The Judge.--“Read if you like, but you will read it to the jurors, who
have nothing to do with it.”
M. Clemenceau.--“The jurors have everything to do with it. I take note
of these words. I will not allow it to be said in presence of the jury
that it has nothing to do with this matter. If _Monsieur le Président_
adheres to those words, I ask him to repeat them.”
The Judge.--“The jurors have nothing to do with the direction of the
trial.”
M. Clemenceau.--“I read Article 319, second part. ‘The witness must not
be interrupted. The accused or his counsel may question him through
the president after his disposition, and say, as well against him as
against his testimony, anything that may be useful to the defence of
the accused.’ _Monsieur le Président_, in conformity with the terms of
this article, I ask the floor to point out which of these two officers
is right.”
The Judge.--“But you will point it out in your argument.”
M. Clemenceau.--“_Monsieur le Président_, I need to point it out in the
presence of these two officers, because, if I am mistaken, one of the
two will correct me.”
The Judge.--“Explain, then, the question that you are going to put. I
will put it.”
M. Clemenceau.--“Colonel Henry says: ‘I spoke to General Gonse of
what I saw in Colonel Picquart’s office, three days after having seen
M. Leblois in Colonel Picquart’s office.’ Colonel Henry says also:
‘Colonel Picquart left the service about a week after I spoke to
General Gonse.’ I point out to the witness--and this is the purpose of
my question--that in good arithmetic eight and three make eleven, and
that the visit of M. Leblois, as is established undeniably, must have
occurred between November 9, the date of M. Leblois’s return to Paris,
and November 14, the date of Colonel Picquart’s departure from the
service,--a period of five days. Between five and eleven days there is
a difference of six days. I call Colonel Henry’s attention to the error
of six days, and I ask him what he has to say about it.”
Colonel Henry.--“You understand that I do not specify dates to a day. I
have not spoken of dates.”
This finishing the confrontation of Colonel Picquart with those who
had contradicted him, the witness-stand was taken by M. Demange, the
counsel of Captain Dreyfus before the council of war.
_Testimony of M. Demange._
M. Labori.--“Will M. Demange tell us what he knows of the Esterhazy
case, and of any matters connected with it that may be useful as
throwing light upon M. Zola’s good faith?”
The Judge.--“Speak only of the Esterhazy case; nothing else.”
M. Demange.--“Exactly, _Monsieur le Président_. In the latter part of
October I learned through the newspapers that M. Scheurer-Kestner had
become convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus, and was at work to secure
his rehabilitation. I wrote to M. Scheurer-Kestner, asking him to make
known publicly at the tribune or elsewhere his reasons for affirming
the innocence of Dreyfus. He did not answer, the reason of his silence
being, as I found out later, that my letter came during the fortnight
in which he had promised General Billot to say nothing. Therefore I
was much agitated in mind until November 13 or 14, the day before
M. Mathieu Dreyfus denounced Captain Esterhazy as the author of the
_bordereau_ before the minister of war. On that day M. Mathieu Dreyfus
came to my house in a state of great agitation, bringing with him a
sample of handwriting astonishingly like that of the _bordereau_, and
said to me: ‘M. Scheurer-Kestner says that it is my duty to denounce
as the author of the _bordereau_ M. Esterhazy, whose writing this is.’
Obeying a feeling of prudence, I said to M. Mathieu Dreyfus; ‘Do what
M. Scheurer-Kestner has told you to do; but, first, I advise you to
ask him to declare publicly that he has designated to the minister of
war as the author of the _bordereau_ the person whom you are about to
denounce; thus no one will be able to question your good faith. And,
since you have only the handwriting, confine yourself to denouncing M.
Esterhazy as the author of the _bordereau_, and go no farther.’ I was
much excited, for I saw a chance for a revision of the Dreyfus case.
