THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA, B.C. 404-371.
After the fall of Athens, Sparta stood without a rival in Greece. In
the various cities which had belonged to the Athenian empire Lysander
established an oligarchical Council of Ten, called a DECARCHY or
Decemvirate, subject to the control of a Spartan HARMOST or governor.
The Decarchies, however, remained only a short time in power, since the
Spartan government regarded them with jealousy as the partisans of
Lysander; but harmosts continued to be placed in every state subject to
their empire. The government of the harmosts was corrupt and
oppressive; no justice could be obtained against them by an appeal to
the Spartan authorities at home; and the Grecian cities soon had cause
to regret the milder and more equitable sway of Athens.
On the death of Agis in B.C. 398, his half-brother Agesilaus was
appointed King, to the exclusion of Leotychides, the son of Agis. This
was mainly effected by the powerful influence of Lysander, who
erroneously considered Agesilaus to be of a yielding and manageable
disposition and hoped by a skilful use of those qualities to extend his
own influence, and under the name of another to be in reality king
himself.
Agesilaus was now forty years of age, and esteemed a model of those
virtues more peculiarly deemed Spartan. He was obedient to the
constituted authorities, emulous to excel, courageous, energetic,
capable of bearing all sorts of hardship and fatigue, simple and frugal
in his mode of life. To these severer qualities he added the popular
attractions of an agreeable countenance and pleasing address. His
personal defects at first stood in the way of his promotion. He was
not only low in stature, but also lame of one leg; and there was an
ancient oracle which warned the Spartans to beware of "a lame reign."
The ingenuity of Lysander, assisted probably by the popular qualities
of Agesilaus, contrived to overcome this objection by interpreting a
lame reign to mean not any bodily defect in the king, but the reign of
one who was not a genuine descendant of Hercules. Once possessed of
power, Agesilaus supplied any defect in his title by the prudence and
policy of his conduct; and, by the marked deference which he paid both
to the Ephors and the senators, he succeeded in gaining for himself
more real power than had been enjoyed by any of his predecessors.
The affairs of Asia Minor soon began to draw the attention of Agesilaus
to that quarter. The assistance lent to Cyrus by the Spartans was no
secret at the Persian court; and Tissaphernes, who had been rewarded
for his fidelity with the satrapy of Cyrus in addition to his own, no
sooner returned to his government than he attacked the Ionian cities,
then under the protection of Sparta. A considerable Lacedaemonian
force under Thimbron was despatched to their assistance, and which, as
related in the preceding chapter, was joined by the remnant of the
Greeks who had served under Cyrus. Thimbron, however, proved so
inefficient a commander, that he was superseded at the end of 399 or
beginning of 398 B.C., and Dercyllidas appointed in his place. But
though at first successful against Pharnabazus in AEolis, Dercyllidas
was subsequently surprised in Caria in such an unfavourable position
that he would have suffered severely but for the timidity of
Tissaphernes, who was afraid to venture upon an action. Under these
circumstances an armistice was agreed to for the purpose of treating
for a peace (397 B.C.).
Pharnabazus availed himself of this armistice to make active
preparations for a renewal of the war. He obtained large
reinforcements of Persian troops, and began to organize a fleet in
Phoenicia and Cilicia. This was intrusted to the Athenian admiral
Conon, of whom we now first hear again after a lapse of seven years
since his defeat at AEgospotami. After that disastrous battle Conon
fled with nine triremes to Cyprus, where he was now living under the
protection of Evagoras, prince of Salamis.
It was the news of these extensive preparations that induced Agesilaus,
on the suggestion of Lysander, to volunteer his services against the
Persians. He proposed to take with him only 30 full Spartan citizens,
or peers, to act as a sort of council, together with 2000 Neodamodes,
or enfranchised Helots, and 6000 hoplites of the allies. Lysander
intended to be the leader of the 30 Spartans, and expected through them
to be the virtual commander of the expedition of which Agesilaus was
nominally the head.
