In France and Italy this same reaction took the form of accepting

the universe as blind but moral; the pantheist movement of the

anti-clerical factions deified what were taken to be the common moral

emotions of mankind speaking particularly of ‘Truth’ and ‘Justice’ as

though there were real beings in a universe where the personal power

and virtues of a Creator were denied. Throughout the more cultivated

Europe a certain number of special marks of the thing increased,

notably the insistence upon landscape, upon our fellowship with the

rest of animated creation, and side by side with these a disdain

or negligence or despair upon the sharp points of Divine Will, of

personal immortality, of possible doom.

There was formed at last in our own time, as the crystallisation of all

this boiling, a philosophy, a set of judgments accepted vaguely, but

finally, by all that is not Catholic in the Occident, and this I will

call ‘sceptical pantheism.’ Over against it stands the defined, exact,

and traditional revelation maintained by the Catholics intact. This

revelation is as separate from that other mood as is the firm strand

from sea water, or waking from dreams.

Here many men reading me (if indeed many men shall read me, for

whatever number of men may read this hotchpotch of a book, most of

them, I think, will skip these musing passages—seeing that their

subjects are the only ones of real import) will reply:

‘In face of this great, new, general, modern spirit, which you call

sceptical pantheism, and which I admit to be the chief moral phenomenon

of our time, the Catholic Church is negligible. I accept your statement

that there is a great general modern spirit or mood full of this

feeling for nature and of brotherhood with all animated creatures and

a substitution of emotional materialism for dogma. I may or may not

accept your particular title “sceptical pantheism,” but I know what

you mean. We are all agreed that the spirit is there; and in face of

it the Catholic position no longer has weight: it no longer counts. It

is a mere surviving habit with most of its so-called adherents (who at

heart are themselves shaken in their adherence). It is ignorance on the

part of a few sincere ones; a bitter refusal to accept evidence on the

part of a larger number of less sincere ones: a deliberate shutting

of the eyes. Catholicism is in process of dissolution and has become

politically negligible.’

That is the reply which I think most educated men in England would

give to the proposition I have just advanced: the proposition that the

modern world is now divided into two sharply defined camps (of which

Catholicism is one) standing each over against the other.

Now these objectors are provincial, both the better informed and the

less. They should appreciate the modern world more exactly. They

could arrive at such an appreciation by a wise use of travel, and of

even their own contemporary society; by getting to know many kinds of

men intimately in France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Belgium, and by

reading the words written upon the Catholic side—a thing which, for

the most part, they wholly neglect to do.

Indeed, I have noticed that the finest and most conclusive pieces of

Catholic apologetics are, in England and America, hidden away in little

publications read by no one but Catholics; and by few, even of these.

If those who make the objection I have just recited would use travel

wisely, or even read contemporary Catholic writing in their own

country, they would appreciate that what I have said is true if one

regards Western Europe as a whole. Outside England every one is aware

of the Catholic Church; two great armies face each other, and the issue

is doubtful. All instructed Europe sees a great duel set between the

Catholic Church and its opponent. All instructed Europe sees that this

duel is taking the form of anti-Catholic laws and of proposals of laws

upon the one side, and upon the other of growing Catholic social power.

Those who, in England, once followed Calvin, who then at second hand

followed Diderot and Voltaire, who then at second or third hand

followed the French romantics, would to-day do well to follow this

great modern quarrel, as it is joined upon the old battleground of

European debate: the arena which lies between the Pyrenees and the

Channel, between the Rhine and the Atlantic: Gaul.

They will find that you can hardly take up a random French newspaper

in a French café without coming upon the great quarrel. They will find

that the statues in the towns express it; the names of the streets; the

titles as well as the tendencies of the novels.

In Italy, though in a different form, it is the same thing. In Spain it

is manifest; in Belgium it is the centre of interest. Throughout the

Occident the struggle is engaged.

