote: _March 25-26_]
At 11 p.m. the Division was still fighting on the ground it had taken
up the previous night, with a large extension of front, which had been
increased from the original 4000 yards to nearly 10,000, with both flanks
in the air, and the Divisional Reserve consisting of two half-companies
of machine-guns, one company of pioneers, and a Field Company R.E.
as escort to the guns. The right was now thrown back, with two Field
Companies and the 7th Northumberland Fusiliers holding the railway,
covering the gap between Achiet-le-Grand and Achiet-le-Petit. On the
right the 127th Brigade held the spurs covering the former village,
its left joining up with the 125th Brigade, which was fighting in the
outskirts of Behagnies and Bee Wood, and the 126th, slightly echeloned
back, continued the line to the trenches and Sunken Road just west of
Ervillers. The Divisional Artillery were now ordered to withdraw to
positions south of Ablainzevelle and, a few hours later, to the Essarts
Valley. The transport rejoined late at night. The arrival of fresh
divisions and the withdrawal of those which needed rest had blocked the
roads for a time. Most of the roads crossed in Bucquoy village, and
before noon on March 25 these were completely congested by masses of
vehicles which could neither get on nor get out. The confusion appeared
hopeless, and had the enemy seriously shelled or bombed these roads the
result would have been appalling. The prompt freeing of the roads was
essential, and the “A” and “Q” Staffs and the A.P.M. were ordered to
concentrate their energies on this job. Ditches were filled in, barbed
wire cut down, traffic diverted across country, and efficient controls
posted. By 4 p.m. a steady stream of traffic was moving along the roads,
and by 10 p.m. the Divisional Transport reached its rendezvous. The
R.A. and R.A.S.C. were then admirably prompt and efficient in locating
and supplying units under the most trying and difficult conditions.
In particular the congestion on the Hannescamps—Essarts road during
those days could only be overcome by combined skill, determination, and
coolness. On this road the Divisional Artillery lost more drivers and
horses than in any other place. But even under such abnormal conditions
rations and ammunition never failed to reach the troops, and hot
meals were frequently served to the men in the front line. For four
days Dispatch Riders[14] were in the saddle day and night, and their
endurance, pluck, and skill in dodging the traffic and getting their
messages through had been of invaluable service to the Division.
The enemy was again working round the flanks, and, in the early hours
of March 26, in accordance with orders from the Corps Commander,
the withdrawal of the Division began, and was carried out in three
successive bounds—first, to the line Achiet-le-Grand—Moyenneville
railway; then to the Forest Lodge—Courcelles line, and finally to the
Bucquoy—Ablainzevelle line. The troops were in position here at 10
a.m., and on this last line the enemy was successfully held.[15] The
withdrawals were accomplished in good order, and, in the case of the
127th Brigade, units slipped away before the enemy was aware of their
retirement, rifle fire being maintained on their late positions for some
time after they had gone. Some units, however, were followed up hotly,
and enemy pressure forced retiring troops to halt from time to time and
open covering fire from different parts of the line, inflicting heavy
casualties upon the Germans. A withdrawal in daylight, in close touch
with the enemy, is a ticklish operation under any conditions, and the
retirement of the troops on either flank some hours earlier added greatly
to the difficulties. The companies of the M.G. Battalion did good work in
covering each retirement, and the support from the artillery was always
effective. Enormous losses were suffered by the enemy at each stage.
During the day strong enemy attacks were delivered in front of Bucquoy,
but were stopped by artillery, machine gun and rifle fire.
On the morning of the 27th March the headquarters of all three infantry
brigades were established in deep dugouts in the vicinity of Essarts,
about 2000 yards north-west of Bucquoy. From 8 a.m. enemy aircraft
showed great activity, and at 10.15 a.m. heavy hostile shelling began.
During the morning an enemy assembly for attack, in Nissen huts south of
Ablainzevelle, and a massing near Ablainzevelle Cemetery, were broken up
by our artillery. At 2.40 p.m. shelling of the front line became very
heavy, but the enemy massing for attack in Ablainzevelle Wood and Village
were dispersed by the Divisional Artillery, assisted by the German guns
which, shooting short, did much damage to their own infantry. At 3 p.m.
an attack from Logeast Wood was shattered by artillery, machine-gun, and
rifle-fire. During the night a patrol of the 6th Manchesters entered
Ablainzevelle, killed several Germans, and brought back two machine-guns,
the officer in command being severely wounded just before regaining
his own lines. The initiative shown in this little affair gained the
Divisional Commander’s congratulations for the battalion.
[Illustration: BUCQUOY—AYETTE ROAD, USED AS LATERAL COMMUNICATION BY
FRONT-LINE TROOPS.]
