1. The government should accord him all his natural rights, and
protect him in the exercise of the same. That is, the political
government should coöperate with the Divine to preserve his will in
its normal condition as a self-acting power, and to guarantee to him
the exercise of this power of self-action in all things good. The man
who is protected in the enjoyment of this inherent liberty of will, is
a free man in the strictest sense of the word. The government over him
may be concentrated in the hands of one man, or it may be divided
among an aristocracy, more or less numerous, or it may be what is
called a democracy, but this does not of itself affect the fact of his
freedom. If the government secure him in the enjoyment of these
rights, and of all which necessarily attaches to them, he is
essentially free. The kind of government, as a hereditary monarchy, or
a democratic republic, does not, of itself, determine the actual
freedom of its subjects. History furnishes many examples of
government in which the power of control was concentrated in the hands
of but one, or of a few individuals, which afforded its subjects the
highest amount of essential liberty. To this day, “_the freedom of the
British Constitution_”--as much as we justly prefer our own--is by no
means an idle boast. It is a great mistake to suppose that a
government which deposits the sovereignty among the great mass of the
people, is the only free government. We are constrained to acknowledge
that it is better to be oppressed by _one_, or by a few tyrants, than
by a multitude of tyrants. It is not _this_ or _that kind_ of
government that makes the subject essentially free. But it is the fact
that the controlling power, whether wielded by one or by many, secures
each man in the enjoyment of his natural rights--affords him that
system of appliances which develops and matures the self-acting power
of his will--discourages all abuse of this power, and fully protects
him in the proper exercise of it in the pursuit of the essential good.
_It is this that makes him free._
We prefer, for those to whom it is applicable, a democratic republic;
because it is a more secure government, and less liable to an abuse of
power; not because it is necessarily a more free government than any
other. Another form of government may secure equal freedom in every
essential particular; and this form may be as oppressive as any
other; and whenever it is so, the condition of the down-trodden
minority is far more hopeless than is that of the oppressed majority
under some other form of government. Still, in certain conditions of
the people, it is a much more secure form of government. The
sovereigns of a state should always be socially equal, and, at the
same time, honest as well as intelligent. Such rulers will not be
oppressors. If the sovereigns of a democracy are intelligent, for the
reason that but few participate directly and personally in the
administration of government and the spoils of office, they have but
few inducements to corruption, and are more likely to be honest. The
mass of the people, though often wrong in opinion, are always right in
sentiment--they mean to do right, and they desire to do right. If they
do err in a given case, they may usually be set right, for they have
no motive to stay wrong. Hence, we think that when the condition of
intelligence is fulfilled in the case of those occupying a social
footing, we may expect a wiser and purer government; whilst the extent
to which they may participate in the affairs of government, giving it
a firmer hold upon their affections, cannot fail to make it a more
secure government. It is widely different in the case of a government
concentrated in the hands of a few. The sovereigns are at the same
time the administrators of law. They share not only the honors of
sovereignty, but also the immediate profits of sovereignty--the spoils
of office. Temptations to abuse power are always present and active.
Hence we find that such governments are more frequently oppressive.
Withal, even in cases in which they are not, (for they need not be,)
for the reason that the mass of the people do not immediately
participate in the affairs of government, they are not as devoted to
its interests, and hence the government cannot be as secure. For these
reasons, a democratic republic is called by way of eminence a _free
government_; but, evidently, not because it is the only form which
secures freedom to its subjects. Any of these forms are legitimate
when they are so adapted to the condition of the people as to secure
to them the highest amount of freedom of which that condition will
admit.
2. The government should secure to him all his acquired rights, or the
rights which he acquires by the proper use of his essential rights. Of
these, we notice,
1. His rights of social equality with those with whom he holds common
interests, pleasures, benefits, happiness, and duties. These rights
usually vary with the condition of different individuals, or
different classes of individuals. It will not be maintained that an
infant or idiot, and a man of rude intellect and vulgar habits, have
interests and duties common to each other, and common to persons in a
different condition, in any such sense as would entitle them all to
social equality. Both their mental and physical condition would be a
bar to any such equality. So in the case of the sexes, difference in
physical condition is a bar, except in the marriage state. So also
certain races of men are by their physical condition barred from
social equality, in many respects, with those of other races. Those
duties required by one condition in order to attain the essential good
are very different from those of another condition which are necessary
to attain the same object. But the privilege of social equality with
all in a similar condition, which results from the discharge of the
duties of that condition, is the right of every one. Some will require
positive law to secure them; as in the marriage relation, the social
as well as other rights of the parties must be secured by law; whilst
others will be better secured by leaving them to be regulated by the
conventional usages of society--only another form of government. But
there is an obvious difference in the social rights of men which
government is bound to respect, unless it would arrest the progress
of civilization; because it is an inequality founded in that
difference of condition, against which no government can provide, nor
was it intended that it should provide. We notice,
2. That government should secure to him all those political rights to
which he is entitled by making a proper use of his essential rights.
We need not specify all the political rights which may be regarded
acquired rights. It is sufficient to consider this topic in regard to
the question of sovereignty. We say, that all the members of a given
society, having a common interest in that society, are entitled to
share the sovereignty of its government _on certain conditions, and on
no other conditions_. We take the ground that mere humanity, in itself
considered, does not entitle any one to the rights of political
sovereignty. If this were so, we should be bound to place females,
together with minors of both sexes, and the inmates of State prisons,
among the sovereigns of society. They are all perfect specimens of
humanity. Of the first it may be said, they are often equal in
intellect with the other sex, and in other respects are generally
superior specimens of humanity. These all have an interest in society
common to all other members of it, and yet it is admitted that they
should not be numbered among the sovereigns of the land. What is it,
then, that entitles a man to the right of political sovereignty?
First--He should have reached that point in mental development in
which he will have a capacity, in common with others, to understand
and appreciate the leading principles of government and their
applications. Second--He should have reached that period in life in
which there is usually a corresponding development of the moral
sense--the feeling of obligation to do right--which affords a
reasonable guaranty for the faithful application of his knowledge in
discharging the duties of sovereignty. Third--He should be in that
state of social equality which gives him a common interest, a common
happiness, and common duties as a citizen, with other sovereigns,
which will also afford a necessary guaranty for the faithful
performance of his duties. And, Fourth--He should be in that physical
condition, also, which is necessary to the duties of so responsible a
position, under all ordinary circumstances. If one or more of these
conditions exclude a whole sex, together with all minors, idiots,
felons, and foreigners, they at the same time limit it to a definite
class of males, and bar all others from any title to it. No sensible
man would admit that the power of sovereign control inherent in
government could, with safety to the only legitimate object of
government, the happiness of the subjects, be deposited with any
other class of men. But those who fulfil these conditions have a right
to rule. They have acquired it by the performance of those duties
which have elevated them to the condition of being qualified for
sovereignty. It should not be withheld. If those in a society
qualified for sovereignty be numerous, the government should take the
popular form--a democratic republic. But if those qualified to rule
are a limited portion of the whole society, some other form of
government is more appropriate.
But our subject leads us to notice: