_Of Cortes' further dispositions for the siege._
Cortes now divided the whole of our troops into three divisions. The
first division, consisting of one hundred and fifty foot, all well armed
with swords and shields, thirty horse, and eighteen musketeers and
crossbow-men, was commanded by Alvarado, under whom Guiterrez de
Badajoz, Andreas de Monjaraz, and Jorge de Alvarado had each the command
of fifty men and a third part of the musketeers and crossbow-men; the
cavalry being under the immediate command of Alvarado himself. To this
division 8000 Tlascallans were added, and Alvarado, in whose division I
also was, received orders to take up his position in the town of
Tlacupa. Cortes particularly recommended us to furnish ourselves with
good weapons, helmets, gorgets, and steel coverings for the legs, to
protect our bodies from the destructive weapons of the Mexicans. These
precautions were, indeed, very necessary; but, notwithstanding all our
defensive armour, scarcely a day past by in which the enemy did not kill
or wound some of our men.
The second division was placed under the command of Oli, and consisted
of thirty horse, one hundred and sixty-five foot, and twenty
crossbow-men and musketeers. Andreas de Tapia, Verdugo, and Lugo
commanded under him, he himself having the immediate command of the
cavalry. To this division, likewise, 8000 Tlascallans were added, and
they were to take up their position in the town of Cojohuacan, about
eight miles from Tlacupa.
Sandoval was appointed to the command of the third division, consisting
of twenty-four horse, fourteen crossbow-men and musketeers, and one
hundred and fifty foot armed with shields and swords. To this division
were added 8000 Indians from the townships of Chalco, Huexotzinco, and
other places in alliance with us. Cortes appointed Luis Marin and Pedro
de Ircio, two intimate friends of Sandoval, to command under him, the
latter himself having the immediate command of the cavalry. This
division was to take up a position near Iztapalapan, and Sandoval's
instructions were to attack that town, and do as much damage there as he
could, until he received further orders. Sandoval did not leave Tezcuco
before Cortes was about to step on board, who himself took the chief
command of the brigantines. On this flotilla there were altogether 325
men. Thus Sandoval, Oli, and Alvarado were each ordered off to different
points: one marched to the left, the other to the right; and those who
are not acquainted with the situation of this town or of the lake in
general, would imagine that these divisions were removing from one
common centre rather than approaching it. Each of these three captains
received particular instructions for his plan of operation, and the next
morning was fixed for our departure.
In order to be detained as little as possible, we sent off the whole
body of Tlascallans in advance to the Mexican frontiers. These troops
marched out in the best possible humour, under their commander
Chichimeclatecl and other officers, but discovered that their
commander-in-chief, the younger Xicotencatl, had remained behind. After
considerable inquiries, it was found that he had secretly returned to
Tlascalla on the previous night to take forcible possession of the
caziquedom and territory of Chichimeclatecl. It appears, according to
the accounts of the Tlascallans, that he wished to avail himself of this
favorable opportunity of raising himself to supreme power in his own
country, which the absence of Chichimeclatecl offered to him, who, in
his opinion, was the only person that stood in his way since the death
of Maxixcatzin, as he did not fear any opposition from his old blind
father. This Xicotencatl, the Tlascallans further added, had never felt
any real inclination to join us in the war against Mexico, but had
frequently assured them it would terminate in the destruction of us
all.[21]
When Chichimeclatecl received information of this, he instantly returned
to Tezcuco in order to apprize Cortes of it. Our general, on hearing
this, despatched five distinguished personages of Tezcuco, and two
Tlascallans, who were his particular friends, after Xicotencatl, to
request his immediate return to his troops, in Cortes' name. They were
to remind him that his father Lorenzo de Vargas would certainly have
marched out against Mexico in person, if blindness and old age had not
prevented him; that the whole population of Tlascalla continued loyal to
his majesty, and that the revolt he wished to excite would throw
dishonour on his own country. These representations Cortes desired
should be accompanied by large promises, to induce him to return to
obedience. Xicotencatl, however, haughtily replied, that he was
determined to abide by his resolve, and our dominion in this country
would not have continued thus long if his father and Maxixcatzin had
followed his advice.