Since the time of Agamemnon no Grecian king had led an army into Asia;
and Agesilaus studiously availed himself of the prestige of that
precedent in order to attract recruits to his standard. The Spartan
kings claimed to inherit the sceptre of Agamemnon; and to render the
parallel more complete, Agesilaus proceeded with a division of his
fleet to Aulis, intending there to imitate the memorable sacrifice of
the Homeric hero. But as he had neglected to ask the permission of the
Thebans, and conducted the sacrifice and solemnities by means of his
own prophets and ministers, and in a manner at variance with the usual
rites of the temple, the Thebans were offended, and expelled him by
armed force:--an insult which he never forgave.
It was in 396 B.C. that Agesilaus arrived at Ephesus and took the
command in Asia. He demanded of the Persians the complete independence
of the Greek cities in Asia; and in order that there might be time to
communicate with the Persian court, the armistice was renewed for three
months. During this interval of repose, Lysander, by his arrogance and
pretensions, offended both Agesilaus and the Thirty Spartans.
Agesilaus, determined to uphold his dignity, subjected Lysander to so
many humiliations that he was at last fain to request his dismissal
from Ephesus, and was accordingly sent to the Hellespont, where he did
good service to the Spartan interests.
Meanwhile Tissaphernes, having received large reinforcements, sent a
message to Agesilaus before the armistice had expired, ordering him to
quit Asia. Agesilaus immediately made preparations as if he would
attack Tissaphernes in Caria; but having thus put the enemy on a false
scent, he suddenly turned northwards into Phrygia, the satrapy of
Pharnabazus, and marched without opposition to the neighbourhood of
Dascylium, the residence of the satrap himself. Here, however, he was
repulsed by the Persian cavalry. He now proceeded into winter quarters
at Ephesus, where he employed himself in organizing a body of cavalry
to compete with the Persians. During the winter the army was brought
into excellent condition; and Agesilaus gave out early in the spring of
395 B.C. that he should march direct upon Sardis. Tissaphernes
suspecting another feint, now dispersed his cavalry in the plain of the
Maeander. But this time Agesilaus marched as he had announced, and in
three days arrived unopposed on the banks of the Pactolus, before the
Persian cavalry could be recalled. When they at last came up, the
newly raised Grecian horse, assisted by the peltasts, and some of the
younger and more active hoplites, soon succeeded in putting them to
flight. Many of the Persians were drowned in the Pactolus, and their
camp, containing much booty and several camels, was taken.
Agesilaus now pushed his ravages up to the very gates of Sardis, the
residence of Tissaphernes. But the career of that timid and
treacherous satrap was drawing to a close. The queen-mother,
Parysatis, who had succeeded in regaining her influence over
Artaxerxes, caused an order to be sent down from Susa for his
execution; in pursuance of which he was seized in a bath at Colossae,
and beheaded. Tithraustes, who had been intrusted with the execution
of this order, succeeded Tissaphernes in the satrapy, and immediately
reopened negotiations with Agesilaus. An armistice of six months was
concluded; and meanwhile Tithraustes, by a subsidy of 30 talents,
induced Agesilaus to move out of his satrapy into that of Pharnabazus.
During this march into Phrygia Agesilaus received a new commission from
home, appointing him the head of the naval as well as of the land
force--two commands never before united in a single Spartan. He named
his brother-in-law, Pisander, commander of the fleet. But in the
following year (B.C. 394), whilst he was preparing an expedition on a
grand scale into the interior of Asia Minor, he was suddenly recalled
home to avert the dangers which threatened his native country.
The jealousy and ill-will with which the newly acquired empire of the
Spartans was regarded by the other Grecian states had not escaped the
notice of the Persians; and when Tithraustes succeeded to the satrapy
of Tissaphernes he resolved to avail himself of this feeling by
exciting a war against Sparta in the heart of Greece itself. With this
view he despatched one Timocrates, a Rhodian, to the leading Grecian
cities which appeared hostile to Sparta, carrying with him a sum of 50
talents to be distributed among the chief men in each for the purpose
of bringing them over to the views of Persia. Timocrates was
successful in Thebes, Corinth, and Argos but he appears not to have
visited Athens.
