M. Labori.--“You are mistaken, _Monsieur le Président_.”

The Judge.--“No.”

M. Labori.--“You are mistaken so far as I am concerned. General Mercier

has not gone far enough. I will not sit down until a certain matter has

been cleared up. The statement of General Mercier must be made clear,

for here I am in the centre of my case.”

The Judge.--“No, you are not in the centre of your case. You are away

from it. You are the lawyer of your client, and you fill the _rôle_ of

the presiding judge. I point out to you that you are encroaching on the

Dreyfus case.”

M. Labori.--“The question is whether General Mercier, who has uttered

certain words, answered one question or another. It is regrettable that

General Mercier should come here to say that a man has been legally

condemned. It is regrettable, because he cannot be examined as to the

reasons for his belief. As to his belief, I knew what it was, and I

knew very well that, if I were to ask him for it, he would proclaim it

loudly. So I am not surprised. But, when I asked General Mercier: ‘Is

it true that a secret document was introduced into the Dreyfus case in

1894?’ he replied: ‘I will not answer’.”

The Judge.--“And he did well.”

M. Labori.--“Then I asked General Mercier: ‘Have you anywhere said so?’

He interrupted me not to answer my first question, but to say: ‘It is

not true that I have so stated.’ That does not interest me. It is the

first point that interests me, and on that, in spite of all incidents

and all emotions, General Mercier is dumb.”

The former minister of war then stepped down, and the former minister

of justice, M. Trarieux, took the stand.

_Testimony of M. Trarieux._

His deposition was as follows:

“I did not follow the details of the Dreyfus trial of 1894. But in

1895 and 1896 serious matters leaked out that much disturbed my mind.

The first concerned the existence of secret documents that were said

to have played a part. Much more light has been thrown upon that

matter since, but I was profoundly agitated by what was said even

then. If other documents than those communicated to the accused and

his counsel had indeed been submitted to the judges and had influenced

their decisions, there was, at least in my opinion, no State reason

that could justify it. The first principle and the essential basis of

our penal law is that an accused person cannot appear before justice

without knowing of what he is accused and concerning what he is to be

called upon for an explanation. Nevertheless, gentlemen, I was not

certain of the fact, and so I kept the secret to myself. Afterward my

trouble was increased by the reading of the testimony of one of the

experts in the Dreyfus case, which chance had placed in my hands. Thus

I became acquainted with the document that determined the condemnation,

and the _bordereau_ of which so much has been said. Resemblances

in the details of certain letters were pointed out; but a serious

observation was made, which I found later in the indictment when the

indictment was made public. It was admitted that the _bordereau_ showed

important differences from the documents with which it was compared.

To explain these differences, it was said that undoubtedly they were

intentional on the part of Dreyfus. I was much struck by this remark.

It was the observation of a moralist rather than the affirmation of

an expert; so I could reason with these gentlemen. I asked myself if

their explanations were not in a certain measure--let us say in a large

measure--shockingly against the probabilities. I asked myself if it was

possible that a person, fearing that he might be compromised by his

handwriting, and wishing to disguise it, had been so stupid as not to

make it absolutely unrecognizable; if it was possible, in short, that

this condemned man would have been so stupid, in spite of his intention

to disarm suspicion, as to leave apparent traces of similarity in

the document. I confess, gentlemen, I was infinitely more struck

by the dissimilarities that could not be explained than by certain

resemblances that are to be found in documents of this sort. I kept my

secret, gentlemen, but my agitation increased. Serene persons about

me asked: ‘Why do you concern yourself with the matter?’ I could not

help it. It is the honor of a land of liberty to concern itself with

questions of justice, for, if a people wishes to be free, it must first

of all be just. It is justice that guarantees liberty to all.

“But, after M. Scheurer-Kestner’s interpellation, I asked him to

relieve my conscience, and to tell me all that he knew. His statements

tore the veil from my eyes. He enabled me to properly compare

Esterhazy’s writing with that of the _bordereau_. It was no longer a

matter of dissimilarities to explain; it was evidence itself; and I

found no difference that was astonishing. Since then I have repeated

the comparison many times, not for myself and alone, but with the aid

of friends. Never have I found a dissenting voice. All who have been

willing to examine have been impressed by the same evidence, and I may

say now, anticipating the chronological order of facts, that later the

experts themselves who contributed to the preparation of the Esterhazy

case had to recognize in it a large measure, although they concluded

that the _bordereau_ is not the material work of Major Esterhazy.

As everybody knows, they have affirmed that the _bordereau_ bears a

striking resemblance to Major Esterhazy’s writing. Only they set up the

hypothesis that this writing must be the work of a skilful forger. At

any rate, these conclusions, made by the experts as well as by myself,

absolutely overturned the conclusions of 1894. M. Scheurer-Kestner

placed in my hands the correspondence between Lieutenant-Colonel

Picquart and his superior, General Gonse, adding a series of other

letters--thirteen, if I am not mistaken--that passed between the

same persons after the departure of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart from

the war department. I have read them and reread them, and have often

reviewed them since in my mind. They left me in no doubt, but I must

declare in what measure they enlightened me. I did not find in them

certain proof that General Gonse had arrived at a fixed decision to

open a revision of the Dreyfus case at a certain date, but I did find

in them indisputable proof that this officer admitted the possibility

of revision, and gave instructions for its preparation, covering all

the acts of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart with his entire approbation.

General Gonse did not say to his subordinate: ‘You are mistaken; you

know it well; you have a secret file in your hands.’ He did not say to

him: ‘Calm yourself; this is madness.’ No. He said: ‘Act with prudence.

No irreparable steps. Do not proceed recklessly. The question is one of

the highest gravity. You must conduct all your negotiations with the

greatest circumspection.’ Then, on the question of expert examination,

he added. ‘To submit the question to experts at this moment is to mix

up third parties with the examination of the affair, under unfavorable

conditions. I advise other steps.’ And he indicated these. He called

attention notably to the necessity of ascertaining under what

conditions the documents enumerated in the _bordereau_ could have been

communicated by the man who was suspected of being its author, and then

the letter finished with recommendations of prudence and the expression

of affectionate sentiments.

“M. Picquart’s reply laid down the question of revision in terms as

express as possible. It was not possible, indeed, to speak in clearer

and more prudent language. What did General Gonse reply? His reply was

formal. He said that, in spite of the disturbing information contained

in the letter, he still advised most careful procedure. But he added

a declaration which to me is absolutely decisive concerning his state

of mind: ‘It is not a question, of course, of stopping the light. It

is a question of preparing the conditions under which the truth may be

manifested.’ That was the language of a man who had not in his hands

certain proof of the treason of Dreyfus. It was the language of a man

whose conscience and heart were disturbed by the fears that had already

invaded the mind of Colonel Picquart, and that with the latter had

become absolute convictions.

“That settled the matter for me, and, when they talk of proof of

judicial error, I say that it is almost absolutely acquired. Similarity

of handwritings; proof that there was no certain demonstration of

the guilt of Dreyfus; demonstration that our military officers

were familiar with the facts, and had given their approval to

investigations,--all these circumstances removed from my mind the last

vestige of doubt.

“General Gonse returned from Cormeilles-en-Parisis on September

15, the day after the letter of the 14th written to him by Colonel

Picquart. The same day ‘L’Eclair’ published an article in which it was

said, I believe, that all veils must be torn off. ‘L’Eclair’ published

a document which until then had remained a secret, and which, it

said, had been produced at the deliberations of the council of war

without the knowledge of Dreyfus or his counsel. This document, said

‘L’Eclair,’ had determined the condemnation. It was a letter exchanged

between the military _attachés_ of two embassies, at the foot of which

were these words: ‘That animal D---- is really becoming too exacting.’

But ‘L’Eclair’ published it as follows: ‘That animal Dreyfus is really

becoming too exacting.’ This, M. Scheurer-Kestner told me, was like

a train of powder through the whole press. A formidable movement of

opinion rose against the few persons who could still speak of what had

happened in 1894. The clear proof of guilt had been found. At last

timid consciences could hope; there was no longer anything to fear.

Dreyfus was really a traitor, since his relations with _attachés_ of a

foreign embassy were confessed by a foreign _attaché_ himself.

“Gentlemen, who could have communicated this document? A few days

later another article was published in ‘Le Matin,’ which reproduced

the _bordereau_ and some bits of the writing of Dreyfus. Violent

discussions ensued. There was a renewal of the report of attempts at

escape. The government was called on to keep careful guard, and an

interpellation was announced by deputy Castelin, who had collected

these various rumors and intended to ask the government for an

explanation as soon as the chamber should reconvene. Then, gentlemen,

came a radical change in the dispositions of the minister of war.

Not only was Colonel Picquart requested to cool his ardor, but it

was deemed necessary to send him away from the war department. It

was announced that there would be no resistance to M. Castelin’s

interpellation. It was deemed impossible to make head against such a

storm. And so, on the 14th, two days before the interpellation, Colonel

Picquart was sent away from the department on a mission, in the course

of which he finally reached Tunis. That is the explanation of this

sudden about-face.

“But who had communicated the document? Not Colonel Picquart. That

was impossible, for he was after a revision of the Dreyfus case,

and this communication was clearly made by some one opposed to such

revision. The communication to ‘L’Eclair’ was not made out of kindness

for Dreyfus; it was a final blow at the condemned man, the last word

that was to arch his tomb. It could not have been Dreyfus’s counsel,

for his counsel did not know the document. It could not have been the

experts, for they had never had it in their hands. No journalist could

have obtained it, except from some one in a position to be acquainted

with it. The persons in such a position were not numerous. There were

six, or eight, or ten, in the department who had it at their disposal.

There was certainly one of these, perhaps several, whose interest

it was to thwart Colonel Picquart, and who, to this end committed

this indiscretion, this criminal indiscretion, for a crime had to be

committed in order to communicate the document under the circumstances

in which it was reproduced by the newspaper. This newspaper, in fact,

had printed the passage in the terms that I have just stated, but it

is now known that the document did not say ‘That animal Dreyfus.’ It

said ‘That animal D....’ It had been necessary to alter the document

in order to make it more decisive. Evidently some one was bent on

laying a trap for Colonel Picquart, bent on threatening him in order

to make the production of his testimony impossible; some one wanted

to close his mouth, and threatened to ruin him if he dared to speak.

Colonel Picquart desired an investigation to determine the author, or

authors, of the plots against him, and, indeed, if they had succeeded

in discovering the guilty party, the whole case might have been cleared

up. On December 18, 1897, I went to the minister of justice to lay the

facts before him, finding, moreover, that he was not at all familiar

with the situation. He promised to consult the prime minister. On

December 23 he notified me that the prime minister had had an interview

with the minister of war, who had promised to send to Colonel Picquart

for the text of the dispatches, and compare them with the writing of an

officer whom Colonel Picquart suspected. He told me that the minister

of war had promised to examine these writings himself, and that later

he would let me know the result. This he did on the 28th. The answer

of the minister of war was that he did not consider Colonel Picquart’s

suspicions well founded, and that he did not see sufficient similarity

in the handwritings to warrant suspicion. I have not to inquire,

gentlemen, whether he was mistaken; it is too delicate a question to

be examined by me. But it is certain that, though the author of these

documents could not be designated with certainty, a crime had been

three times repeated in the Speranza letter of 1896 and in the two

dispatches of 1897. So I expected that a supplementary investigation

would be undertaken. But nothing of the kind. There was silence for

several days, and then in despair Colonel Picquart decided to lodge

with the public prosecutor on January 4, 1898, a formal complaint that

these four documents were forged. Another week went by, and nothing was

done. Major Ravary continued to think that these facts did not call for

the examination solicited. Undoubtedly they had not, in his eyes, the

importance that Colonel Picquart attached to them, and so on January

10, six days later, the council of war met, and, before it, was read

the indictment with which you are familiar,--an indictment, astounding

to say, which made not the slightest allusion to the facts which

Colonel Picquart considered so serious.

“It is certain--Major Esterhazy confesses it--that a document was

withdrawn from the war department,--the document which he says was

delivered to him by a veiled lady. Who took away that document? What

was done in the course of investigation to find out who took it

away? Nothing. I pointed out to the minister of war that letters and

dispatches had been sent to Colonel Picquart in order to close his

mouth, telling him not to come back from Tunis, and that his future

would be destroyed, if he should come back. Who sent these letters and

dispatches? No attempt has been made to find out.

“In conclusion, I have but a single word to say. After my participation

in this affair I desired to attend the hearing before the council of

war to see what would take place there. I mingled with the public,

and, not as former minister of justice or as a senator, but as a

simple citizen, I was present at the trial. I was conscious from the

first moment that I was not witnessing an ordinary trial, but a trial

like no other. In the first place I heard read a declaration from

General Saussier that he had ordered this matter carried before the

council of war in order to clear up obscurities which, in his opinion,

could be cleared up only by an open debate. By this I was somewhat

reassured, for to have an open debate was in itself a great deal. Now,

gentlemen, there immediately appeared a lawyer for Mme. Dreyfus and her

children, and another for the complainant. They asked to be accepted

as participants in the trial. I knew that there were precedents for

this, notably in the Kraemer case at Lyons; Dalloz and other authors

say that councils of war can admit such participation. But in this case

it was denied. Then came the reading of the indictment. This indictment

was a plea for the accused, and a fierce attack upon his accusers. As

soon as the reporter opened his mouth, it was apparent that he was not

present as an accuser, but as the foremost defender of the accused.

Then I asked myself: ‘Where, then, is the open debate called for by

General Saussier?’ Up to the moment when the closing of the doors made

it impossible for me to hear more of the trial, I saw nothing but a

semblance of an open debate. And now, gentlemen, I have told you all

that I know, all that I have seen, all that I can say.”

At this point an adjournment was taken for the day.

The trial of Emile Zola: containing M. Zola's letter to President Faure relating to the Dreyfus case, and a full report of the fifteen days' proceedings in the Assize Court of the Seine, including testimony of witnesses and speeches of counsel · 第 71 / 282 题