Upon this our general ordered an alguacil to repair in all haste with
four of our horse and five distinguished men of Tezcuco to Xicotencatl's
abode, to take him prisoner, and hang him without any further ceremony.
"All kindness," added Cortes, "is thrown away upon this cazique. His
whole time is spent in devising plots and creating mischief. I cannot
suffer this to continue any longer; the matter has now come to a
crisis."
As soon as Alvarado received information of these commands, he urgently
begged of Cortes to pardon Xicotencatl. Our general replied that he
would consider about it, though he secretly gave the alguacil peremptory
orders to put him to death, which was accordingly done. Xicotencatl was
hung in a town subject to Tezcuco, and thus an end was put to all his
plottings. Many Tlascallans assured us that the elder Xicotencatl
himself had cautioned Cortes against his son,[22] and had advised him to
put him to death.
This affair delayed our departure from Tezcuco for one day; and thus it
was not till the 13th of May, 1521, that we commenced our march. As our
road lay for a considerable distance in the same direction, our division
under Alvarado and that under Oli marched out at the same time. The
first night we encamped in the township of Alcuman, to which place Oli
had despatched some men in advance to prepare quarters for his troops,
and had ordered that the houses which they took possession of should, by
way of distinction, be decorated with green boughs. When we arrived with
Alvarado, we found, to our surprise, that every house had been taken,
and the two divisions were just about to settle the matter, sword in
hand, when the officers stepped in between, and thereby put a stop to
the dispute. But the insult which had thus been offered to us was not so
easily to be forgotten; when, therefore, this circumstance became known
to Cortes, he sent off father Melgarejo and Luis Marin to us, with
letters to every officer and soldier, in which he reproached us for
quarrelling, and admonished us to keep peace with each other. From this
moment Alvarado and Oli were never upon such friendly terms as formerly.
The following morning the two divisions continued their march, and we
encamped for the night in a town subject to Mexico, but which was quite
deserted by its inhabitants. This was likewise the case in Quauhtitlan,
where we took up our quarters the next night.
Tenayucan and Escapuzalco, through which we marched the day following,
were also quite deserted. Our Tlascallan friends spread themselves all
through these townships, and entered into every house during the fore
part of the evening, from which they brought in quantities of
provisions. We adopted every military precaution for the night, as we
were not far distant from Mexico, and could plainly hear the Mexicans,
who were lying in crowds in their canoes on the lake and along the
causeways, hooting and yelling fearfully throughout the whole of the
night, and challenging us to the combat. Their object, was to induce us
to fall upon them in the dark, when they would have had a great
advantage over us. We had, however, received a sufficient warning by our
former misfortune, and very wisely kept ourselves as quietly as possible
until next morning, which was a Sunday.
After father Juan Diaz had said mass, we commended ourselves to the
protection of the Almighty, and both divisions marched forward to cut
off the aqueduct of Chapultepec, which lies about two miles from
Tlacupa, and supplies Mexico with water. On our way thither, we fell in
with several bodies of Mexicans, who had received intelligence that this
was to be the commencement of our operations against Mexico. The enemy
had in every way the advantage ground over us, and attacked us
vigorously with lances, arrows, and stones, by which three of our men
were wounded; but we soon put them to flight, and they were so closely
pursued by the Tlascallans that they lost twenty killed, and seven or
eight were taken prisoners. We were now able to destroy the aqueduct
without any further opposition, and the city of Mexico was deprived of
this source of obtaining water during the whole of the siege.
As soon as we had destroyed this aqueduct, our officers determined to
make an attempt upon one of the bridges on the causeway leading from
Tlacupa. We had scarcely begun to move along the causeway when numbers
of canoes, filled with troops, advanced swiftly from both sides, while
other large bodies of the enemy came marching up the causeway against
us, so that we were quite astounded at the very sight. In the first
encounter thirty of our men were wounded and three killed.
Notwithstanding all this, we fought our way up to the first bridge.
