M. Labori.--“M. Zola asks to prove this illegality, and the elements
out of which it grew, from the standpoint of his good faith. This
illegality is not confined to the moment of the verdict of the council
of war, but extends over the very period of inquiry in which occurred
facts of the highest gravity which M. Zola asks to produce. If the
court considers that Mme. Dreyfus can not be heard on this point, I
shall be obliged to offer a motion.”
The Judge.--“Offer your motion. The question will not be put by me.”
M. Clemenceau.--“I ask to make a simple observation, addressed
especially to the jurors. I am of the opinion that the law must be
complied with, whatever it may be. But I beg you to remember, gentlemen
of the jury, that M. Zola has written an article which fills sixteen
pages of the pamphlet in my hands. Out of these sixteen pages the
public prosecutor, at the order of the minister of war, complains of
only fifteen lines, and, when we come to court, it transpires that, in
spite of a judicious selection of fifteen lines from sixteen pages,
the prosecution is still embarrassed by one of these fifteen lines.
They tell us in these fifteen lines there are still six which must be
put aside, because, were we to leave them there, embarrassing evidence
would be put in.”
The Judge.--“I repeat that no question will be put which would be a
means of arriving at the revision of a case sovereignly judged.”
M. Clemenceau.--“Then the court will put no question concerning good
faith?”
The Judge.--“Concerning anything that relates to the Dreyfus case. No.
Offer your motions. I repeat that I will not put the question.”
M. Labori.--“Will you permit me, _Monsieur le Président_, in our common
interest, to ask you, then, what practical means you see by which we
may ascertain the truth?”
The Judge.--“That does not concern me.”
M. Labori then made a formal motion that, whereas the matters upon
which the testimony of Mme. Dreyfus was required bore directly upon the
matters expressly set out in the complaint, and especially upon the
illegality charged, and whereas the defendants maintained, in spite of
the court’s decree, the right to prove their good faith, and whereas
the refusal to hear the witnesses summoned would constitute the highest
violation of the defendants’ rights, the court order the following
questions to be put to Mme. Dreyfus:
(1) What do you think of M. Zola’s good faith?
(2) What are the reasons that have led you to believe in his good
faith?
(3) Do you consider from what you know that the measures taken against
your husband were legal or illegal?
(4) Will you describe the first visit of Major du Paty de Clam at your
house? Who were present?
(5) Did not M. du Paty de Clam utter the grossest insults against your
husband?
(6) Did he not pretend to demonstrate his guilt geometrically and by
drawing concentric circles?
(7) Did he not speak of the Iron Mask?
(8) Did he not expressly forbid you to speak of the arrest to anyone
whomsoever, even to his family?
(9) After how long a time were you allowed the right to write to your
husband?
(10) After how long a time did you again see your husband?
(11) Did not M. du Paty de Clam say to you: “He denies, but I shall
succeed in making him spit out all that he has in his body”?
(12) Did not M. du Paty de Clam nevertheless lead you to hope that
perhaps there had been an error, and that up to November?
(13) Did not M. du Paty de Clam try, by the most irregular means, and
even by insidious means, to tear confessions from you throughout the
trial and after the verdict?
(14) What do you think of your husband’s character and morals? What
was the nature of your life with him after your marriage?
(15) Did not your husband steadily declare, during the trial and
after, that this whole matter was incomprehensible, and that he was
the victim of a conspiracy?
The reading of these questions being received with a hostile
manifestation from those present in the court-room, M. Labori turned to
the audience, and shouted: “If you think you can prevent me from doing
my duty, you are mistaken. I am embarrassed only when I am applauded.
Let them howl! It is all one to me.”
The Attorney-General.--“I simply call attention to this,--that these
incidents are rehearsed before the audience, but they are always the
same, and that the jurors whom you have just addressed will remember
that you have for the thing judged yesterday the same respect that
you have for the thing judged on a previous occasion. I said at the
beginning that a plan had been fixed upon; it is being carried out,
and you have just given us the formula: ‘I do not know the law, and
I do not want to know it.’ Well, we know it, and we will see that it
is respected, with the aid of the jurors, in whom I have absolute
confidence.”
M. Labori.--“M. Zola will answer in a moment, and it is to assure him
the means of doing so that I take the floor.”
The Judge.--“Take it once for all, and do not renew this scene with
each witness.”
M. Labori.--“Pardon me, I am much grieved if the line of conduct
which I follow is in any way inconvenient or disagreeable to anyone
whomsoever. But I know very well that it is dictated to me by a
conviction so profound and a resolution so fixed that nothing, nothing,
shall force me to deviate from it by a line. That said, I answer the
attorney-general in a word. The attorney-general, who, after a firm and
energetic beginning, preserved a profound silence throughout the last
part of yesterday’s hearing” ...
The Attorney-General.--“To the point of self-denial.”
M. Labori.--“To the point of self-denial, ... rises today to tell us
that we are confronted with a fixed plan, and that the same incidents,
starting from the same preconceived idea, are being rehearsed. Very
well, but the plan that we have fixed is the plan that leads to the
light. There is another plan which is being rehearsed at the other side
of the bar,--the plan which leads to obscurity and darkness. Reference
has been made to the thing judged. We respect it. We respect the thing
judged yesterday, but between that and the other the difference is that
the thing judged yesterday was legally judged, and that the other was
judged illegally.”
M. Zola.--“Gentlemen of the jury, to you will I address myself. I am
not an orator, I am a writer; but unfortunately” ...
The Judge.--“You should address the court.”
M. Zola.--“I ask your pardon. I thought that I had permission to
address the jurors. But I will address myself to you. What I have to
say will be as well said. I am a writer; I am not accustomed to public
speaking; moreover, I am an extremely nervous being, and am liable to
use words that ill express my thought. Undoubtedly I have expressed it
ill, since I have been misunderstood. I am quoted as saying that I have
placed myself above the law. Did I say that?”