The forces on either side use every weapon to hand. Those opposed

to the Catholic Church use, when they are in political power, the

bludgeon of a universal and enforced anti-Catholic popular education,

against which the Catholics use the force of personal intelligence and

individual argument, as also a sort of perpetual wrestling against

their opponents through the claim of freedom. Where it is the other way

about, and the Catholic tradition has at least the sympathy of those

in political power, you have not indeed (as you may have later) strong

insistence on the Catholic side—as defined, as direct, and as violent

as the present anti-Catholic action—you have not, for instance, an

insistence upon the compulsory public teaching of Catholicism in the

popular schools, as you have anti-Catholic public teaching under

the anti-Catholic governments; but you have the continued support

of essentially Catholic things. The new dictatorship in Italy, for

example, when it had cleared out the parliamentary nastiness, took for

one of its first principles the restoration of the crucifix to the

schools, and insisted upon the official world hearing Mass.

Having thus stated the great quarrel, I ought, perhaps, like a good

modern, to begin prophesying, and state what its development will be.

But I deny the capacity of our popular prophets. I do not know the

future. But that these two comparatively simple elements, the Faith and

anti-Faith, stand before us to-day should, I think, be clear to all

sufficiently experienced observers.

There is upon the one side (everywhere except in England) a now large,

a believing, and a coherent Catholic body: there is upon the other

side the mood of which I have spoken—the mood in which it is even

thought worse to be cruel to an animal than to a man; the mood in

which the existence and nature of the human soul are contentedly or

discontentedly left aside as undiscoverable; the mood in which the most

fundamental institutions of society may be questioned or denied; the

mood in which the fixity of marriage is universally abandoned, and in

which property has no longer a reasoned moral right. Indeed, in poor

support of property (outside the Catholic philosophy) to-day only two

rotten struts remain: first, the assertion that possession by a few in

the midst of a free community is natural because it has always existed;

that is mere ignorance of history: secondly, the asinine pretence

that the few who possess have a right to possession through their

greater virtue and intelligence—as for instance a millionaire eating

uneatable things to the noise of an intolerable band in any one of our

cosmopolitan hotels....

I marvel that those who possess on such a tenure should not perceive

the frailty of their tenure. They are, it is true, now fallen into a

permanent state of panic, but they still have a vague conception that

the present arrangement is in some ways secure.

It is not secure. It has no moral basis or custom behind it. The

stability of a society depends upon an acceptation of its laws. If

their enforcement is thought right, and the institutions which they

defend are accepted by the conscience of men, the laws and society

stand; if not, both fall.

But who to-day defends the right of our handful of rich men to govern

as they do, and to control the state? How many even grant them a moral

right to property? They are themselves the negation of property. They

boldly proclaim that the over-reaching of others, the catching-up of

other men’s fortunes into their grasp by tricks, is the only talent

they can exercise, and, indeed, the only one which they revere in

their fellows. They have ruined that middle-class lacking which the

institutions of the State, and particularly ownership, lose their

foundation. Nevertheless, our society, of which these millionaires

are to-day the masters, will not endure; for no one thinks of them

as lords: all despise them, and the greater part of men have ceased

to envy them, and have begun to hate. The rule they exercise through

demagogy, and particularly through their purchase of the press, and

(less important) through their purchase of the politicians, cannot

endure. So much is certain; nor is it prophecy to affirm it any more

than it is prophecy to affirm the consequences of a natural law. Yet

does it not seem probable that when this ephemeral phase is over,

normal freedom will return.

The mass of men in an industrial civilisation is now caught in a

machine from which they cannot escape, and subservience to which has

become at last their nature. Every day there die some number of those

men and women who could still remember an England of the countrysides

and of personal loyalties. Soon, very soon, there will be none left but

those who, all their lives, have known nothing but the universal wage

system of our towns.

It is this which makes the coming of compulsory labour in our great

industrial cities probable enough. Any one can see that there are

only three possible solutions to the present insecurity of all public

service. The best solution would be the production of a contented

populace through the better distribution of property. Such a populace

would, though workers, be interested in the stability and security of

a society in which they were also partners; but that solution will not

be reached, or even approached, because it is against the mentality of

time; because it seems fantastic. The next solution is the servitude

of all under a tyranny of public officials. It involves confiscation

of property now owned by a few, and the organisation of the industrial

world despotically under a group of politicians. It is called Socialism.