Hostilities were at first confined to Sparta and Thebes. A quarrel
having arisen between the Opuntian Locrians and the Phocians respecting
a strip of border land, the former people appealed to the Thebans, who
invaded Phocis. The Phocians on their side invoked the aid of the
Lacedaemonians, who, elated with the prosperous state of their affairs
in Asia, and moreover desirous of avenging the affronts they had
received from the Thebans, readily listened to the appeal. Lysander,
who took an active part in promoting the war, was directed to attack
the town of Haliartus; and it was arranged that King Pausanias should
join him on a fixed day under the walls of that town, with the main
body of the Lacedaemonians and their Peloponnesian allies.
Nothing could more strikingly denote the altered state of feeling in
Greece than the request for assistance which the Thebans, thus menaced,
made to their ancient enemies and rivals the Athenians. Nor were the
Athenians backward in responding to the appeal. Lysander arrived at
Haliartus before Pausanias. Here, in a sally made by the citizens,
opportunely supported by the unexpected arrival of a body of Thebans,
the army of Lysander was routed, and himself slain. His troops
disbanded and dispersed themselves in the night time. Thus, when
Pausanias at last came up, he found no army to unite with; and as an
imposing Athenian force had arrived, he now, with the advice of his
council took the humiliating step--always deemed a confession of
inferiority--of requesting a truce in order to bury the dead who had
fallen in the preceding battle. Even this, however, the Thebans would
not grant except on the condition that the Lacedaemonians should
immediately quit their territory. With these terms Pausanias was
forced to comply; and after duly interring the bodies of Lysander and
his fallen comrades, the Lacedaemonians dejectedly pursued their
homeward march. Pausanias, afraid to face the public indignation of
the Spartans took refuge in the temple of Athena Alea at Tegea; and
being condemned to death in his absence, only escaped that fate by
remaining in the sanctuary. He was succeeded by his son Agesipolis.
The enemies of Sparta took fresh courage from this disaster to her
arms. Athens, Corinth, and Argos now formed with Thebes a solemn
alliance against her. The league was soon joined by the Euboeans, the
Acarnanians, and other Grecian states. In the spring of 394 B.C. the
allies assembled at Corinth, and the war, which had been hitherto
regarded as merely Boeotian, was now called the CORINTHIAN, by which
name it is known in history. This threatening aspect of affairs
determined the Ephors to recall Agesilaus, as already related.
The allies were soon in a condition to take the field with a force of
24,000 hoplites, of whom one-fourth were Athenians, together with a
considerable body of light troops and cavalry. The Lacedaemonians had
also made the most active preparations. In the neighbourhood of Corinth
a battle was fought, in which the Lacedaemonians gained the victory,
though their allied troops were put to the rout. This battle, called
the battle of Corinth, was fought in July 394 B.C.
Agesilaus, who had relinquished with a heavy heart his projected
expedition into Asia, was now on his homeward march. By the promise of
rewards he had persuaded the bravest and most efficient soldiers in his
army to accompany him, amongst whom were many of the Ten Thousand, with
Xenophon at their head. The route of Agesilaus was much the same as
the one formerly traversed by Xerxes, and the camels which accompanied
the army gave it somewhat of an oriental aspect. At Amphipolis he
received the news of the victory at Corinth; but his heart was so full
of schemes against Persia, that the feeling which it awakened in his
bosom was rather one of regret that so many Greeks had fallen, whose
united efforts might have emancipated Asia Minor, than of joy at the
success of his countrymen. Having forced his way through a desultory
opposition offered by the Thessalian cavalry, he crossed Mount Othrys,
and marched unopposed the rest of the way through the straits of
Thermopylae to the frontiers of Phocis and Boeotia. Here the evil
tidings reached him of the defeat and death of his brother-in-law,
Pisander, in a great sea-fight off Cnidus in Caria (August 394 B.C.)