According to what we afterwards heard, it was the wish of the Mexicans
that we should pass over the bridge; for we had no sooner done so than
we were assailed by such terrific crowds, as to be unable to move. What
indeed could we do on a causeway which was no more than eight paces in
breadth, where we were attacked on all sides at once? Our crossbow-men
and musketeers certainly kept up a continued fire on the canoes, but the
enemy received but a trifling loss this way, for they had raised boards
alongside of their canoes, by which their troops were sheltered from our
fire. Those of the enemy's troops which attacked us on the causeway
itself we certainly drove back each time into the water, but fresh
troops kept pouring in too fast for us to gain much advantage this way.
Here our cavalry was of no manner of use to us, while the horses were
greatly exposed to the attacks of the enemy on each side of the
causeway, and many were consequently wounded. If our cavalry attempted
to pursue the enemy into the water, the latter had provided against this
by palisades, behind which they retired, and stretched out against them
their long lances, to which they had fastened the swords we
unfortunately lost on our retreat from Mexico.
In this way the battle continued for upwards of an hour, the enemy each
time returning to the attack with such excessive fury that, at length,
we could stand our ground no longer: nor was this all, for we now saw
another large fleet of canoes approaching with a fresh body of men, who
were ordered to fall upon our rear. We therefore determined to retreat
back along the causeway, for which purpose we ordered the Tlascallans to
move off first, that we might effect our retreat in perfect good order.
Here the Tlascallans had greatly embarrassed us in our movements, who,
it is well known, never can fight standing in the water.
The instant the Mexicans perceived we were turning back, and saw the
Tlascallans moving off the causeway, they set up most distracting yells,
and attacked us man to man with great fierceness. It is indeed out of my
power to describe it. The whole of the causeway was instantly covered
with lances, arrows, and stones, besides that vast quantities fell into
the water. When we had again reached the mainland, we returned fervent
thanks to the Almighty for having rescued us from this severe battle.
Eight of our men were killed and fifty wounded: added to all this, we
were obliged to put up with the hootings and jeers of the enemy, who
kept calling upon the Tlascallans to come with double their numbers next
time, and they would very soon settle their impudence. Our first deeds
of arms, therefore, merely consisted in destroying the aqueduct of
Chapultepec, and in reconnoitring the lake along the causeway, in which
we did not exactly reap much honour.
For the rest, we passed the following night very quietly in our
quarters, posted our sentinels, and dressed our wounds. One of our
horses was so severely wounded that it died soon after.
The following morning Oli determined upon taking up the position
assigned to his division at Cojohuacan, about six miles further on; and
however Alvarado and the other cavaliers might beg of him not to
separate the two divisions, yet he would not alter his determination.
Christobal de Oli was a man of uncommon bravery, whose pride was wounded
at the unsuccessful attempt we had made upon the causeway, and he
accused Alvarado of inconsiderateness for having ordered the attack.
Nothing, therefore, could induce him to stay, and he marched off with
his men to Cojohuacan.
The separation of the two divisions was very impolitic at this juncture;
for if the Mexicans had been aware of the smallness of our numbers, and
had attacked either of the divisions during the five following days,
before the brigantines had arrived, we should with difficulty have
escaped destruction. Both divisions, therefore, remained as quiet as the
enemy would allow them, though not a day passed by that the Mexicans did
not land troops to annoy us in our camp, and, if possible, to entice us
into places where we should be unable to act, and they could attack us
to greater advantage.
Sandoval, as we have seen, left Tezcuco with his division four days
after the feast of Corpus Christi, and marched towards Iztapalapan. His
route lay through townships which were either subject to, or in alliance
with Tezcuco. As soon as he arrived at Iztapalapan, he commenced his
military operations by burning down the greater portion of the houses
which stood on the mainland.
It was not long before large bodies of Mexican troops arrived for the
protection of Iztapalapan, with whom Sandoval had a severe skirmish, and
drove them back again to their canoes; but still they continued to
shower their arrows and darts upon him, and wounded several of his men.
During this conflict a thick smoke was seen to rise from several signal
fires which had been lighted on the surrounding hills. This had been a
signal to call in all the canoes of Mexico and of the other towns
situated on the lake, as Cortes had just run out from Tezcuco with the
thirteen brigantines.