[Illustration: ESSARTS CRUCIFIX, USED AS HQRS. OF 211TH ARTILLERY BRIGADE
DURING MARCH-APRIL FIGHTING.]
[Illustration: ESSARTS VALLEY, SHOWING POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY DIVISIONAL
ARTILLERY.]
[Illustration: GOMMECOURT WOOD, SHOWING OLD GERMAN FRONT LINE (1916) AND
FONQUEVILLERS.]
[Illustration: GOMMECOURT WOOD, LOOKING TOWARDS HANNESCAMPS.]
[Illustration: JULIUS POINT, LOOKING TOWARDS PIGEON WOOD.]
The boundaries between the 4th and 6th Corps had been continually
changing. This caused much alteration of wagon-lines, rear headquarters,
etc., and the difficulties were not lessened by such alarmist rumours
from the rear as that the enemy had broken through into the Ayette Valley
to the north, and as there was a right-angle bend in the British line
south of Bucquoy, on the right of the Division’s front, this would mean
that both flanks of the Division were enveloped. The rumour was denied by
the 126th Brigade, who stated that they were in touch with the 4th Guards
Brigade, 31st Division. Patrols sent out to Ayette and Le Quesnoy Farm
found that the line on the left of the Division had not been penetrated,
and at 2 a.m. on the 28th the 126th Brigade and the 4th Guards Brigade
reported the position satisfactory, the Guards Division having extended
to its right and joined up with the 4th Guards Brigade, thus closing
the gap. Two companies of the 125th were sent to reinforce the 126th.
The trenches now taken over by the Division were as bad as they could
possibly be, having been disused for years. They were, moreover, open
to fire on three sides, and as rain had been falling for some time, and
showed no sign of stopping, they were knee-deep in mud and water.
[Sidenote: _March 28_]
At 8.15 a.m. on the 28th after a heavy bombardment of the divisional
front, an enemy attack developed from the direction of Ablainzevelle,
and was broken up by rifle, machine-gun, and Lewis-gun fire. A second
attack at 10.15 a.m., the enemy advancing in three waves from Logeast
Wood, was repulsed, chiefly by infantry fire. An hour later large parties
from the same direction were met in the open and driven back, except
at one point where the enemy obtained a footing in our lines. The 6th
and 8th Manchesters at once counter-attacked with the bayonet, and all
Germans who had entered our lines were killed or captured. At 1.30 p.m.
a bombing attack was made against the left of the 127th Brigade. The 6th
Manchesters again counter-attacked and captured two machine-guns and an
officer. While one of the hottest attacks of the day was in progress
Corporal A. Brooks, 6th Manchesters, noticed that his men were short of
rifle-oil and that the bolts of the rifles, from incessant use, were not
working freely. In the face of the enemy machine-guns and rifles the
corporal calmly moved along the line of his platoon with an oil-can,
personally oiled the bolts—and survived. At 7.10 p.m. concentrated
machine-gun fire inflicted heavy losses on the enemy assembling in Nissen
huts between Ablainzevelle and Logeast Wood.
As Fonquevillers had become a shell storm centre D.H.Q. was moved to St.
Amand. During the night of the 28th March the Division took over 1500
yards of front on its right flank from the 62nd Division, and a Field
Company R.E. was moved up in close support of each infantry brigade.
The 123rd Brigade, 41st Division, was placed at the disposal of the
Divisional Commander as a reserve. Within the space of forty-eight hours
the enemy had made eight attacks upon the Division, but only on the one
occasion had he entered our line, to be driven out immediately at the
point of the bayonet. The number of effectives in the three infantry
brigades and their condition were now reported as follows—
125th Brigade, 1017. Fairly fresh.
126th ” 1037. Much shelled, ready to fight, but cannot march.
127th ” 1100. Very weary.
But in spite of weary bodies cheerfulness pervaded the Division, though
most of the men could not understand why they had been ordered to
withdraw on the 26th, after proving that they could do more than hold
their own against Jerry. Open warfare of this sort was more to their
taste than the monotonous trench warfare had been. “Simply topping
fighting!” was an officer’s opinion. “Bit of change like, this ’ere, from
the trenches,” observed one Wigan man to another after four days of hard
fighting without sleep. After due consideration the other replied: “Aye,
mate, this is a bit of aw reet; it favours a b⸺ picnic.”
The sappers had been sent up in support, and though instructions had been
given that they were not to be used in the front line, they made their
way into it and even sent out patrols. They and the 7th Northumberland
Fusiliers, who were also being used as front-line troops, captured
prisoners. The battle surplus of battalions had been formed into a
composite battalion, to be used as a fighting unit if required, but this
was not found necessary, as the enemy’s progress was stayed. March 29 was
a comparatively quiet day. The great German Offensive had been definitely
checked on this part of the Third Army’s front by the determination
and fighting qualities of all ranks and all arms. On the night of the
29th-30th the Division was relieved by the 41st Division and given a
couple of days in the second-line trenches, in the Hébuterne—Gommecourt
sector, with the exception of the 126th Brigade and “B” Company, M.G.