Conon, with the assistance of Pharnabazus, had succeeded in raising a
powerful fleet, partly Phoenician and partly Grecian, with which he
either destroyed or captured more than half of the Lacedaemonian fleet.
Agesilaus, fearing the impression which such sad news might produce
upon his men, gave out that the Lacedaemonian fleet had gained a
victory; and, having offered sacrifice as if for a victory, he ordered
an advance.
Agesilaus soon came up with the confederate army, which had prepared to
oppose him in the plain of Coronea. The Thebans succeeded in driving
in the Orchomenians, who formed the left wing of the army of Agesilaus,
and penetrated as far as the baggage in the rear. But on the remainder
of the line Agesilaus was victorious, and the Thebans now saw
themselves cut off from their companions, who had retreated and taken
up a position on Mount Helicon. Facing about and forming in deep and
compact order, the Thebans sought to rejoin the main body, but they
were opposed by Agesilaus and his troops. The shock of the conflicting
masses which ensued was one of the most terrible recorded in the annals
of Grecian warfare. The shields of the foremost ranks were shattered,
and their spears broken, so that daggers became the only available arm.
Agesilaus, who was in the front ranks, unequal by his size and strength
to sustain so furious an onset, was flung down, trodden on, and covered
with wounds; but the devoted courage of the 50 Spartans forming his
body-guard rescued him from death. The Thebans finally forced their
may through, but not without severe loss. The victory of Agesilaus was
not very decisive; but the Thebans tacitly acknowledged their defeat by
soliciting the customary truce for the burial of their dead.
Agesilaus, on his arrival at Sparta, was received with the most lively
demonstrations of gratitude and esteem, and became hence-forward the
sole director of Spartan policy.
Thus in less than two months the Lacedaemonians had fought two battles
on land, and one at sea; namely, those of Corinth, Coronea, and Cnidus.
But, though they had been victorious in the land engagements, they were
so little decisive as to lead to no important result; whilst their
defeat at Cnidus produced the most disastrous consequences. It was
followed by the loss of nearly all their maritime empire, even faster
than they had acquired it after the battle of AEgospotami. For as
Conon and Pharnabazus sailed with their victorious fleet from island to
island, and from port to port, their approach was everywhere the signal
for the flight or expulsion of the Spartan harmosts.
In the spring of the following year (B.C. 393) Conon and Pharnabazus
sailed to the isthmus of Corinth, then occupied as a central post by
the allies. The appearance of a Persian fleet in the Saronic gulf was
a strange sight to Grecian eyes, and one which might have served as a
severe comment on the effect of their suicidal wars. Conon dexterously
availed himself of the hatred of Pharnabazus towards Sparta to procure
a boon for his native city. As the satrap was on the point of
proceeding homewards, Conon obtained leave to employ the seamen in
rebuilding the fortifications of Piraeus and the long walls of Athens.
Pharnabazus also granted a large sum for the same purpose; and Conon
had thus the glory of appearing, like a second Themistocles, the
deliverer and restorer of his country. Before the end of autumn the
walls were rebuilt. Having thus, as it were, founded Athens a second
time, Conon sailed to the islands to lay again the foundations of an
Athenian maritime empire.
During the remainder of this and the whole of the following year (B.C.
392) the war was carried on in the Corinthian territory.