The first attack our general made with this fleet was against a rocky
height on an island near Mexico. This place had been strongly fortified,
and was garrisoned by a great number of Mexicans and inhabitants of
other townships. All the canoes of Mexico, Xochimilco, Cojohuacan,
Huitzilopuzco, Iztapalapan, and Mexicalzinco, had united in a body to
oppose Cortes, which was the reason why the attack was carried on with
so little vigour against Sandoval, who, however, was not able to do the
enemy much damage, as most of the houses stood in the water; though, in
the commencement of the attack, our allies had made many prisoners. In
Iztapalapan, Saudoval found himself on a peninsula in the lake, and the
only way by which he could reach Cojohuacan was by a causeway which ran
half way through the lake, on which he would have been assailed from
both sides by the enemy, without his being able to defend himself with
much advantage.
When Cortes observed the vast number of canoes which kept continually
crowding around the brigantines, he began to feel alarmed, and this not
without reason, for their number amounted to above 4000. He therefore
abandoned his attack upon the rock, and selected a position with his
brigantines, where he would be able to observe all the enemy's
movements, and steer off in any direction he might choose. He likewise
issued orders to the respective commanders of the brigantines not to
commence an attack on the canoes before the wind, which had just
commenced blowing from the land, should have increased. When the
Mexicans found our fleet was moving off again, they not incorrectly
ascribed it to fear, and they immediately advanced with their canoes to
fall upon the brigantines. There now suddenly arose a stiffish breeze,
our rowers pulled with all their might, and Cortes ordered the
brigantines to run right in among the canoes. Numbers were bored into
the ground, many of the enemy killed and wounded, and all the rest of
the canoes turned round, and made off at a rapid rate, to seek refuge
between the houses built in the lake, where they could not be followed
by the brigantines. This was our first naval engagement, and Cortes
gained the victory, thanks be to the Almighty.
After this encounter he steered for Cojohuacan, where Oli had taken up
his position. Here again he fell in with large bodies of the enemy, who
lay in wait for him at a point of considerable danger, and attempted to
carry off two of the brigantines. They attacked him at the same time
from their canoes, and from the tops of the temples. Cortes now fired
in upon them with the cannon, and killed great numbers. The artillerymen
fired away so incessantly upon this occasion, that all their powder was
consumed, and some of them had their faces and hands burnt. Cortes then
despatched the smallest brigantine to Iztapalapan, to bring away all the
powder Sandoval had with him there, and wrote word to him not on any
account to quit that place. He himself staid the two next days with Oli,
on whose position the enemy continued their attacks without
intermission.
I must now also relate what took place at this time in Tlacupa, where I
was stationed with Alvarado.
When we received intelligence that Cortes had run out with the
brigantines, we advanced along our causeway up to the bridge, but this
time with greater precaution. Our cavalry was stationed in front of the
causeway, while the remaining troops moved along in a close body up to
the bridge, the crossbow-men and musketeers keeping up an incessant fire
upon the enemy. In this way we renewed the attack each day, and repaired
the gaps in the causeway, but three of our men had been killed.
In the meantime the enemy did Sandoval considerable damage from the tops
of the houses which stood in the water, and he therefore resolved to
attack those which he was best able to get at. Quauhtemoctzin then sent
off a large body of troops to the assistance of the town, with commands
to cut through the causeway in Sandoval's rear. Cortes observing a vast
number of canoes going in the direction of Iztapalapan, instantly
steered with the brigantines for the same place, and ordered Oli, with
the whole of his division, to shape his course thither along the
causeway. They found the Mexicans already hard at work in cutting
through the causeway, and concluded from this that Sandoval was
destroying the houses which stood in the water. They found him, as they
had suspected, already in the heat of an engagement with the enemy, who,
however, retired on the approach of the brigantines.
Cortes now ordered Sandoval to quit Iztapalapan with his troops, and to
take up his position at Tepeaquilla, in front of the causeway, which
leads from this place to Mexico. This Tepeaquilla is at present
dedicated to our dear lady of Guadaloupe, where so many miracles have
happened, and still daily take place.