That will not come either, although it is the ideal still favoured by

some few belated Utopians. It will not come because the rich are too

powerful and the politicians too corrupt. If it did come, it would mean

a complete breakdown of society—but that is by the way.

The third solution is compulsory labour legally conducted, as it is

virtually conducted to-day, for the advantage of the owners; and _that_

solution seems to be approaching.

When the general services of the community are interrupted by a

strike—the necessary service of communication by rail, for example,

or the necessary service of the modern post-office—the clamour

for compulsory labour at once arises. It sounds reasonable. It is

consonant to the mind of the whole community; and whether it is called

arbitration or fixed contract, or disciplinary power of trades unions,

compulsory labour is the underlying idea. It is close upon us.

But though the chance of servitude is a thing of the highest moment, I

cannot help watching with amusement a small concomitant of the great

process. I confess rather ashamedly to too great an interest in a

subsidiary point, and that is, watching the euphemisms under which the

process is covered.

For when men return to an old institution which they have discarded,

and the proper name for which has grown odious (as we are returning to

the enslavement of labour), they are particularly anxious to avoid that

name, and spend much of their energy in discovering some way of getting

the old thing under a new title—thus no one will call compulsory

labour slavery, nor will even the words ‘compulsory’ or ‘compulsion’

appear on the surface. There will be some other term, and I for one

shall follow with curiosity and delight the evolution of that term.

Just for the moment the odds are in favour of the term ‘loyalty’—it

has a fine chivalric ring and makes an admirable mask; so men who

continue to work for the profit of their masters during a strike are

called ‘loyal.’ To insist upon one’s right to sell one’s labour at

one’s own price, instead of being ruled by some corrupt trade union

leader who has been bought by the masters, is to be ‘disloyal’ to one’s

union, or even to one’s ‘leader.’

There is quite a chance that the words ‘loyal’ and ‘loyalty’ will

capture the position, and that a few generations hence we may have

placards on the wall, ‘Notice: A disloyal employé of the Meat Trust

is at large,’ with a description of him following; and then we shall

have ‘loyalty’ courts for trying and punishing people who rebel against

compulsory labour.

Another word which is still in the running is the word

‘constitutional’; it has a grander sound than ‘loyal,’ but it is

less tender. Men acting as free men are nearly always striking

‘unconstitutionally,’ breaking the terms secretly purchased by the

capitalists from a ‘leader.’ ‘Loyal’ has also a better chance than

‘constitutional,’ because it is a shorter word; but perhaps the two

will be used side by side. The legal indictment against a runaway

slave, a couple of centuries hence, will be, perhaps, that his act

was ‘unconstitutional,’ while the conventional term will, perhaps,

be ‘disloyal’—or there may be some new term. But two things are

probable—not certain: (1) that compulsory labour will come; (2) that

it will be given some name not even remotely connected with the idea of

slavery or compulsion.

Probable, not certain; for who can tell, in the millioned complexity of

affairs, what new factor may not arise? A man may go round on a mule

calling himself a prophet, and change the whole world to-morrow.

Yet men prophesy to-day, when all is mist and fog. They prophesy as

never did they prophesy before: with an assurance and a conviction born

of physical science misapplied.

This passion for prophesying has several sources which converge to

produce such modern folly. I think the strongest motive is mere relief

to the nerves. Men find that, by prophesying that a thing will take

place which they desire to take place, they are themselves soothed.

One could make shoals of books by merely cutting such pronouncements

out of the European papers during the last ten years, cuttings in

which it would be manifest that the writer was in a reckless mood,

indifferent to the probability of his assertion.