One of the most important events at this time was the destruction of a
whole Lacedaemonian MORA, or battalion, by the light-armed mercenaries
of the Athenian Iphicrates. For the preceding two years Iphicrates had
commanded a body of mercenaries, consisting of peltasts, [So called
from the pelta, or kind of shield which they carried.] who had been
first organised by Conon after rebuilding the walls of Athens. For
this force Iphicrates introduced those improved arms and tactics which
form an epoch in the Grecian art of war. His object was to combine as
far as possible the peculiar advantages of the hoplites and light-armed
troops. He substituted a linen corslet for the coat of mail worn by
the hoplites, and lessened the shield, while he rendered the light
javelin and short sword of the peltasts more effective by lengthening
them both one-half These troops soon proved very effective. After
gaining several victories he ventured to make a sally from Corinth, and
attacked a Lacedaemonian mora in flank and rear. So many fell under
the darts and arrows of the peltasts that the Lacedaemonian captain
called a halt, and ordered the youngest and most active of his hoplites
to rush forward and drive off the assailants. But their heavy arms
rendered them quite unequal to such a mode of fighting; nor did the
Lacedaemonian cavalry, which now came up, but which acted with very
little vigour and courage, produce any better effect. At length the
Lacedaemonians succeeded in reaching an eminence, where they
endeavoured to make a stand; but at this moment Callias arrived with
some Athenian hoplites from Corinth, whereupon the already disheartened
Lacedaemonians broke and fled in confusion, pursued by the peltasts,
who committed such havoc, chasing and killing some of them even in the
sea, that but very few of the whole body succeeded in effecting their
escape.
The maritime war was prosecuted with vigour. Thrasybulus, and after
his death Iphicrates, were successful upon the coast of Asia Minor, and
made the Athenians again masters of the Hellespont. Under these
circumstances the Lacedaemonians resolved to spare no efforts to regain
the good will of the Persians. Antalcidas, the Lacedaemonian commander
on the Asiatic coast, entered into negotiations with Tiribazus, who had
succeeded Tithraustes in the satrapy of Ionia, in order to bring about
a general peace under the mediation of Persia. Conducted by Tiribazus,
Antalcidas repaired to the Persian court, and prevailed an the Persian
monarch both to adopt the peace, and to declare war against those who
should reject it. Antalcidas and Tiribazus returned to the coasts of
Asia Minor, not only armed with these powers, but provided with an
ample force to carry them into execution. In addition to the entire
fleet of Persia, Dionysius of Syracuse had placed 20 triremes at the
service of the Lacedaemonians; and Antalcidas now sailed with a large
fleet to the Hellespont, where Iphicrates and the Athenians were still
predominant. The overwhelming force of Antalcidas, the largest that
had been seen in the Hellespont since the battle of AEgospotami,
rendered all resistance hopeless. The supplies of corn from the Euxine
no longer found their way to Athens: and the Athenians, depressed at
once both by what they felt and by what they anticipated, began to long
for peace. As without the assistance of Athens it seemed hopeless for
the other allies to struggle against Sparta, all Greece was inclined to
listen to an accommodation.
Under these circumstances deputies from the Grecian states were
summoned to meet Tiribazus; who, after exhibiting to them the royal
seal of Persia, read to them the following terms of a peace: "King
Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia and the islands of
Clazomenae and Cyprus should belong to him. He also thinks it just to
leave all the other Grecian cities, both small and great,
independent--except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which are to belong to
Athens, as of old. Should any parties refuse to accept this peace, I
will make war upon them, along with those who are of the same mind,
both by land and sea, with ships and with money." All the Grecian
states accepted these terms.
This disgraceful peace, called the PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS, was concluded
in the year B.C. 387. By it Greece seemed prostrated at the feet of
the barbarians; for its very terms, engraven on stone and set up in the
sanctuaries of Greece, recognised the Persian king as the arbiter of
her destinies. Although Athens cannot be entirely exonerated from the
blame of this transaction, the chief guilt rests upon Sparta, whose
designs were far deeper and more hypocritical than they appeared.
Under the specious pretext of securing the independence of the Grecian
cities, her only object was to break up the confederacies under Athens
and Thebes, and, with the assistance of Persia, to pave the way for her
own absolute dominion in Greece.
No sooner was the peace of Antalcidas concluded than Sparta, directed
by Agesilaus, the ever-active enemy of Thebes, exerted all her power to
weaken that city. She began by proclaiming the independence of the
various Boeotian cities, and by organizing in each a local oligarchy,
adverse to Thebes and favourable to herself. Lacedaemonian garrisons
were placed in Orchomenus and Thespiae, and Plataea was restored in
order to annoy and weaken Thebes. Shortly afterwards the
Lacedaemonians obtained possession of Thebes itself by an act of
shameful treachery. They had declared war against Olynthus, a town
situated at the head of the Toronaic gulf, in the peninsula of the
Macedonian Chalcidice, the head of a powerful confederation which
included several of the adjacent Grecian cities. The Thebans had
entered into an alliance with Olynthus, and had forbidden any of their
citizens to join the Lacedaemonian army destined to act against it; but
they were not strong enough to prevent its marching through their
territory. Phoebidas, who was conducting a Lacedaemonian force against
Olynthus, halted on his way through Boeotia not far from Thebes; where
he was visited by Leontiades, one of the polemarchs of the city, and
two or three other leaders of the Lacedaemonian party in Thebes. It
happened that the festival of the Thesmophoria was on the point of
being celebrated, during which the Cadmea, or Theban Acropolis, was
given up for the exclusive use of the women. The opportunity seemed
favourable for a surprise; and Leontiades and Phoebidas concerted a
plot to seize it. Whilst the festival was celebrating, Phoebidas
pretended to resume his march, but only made a circuit round the city
walls; whilst Leontiades, stealing out of the senate, mounted his
horse, and, joining the Lacedaemonian troops, conducted them towards
the Cadmea. It was a sultry summer's afternoon, so that the very
streets were deserted; and Phoebidas, without encountering any
opposition, seized the citadel and all the women in it, to serve as
hostages for the quiet submission of the Thebans (B.C. 382). This
treacherous act during a period of profound peace awakened the
liveliest indignation throughout Greece. Sparta herself could not
venture to justify it openly, and Phoebidas was made the scape-goat of
her affected displeasure. As a sort of atonement to the violated
feeling of Greece, he was censured, fined, and dismissed. But that
this was a mere farce is evident from the fact, of his subsequent
restoration to command; and, however indignant the Lacedaemonians
affected to appear at the act of Phoebidas, they took care to reap the
fruits of it by retaining their garrison in the Cadmea.
The once haughty Thebes was now enrolled a member of the Lacedaemonian
alliance, and furnished her contingent--the grateful offering of the
new Theban government--for the war which Sparta was prosecuting with
redoubled vigour against Olynthus. This city was taken by the
Lacedaemonians in B.C. 379; the Olynthian confederacy was dissolved;
the Grecian cities belonging to it were compelled to join the
Lacedaemonian alliance; whilst the maritime towns of Macedonia were
reduced under the dominion of Amyntas, the king of Macedon.
The power of Sparta on land had now attained its greatest height. Her
unpopularity in Greece was commensurate with the extent of her harshly
administered dominion. She was leagued on all slides with the enemies
of Grecian freedom--with the Persians, with Amyntas of Macedon, and
with Dionysius of Syracuse. But she had now reached the turning-point
of her fortunes, and her successes, which had been earned without
scruple, were soon to be followed by misfortunes and disgrace. The
first blow came from Thebes, where she had perpetrated her most signal
injustice.