Battalion, which remained at Essarts at the disposal of the G.O.C., 41st
Division. The Divisional Artillery now occupied positions around Essarts,
and there was no chance of even two days’ rest for them.
[Sidenote: _Enemy Offensive Checked_]
The Division had entered upon these operations under exceptionally
difficult circumstances. South of Arras the whole British front was
being pushed back. Information was indefinite and conflicting. Owing to
the congestion of the roads, the constant changes of positions and the
consequent difficulties of keeping in touch, the troops had had to rely
for a time on emergency rations solely. They had been pitted against
specially selected and trained storm-troops, greatly superior in numbers
and imbued with the confidence and enthusiasm which a triumphant advance
is bound to inspire. On several occasions both flanks of the Division
had been left in the air, but even then it had proved its ability to
hold its ground stubbornly and cheerfully until ordered to retire; and
its withdrawals had been carried out in good order and with exemplary
steadiness. The Divisional Commander was more than pleased with his
officers and men; he was now confident of their fighting spirit and
skill, as they were confident in his leadership; and when the Division
was relieved he issued the following Special Order of the Day—
“On being withdrawn from front line of the great battle in
which the Division is engaged, the Major-General wishes to
congratulate all ranks of all arms and services in the Division
on the magnificent work they have done.
“The co-operation between all arms on the battlefield, and
the soldierly spirit displayed by all ranks, resulted in no
ground being given up by the Division without an order, and in
enormous losses to the enemy, whose advance has thereby for the
moment been brought to a standstill.
“The Divisional Motto to ‘GO ONE BETTER’ has been truly
established. The Divisional Commander is convinced that all
ranks, at all times and in all places, will live up to it.”
Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper, commanding the 4th Corps, telegraphed—
“The Corps Commander congratulates 42nd Division on their
magnificent behaviour during the last few days of fighting.
Numerous heavy attacks have been made by the enemy, and have
been completely repulsed with heavy loss, and the capture of
prisoners and machine-guns. He heartily thanks the troops for
their courage and endurance, and is confident that they will
continue to hold the line against all attacks.”
The Division returned to the front line on the night of April 1-2, the
125th Brigade and the 1/7th Northumberland Fusiliers holding the right
sub-sector, and the 126th Brigade and the three Field Companies, R.E.,
the left, with the 127th Brigade in support. All three infantry brigades
had their headquarters in Essarts, a village on which a disproportionate
amount of “hate” seemed to be concentrated. On the night of the 2nd the
125th Brigade raided a new enemy work east of the Bucquoy—Ablainzevelle
road and established a strong point in the work; and at 2 a.m. on the 3rd
the 32nd Division, on the left of the 42nd, made a successful attack upon
Ayette, capturing 200 prisoners, and establishing a line east of Ayette.
At 5 a.m. on the 5th of April the 125th Brigade front and the
neighbourhood of Essarts were heavily shelled, gas being freely used.
The 126th Brigade, moving into support trenches at Essarts, suffered
very severely, the 10th Manchesters losing more men than in the whole
of the previous twelve days fighting. H.E. and gas shells alternately
poured down for the space of five hours. The night was pitch-black, as
the men stumbled along the muddy trenches, unable to see or breathe. The
trenches, already a foot deep in mud, were described as “slime and blood,
carpeted with bodies.” But when the bombardment lifted, the men extracted
their dead and wounded comrades, and resumed their tasks, their resolve
to “best the Boche” being no whit abated. The Composite Battalion, also
near Essarts, had fifty casualties, and the Divisional Artillery also
suffered, though less severely. At 8 a.m., under cover of a trench-mortar
hurricane bombardment, which inflicted very heavy casualties, not only
among the front-line troops but also in the reserve companies, and
completely destroyed a machine-gun section, the enemy attacked and
succeeded in throwing back the left of the 8th Lancashire Fusiliers, the
two companies being wiped out almost to a man. The 7th L.F. and the
right company of the 8th were able to hold their ground, and the latter
began to work its way up the trench to the north, but was forced to
fall back when nearly surrounded, owing to the retirement of the left
company of the left battalion of the division on its right. All lines
being down, communication was bad, but at 11.40 a.m. orders were issued
that the survivors of the 8th L.F. must eject the enemy at once. They
counter-attacked, and at noon reached the main cross-roads in Bucquoy,
where hand-to-hand fighting took place amid the ruins of the village.