Another motive is the motive of reputation; for if the prophet brings

it off, he can point to his success and be sure of a following, whereas

if he does not bring it off, he can rely upon that atrophy of the

memory which the universal reading of the daily press has brought

about. Another cause, as I have said, is the influence of physical

science, that influence which affects the whole of modern life, and

nearly always for ill. Physical science has proceeded from discovery

to discovery in our time, until men are prepared for any marvel. It is

true that side by side with this advance in the control of physical

things there has gone a corresponding decline in the critical faculty,

in the powers of reason: and a still more rapid decline in morals. But

the main fact is familiar to the whole world, and is, superficially,

the most astonishing thing of to-day. Our time has advanced in its

knowledge of inanimate nature and in its control thereof as no other

past time advanced.

Now this process was everywhere accompanied by, and tested by,

prophecy. The seeker after some new ‘law’ (as a sequence of physical

phenomena is rather oddly called) would experiment until sequence was

discovered, and, when it was discovered, he could confidently presume

upon its completion; as, for instance, in the series of atomic weights.

He could say, ‘You will find that this series will follow upon such

and such a course,’ and when he was proved right he had achieved his

end. The whole method of the progress was of this nature. It was

like a man plotting down points upon a curve until he had aligned a

sufficient number to give him the general formula, after which he could

confidently say, ‘You will find, when the curve is fully described,

such and such other points to lie along it.’ Or it was like a man

reëstablishing a Roman road. He says: ‘I find a section of it here

pointing right to a neighbouring port, and a little way on another

section still pointing the same, and I am confident that I shall find

some place-name or parish boundary or other relic confirming that Roman

road throughout.’ He is pretty certain to be right.

On the parallel of physical science, this habit of prophecy as the

confirmation of judgment spread to things, in which, by their nature,

mechanical judgment is impossible.

Another negative source was ignorance, and especially ignorance of the

past. Our moderns have more and more lost the knowledge of the past.

They have been taught to despise it; they think of it first as of

something foreign and odd; later, if they study, as of something very

different from what it was. They, therefore, miss the lessons of the

past, and especially the chief lesson, which is that the developments

of society follow no mechanical process; that their way is not the way

of an arrow, but of a serpent. Ignorant of this, men fall into the

simple error of taking the tangent to the curve, of prolonging the

actions of causes immediately before their eyes, and of conceiving the

future in terms of the present, as children do. Hence these confident

assertions that in so many years such and such a country will have

grown to such and such a population: that such and such a language will

have become dominant—and so forth.

But it is to be noted that this process is not often applied to evils,

for men do not like to face an evil future.

I notice in this political or social prophecy one very strange

omission: they never by any chance allow for that cause which is the

major cause of change in human affairs: I mean religion.

Thirteen hundred years ago, the great fact before all men’s eyes

was the Roman Empire of the East. The commander of the armies, a

half-divine being seated in Constantinople, was the centre of the

world and the acknowledged head of all that counted, from the Atlantic

to the Persian borders, and from the Northern barbarism to the

desert. Pressure menaced from the Persian hills and from the Tigris,

and there was pressure from savage hordes in the mountains, and in

the plains beyond to the north. Had men then been in the habit of

prophesying after our foolish modern fashion, they would have told you

this or that, but all in terms of the Empire, or the German and Slav

barbarians, or the Persians; and while they so thought in terms of the

only things they knew, there had already arisen, in a place remote and

utterly insignificant, among tribes of a few hundreds without power,

culture, or tradition, under conditions utterly negligible, the flaming

spirit of Islam.

To our own modern world there must come either some vast religious

reaction, or some vast religious novelty, or both. It is inevitable;

for men live by religion. Yet no one speaking of the future takes it

for one moment into account. I know of but one book, a book of singular

genius, in which the thing appears, though tentatively; and that is in

Jefferies’ fine vision called ‘After London.’ But even Jefferies did

not make of it the main source of change. In his day men had already

begun to lose the significance of religion in human affairs.

The great light of the Forelands on the weather side, the Goodwin

Lights on the lee, stood like the lamps of a street in the fall of that

darkness as, with the tide beneath us, we ran up for London River. But,

the wind coming from more northerly, we had to choose between beating

up and standing out.