That city had been for three years in the hands of Leontiades and the
Spartan party. During this time great discontent had grown up among
the resident citizens; and there was also the party of exasperated
exiles, who had taken refuge at Athens. Among these exiles was
Pelopidas, a young man of birth and fortune, who had already
distinguished himself by his disinterested patriotism and ardent
character. He now took the lead in the plans formed the the liberation
of his country, and was the heart and soul of the enterprise. His warm
and generous heart was irresistibly attracted by everything great and
noble; and hence he was led to form a close and intimate friendship
with Epaminondas, who was several years older than himself and of a
still loftier character. Their friendship is said to have originated
in a campaign in which they served together, when, Pelopidas having
fallen in battle apparently dead, Epaminondas protected his body at the
imminent risk of his own life. Pelopidas afterwards endeavoured to
persuade Epaminondas to share his riches with him; and when he did not
succeed, he resolved to live on the same frugal fare as his great
friend. A secret correspondence was opened with his friends at Thebes,
the chief of whom were Phyllidas, secretary to the polemarchs, and
Charon. The dominant faction, besides the advantage of the actual
possession of power, was supported by a garrison of 1500
Lacedaemonians. The enterprise, therefore, was one of considerable
difficulty and danger. In the execution of it Phyllidas took a leading
part. It was arranged that he should give a supper to Archias and
Philippus, the two polemarchs, and after they had partaken freely of
wine the conspirators were to be introduced, disguised as women, and to
complete their work by the assassination of the polemarchs. On the day
before the banquet, Pelopidas, with six other exiles, arrived at Thebes
from Athens, and, straggling through the gates towards dusk in the
disguise of rustics and huntsmen, arrived safely at the house of
Charon, where they remained concealed till the appointed hour. While
the polemarchs were at table a messenger arrived from Athens with a
letter for Archias, in which the whole plot was accurately detailed.
The messenger, in accordance with his instructions, informed Archias
that the letter related to matters of serious importance. But the
polemarch, completely engrossed by the pleasures of the table, thrust
the letter under the pillow of his couch, exclaiming, "Serious matters
to-morrow."
The hour of their fate was now ripe. The conspirators, disguised with
veils, and in the ample folds of female attire, were ushered into the
room. For men in the state of the revelers the deception was complete;
but when they attempted to lift the veils from the women, their passion
was rewarded by the mortal thrust of a dagger. After thus slaying the
two polemarchs, the conspirators went to the house of Leontiades whom
they also despatched.
The news of the revolution soon spread abroad. Proclamations were
issued announcing that Thebes was free, and calling upon all citizens
who valued their liberty to muster in the market-place. As soon as day
dawned, and the citizens became aware that they were summoned to
vindicate their liberty, their joy and enthusiasm were unbounded. For
the first time since the seizure of their citadel they met in public
assembly; the conspirators, being introduced, were crowned by the
priests with wreaths, and thanked in the name of their country's gods;
whilst the assembly, with grateful acclamation, unanimously nominated
Pelopidas, Charon, and Mellon as the first restored Boeotarchs.
Meanwhile the remainder of the Theban exiles, accompanied by a body of
Athenian volunteers, assembled on the frontiers of Boeotia; and, at the
first news of the success of the conspiracy, hastened to Thebes to
complete the revolution. The Thebans, under their new Boeotarchs, were
already mounting to the assault of the Cadmea, when the Lacedaemonians
capitulated, and were allowed to march out with the honours of war.
The Athenians formed an alliance with the Thebans, and declared war
against Sparta.
From this time must be dated the era of a new political combination in
Greece. Athens strained every nerve to organize a fresh confederacy.
Thebes did not scruple to enrol herself as one of its earliest members.
The basis on which the confederacy was formed closely resembled that of
Delos. The cities composing it were to be independent, and to send
deputies to a congress at Athens, for the purpose of raising a common
fund for the support of a naval force. Care was taken to banish all
recollections connected with the former unpopularity of the Athenian
empire. The name of the tribute was no longer PHOROS, but SYNTAXIS, or
"contribution." The confederacy, which ultimately numbered 70 cities,
was chiefly organised through the exertions of Chabrias, and of
Timotheus the son of Conon. Nor were the Thebans less zealous, amongst
whom the Spartan government had left a lively feeling of antipathy.
