_Monsieur le Directeur_:
You must be distressed by all the basenesses of the present hour. But
once more let your voice be heard in the name of this poor France,
who defends her last honor in the hands of those who betray her. A
certain man is at this moment the target of public contempt. This man
is the minister of war, a sinister figure, whose personality appears
at the saddest hours in our history. If the Méline cabinet associates
its cause with that of the minister of war, it is irrevocably lost in
the esteem of the country and the army. Not a single one of the 27,000
officers would dare to defend the minister of war. You cannot imagine
the contempt that his lies and empty declarations have engendered.
How guilty, then, is this government that seeks out such men, knowing
what they were and what they are. Every step of this man is marked
by an injustice. Regular promotion no longer exists. Of the rights
consecrated by the committees of classification he takes no heed.
The promotion lists are modified in the office of the minister, who
inserts or erases as he sees fit.
“Well, gentlemen, these are the supporters of the army. These are the
patriots. I point them out to you.
“Did Emile Zola ever use such language? Undoubtedly he has spoken
strongly, and, if, instead of being here in this echoing trial, we were
in some parlor or some office, we might ask him perhaps to soften some
corners of his letter. But he wanted it to go far; he wanted it to be
heard. It has been heard, as he wished; and he was right. But at bottom
what was his thought? He had arrived at the conclusion that a judicial
error had been committed; that this judicial error was not criminal
in its origin, but grew out of the credulity of a few: that it was
confirmed by the malice and the blindness of a few others, as well as
by the solidarity of brothers in arms; and that it was finally sealed
by a violation of law. Well, gentlemen, this being the case, it was
necessary, in the first place, to fix the limits of our proofs. Even in
the strangulation to which we have been subjected, we have been treated
with some regard, made necessary, I fancy, by the processes of justice,
for here, it seems, outside of the Zola case, there are two other
cases,--the Dreyfus case and the Esterhazy case. Of the Esterhazy case
we may say everything. Of the Dreyfus case we may say nothing. Why this
distinction? Is it based on the thing judged? Ah! I confess, gentlemen,
that, when I first asked myself the explanation of this singular
restriction upon a trial which M. Zola wished to be so open, I said to
myself: ‘It is very simple; we shall be permitted to say nothing. In
fact, there are decrees which prohibit all attack on the thing judged,
even by demonstrating that the judges are liars. So, as we have to deal
here with two things judged, the Dreyfus case and the Esterhazy case,
they will strangle us in silence.’ Well, they have not done it. I know
not why, because, in truth, in the path upon which they have entered
they had the means. But they did not dare to use them, and in this
affair, as in so many others in this country, they took half-measures,
partial closed doors, partial explanations, partial thing judged.
“True, gentlemen, it would not have been easy to entirely close my
mouth. I should have risen just the same after the shorter trial, and
made my argument, simply telling you what others have told you. If I
had not been contradicted, it would have been necessary to extend the
scope of the debate.
“Now, gentlemen, I want to sum up for you chronologically the facts in
this case, to sum them up in spite of all the obstacles that have been
placed in my path. And it is the object of my argument to try to show,
by reasoning and by induction, in all cases where the light has not
been complete, the necessary answers to the questions that I have been
forbidden to ask,--answers that result inevitably from the study, or,
to be more exact, from the silence, of our adversaries.”
At this point the court interrupted M. Labori, declaring an adjournment
until the following day.