M. Labori.--“Yes.”

The Judge.--“Is this in relation to the Dreyfus case?”

M. Labori.--“It is in relation to a document involved in the Dreyfus

trial.”

The Judge.--“I ask you to say nothing about it.”

M. Labori.--“Yesterday General Mercier thought it his duty to refer

to the Dreyfus case in words which, like all those that come from a

certain direction here, are incomplete. They were received with very

violent manifestations, but I have not been able to obtain anything

additional, because it is an understood thing here that in this matter

anyone can say anything that will injure us, but no one has a right to

say anything that can help us.”

The Judge.--“Pardon me, M. Labori, I believe that I preside here with

all the independence desirable. If I prevent M. Trarieux from speaking

of the Dreyfus case, it is because there has been a decree of the

court. You remind me of what General Mercier said yesterday. Permit me

to add that, if the general said it, it was because I did not have time

to stop him. He spoke too quickly; otherwise I would have prevented

him. You ask questions that violate the decree which we have rendered.”

M. Labori.--“I shall ask all the questions that I think useful to my

offence, whatever your opinion of them may be. You will pass upon them,

_Monsieur le Président_,--and the court with you, for you are not the

sole master,--as you see fit.”

M. Clemenceau.--“I think that the court misunderstands. None of us

intend to violate its decrees. What we wish to point out is that,

in spite of you, _Monsieur le Président_,--you yourself have said

it,--General Mercier made a certain declaration yesterday. We desired

to bring out today either a contradiction or a confirmation of the

words uttered by General Mercier, and, by virtue of a decree of the

court, you say to us: ‘That is not possible.’ The jurors will observe

that for a court of justice this is a singular situation. The charge

may be made, but it may not be contradicted.”

M. Trarieux.--“The charge, whether against M. Scheurer-Kestner or

against M. Mathieu Dreyfus, that they are responsible for the existing

agitation and disorder is quite erroneous and ill-founded. In fact,

there are two ways of obtaining the revision of a judicial error, and

Article 443 of the code of criminal examination defines them. The first

is this: once a condemnation has been pronounced, if it be discovered

that the facts on which this condemnation rest were committed by

some other person than the person condemned, this other person may

be prosecuted, and, if a condemnation is secured, this condemnation

being contradictory of the previous condemnation of an innocent man,

a revision of the judicial error becomes imperative. Thus these two

condemnations necessarily bring about, _ipso facto_, a revision of the

trial. The second method is provided by a law passed by the present

legislature on June 6, 1895, under the government to which I had the

honor to belong. It provides that, if, after a condemnation, a new

fact be discovered which was unknown at the time of the condemnation,

and which is of a nature to establish the innocence of the party

condemned, the matter may be laid before the minister of justice to

induce him to procure a revision of the case. The minister of justice

is asked to lay the matter before the court of appeals, which is judge

in such a matter. Now, it is indisputable that M. Mathieu Dreyfus took

the first method, for, by preferring a formal complaint against Major

Esterhazy, he hoped to secure a condemnation of him, the immediate

consequence of which would have been a revision of his brother’s case.

The question is whether he would not have done better to take the

second method. It seems to be the opinion that he should have applied

to the minister of justice and asked him to lay the matter before the

court. I think that this is a mistaken opinion. Suppose, instead of

making the complaint against Major Esterhazy, M. Mathieu Dreyfus had

applied to the minister of justice for a revision, what new fact could

he have pointed out to induce the minister of justice to lay the matter

before the court of appeals? There was only one,--the similarity of

Major Esterhazy’s handwriting to that of the _bordereau_ attributed by

the verdict of 1894 to Captain Dreyfus. If this had been pointed out

to the minister of justice, it would have been necessary to draw the

immediate conclusion that the author of this handwriting, M. Esterhazy,

was the guilty party. It would have been impossible to lay the demand

for revision before the court of appeals prior to a decision upon this

question after a confrontation with M. Esterhazy. No revision of the

judicial error of which Dreyfus was the victim could have been ordered,

until it had been established in the presence of the party directly

interested, M. Esterhazy, that this error was committed by him, or

that it was the result of his crime, and that he was the author of the

_bordereau_ unjustly attributed to Dreyfus. Therefore the minister of

justice would have had to prosecute M. Esterhazy. But this he could not

have done himself, for the simple reason that M. Esterhazy, being a

soldier, is responsible only to the military courts, and consequently

the minister of justice would have had to hand the matter over to the

minister of war, who would have been charged with the prosecution. If,

then, M. Mathieu Dreyfus had chosen the method of appealing to the

minister of justice, not only would nothing have been gained, but time

would have been lost, for the same result would have been reached by a

circuitous route.”

A group of witnesses was then called, consisting of M. Forzinetti, M.

Lebrun-Renault, and others who had heard M. Lebrun-Renault declare that

Dreyfus had never made a confession to him. But, the court declining

to hear any of them, on the ground that their testimony concerned the

Dreyfus case, they were all obliged to retire.

_Testimony of Doctor Socquet._

Dr. Socquet was then recalled to the stand.

M. Clemenceau.--“I forgot to ask Dr. Socquet whether he found Mme. de

Boulancy at No. 22, Boulevard des Batignolles.”

Dr. Socquet.--“No.”

M. Clemenceau.--“Will he tell the court how he succeeded in finding

her, since that was the only address that he knew?”

Dr. Socquet.--“Through the letter handed to me by _Monsieur le

Président_. He gave me a doctor’s certificate establishing her

sickness, which was accompanied by a letter that gave the address.”

M. Clemenceau.--“I remind the court of an incident that occurred at

the last hearing. I informed the court that Mme. de Boulancy did not

live in the Boulevard des Batignolles, and the court answered: ‘She

does live there, for the doctor’s certificate designates that address.’

Therefore I am at a loss to understand. Does _Monsieur le Président_

recall the incident?”

The Judge.--“Perfectly. I am looking for the address in the letter.”

Dr. Socquet.--“It is on the third page.”

The trial of Emile Zola: containing M. Zola's letter to President Faure relating to the Dreyfus case, and a full report of the fifteen days' proceedings in the Assize Court of the Seine, including testimony of witnesses and speeches of counsel · 第 77 / 282 题