Lieut.-Colonel St. Leger Davies[16] was mortally wounded by machine-gun
fire, and Captain G. W. Sutton, M.C. assumed command and successfully
organized the consolidation of the line regained until he, too, was
severely wounded. Very fierce fighting continued, and two platoons of the
5th L.F. were brought up. The counter-attack progressed favourably until
the line of the Bucquoy—Ayette road was reached, when it was held up by
machine-gun fire. Touch had again been lost with the battalion on the
right, and the 5th L.F., bringing up their remaining company, formed a
defensive flank in touch with the 7th L.F., and the attack was brought to
a standstill. The fighting, which had been very bitter all day, gradually
died down, and at 8 p.m. the front was quiet, touch being regained on the
right flank during the night.
The morning of the 6th was quiet except for artillery fire on both sides.
Later information revealed the fact that the attack of the previous day
on the divisional front formed part of one of the fiercest and last
attacks with which the enemy followed up his initial offensive. Its
repulse proved of very great importance. The 5th East Lancashires were
put at the disposal of the 125th Brigade, and their place on Henley Hill,
the key to the position between Essarts and Ablainzevelle, was taken by
the Composite Battalion. Later in the day the 126th Brigade was moved to
Souastre, and on the following night the other infantry brigades were
also relieved by the 62nd Division, D.H.Q. being opened at Pas Château,
about ten miles west of Bucquoy. On the night of the 8th the R.E., the
M.G. Battalion, and the Pioneer Battalion were relieved, and also a
company of the 8th Manchesters, which by some mischance had not been
relieved on the previous day. Being naturally annoyed at this delay the
company vented its displeasure upon the Boche by raiding Ablainzevelle,
inflicting many casualties, and capturing prisoners and a machine-gun.
The casualties in the Division from March 24 to April 8 numbered 126
officers and 2839 other ranks, but heavy as this total was, the loss
inflicted upon the enemy by the Division was far greater. The evacuation
of the wounded had proceeded smoothly in spite of the heavy traffic and
congestion at the Dressing Stations, and very few casualties had fallen
into the hands of the enemy. No man did better work for the wounded
than Padre E. C. Hoskyns, M.C., attached to the 7th Manchesters. At
Achiet-le-Grand, on March 24, he collected a large number of casualties
of many units and of various divisions, tended them under heavy fire,
and, though himself slightly wounded, remained with them until they could
be evacuated. Later, he collected wounded and stragglers, organized
carrying-parties, and got the last party safely off just before the
enemy arrived. Good work was done by the Military Police, who had a
very difficult task in managing traffic about Bucquoy, Essarts, and
Hannescamps, and who performed acts of conspicuous gallantry. The Signal
Company had shown its usual efficiency, intrepidity and capacity for hard
work.
Machine-gunners and Lewis-gunners were sorely tried by the need to
carry their guns a distance of seven miles or more into action before
undergoing the sufficiently severe strain of continuous fighting. The
M.G. Battalion, splendidly led by its Commander, Lieut.-Colonel W. K.
Tillie, D.S.O., had done its full share in the gallant and successful
resistance made at Ervillers, Bucquoy, Ablainzevelle and elsewhere. The
efficacy of the Lewis-gun was clearly brought out, and was enhanced by
the initiative of the personnel who used it. It was also satisfactory
to note the effective use of infantry weapons, particularly the rifle,
and the reliance placed upon them by the men after the first few hours
fighting. The attention that had recently been given to rifle practice
proved invaluable, for the men discovered that provided they applied the
lessons learnt, the enemy had little chance of getting to close quarters.
[Sidenote: _Factors of Success_]
Two of the factors that contributed to the Division’s success may be
summarized as follows—
(1) The spirit of mutual trust and camaraderie, from the highest to the
lowest, which had been fostered in the Division. While the spirit of
emulation to carry out the Divisional Motto animated every unit, each
knew that it could rely confidently upon the others.
(2) The rigorous training of the Division in the offensive method of
defence in depth, and the system of holding tactical localities by
units—as opposed to long lines—combined with preparedness for immediate
local counter-attack.
Every branch of the divisional organization had been severely proved in
the fire of this epic struggle, and had stood the test gloriously. It
is impossible to praise too highly the conduct of all ranks throughout
the operations, the initiative of the subordinate commanders in
directing and controlling their commands, and the tenacity, keenness and
fighting spirit of all arms and all ranks. Whether repelling attacks,
or counter-attacking, or withdrawing in accordance with orders, their
cheerfulness and high spirits never flagged. They were quite confident
that they could “lick Jerry” at any time or in any place, and however
weak and exhausted the flesh might be the spirit was always willing. The
reply given by a brigade to H.Q. inquiry as to its state of exhaustion is
typical: “Can’t march, but can fight.”