The military force was put in the best training, and the famous "Sacred
Band" was now for the first time instituted. This band was a regiment
of 300 hoplites. It was supported at the public expense and kept
constantly under arms. It was composed of young and chosen citizens of
the best families, and organized in such a manner that each man had at
his side a dear and intimate friend. Its special duty was the defence
of the Cadmea.
The Thebans had always been excellent soldiers; but their good fortune
now gave them the greatest general that Greece had hitherto seen.
Epaminondas, who now appears conspicuously in public life, deserves the
reputation not merely of a Theban but of a Grecian hero. Sprung from a
poor but ancient family, Epaminondas possessed all the best qualities
of his nation without that heaviness, either of body or of mind, which
characterized and deteriorated the Theban people. By the study of
philosophy and by other intellectual pursuits his mind was enlarged
beyond the sphere of vulgar superstition, and emancipated from that
timorous interpretation of nature which caused even some of the leading
men of those days to behold a portent in the most ordinary phenomenon.
A still rarer accomplishment for a Theban was that of eloquence, which
he possessed in no ordinary degree. These intellectual qualities were
matched with moral virtues worthy to consort with them. Though
eloquent, he was discreet; though poor, he was neither avaricious nor
corrupt; though naturally firm and courageous, he was averse to
cruelty, violence, and bloodshed; though a patriot, he was a stranger
to personal ambition, and scorned the little arts by which popularity
is too often courted. Pelopidas, as we have already said, was his
bosom friend. It was natural therefore, that, when Pelopidas was named
Boeotarch, Epaminondas should be prominently employed in organizing the
means of war; but it was not till some years later that his military
genius shone forth in its full lustre.
The Spartans were resolved to avenge the repulse they had received; and
in the summer of B.C. 378 Agesilaus marched with a large army into
Boeotia. He was unable, however, to effect any thing decisive, and
subsequent invasions were attended with the like result. The Athenians
created a diversion in their favour by a maritime war, and thus for two
years Boeotia was free from Spartan invasion, Thebes employed this time
in extending her dominion over the neighbouring cities. One of her
most important successes during this period was the victory gained by
Pelopidas over a Lacedaemonian force near Tegyra, a village dependent
upon Orchomenus (B.C. 375). Pelopidas had with him only the Sacred
Band and a small body of cavalry when he fell in with the
Lacedaemonians, who were nearly twice as numerous. He did not,
however, shrink from the conflict on this account; and when one of his
men, running up to him, exclaimed, "We are fallen into the midst of the
enemy," he replied, "Why so, more than they into the midst of us?" In
the battle which ensued the two Spartan commanders fell at the first
charge, and their men were put to the rout. So signal a victory
inspired the Thebans with new confidence and vigour, as it showed that
Sparta was not invincible even in a pitched battle, and with the
advantage of numbers on her side. By the year 374 B.C. the Thebans had
succeeded in expelling the Lacedaemonians from Boeotia, and revived the
Boeotian confederacy. They also destroyed the restored city of
Plataea, and obliged its inhabitants once more to seek refuge at Athens.
The successes of the Thebans revived the jealousy and distrust of
Athens. Prompted by these feelings, the Athenians opened negotiations
for a peace with Sparta; a resolution which was also adopted by the
majority of the allies.
A congress was accordingly opened in Sparta in the spring of 371 B.C.
The Athenians were represented by Callias and two other envoys; the
Thebans by Epaminondas, then one of the polemarchs. The terms of a
peace were agreed upon, by which the independence of the various
Grecian cities was to be recognised; and the Spartan harmosts and
garrisons everywhere dismissed. Sparta ratified the treaty for herself
and her allies; but Athens took the oaths only for herself, and was
followed separately by her allies. As Epaminondas refused to sign
except in the name of the Boeotian confederation, Agesilaus directed
the name of the Thebans to be struck out of the treaty, and proclaimed
them excluded from it.
The peace concluded between Sparta, Athens, and their respective
allies, was called the PEACE OF CALLIAS. The result with regard to
Thebes and Sparta will appear in the following chapter.