I had already resolved, moreover, to address myself to the minister
of justice, since I had learned from M. Salle that there had been a
violation of the law. But I had not yet done so, for a reason that
I may point out. Before employing the legal course, and especially
that belonging to me by virtue of Article 441 of the code of criminal
examination,--that is, the nullification of the sentence on the ground
of violation of law,--I desired the assistance of those who, wearing
the robe as I do, are anxious concerning the rights of defence. I
awaited very impatiently the Esterhazy trial. I was present at that
portion of it which was held in public, and even asked permission
to intervene that there might be a contradictor. The permission was
refused. But what especially interested me was the testimony of the
experts. It was here that I expected to find the new fact necessary to
the obtaining of a revision in case of Esterhazy’s acquittal. Dreyfus
having been convicted only on the _bordereau_ and on handwriting, the
expert testimony in the case of M. Esterhazy might bring out elements
that would permit me to say to the minister of justice: ‘Here is
the new fact.’ I knew from M. Ravary’s report that the experts had
concluded that the writing was not M Esterhazy’s, but I did not know
their reasons. I got no satisfaction, because of the closing of the
doors, and thus this method of revision was cut off. There remained
then the method of nullification. But I could not apply to the minister
of justice, unless I was certain that the door would open, should I
knock. Now, the conditions under which the Esterhazy trial took place
had convinced me that the government did not desire to throw light on
the Dreyfus case.
“What could I do? I could say to the minister of justice: ‘I am
morally certain that there has been a violation of the law,’ but
I could not give him legal proof. I had to do, then, what is done
in cases of this sort,--call on the minister of justice for an
investigation, in order to have my assertion verified. I did not wish
to take the step alone, and at that moment I had not found the desired
assistance, either among lawyers or among those in political life.
They said to me: ‘Have a care: do not stir up this Dreyfus matter now.
It is too soon; we must wait.’ And I was waiting at the time when M.
Scheurer-Kestner brought his facts to the knowledge of the public. It
was necessary to my purpose to have a government desirous of throwing
full light upon the matter, because, if there was to be a revision, it
should not take place behind closed doors. When seven officers who are
honesty itself have condemned a man erroneously, public opinion cannot
be convinced, unless their error can be precisely pointed out. Well,
I was convinced that the government did not want the light, and so I
asked myself what I should do. Then were unchained the passions which
today are making such riot, preventing men from giving further thought
to the fate of my unfortunate client. It is no longer a question of
the Dreyfus case; it is a question of the honor of the army; it is the
struggle between the Semites and the anti-Semites. But I, alas! am
concerned only with the interests of my client. Consequently, I said
to myself, we must await more peaceful times, and I said the same to
M. Mathieu Dreyfus and to Mme. Dreyfus. The attorney-general has told
you that recourse had been had to revolutionary methods; but this
reproach cannot be addressed to M. Zola, because he had not the power
to use the legal methods. Only the Dreyfus family could use those, and
consequently it is the Dreyfus family that is to be reproached, and,
indirectly, myself. And I might even tell you that, for a long time,
and especially since the speech of the attorney-general, I have been
receiving every morning letters signed and unsigned, the former polite,
the latter anything but polite, in which I am reproached with having
failed in my duty. I consider that I have not failed. My duty has
always been before my eyes, and you may be certain that my conscience
will never allow me to shrink from it. But I believe that I acted
very prudently in advising M. Dreyfus to wait. And so it is that the
Esterhazy case, which had given me hope that I could resort to the
legal methods of securing a revision, has made it impossible for me to
use these methods, because it has convinced me that the government does
not want the light.”
M. Labori.--“Will M. Demange tell us what he thinks of this passage
from Major Ravary’s report? ‘To sum up what is left, a painful
impression which will have an echo in all hearts truly French. Of the
actors in the cast some have acted in the presence of the public,
others have remained behind the scenes; but all the methods employed
had the same end in view,--the revision of a judgment legally and
justly rendered.’”
M. Demange.--“Since I desired to apply to the minister of justice for a
nullification of the judgment, I could not have considered it legally
rendered.”