We did the last, though the wind was falling, because that lane of

water is full of the world’s shipping, and it was plainer to keep a

course. By midnight the breeze had died down to a light air, and,

somewhat later, the sky now very clear, we bore up on the other tack,

the starboard tack, and went round till we had the dying air right

abeam, and so came under brilliant stars within the point of Thanet

land and dropped anchor and slept.

But early the next morning we woke to see the sun rising up undimmed

over the wide North Sea, cut sharply by the calm horizon. It promised a

warm and kindly day....

I could wish that this book, already so long as to have become

intolerable to the reader, the writer, the printer, and all others

concerned in its production, already so heavy as to have become a

business to the publisher, the carman, and the railway people (if,

indeed, they transport it, but I have known of books transported in

bulk on shipboard, and sinking to the glory of God, before they reached

their destination, and that to the great advantage of our miserable

world, which is abominably overcrowded with books)—I could wish that

this book, already so prolix, so otiose, so weary of its way that no

poor gabbler in an inn ever more offended his audience than I will

mine; I could wish that this book, which may be called The Great Sea

Serpent of books, or again, The Cromwell Road of Books, or once again,

The Pambiblicon, or endless Compendium, or again, The Long Arctic

Night—what you will—I could wish that this book were longer still, I

say, in order that I might drag you to perdition with the tedium of a

million memories north of the Forelands, north of the Goodwins, north

of Long Nose: memories of the Muddy Rivers of the Trinobantes, whose

descendants inhabit rather than cultivate the Essex clay: memories

of sandbanks rising out of the misty seas like whales, and of the

platters of Harwich, and of the King’s ship called The Serpent, and of

Orford River, and of the Onion, and of Lowestoft, Yarmouth, and the

exceedingly difficult labyrinth of the Wash, and of the awful great

tide at King’s Lynn.

But I renounce—not so much for your sakes as for my own, nor do I even

speak of that Thames River which sailors called London River, and of

the getting across it slantwise in spite of the great ships and the way

in which time has silted up that harbour.

There are many curious things to be noted about the opening of London

River. There is the double tide, so that a man making Long Nose from

the Channel finds a new tide taking him up towards London. There is

the way in which the best of all the channels into the river is the

one least used, because it would make ships go out of their way. Ships

come into the Thames either from the north or from the south, so they

save time, which is money, by skirting either coast, but the main mid

channel only the Dutchmen use when they have occasion to come up London

River; I approve them. Then there is the way in which undoubtedly all

this has silted up and risen since the time of the ancients. It is

not only the stuff brought down by the river which has piled up these

banks; there is also, I am sure, a lifting of the land. Nothing else

could account for Thanet ceasing to be an island, or for Richborough

standing now high and dry. The surface of the earth moves slowly up and

down over centuries, and no one shall persuade me that Pevensey has run

dry, Rye has been drained, Lympne has run far inland, Dover inlet has

been closed, and the Wensum turned from a great sea passage to a ditch

by any action other than the lifting of the land. The last thing to be

said about Thamesmouth is this, that it was never shut for traffic

since the beginning of recorded time ... until.... Men always traded up

and down it with a swarm of shipping since men first left memorial of

their doings, _until_ the fourth of August, 1914.

It is not the least arresting of those many portents accompanying the

Great War that in its first week, for the first time in human history,

the port of London was paralysed.

And so back to the Forelands, and the run between the Kentish corner

and the Goodwin Sands, with a few kind words to Saint Augustine, and

Julius Cæsar, and the men that murdered Saint Thomas, and so grew

tails, and such others as have landed at this turn of the coast; but

none for Hengist and Horsa, who never lived at all, and yet have done

all manner of harm. So through the Downs into the Channel again and

back on my way to the sea of Sussex, and to the shores which may be

drowned and swamped for a while by alien townsmen, but will keep their

own counsel and in due time will rise again.

The cruise of the Nona · 第 18 / 25 段